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Abstract 
Investigating the Role of Counterfactual Thinking in the Excess Choice Effect 
Rebecca Jayne Hafner 
According to economic rational choice theory greater choice will deliver 
well-being by increasing the likelihood that individuals satisfy personal 
preferences (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). Consequently, extensive 
choice has become a fundamental aspect of both consumer markets and public 
policy (Schwartz, 2000; 2004; Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Crucially however, recent 
psychological research has begun to challenge the assumption that more choice 
leads to greater well-being. In several instances evidence has been found that 
whilst some choice is good, more choice can lead to reduced post-decisional 
satisfaction (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009). This is referred to as the Excess Choice Effect (ECE). If 
widespread, this ECE may mean that policies aimed at increasing well-being via 
choice actually deliver the opposite of their objectives.  
Although subject to much theoretical speculation, surprisingly little is 
known about the underlying cause of this effect. In light of this lacuna, the main 
aim of the current thesis was to investigate an alternative explanation for the ECE 
– namely, increased counterfactual thought. Across 7 experiments various factors 
known to influence the availability of counterfactual thoughts were manipulated, 
and the impact upon the prevalence of the ECE was explored, whilst another 
experiment (Experiment 7) aimed to determine individuals’ predicted affective 
responses to extensive choice. Overall, evidence was found that counterfactual 
XX 
thinking appears to play an important role in driving the dissatisfaction often 
associated with extensive choice. Specifically, the ECE was found to be most 
prevalent where counterfactual alternatives were made readily available, for 
example when under low cognitive load, when reflecting upon a recent, real-life 
decision, and when choice outcomes were negative. Further, in Experiment’s 1, 
5, 6, and 8 these ECE’s were found to be significantly mediated by increased 
counterfactual thought, or the heightened experience of counterfactual emotion, 
following extensive choice. No evidence for any impact of choice level upon 
(psychological) satisfaction levels was found when the capacity to think 
counterfactually was reduced, i.e. via high cognitive load, over time, when 
reflecting upon a hypothetical scenario, or following a positive choice outcome. 
Ideas for future research are considered, and the potential implications of these 
findings for our theoretical understanding of the ECE, for the psychology of 
choice, for consumer well-being, retailers and the construction of public policy are 
discussed. 
1 
Chapter 1 –  Introduction to Economic Theory, the Excess Choice Effect, and 
Counterfactual Thinking 
1.1 Overview 
Contrary to economic rational choice theory, recent psychological research 
has shown that increased choice may be associated with decreased chooser 
satisfaction and well-being (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar, Jiang & Huberman, 
2004; Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Schwartz, 2004; Botti & 
Iyengar, 2006). This is referred to as the ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE). However 
empirical evidence for the underlying cause of this effect is limited. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to explore the role of counterfactual thinking (CFT) as a 
potential driving force behind the ECE. Based upon the counterfactual literature I 
attempt to manipulate factors in order to influence the availability of 
counterfactual thoughts across different choice tasks. I then examine the impact 
of these manipulations upon subsequent satisfaction levels and the prevalence of 
the ECE. From this I aim to a) further theoretical understanding of the ECE in 
terms of the underlying cause and long term implications of the effect, and b) 
determine the applied implications within the field of the psychology of choice, 
particularly with regard to the construction of choice architectures and public 
policy.     
Section 1.2 introduces economic rational choice theory, which has largely 
driven the trend towards ever-increasing choice within modern society. Section 
1.3 reviews evidence from psychological research which has demonstrated the 
ways in which people systematically violate these principles of rational decision 
making. Section 1.4 introduces the economic perspective of increased choice, 
and also considers evidence for the psychological benefits of the provision of 
2 
some choice. Then Section 1.5 provides a review of psychological evidence for 
and against the ECE, and existing explanations for the effect are also detailed. 
Section 1.6 describes how the rationale for the current thesis follows from 
evidence demonstrating a link between increased choice and increased regret, 
and the role of regret as a counterfactual emotion is considered. Section 1.7 
provides a general introduction into the topic of counterfactual thinking. Section 
1.8 considers numerous factors which have been shown to make counterfactual 
alternatives more or less readily available. Section 1.9 considers existing links 
between the choice and counterfactual literatures. Then Section 1.10 considers a 
number of possible ways of manipulating counterfactual availability. Section 1.11 
describes research on the temporal pattern to the experience of the 
counterfactual emotion of regret, and how this links to the ECE. Finally, section 
1.12 provides the broad motivation for my research, and it also gives an outline of 
the subsequent experimental chapters.  
1.2 Economic Rational Choice Theory 
Classic economic theory has a distinctive core, which emerges from the 
assumption that all decisions are made upon the basis of ‘constrained 
maximization’ (Watson, 2007). Agents are considered to be ‘constrained’ 
because they will not have a limitless supply of time or money, yet within this 
context individuals will strive to allocate their resources to the best available 
outcome, i.e. the outcome with the greatest reward at the lowest possible cost. 
To illustrate, consider a scenario in which the protagonist is deciding which car to 
purchase from a selection available at a second hand car-dealers. The chooser 
will ‘weigh-up’ each option’s potential benefits, in terms of appearance, 
performance, age, and any other relevant dimensions, and will then contrast or 
3 
‘trade-off’ these benefits against comparative costs. On the basis of these 
comparative judgements, the chooser will strive to pick the option which provides 
the greatest maximization of value, at the lowest possible cost (Mas-Colell et al., 
1995). The chooser may also factor in time as an additional cost if he chooses to 
continue his search elsewhere. However, making these trade-offs between the 
costs and benefits associated with different alternatives may be difficult, and can 
often lead the chooser to experience some degree of cognitive conflict (Dhar, 
1997). This is further accentuated by the fact that the chooser can only predict or 
imagine the potential benefits of the different options. In this regard decision 
making is often said to be subject to a degree of uncertainty, as the chooser 
cannot know for sure the extent to which each option will match his expectations 
(Savage, 1954; Shafir, Simonson & Tversky, 1993; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, 
Manstead & van der Pligt, 2000a).  
In order to explain how people resolve such cognitive conflicts, economic 
rational decision making theorists have developed normative models, such as 
expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), in which individuals 
assign probabilities to the possible outcomes, and calibrate utilities to value the 
outcomes accordingly. On the basis of this formal modelling approach, 
economists have subsequently long assumed people to have stable and well 
established preferences, which are simply called upon at the moment of choice, 
allowing the chooser to make their decision based upon the alternative with the 
highest value, or expected utility (Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944; Perloff, 2010).  
Following this, the four basic underlying assumptions of economic rational 
choice theory are as follows: 1) completeness (that all outcomes can be rank-
4 
ordered in an order of preference); 2) transitivity (if option A is preferred to option 
B, and option B is preferred to option C, then option A is preferred to option C); 3) 
unlimited cognitive capacity (to comparatively weigh up each option against each 
other); and 4) perfect information (that an individual will always make fully 
informed decisions) (Watson, 2007). Indeed, as Perloff (2010) states, “as 
economists we assume that decision makers are aware of all the relevant 
information, know their own income, their own tastes, the relevant prices, and 
hence they make informed decisions” (pp. 126). On the basis of this economic 
theory then, if we know the decision-makers’ preference ranking, we can predict 
his or her choice infallibly. It is assumed, for example, that preferences will not be 
affected by variations of irrelevant features of options or outcomes (Payne, 
Bettman & Johnson, 1993). This has been referred to as ‘invariance’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). For example, the choice should not be affected by the 
presence or absence of different lower-ranking alternatives, or by the way in 
which the alternatives are presented, or framed. 
1.3 Violations of the Economic Perspective of Rational Decision Making 
However, as psychological research has shown, human beings frequently 
violate the principles of invariance and the basic assumptions of rational choice 
(Simon, 1955; 1956; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1986; Shafir et al., 1993; 
Schwartz, 2004). Indeed, according to Simon (1955; 1956), people are not 
always rational decision makers, and the choices we make are more often the 
result of limited cognitive capacities, and environmental and situational influences 
(in terms of satisfying individual needs, or drives), rather than the rational 
processing of each alternative. Further, decision making theorists have proposed 
that people often rely on non-compensatory heuristics, or ‘rules of thumb’, rather 
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than appropriate statistical information during decision making (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002), particularly in complex 
decision scenarios, or when the consumer is uncertain about their goals 
(Hogarth, 1987). These have been shown to lead to systematic biases in 
response, and according to Kahn and Baron (1995), may also “lead people away 
from considering options that may have greater {holistic} value” (pp. 325). 
1.3.1 Framing Effects 
The first way in which the assumption of invariance has been shown to be 
violated relates to framing effects, in terms of the way in which options are 
described (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). For example, in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1981) experiment, participants were presented with two versions of 
the Asian disease problem, which they are informed is expected to kill 600 
people. Participants are informed that two alternative methods of combating the 
disease have been proposed. In the first scenario, participants were told that if 
they choose Option A, 200 people will be saved, and if they choose Option B, 
there is a one-third probability that 600 will be saved, and a two-thirds probability 
that no-one will be saved. When presented with this scenario the majority of 
participants were found to opt for Option A. However, in the second scenario, 
participants were told if they chose Option A then 400 people would die, or if they 
chose Option B, then there is a one-third probability that no-one would die, and a 
two-thirds probability that 600 people would die. In this instance the vast majority 
of participants were found to opt for Option B. Thus participants were found to 
judge the same outcomes very differently depending upon the way in which the 
problem was framed.  
6 
Similarly, in Shafir’s (1993) experiment, participants were presented with a 
scenario in which they had to select which parent should be given custody of a 
child. The description of one parent was richer than the other: containing both 
more positive and more negative attributes. Participants were either asked to 
decide who should be granted custody, or who should be denied custody. Shafir 
(1993) found that the parent with the richer description was favoured under both 
instructions, presumably because the participants used the many positive 
attributes as reasons to accept when the question was framed this way, and yet 
focused on using the negative attributes as reasons to reject when the question 
was framed differently. Thus participants were found to reach different decisions 
based upon the same information, depending on how the information was 
framed. This goes against the economic assumption of invariance by showing 
that participants were influenced by the objectively ‘irrelevant’ feature of the 
wording of the question.   
1.3.2 Anchoring 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identified three additional cognitive biases 
– anchoring, availability and representativeness. Each of these has been shown 
to influence the way people intuitively assess probabilities, thus potentially 
biasing judgements of expected utility, and leading to violations of the basic 
assumptions of rational choice theory. The first of these, ‘anchoring’, refers to the 
common tendency to rely too heavily, or ‘anchor’ to an implicitly suggested 
reference point when making judgements. This then leads to a bias towards 
adjusting the interpretation of subsequent information in light of the original 
anchor, or reference point. For example, in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
experiment, participants were asked to guess the percentage of African nations 
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which were part of the United Nations. Participants were presented with one of 
two different anchors. In the first condition they were asked whether the 
percentage was more or less than 10%, whilst in the second condition they were 
asked whether the figure was more or less than 65%. The authors found that 
participants in the first condition guessed significantly lower amounts (an average 
of 25%) in comparison to participants in the second condition, who guessed an 
average of 45%. Thus the initial information presented to participants is seen to 
act as an anchor on which participants based their subsequent judgements.  
Simonson and Tversky (1992) found similar effects using choices amongst 
consumer goods. In this experiment, the presence of a more expensive 
microwave oven was found to significantly increase the number of participants 
opting to choose a cheaper model of the same brand. Shafir et al., (1993) 
describe how these anchoring effects are often exploited in real-life sales tactics. 
The authors provide an example of a mail order business (‘Williams-Sonoma’) 
selling bread-baking appliances, who found that sales of a cheaper model were 
found to almost double when the business started selling another more 
expensive model. In each of these instances participants’ judgements of the 
same objective outcomes were shown to be influenced by the presence of 
different anchors, or reference points. In addition, both Simonson and Tversky’s 
(1992) experiment, and the case described by Shafir et al., (1993) also relate 
directly to the choice literature (discussed in section 1.4.1 below), in terms of 
demonstrating the motivational benefits that the provision of some choice can 
have over no choice.      
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1.3.3 Availability      
The second bias described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is that of 
‘availability’. This refers to the common tendency for people to predict an 
outcome based upon how easily an example can be brought to mind. For 
example, in their original experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked 
participants to estimate the relative frequencies of letters in different positions in 
English words. For example participants were asked to estimate whether the 
letter ‘R’ was more likely to appear in the first or third position. The authors used 
five consonants (K, L, V, R and N) which in reality were each more frequently 
used in the third position. However, results demonstrated that the vast majority of 
participants judged each letter to be more frequently used in the first than third 
position. The authors interpret this bias as being due to the fact that people could 
easily think of examples of words that began with any of the letters, making this 
their immediate response. By contrast it is much more difficult to think of 
examples containing these letters as the third letter, and this lack of readily 
available alternatives leads to another systematic bias in judgement.  
In addition, Slovic, Kunreuther and White (1974) describe how decisions to 
buy insurance for natural disasters are greatly affected by recent experiences. 
For example, the authors describe how in the aftermath of earthquakes or floods, 
sales of respective insurance policies rise sharply, but then steadily decrease 
from that point as vivid memories fade, thus providing a real-life example of the 
availability bias. People were found to judge the threat of specific natural 
disasters as more likely the more readily they could bring an example to mind. 
Similarly, Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein (1982), asked participants to estimate 
the number of deaths per year caused by disease, accident, natural disasters, 
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and homicide. The authors found participants frequently overestimated the 
number of deaths caused by dramatic means (such as accident, homicide, floods 
and tornados) and underestimated the number of deaths due to perhaps less 
vivid causes (such as diabetes, stroke, and asthma). The authors claim this is 
due to the fact that deaths by more dramatic means were more likely to be 
reported in the media, leading people to overestimate the frequency with which 
these events were likely to occur. Once again, this demonstrates an availability 
bias – where judgments of probability were found to be significantly influenced by 
the extent to which an example could readily be brought to mind. 
1.3.4 Representativeness 
The third heuristic discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is that of 
‘representativeness’. This is defined as a subjective judgement of the extent to 
which the event in question is “similar in properties to its parent population” (pp. 
431, Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). In other words, the tendency people have of 
making judgements based upon their mental representations of what more 
closely fits a particular stereotype. For example, in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1973) experiment, participants were asked to estimate the probability that ‘Tom 
W’ specialized in different University subjects. The authors found that 
participants’ judgments were largely influenced by a description of Tom W’s 
personality, and less on the base rate probability of Tom being that kind of 
student in the first place. Participants’ judgments were based upon how 
representative they believed Tom was of a typical person interested in each of 
the subjects. In a similar study, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that the 
vast majority of participants judged it more likely that ‘Linda’ was a bank teller 
active in the feminist movement than just a bank teller. The subjects’ based their 
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judgements upon a description of Linda’s personality, and this led them to be 
biased in their judgements towards what they believed was representative of this 
description, thus ignoring base rates and the fact that the probability of two 
events occurring together (i.e. in "conjunction") is always less than or equal to the 
probability of either one occurring alone. Accordingly this effect has also been 
referred to as the ‘conjunction fallacy’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  
Therefore to summarise so far, one important element of economic 
decision making theory relates to our ability to judge probabilities accurately. 
However, as this research demonstrates, limited cognitive capacities mean 
people often fall short of this (Simon, 1955; 1956), leading to frequent violations 
of the principles of rational choice and invariance. The use of these heuristics is 
perhaps particularly relevant within the context of extensive choice, as previous 
research has shown that whilst limited-choice contexts may invite people to 
engage in a process of rational optimization, in order to find the option that is best 
suited to them, in cases where the chooser is presented with extensive choice, 
they may try to balance the trade-off between accuracy and effort by adopting 
these potentially maladaptive simplifying judgement strategies (Payne, Bettman & 
Johnson, 1988). 
1.4 Economic Theory and Increased Choice 
Another key contention of economic theory is that “more choice is always 
preferred to less” (Perloff, 2010, pp. 121). To put it another way, if people are 
rational decision makers then expanding the choice set can never make people 
worse off, as it equates to fewer constraints (Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Indeed, 
increased choice is assumed to deliver greater satisfaction and chooser well-
being on the basis that it increases the likelihood that individuals can satisfy their 
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personal preferences (Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Perloff, 2010), and on the basis of 
this assumption, increased choice has become the dominant focus of policy 
makers over the last 20 years (Schwartz, 2000; 2004; Botti & Iyengar, 2006). As 
Iyengar et al., (2004) state, ‘the assumption that choice is both desirable and 
powerful is inherent to consumerism’ (pp.85). Indeed, modern consumers are 
now offered vastly increased choice across a range of life domains in which 
choice was previously limited, including consumer goods (Iyengar, 2010; Iyengar 
& Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004), health care (Schneider, 1998; Botti & McGill 
2006; Botti & Iyengar, 2006; Luce 1998; Propper, Wilson & Burgess, 2005), 
pensions (Benartzi & Thaler, 2002; Iyengar et al., 2004; Iyengar & Kamenica, 
2010; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), education (Schwartz, 2004; Cullen, Jacob, & 
Levitt, 2006), entertainment (Iyengar, 2010; Schwartz, 2004), religion (Wolfe, 
2001), and even personal identity (Schwartz, 2004). Indeed, the notion that this 
provision of choice is advantageous is widely accepted is modern society 
(Schwartz, 2000; 2004).  However, recent psychological research has begun to 
question the extent to which this presumption holds true. 
1.4.1 The Benefits of Some Choice 
 There is little doubt that some choice can improve individual welfare. For 
example, in Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith and Deci’s (1978) experiment it 
was found that participants who were asked which of six puzzles they would like 
to complete experienced increased intrinsic motivation and overall task 
performance, compared to a control group who were told which tasks to 
undertake. Further, Deci and Ryan (1985) showed that by increasing intrinsic 
motivation, choice was associated with greater satisfaction and greater 
experience of positive affect. Indeed, the removal of choice has been shown to 
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be highly detrimental to individual well-being, often leading to feelings of 
helplessness and hopelessness (Seligman, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988). By 
giving people even seemingly trivial choices, life satisfaction and health has been 
shown to improve. For example, Langer and Rodin (1976) conducted an 
experiment in a nursing home, and found that residents who were offered greater 
choice and personal responsibility over simple matters such as how to arrange 
the furniture in their room, experienced significantly greater well-being, in terms of 
health and happiness and activity levels, in comparison to a control group who 
were not allowed the freedom to make these seemingly inconsequential 
decisions.  In addition, as previously mentioned, both Simonson & Tversky (1992) 
and Shafir et al., (1993) found that participants experienced increased motivation 
to purchase a product when they were provided with limited choice over no 
choice. As such this research provides support for economic theories’ contention 
that choice is beneficial to the individual. By providing greater intrinsic motivation 
and greater perceived control research has shown that some choice can be 
associated with greater well-being than situations in which choice is removed 
altogether.  
However, notably, this early research into the benefits of choice concerns 
a comparison between the provision of some choice with no choice whatsoever, 
in situations involving relatively simple decisions. On the other hand, the vastly 
increased choice available in modern society often presents the individual with an 
extensive number of options, involving more complex decision scenarios (e.g. 
pensions, employment, education etc.). As such this has led more recent 
psychological research to challenge the basic assumption that more choice is 
always beneficial, by investigating the boundaries and limitations of this effect.      
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1.5 The Excess Choice Effect 
One avenue of research has aimed to directly investigate the impact of 
increased choice on consumer satisfaction and well-being. A number of 
researchers have shown that whilst some choice is good, more choice can be 
detrimental to satisfaction, and may a) lower the utility experienced from 
consumption of the chosen good, and b) dampen overall product demand. This 
negative impact of increased choice has been variously referred to as the “the 
problem of too much choice” (Fasolo, McClelland & Todd, 2007), the “choice 
overload hypothesis” (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Mogilner, Rudnick& Iyengar, 
2008), the “overchoice effect” (Gourville & Soman, 2005), the “tyranny of choice” 
(Schwartz, 2000), the “too-much-choice effect” (Lenton, Fasolo & Todd, 2008; 
Scheibehenne, Greifeneder &Todd, 2009), and the excess-choice effect 
(Arunachalam, Henneberry, Lusk, & Norwood, 2009). Throughout this thesis I 
now refer to this effect as the ‘Excess Choice Effect’, or ‘ECE’. This phrase is 
selected for continued use as it is relatively neutral, and simply describes the 
effect being considered, where the other listed terms, such as ‘tyranny’, 
‘problem’, ‘overload’, and ‘too much’ are comparatively more value laden.
Although subject to some debate (see, for example, Cardozo, 1965; 
Fornell, 1992; Gardial, Clemons, Woodruff, Schumann & Burns, 1994; Halstead, 
Hartman & Schmidt 1994; Oliver, 1997; Peterson & Wilson, 1992; Yi, 1990), 
based upon commonalities in the literature, Giese and Cote (2002) recently 
defined ‘satisfaction’ as ‘a summary affective response of varying intensity, with a 
time specific point of determination, which is directed towards focal aspects of 
product acquisition and/or consumption’ (pp. 2). As noted above, economic 
theory states that increased choice should, all else equal, increase satisfaction 
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with the chosen option (Dolan & White, 2007), in terms of eliciting a more intense 
positive affective response to the chosen item. However it now appears this is 
bounded and that in reality there appears to be an optimal threshold beyond 
which satisfaction with chosen options decreases as the option set increases 
(Shah & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009). For instance, Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000), found that whilst large choice set sizes were initially more 
attractive, participants were more likely to purchase gourmet jams or chocolates 
or to undertake optional class essay assignments when offered a limited (6) 
rather than an extensive (24) array of choices. Moreover, participants reported 
greater subsequent satisfaction and reduced regret with their selections, and 
wrote objectively better essays, when their original set of options had been 
limited. The initial attractiveness of large choice set sizes and its’ subsequently 
detrimental consequences has been referred to as the ‘Paradox of Choice’
(Schwartz, 2000; 2004). 
Similar findings have been found for more important choices. For example, 
Iyengar, Wells and Schwartz (2006) found that the presence of more choice is 
associated with lower chooser confidence and greater experiences of negative 
affect. Specifically, job seekers who pursued more job opportunities were found 
to achieve higher starting salaries, and yet were also less satisfied with their 
accepted job offer and reported less commitment to their position, than job 
seekers who pursued fewer job opportunities. This seems to indicate that even 
when more choices lead to seemingly objectively better outcomes, they may be 
perceived as worse subjectively. 
Further, Iyengar et al., (2004) examined the ECE within the context of 
financial decision making, specifically with regard to pension investment 
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opportunities. The authors examined participation rates in the 401(k) pension 
plans (a contribution-based retirement plan that became popular in the USA in 
the 1980s) of approximately 800,000 employees in an investment management 
company. The number of different plans offered to employees ranged from 2 –
59. Results indicated that employees were most likely to participate in the 
pension plan if they were offered fewer than 10 options, and that increases in 
choice beyond this were associated with a decline in participation. As such, 
participants offered ‘too much’ choice (in this case, anything more than 10 
options) were likely to ultimately forego considerable financial benefits, with 
potentially highly consequential implications for their (later) life circumstances. 
Shar and Wolford (2007) investigated the influence of intermediate choice 
set sizes upon satisfaction. In their experiment, participants were presented with 
a selection of pens, in assortment sizes ranging from 2 – 20. Participants were 
informed that each of the pens was worth around $2, and asked whether they 
would like to purchase one at a special rate of $1. The number of participants 
choosing to purchase pens according to the number of options available formed 
the primary dependent measure. Consistent with the findings of Iyengar et al., 
(2004), the authors found that the likelihood of participants choosing to purchase 
a pen increased until an optimum of ten options. After this point as choice 
increased, the likelihood of participants choosing to purchase a pen decreased. 
The authors’ state this demonstrates that satisfaction is a curvilinear function of 
the number of options available, and that when choice sets were small, 
satisfaction (i.e. buying behaviour) was high as consumers were able to find an 
option that satisfied their needs. Conversely, as choice levels continued to 
increase participants found their decisions systematically more difficult, leading to 
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reduced satisfaction. This provides further evidence for the ECE, by identifying 10 
options as being optimal for satisfaction, after which point further increases in 
choice set size lead to systematic decreases in satisfaction with decision 
outcome.  
Reutskaja and Hogarth (2009) found a similar pattern of results. In their 
experiment, participants were asked to select a gift-box for a friend from a 
selection of either 5, 10, 15 or 30 options. The authors found that satisfaction with 
both decision outcome and decision process was highest for the medium sized 
(10 and 15) option sets, providing support for Shar and Wolford’s (2007) 
suggestion that satisfaction is an inverted U-shaped function of the number of 
alternatives available.  
Lee and Lee (2004) also found evidence of the ECE in their on-line 
experiment. Participants were asked to select which CD player they would want 
to buy for a friends’ birthday, where the number of alternatives available ranged 
from 18 – 27. Results indicated that participants felt more confused and less 
satisfied with their choices in the 27-alternative condition, than in the 18-
alternative condition. Similarly, In Mogilner et al.,’s (2008) experiment, 
participants were shown a menu of either a limited (5) or an extensive (50) 
number of coffee options. These options were either grouped into informative 
categories such as ‘spicy’, ‘nutty’, ‘mild’, ‘earthy’ and so on; uninformative 
categories based upon letters of the alphabet e.g. ‘category A’, ‘category B’ and 
so on; or were simply not categorized at all. After choosing which coffee they 
would like to sample all participants were then given a small amount of the same 
coffee to try, allowing for a controlled examination of the effects of categorization 
and assortment size upon satisfaction. The authors found that satisfaction in the 
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extensive choice, uncategorized group was significantly lower than satisfaction in 
the limited choice groups, and either of the extensive choice, categorized groups. 
This provides evidence for the ECE. The presence of categories was found to 
simplify the extensive choice set, and subsequently participants were better able 
to cope with making a decision from a large number of options; something which 
was otherwise associated with decreased satisfaction. 
Chernev (2003a; 2003b) also found evidence for an ECE. In his (2003a) 
experiment, participants in an ‘articulated preference’ condition were asked to 
think about their ideal chocolate, and to then rank order a list of attributes (for 
example, nuts versus no nuts) in terms of their desirability. Participants were then 
presented with either a large (16 options) or a small (4 options) assortment of 
chocolates, and were asked to select the option which was most attractive to 
them. Chernev (2003a) found that for large assortments, participants without a 
strong pre-articulated ‘ideal point’ were significantly more likely to switch to a 
selection of the most popular chocolates as a thank-you for participating, as 
opposed to sticking with the chocolate they had identified as most attractive, with 
a greater likelihood of switching indicating lower satisfaction with initial choice. 
For choices made using the small assortment no significant effects of ideal point 
availability were found. Chernev (2003a) suggests this demonstrates that 
selections from large assortments can lead to weaker preferences and reduced 
satisfaction (as shown by a greater likelihood of switching to a default ‘most 
popular’ option), in cases where participants do not have a clear, articulated 
starting ideal point.  
Chernev found similar results in his (2003b) experiment, which also 
involved satisfaction with chocolate choice. In this case participants were asked 
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whether they would like to select from the extensive (20) or the limited (8) 
selection, and were also asked to evaluate the attractiveness of their chosen 
option, as well as their confidence that they had picked the best option available. 
Results indicated that participants who were asked to articulate their preferences 
were more likely to make their selection from the extensive, rather than the 
limited choice set. However subsequent confidence levels were found to vary as 
a function of assortment size – with participants being generally more confident 
that they had picked the best option from the selection when choosing from the 
limited choice set, thus demonstrating that extensive choice led to reduced 
confidence in the quality of decision outcomes.     
Greifeneder, Scheibehenne and Kleber (2010) found evidence for an ECE, 
and also found evidence that the presence of the ECE was dependent on choice 
complexity, and the number of attributes that alternatives are differentiated on. In 
their experiment, Greifeneder et al., (2010) asked participants to choose the 
coloured pen they liked the most from a limited (6), medium (15), or extensive 
(30) selection, wherein the number of attributes that the alternatives differentiated 
on was also manipulated (1 versus 6 in experiment one, and 4 versus 9 in 
experiment two). Results indicated that when the alternatives were differentiated 
on the maximum number of attributes (i.e. 6 in experiment one, 9 in experiment 
two), satisfaction decreased with increased choice. The authors’ state this 
demonstrates that the ECE may be more likely when choosing is complex. 
Finally, a real-life example of the ECE stems from Proctor and Gamble, who 
found that sales of their ‘Head and Shoulders’ shampoo increased by 10% when 
they reduced the number of varieties of the brand on sale (see Goldstein, 2001). 
Thus, in numerous instances, it has been demonstrated that increased choice 
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can be associated with decreased satisfaction and confidence in the chosen 
outcome, decreased product demand, and greater experience of negative affect.  
1.5.1 Evidence Against the ECE 
However, the universality of the ECE has been challenged. Some 
researchers have found no evidence of the ECE. For example, in Arunachalam et 
al.,’s (2009) experiment, participants were found to be significantly more likely to 
opt for a soda over cash as payment for participation in a study if they were 
shown an extensive selection of 24 different flavours, rather than a limited choice 
of just 6 flavours. The authors state this demonstrates an ‘anti-ECE’, by 
supporting the standard economic model that more choice is beneficial to 
chooser motivation.  
Berger, Draganska and Simonson (2007) also found no evidence for the 
ECE. In their experiment, participants were asked to select the chocolate they 
would most like to sample from one of two different brands. One brand contained 
an intermediate (10) selection of chocolates, whilst the second brand contained 
an extensive (30) number of options. After choosing and sampling a chocolate, 
participants rated perceived quality of the product and brand, as well as their 
likelihood of purchase. The authors found that despite the fact that participants 
rated choosing from the extensive choice as more difficult and frustrating; the 
majority of participants were attracted to the brand offering the extensive, rather 
than the limited selection of chocolates. In addition, quality ratings, and likelihood 
of purchase were both found to be higher for the brand offering the extensive 
selection of chocolates, in comparison to the intermediate choice brand. The 
authors’ interpret this as demonstrating that the size of a brand’s assortment may 
be seen as a quality cue.  
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Kahn and Wansink (2004) found that assortment size, as well as the 
perceived variety and structure of that assortment could influence consumption 
levels. In their experiment, participants were offered jelly beans to eat, from either 
a limited (6 colours) or an extensive (24 colours) selection. These assortments 
were either organised by colour, or scrambled altogether (disorganised 
selection). Kahn and Wansink (2004) observed that consumption levels 
increased as choice level increased, for organised assortments (no difference 
was found for disorganised assortments). However it may be questionable to 
assume that increased consumption necessarily equates to increased 
satisfaction. This point was demonstrated by Reibstein, Youngblood, and 
Fromkin (1975) who also found that increased choice lead to increased 
consumption. In their experiment, participants were asked to select which soft 
drink they would like to try from either a limited (2) or an increased (4) selection of 
flavours. Participants’ consumption and satisfaction levels were then examined. 
The authors found that participants who chose from the increased selection drank 
more of their chosen drink, than participants who chose from the more limited 
selection. However, even though there were increases in consumption levels, no 
differences were found in terms of satisfaction levels. As such this raises doubt 
over the use of either of these two studies showing increased consumption with 
increased choice as providing evidence against the ECE, even though the former 
was considered relevant in Scheibehenne, Greifeneder and Todd’s (2010) meta-
analyses (discussed momentarily below).  
Scheibehenne et al., (2009) found no evidence for the ECE except in a 
study which called for choice justifications. The authors conducted a series of 
studies to examine potential moderators of the ECE. In the first study option 
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variety was manipulated. Participants read descriptions of either a large (30) or 
small (5) variety of restaurants, and were then asked whether they would prefer 
cash or a voucher to dine at one of the restaurants. The authors found no 
evidence of the ECE, with participants in both large and small variety conditions 
being equally likely to opt for a restaurant voucher over cash. The authors then 
examined the moderating impact of prior preferences, cultural differences, further 
increases in choice set size and choice justification on the ECE. Of these four 
manipulations only choice justification was found to elicit an ECE. The authors 
claim this fits with the assumption that justification becomes more difficult when 
options become more difficult to distinguish from one another – which naturally 
increases as assortments grow larger. This assumption is furthered supported by 
Sela, Berger and Liu (2009), who found that because choosing from larger 
assortment sizes is more difficult, people will select options which are easiest to 
justify. In their experiment, participants presented with a large selection of 10 ice 
cream flavours were much more likely to select a reduced fat option than 
participants who were presented with a limited selection of only 2 options. The 
authors suggest that this is because when presented with increased choice, 
people will choose options that are easier to justify.  
Finally, Scheibehenne et al., (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 50 
studies which had examined the ECE, and found an overall effect size of virtually 
zero, meaning that no evidence was found for a reliable occurrence of the ECE 
across the choice literature. Nevertheless the large degree of variance in study 
outcomes led the authors to conclude that a theoretical account which could help 
to cover the divergent findings was needed. It is suggested that this may depend 
on the prevalence of particular moderator variables, such as a call for post-
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decisional justifications (see Scheibehenne et al. 2009), and the interaction 
between the structure of the choice assortment and decision processes. For 
example, this could involve the interaction between choice complexity, in terms of 
the number of attributes that alternatives are differentiated on (see for example, 
Greifeneder et al., 2010), with individual differences in the degree to which 
decision makers make use of complex versus heuristic decision processes (see 
for example, Scheibehenne & Todd, 2009). 
The main aim of the current research was to investigate the potentially 
causal role of counterfactual thought in driving the ECE. The rationale for this is 
provided in Section 1.6 below. If supportive evidence is found for this overarching 
hypothesis, it is possible that this in turn may go some way to explaining some of 
the divergent findings noted in Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2010) meta-analyses. 
Specifically, it may be the case that variability in the experimental circumstances 
of studies considered in the meta-analyses may have made counterfactual 
alternatives more or less readily available. As such, via predicted influence on 
counterfactual generation, it is possible that there are certain situational factors 
which may be influential in determining the prevalence of the ECE. Evidence for 
factors known to influence the availability of counterfactual thoughts, alongside 
the predicted impact of each upon the ECE is considered in Sections 1.8 and 1.9 
below, whilst the potential for the current research to explain the divergent 
findings noted in Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2010) meta-analyses is a point to which 
I will return in greater detail in Chapter 6.   
1.5.2 Existing Explanations for the ECE  
There are several, not necessarily mutually exclusive, existing 
explanations for the ECE. From an economic perspective, as the number of 
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options increases the marginal value of the chosen option may decrease 
because more of the rejected alternatives share positive attributes with the 
chosen option or may even have positive attributes that the chosen option lacks. 
That is, "opportunity costs", i.e. the loss of benefits associated with the next best 
alternative foregone, tend to increase with option size reducing the satisfaction 
with the actual option chosen. However, while opportunity cost might explain a 
reduction in marginal satisfaction from a larger choice set it does not explain why 
people show less satisfaction in absolute terms when faced with more options. If 
one is a perfectly rational decision maker then the option chosen is still the best 
available and should provide the highest level of satisfaction under the 
circumstances and certainly no lower than selecting the same alternative from a 
smaller choice set.  
However, as previously mentioned, psychological research stretching back 
to Simon (1956) has demonstrated that people repeatedly fall short of perfectly 
rational decision making due to limited cognitive capacity. Consequently, 
individuals are rarely able to fully process all the possible information that they 
would need to make an optimal choice (Botti & Iyengar, 2006); a problem that 
grows with choice set size (Dhar, 1997; Gourville & Soman, 2005; Huffman & 
Kahn, 1998; Schwartz, 2004; Fasolo, Hertwig, Huber, &Ludwig, 2009). This may 
lead to decisions made from extensive selections being harder to justify 
(Scheibehenne et al., 2009; Sela et al., 2009), or to the use of potentially 
maladaptive simplifying decision making heuristics (Payne et al., 1988; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). In either case this may result in reduced enjoyment with 
decision outcomes which are likely to be perceived as suboptimal. Further, 
Schwartz (2004) argues that this can lead to an increased likelihood of regret, 
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making decisions both harder to make in the first place (anticipated regret) and 
harder to enjoy (post-decisional regret). Supporting this suggestion a number of 
studies have found more self-reported regret for options chosen from larger 
choice sets (Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White& Lehman, 2002; 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Indeed, Roese & Summerville (2005) suggest that the 
top six biggest regrets in life involve those areas which offer the greatest amount 
of choice and opportunity, namely; education, career, romance, parenting, the 
self and leisure. 
1.6 Developing the Rationale for the Current Research  
1.6.1 Regret as a Counterfactual Emotion 
But how is it that we come to experience more regret as choice levels 
increase? Regret is defined as a negative cognitively determined emotion that we 
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have 
been better, had we acted differently (Zeelenberg, 1999). In this respect, regret 
has been termed a counterfactual emotion, in that the experience of regret 
cannot occur without a prior counterfactual inference (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Landman, 1993). Epstude and Roese (2008) define counterfactuals as evaluative 
thoughts about imagined alternatives to past events, which are typically 
associated with various negative emotions (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 
1995).They are epitomised by the phrase “what might have been” and may serve 
the important beneficial functions of behaviour and mood regulation. As the 
number of available options increases the range of alternative states of the world 
that did not actually occur, i.e. counterfactuals, also increases. The current thesis 
suggests that previous research which has noted a link between increased 
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choice and regret (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002; Roese & 
Summerville, 2005) may have picked up on one aspect of a general increase in 
counterfactual thought. Supporting this contention, Markman, Gavanski, 
Sherman, and McMullen (1993) showed that generating counterfactuals 
heightened general feelings of dissatisfaction. Consequently I suggest that it is 
counterfactual thoughts concerning the realisation that better choice alternatives 
may have potentially been foregone which may drive the experience of regret and 
ultimately undermine satisfaction. 
1.6.2 Summary of Main Aim of the Current Thesis 
Therefore, to summarise so far, the main aim of the current thesis was to 
explore an alternative explanation for the ECE. Section 1.5.2 reviewed evidence 
that increased choice has been associated with increased regret (e.g. Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002; Roese & Summerville, 2005). Following this 
association, and the nature of regret as a counterfactual emotion, the current 
research suggests that the ECE may be attributable to a general increase in 
counterfactual thought. As the more options one has available increases, it is 
likely that post-decisional counterfactual thoughts concerning potentially ‘better’ 
imagined alternatives will also increase. It is predicted that it is this increased 
imagination of potentially ‘better’ alternatives which may be detrimental to 
satisfaction. What follows now, and for the remainder of this chapter is an 
introduction to relevant aspects of the counterfactual literature. I also explain 
how, based upon this literature, I intend to manipulate various factors which 
should influence the availability of counterfactual thoughts, in order to examine 
the subsequent impact on the prevalence of the ECE.  
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1.7 What is Counterfactual Thinking? 
Counterfactuals have been defined as evaluative thoughts about imagined 
alternatives to past events (Epstude & Roese, 2008), epitomised by the phrase 
“what might have been” (Roese, 1997). Research into counterfactual thinking has 
found that people create counterfactual alternatives to reality by mentally un-
doing certain facts in their mental representation of reality (Byrne, 2005). Indeed, 
according to Roese and Olson (1995), in order to generate a counterfactual 
thought one typically starts with some factual outcome as the point of departure 
for the counterfactual supposition, and then alters (or mutates) some factual 
antecedent, whilst simultaneously assessing the possible consequences of that 
alteration. These counterfactual thoughts usually move in a direction that brings 
simulated occurrences closer to default expectations about how the world works. 
As Roese and Olson (1995) state, ‘counterfactuals recapitulate expectations’ (pp. 
28). According to McEleney and Byrne (2006), this tendency to compare states of 
reality with ‘what might have been’ is a universal characteristic of human thought, 
which has been documented to occur from early childhood (Harris, 2000), and 
across cultures (see, for example, Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & Nishina, 2003).   
Spontaneously generated counterfactuals tend to be upward (i.e. 
imagining how an outcome could have turned out better had one acted 
differently), suggesting an overall emphasis on improvement (Nasco & Marsh, 
1999; Roese & Olson, 1995; Koehler & Harvey, 2004). Such counterfactuals are 
typically associated with the experience of a range of negative affect including 
shame, guilt, disappointment and regret (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Niedenthal et 
al., 1994; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995).As Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982b, pp. 202) state, mental simulations typically have ‘implications for 
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emotions that arise when reality is compared with a favoured alternative, which 
one had failed to reach but could easily imagine reaching’. Conversely, 
downward counterfactuals are considerations of how things could have turned 
out worse, and these thoughts are usually associated with the experience of 
positive affect, such as relief (Roese, 1997). It has been argued that 
counterfactuals typically involve and may serve the important beneficial functions 
of mood and behaviour regulation (Roese & Olson, 1995), in terms of providing a 
source of motivation to consider how the event happened, and how one could 
strive to prevent its future occurrence (see also, Zeelenberg, 1999).  
In Sections 1.2 and 1.3 I considered the basic assumptions of rational 
decision making from an economic perspective, and psychological evidence 
demonstrating how people frequently violate these principles. It has been argued 
that each of these simplifying heuristics often used in judgements of probability 
may relate back to an underlying process of counterfactual thought (e.g. Byrne, 
2005). In each instance people imagine alternatives to reality which are 
consistent with their mental representations (Byrne, 1997; Legrenzi, Girotto, & 
Johnson-Laird, 1993). For example, regarding the availability and 
representativeness heuristics, people are shown to be biased towards outcomes 
for which alternatives are more readily available, or outcomes which are 
consistent with their mental representations of reality. On the other hand, in the 
case of anchoring, the anchored information is immutable, akin to a single 
possibility idea. Thus people find it difficult to imagine an alternative to it. This 
explains why judgements are often found to be biased in favour of the anchored 
information, as people find it very difficult to move away from this as a starting 
point.  
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However, that people frequently violate the principles of economic rational 
decision making based upon the ease with which counterfactual alternatives 
come to mind, does not necessarily mean that this process is irrational. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the counterfactual imagination of possibilities is organized 
along the same principles as rational thought (Byrne, 2005). Byrne (2005) 
suggests three main steps to illustrate this conclusion: 1) that humans’ are 
capable of rational thought, despite the exhibition of systematic errors in 
judgement. 2) That the principles that guide people to think about possibilities are 
rational, in that they provide one with the competence to make rational decisions, 
even if these are then restricted by the limitations of working memory. 3) Finally, 
that the same principles which guide a process of rational thought also guide the 
counterfactual imagination. This is further reflected by the fact that some aspects 
of reality are found to be more commonly altered than others, and these aspects 
are known as ‘fault lines’ of reality, or points at which reality appears to be 
‘mutable’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Roese & Olson, 1995). Evidence for 
each of these ‘fault lines’ is now considered in turn.  
1.8 Counterfactual Mutability 
1.8.1 Exceptional versus Routine Events  
Research has shown that people tend to imagine alternatives to 
exceptional events more readily than routine events (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; 
Gavanski & Wells, 1989). In Kahneman & Tversky’s (1982a) experiment, for 
instance, participants read a scenario detailing an automobile accident. 
Participants were informed that the person involved had either a) left work early 
but drove home by his usual route, or b) left work at the normal time but took an 
unusual route home, and were then asked to imagine how the event could have 
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been avoided. The authors found that people typically mutated the exception 
rather than the norm, i.e. when the departure time was exceptional, participants 
noted the accident could have been avoided if he left work at the normal time. 
Conversely when the route taken was exceptional then most participants noted 
that it could have been avoided had he taken his usual route. Kahneman and 
Miller (1986) state this demonstrates a fundamental tendency to create 
counterfactual alternatives which reflect normality or typicality.   
Lundberg and Frost (1992) found a similar pattern of results. Their 
experiment was conducted within the field of financial decision making, and 
asked participants to read a series of scenarios detailing misplaced investment 
opportunities. In each case both a routine and an exceptional circumstance led 
the protagonist to lose money. For example, in one case participants read how 
‘Mr. Jones’ needed to place stops on his investments one afternoon, before a 
predicted drop in the market at the end of the day, which would have caused him 
to lose money. However, that afternoon he had to attend a business lunch, which 
participants are told was a frequent occurrence. As such he left his trusted 
colleague, well known for his reliability, in charge of placing the stops. Out of 
character, the colleague simply forgot to place the stops, and Mr Jones 
subsequently saw what had been a significant profit earlier on that day turn into a 
substantial loss. Participants are asked to imagine how Mr Jones would be 
feeling, and to complete one or more likely ‘If only.....’ thoughts he may have had. 
Lundberg and Frost (1992) found that participants were significantly more likely to 
undo the exceptional, rather than the routine, event in each situation, i.e. ‘if only 
my colleague had not forgotten to place the stops’, rather than ‘if only I had not 
gone out to lunch’. By transferring to a domain in which participants made 
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judgements requiring expertise and the evaluation of technical information, the 
authors conclude that this is a robust finding, and one which is not limited to 
relatively more easily understood judgements of social interactions (see also, 
Buck & Miller, 1994). 
1.8.2 Action versus Inaction 
Another debated determinant of counterfactual mutability concerns the 
action effect, whereby research has shown that people may be more likely to 
generate counterfactual thoughts following action than inaction (Byrne, 2005; 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). One of the earliest investigations into the effect was 
conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1982a), in which participants were asked 
to consider two hypothetical scenarios. In the first, Paul considered switching his 
stocks from Company A to Company B, but decided against it. In the second, 
George considered the same switch in stocks, and decided to make the switch. 
Thus the outcome of Paul’s decision can be seen to stem from inaction, whilst the 
outcome of George’s decision is the result of action. Participants were informed 
that both Paul and George would have been better off by $1200 if they had 
chosen the alternative course of action (or inaction), i.e. Paul would have been 
better off financially had he swapped his stocks, whilst George would have been 
better off had he not swapped his stocks. Participants were asked to judge which 
investor would experience the most regret at this loss of income. The vast 
majority (92%) of participants believed George, the actor, would feel more regret 
than Paul, the non-actor.  
Numerous other studies have replicated this effect, leading Gilovich and 
Medvec (1995) to conclude that the action effect is one of the most robust 
findings in the counterfactual literature. For example, using a variety of 
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hypothetical scenarios, Landman (1987) demonstrated that good outcomes were 
viewed more favourably, and bad outcomes more negatively when these were 
achieved through action, than when the same outcomes were achieved through 
inaction. Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Strathman, Richman and Sherman (1990) varied 
the salience and outcome valence of the investment scenario, and also found 
that where outcomes were negative, actions were associated with greater 
experience of negative affect than failures to act. When outcomes were positive, 
participants were found to experience greater positive affect following action, but 
only when the counterfactual alternative was made highly salient.  Similarly, in 
Avni-Babad’s (2003) experiment, participants were provided with a version of the 
investment scenario, minus counterfactual information regarding how the 
investment would have turned out had the investor decided to do the opposite 
(i.e. act or not act). The action effect was replicated – participants judged that the 
actor would generate more counterfactual thoughts, and would experience 
greater levels of regret than the non-actor, even in the absence of prior 
counterfactual information. 
In Ritov and Baron’s (1990) experiment, participants were asked to 
imagine a scenario in which they had a choice of either killing 5 people (i.e. 
through action), or letting 10 people die (through inaction). The authors found that 
participants consistently opted to do nothing. This provides further evidence for 
the action effect, as the potential regret stemming from action was judged to be 
significantly greater than the comparative regret resulting from inaction. In 
addition, Zeelenberg, van der Pligt and Manstead (1998) coded data from 64 
cases presented on Dutch TV show ‘I Am Sorry’, which gave individuals the 
opportunity to apologise to individuals they had fallen out with. The authors found 
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a significant focus on actions, with most participants choosing to apologise for 
things they had done, as opposed to things they failed to do (Study 1). This 
finding was further replicated in a second experiment (Study 2a) using a large 
scale survey of the Dutch population, in which participants were asked whether 
they typically felt more regret following actions or failures to act. Once again, 
results indicated that the majority of participants reported experiencing more 
regret following actions than inactions.  
Connolly, Ordóñez and Coughlan (1997) also replicated the action effect in 
their experiment using a hypothetical scenario in which the person described 
either switched, or didn’t switch, from aspects of a required university course. The 
authors found that participants judged that a person who experienced the same 
outcome as a result of action would experience greater regret in response to a 
negative outcome, and greater elation in response to a positive outcome, than a 
person who experienced the same outcomes as a result of inaction. As the same 
results were obtained whether the action was the result of the persons’ own 
choice or through random computer re-assignment, the authors’ claim this 
demonstrates that control and responsibility for action do not appear to be key to 
the prevalence of the action effect.  Further, Byrne and McEleney (2000) 
(Experiment 1) used Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982a) original investment 
scenario, and found that participants judged the actor to experience more regret 
than the non-actor, when the outcomes of the scenarios were both known and 
the same. These findings were also replicated in Experiment 3, which used a 
variation of the investment scenario, but with a negative outset, demonstrating 
that results were not dependent upon a neutral initial scenario state. 
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Other research has identified potential explanations for the effect. 
According to Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) actions are rendered more 
mutable than failures to act as a result of inaction being perceived as more 
normal. Thus, in deciding to act, a person is acting ‘abnormally’, and thus 
counterfactual alternatives become more readily available (i.e. the event is more 
mutable), than if one is considering the same outcome caused as a result of 
inaction. Kahneman and Tversky (1982a) suggest that this may lead to emotional 
amplification, whereby people have a tendency to react more strongly to those 
events for which it is easiest to imagine another outcome occurring. This has 
been attributed to mental models (Byrne & McEleney, 2000), and the more 
explicit representations people hold in mind for action (this will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4).  
Additional research has identified limitations to the action effect including 
N’gbala and Branscombe (1997) who found that the effect only occurred when 
people were able to directly compare the consequences of action with those of 
inaction. In addition, by providing a measure of mutability the authors found that 
whether the action/inaction versions of events were presented alone or together, 
they were both mutated with equal frequency, seemingly contrary to norm 
theory’s account. Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk and Pieters’ (2002), also 
found evidence that the action effect only occurred when prior information was 
both available and positive. However, a more extensive introduction to the action 
effect literature and potential explanations for the effect is provided in Chapter 4, 
in which I investigate the potential for default options to improve satisfaction with 
extensive choice, due to the predicted impact of defaults (or inaction) upon 
counterfactual thought.  
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1.8.3 Controllable versus Uncontrollable Antecedents 
Other research has found that people tend to generate counterfactuals 
more readily following controllable than uncontrollable antecedents. For example, 
in Girotto, Legrenzi and Rizzo’s (1991) experiment, participants were asked to 
read a scenario in which the protagonists’ drive home was delayed for several 
reasons. The authors found that participants were more likely to generate 
counterfactual thoughts regarding aspects which were under the protagonists’ 
direct control (such as stopping for a beer), rather than aspects which were 
beyond his control (such as stopping for traffic). McCloy and Byrne (2000) 
furthered this using an alternative version of the scenario. The authors found that 
participants were most likely to focus on events that were within the protagonists’ 
control which had previously been deemed to be socially unacceptable, i.e. 
choosing to stop for a burger, over factors which were more socially acceptable 
e.g. visiting his parents.  
In Markman, Gavanski, Sherman and McMullen’s (1995) experiment, 
participants played a computer simulated ‘wheel of fortune’ game. Participants 
were shown two spinning wheels, and were told that the outcome of one would 
determine how many lottery tickets they won, whilst the outcome of the other 
would determine how much a second player (actually a confederate) won. The 
game was fixed to either result in the participant either experiencing a ‘near-big-
win’, in which they narrowly missed the jackpot of 75 lottery tickets, and landed 
on 10 instead, paired with a loss to the other player. Alternatively participants 
experienced a ‘near-big-miss’, in which they narrowly avoided landing on 
bankrupt and got 10 tickets instead, paired with a big win by the other player. 
Control was manipulated by either allowing participants to spin the wheel for 
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themselves, or by allowing participants to choose which of the 2 wheels would be 
theirs. The authors found that participants were significantly more likely to 
generate counterfactual thoughts about the aspect of the game which they 
perceived to be under their control. In addition, these counterfactual thoughts 
were found to predict affective reactions to the spin outcome. Specifically, 
satisfaction was found to decrease as the number of counterfactual thoughts 
generated increased. The authors suggest these results demonstrate that it is the 
features of a game which are focused on, which determine the alternatives to 
reality which are imagined, in line with the counterfactual availability heuristic.    
1.8.4 Negative versus Positive Outcomes 
Research has also found that counterfactuals may be cued more readily 
following negative than positive decision outcomes (Roese, 1997; Boninger, 
Gleicher & Strathman, 1994; Sanna & Turley, 1996; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). For 
example, using both a scenario study and a real-life example of satisfaction 
following exam performance, Sanna and Turley (1996) found that counterfactuals 
were three times more likely to be generated following negative than positive 
outcomes. In their experiment, participants were asked to read a vignette in 
which the protagonist, Pat (who either typically performed well or poorly in 
courses), had either passed or failed a recent exam. Participants were asked to 
retell the story into microphones, and the number of spontaneously generated 
counterfactuals was recorded (Study 1). The authors found that participants were 
significantly more likely to generate counterfactual thoughts where outcomes 
were negative, and in which prior expectations had been violated. This effect was 
replicated in a second study (Study 2), which examined the impact of outcome 
valence upon counterfactual generation following real-life exam performance. 
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Specifically, as outcomes became more positive, the number of spontaneously 
generated counterfactuals decreased.      
Tsiros and Mittal (2000) found similar results. Their experiment used a 
hypothetical purchasing scenario in which the protagonist, Paul, wished to 
purchase a laptop computer. Participants were provided with either positive or 
negative feedback information about the outcome of his decision (Study 4). The 
authors found that participants were significantly more likely to generate 
counterfactual thoughts when the feedback information provided to them was 
negative. Further, in line with the overarching hypothesis of the current thesis, the 
authors found evidence that it was this increased tendency to engage in a 
process of counterfactual thought which drove the experience of regret, ultimately 
undermining satisfaction.  
In addition, Walchi and Landman (2003) examined the impact of 
counterfactual thought on consumer affect. In their experiment, participants who 
were involved in job-searching were asked to read a description of a software 
programme designed to customise CV’s for applications to different 
organisations. Participants were told to imagine they had purchased and used the 
programme, and were then given feedback relating to the success of their job 
search. In the positive feedback condition, participants were informed that their 
CV had been identified as an important contributing factor to the success of their 
job search. In the negative feedback condition participants were told that their CV 
had been identified as the major reason why they hadn’t been invited for 
interviews, whilst participants in the neutral feedback condition were told their job 
search was proceeding satisfactorily, and received no feedback regarding their 
CV. The authors found that participants who received negative feedback 
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exhibited significantly greater levels of spontaneous counterfactual thought and 
regret, in comparison to the other two conditions.  
Other evidence for the effect of valence upon counterfactual generation is 
more indirect. For example, both Gleicher et al., (1990) and Landman (1987) 
used Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982a) investment scenario, and only found 
evidence for an action effect when outcomes were negative. When outcomes 
were positive the action/inaction manipulation had a reduced impact upon 
affective reactions, suggesting that counterfactual thoughts were more readily 
cued, and subsequently more influential in judgements pertaining to negative 
outcomes. However, other researchers have failed to find evidence of this effect. 
For example, in Roese & Olson’s (1993) scenario based study, participants were 
found to generate counterfactual alternatives following positive and negative 
outcomes with equal frequency (see also Markman et al., 1993). However, a 
more extensive introduction into the existing research on counterfactuals and 
valence will be provided in Chapter 5. In that chapter I investigate whether 
valence may be influential in determining the prevalence of the ECE, due to its 
predicted impact upon counterfactual thought.    
1.9 Existing Links between the ECE and Counterfactual Thought 
Previous research has theoretically linked the ECE with counterfactual 
thought. For example, Anderson (2003) suggested that the mutability of 
alternatives could directly impact upon decision-satisfaction as increased 
counterfactual thought is associated with increased regret. Further, Gingras 
(2003) found that participants were less satisfied with decisions made from 
diverse options, as opposed to more similar options, and attributed this difference 
to increased counterfactual thought. However, despite this body of research, and 
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the fact that the notion of counterfactuals appears to be at the heart of theorising 
about the ECE (Schwartz et al., 2002; Schwartz, 2004), it is somewhat surprising 
that no studies, as far as I am aware, have actually tried to measure their 
presence in conditions of more vs. less choice. 
Sagi and Friedland (2007) argued that counterfactuals may not be as 
important to judgments of regret following choice as other authors have 
suggested. In their experiment, participants read a scenario detailing possible 
options of ways to spend a free evening, and were told to imagine that they had 
chosen to go to the cinema, and that the film they watched turned out to be long 
and boring. Participants were then asked to imagine the regret they might feel for 
having chosen this option. The authors found that increasing option set size and 
increasing option diversity lead to increased regret, and on the assumption that 
unpopular options would not be simulated counterfactually as alternative choices, 
they argued that counterfactual thinking was unlikely to play a role in decision 
regret.  
However, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the consideration of 
alternatives and the simulation of their characteristics is also a process that 
involves some form of counterfactual thought. In addition, in that research 
comparisons were drawn about increased choice on the basis only of decisions 
made between 2 vs. 3 alternatives, and no direct measure of counterfactual 
thought was utilized. The current experiments subsequently aim to investigate the 
authors’ claim that increased option set size cannot lead to increased 
counterfactual thought. This will be done by a) directly examining the prevalence 
of counterfactual thoughts in conditions of more vs. less choice, and b) 
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manipulating counterfactual availability through various means in order to 
determine any impact upon the ECE. 
1.10 Manipulating Counterfactual Thought
One possible way of undermining the systematic generation of 
counterfactuals is through the introduction of a cognitive load dual-task (Ward & 
Mann, 2000). Previous research (e.g. De Neys & Schaeken, 2007) has found that 
activities which involve effortful processing become harder when cognitive 
resources are burdened through a cognitive load dual-task. Although 
counterfactuals may vary in the degree to which their generation relies on effortful 
processing (see for example, Kahneman, 1995; Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & 
Beike, 2003; I return to a discussion of this point in Chapter 2), there is consistent 
evidence that reasoning about counterfactual possibilities draws upon executive 
processes, including working memory. This has been shown in developmental 
research where the link between working memory and counterfactual thinking is 
well established (see, for example, Müller, Miller, Michalczyk & Karapinka, 2007; 
Beck, Riggs & Gorniak, 2009), and has been shown to extend to judgements that 
are often considered to be influenced by the automatic activation of 
counterfactual thoughts (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008). In addition, patients with 
dysexecutive syndrome associated with prefrontal lobe lesions demonstrate 
relatively specific deficits of counterfactual thinking (e.g., Gomez-Beldarrain, 
Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalez, & Grafman, 2005) as do patients with 
disorders associated with frontal lobe functioning, namely Parkinson’s Disease 
(McNamara, Durso, Brown, & Lynch, 2003) and schizophrenia (Hooker, Roese & 
Park, 2000).  
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Indeed, thinking counterfactually depends upon considering multiple 
possibilities (Byrne, 2005), the representation of which is considered to draw 
upon the resources of working memory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).  For 
example, Ward and Mann (2000) found that normally restrained eaters ate 
considerably more when placed under a high cognitive load. The authors attribute 
this to the fact that when placed under high load, participants were unable to 
engage in a process of counterfactual thinking in which they would normally 
compare their current behaviour with a standard or ideal state, leading to 
relatively unrestrained behaviour. 
Consequently one objective of the current thesis was to explore the impact 
of load upon the prevalence of the ECE. Assuming load is found to reduce 
counterfactual thinking then one would also expect a high load to reduce the 
ECE, if the effect is being driven by an underlying process of counterfactual 
thought. These hypotheses were tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 examines 
whether a similar process may account for the ‘paradox of reversibility’, where 
research has shown that having the opportunity to change your mind post-
decision may also be counter-intuitively detrimental to satisfaction (evidence for 
this effect is reviewed in Chapter 2).  
Notably, it is possible that the addition of a secondary load task may also 
impact upon other potential explanations for the ECE. For example, when placed 
under high load a) a person may feel even less able to fully process all of the 
available information presented to them (Simon, 1956; Huffman & Kahn, 1998; 
Botti & Iyengar, 2006), which may mean that b) decisions are made even harder 
to justify (Scheibehenne et al., 2009; Sela et al., 2009), or c) that the individual 
may be more likely to adopt potentially maladaptive decision strategies (see, for 
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example, Payne et al., 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, in each of 
these instances it would appear that the addition of load may lead to an 
increased likelihood of participants exhibiting an ECE: as load is likely to 
exacerbate the experience of each of these factors. Yet, as discussed above, the 
current research predicts that the addition of load will reduce the experience of 
the ECE – if the effect is being driven by a process of counterfactual thought. 
Specifically, it is predicted that load will lead to a reduction in counterfactual 
thought, and that this may lead to a reduced tendency for participants to exhibit 
an ECE. As such, whether any experience of the ECE is heightened or reduced 
under high load will give us an initial insight into the processes underlying the 
effect. Finally, by then conducting two mediation analyses: one under low load, 
and a second under high load, it will be possible to determine whether the any 
impact of choice level upon satisfaction is indeed being driven by a process 
counterfactual thought, or whether load may instead be impacting on one of the 
other potential explanations for the effect listed above. 
Experiment 3 was designed in order to investigate the longitudinal 
implications of the ECE, and the rationale for this is provided in Section 1.11 
below. Experiments 4, 5 and 6 were focused upon the counterfactual action 
effect, and aimed to manipulate counterfactual availability by presenting 
participants with a default option, as research has shown that choosing to stick 
with a default may be viewed as being akin to inaction (e.g. Ritov & Baron, 1992). 
As such, it was predicted that if counterfactuals were driving the ECE then 
presenting participants with a default option should reduce the availability of 
counterfactual thoughts, and potentially improve subsequent satisfaction with 
extensive choice. Experiment 7 was designed to examine whether people are 
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able to accurately forecast the potential impact of extensive choice upon post-
decisional satisfaction levels. Finally, Experiment 8 aimed to manipulate 
counterfactual availability via task outcome valence. It was predicted that 
counterfactual thoughts would be cued more readily following negative, than 
positive decision outcomes. On this basis it was hypothesised that if 
counterfactuals were driving the ECE then the effect would be stronger following 
a negative task outcome.  
1.11 Longitudinal Effects of Counterfactual Thinking 
 Research has also examined the longitudinal effects of the counterfactual 
emotion of regret. In several instances evidence has been found that regrets 
following failures to act, or omissions, persist longer than regrets following 
actions, or commissions. For example, Kinnier and Metha (1989) asked 
participants what they regretted most when they looked back over their lives. The 
authors found that the vast majority regretted failures to act, in terms of not 
having taken their education more seriously, not being more assertive and not 
spending more time with family. Similar patterns of results were found by Gilovich 
and Medvec (1994), Feldman, Miyamoto and Loftus (1999), and Roese and 
Summerville (2005) (I provide an extensive review of this literature in Chapter 3).  
Gilovich, Medvec and Chen (1995) argued that one reason why people 
regret inactions more than actions in the long term is that cognitive dissonance 
reduction is more active for actions. Actions are psychologically fixed by their 
factual status, meaning that for actions there is typically one focal imagined 
alternative (i.e. not having acted). By contrast, failures to act are more 
psychologically open, more imaginatively boundless, and this openness to 
opportunity means people are less able to engage in a psychologically beneficial 
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process of dissonance reduction (see also, Roese & Summerville, 2005). 
Following this, Gilovich and Medvec (1995) suggest that the theoretical 
mechanisms behind the reduction in the experience of regret include both 
behavioural repair work, whereby people undertake steps to correct their 
regretted actions, and psychological repair work, in terms of identifying ‘silver
linings’ and cognitive dissonance reduction (Gilovich et al., 1995; Festinger, 
1957; Cooper & Fazio, 1984). As such, there is substantial evidence to suggest 
that there is a reduction in the experience of regret following actions over time. In 
Experiment 3 I apply this aspect of counterfactual theory to the ECE. It was 
hypothesised that any ECE which may be apparent in the short-term would 
reduce over time due to the temporal pattern to the experience of regret. 
1.12 Summary of Aims and Experimental Chapters 
In Section 1.5 I considered evidence for the ECE, and in Section 1.6 I 
developed the rationale for my research – to investigate the overarching 
hypothesis of counterfactual thought as a potential driving force behind the ECE. 
Following this, Sections 1.8 and 1.9 introduced the relevant counterfactual 
literature and how this links to the field of choice. In Section 1.10 I described how 
I intend to manipulate factors to influence the availability of counterfactual 
thoughts across different choice tasks in order to test my overarching hypothesis. 
To summarise therefore; in Chapter 2 I use a secondary cognitive load task in 
order to manipulate the extent to which participants are able to engage in 
counterfactual thinking. It was predicted that the ECE would be found under low, 
but not high load, due to the predicted impact of load upon counterfactual 
thought. In Chapter 3 I investigate the longitudinal implications of the ECE. Based 
upon the counterfactual literature it was predicted that any ECE which may be 
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apparent in the short term (under low load), would reduce over time due to the 
predicted temporal pattern to the experience of regret. In this experiment I 
transfer to the field of the psychology of health, and use placebo treatments to 
explore whether choice can impact upon physiological as well as psychological 
well-being. The implications of this for furthering our understanding of the true 
extent of the “problem” of extensive choice are considered.  
 The experiments detailed in Chapter 4 were designed to draw upon 
another key aspect of the counterfactual literature – the counterfactual action 
effect. These experiments were designed to test whether satisfaction with 
extensive choice might be improved if participants were offered a default option, 
due to the predicted impact of defaults (i.e. inaction) upon counterfactual thought. 
Experiment 7 was designed to contribute to both the default and ECE literatures 
by examining whether participants predictions about preferred choice types would 
match the actual experiences of those in Experiments 4 – 6. In Chapter 5 I aimed 
to manipulate counterfactual availability via outcome valence. This was based 
upon the findings of the previous experimental chapters, and upon the 
counterfactual literature which has demonstrated that counterfactuals may be 
cued more readily following negative than positive decision outcomes. It was 
predicted that if counterfactuals were driving the ECE then the effect would be 
stronger following a relatively negative decision outcome, and subsequently 
reduced where outcomes were positive. In each instance I consider my findings 
in terms of both the existing ECE and counterfactual literatures.  Finally, Chapter 
6 is a summary of my findings and an attempt to evaluate the wider implications 
of these findings for the psychology of choice and consumer well-being. I also 
identify possible directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Investigating the Role of Counterfactual Thinking within the Excess 
Choice Effect (and Reversibility Paradox) using Cognitive Load 
Introduction 
2.1 Chapter Overview
 The experiments detailed in this chapter aimed to explore the potentially 
causal role of CFT in driving two paradoxical effects within the current choice 
literature. These refer to the excess choice effect (ECE), and reversibility 
paradox, whereby respective research has noted that extensive choice and 
decision reversibility may be associated with decreased chooser satisfaction 
levels. A secondary cognitive load task was implemented into the procedure with 
the aim of manipulating the availability of thoughts about unchosen options, in 
order to determine any subsequent impact upon the two choice paradoxes. I 
begin now by providing a brief recap of the ECE literature, and an introduction to 
the existing reversibility paradox literature, before moving on to describe how 
both paradoxes may be linked by the same underlying process – of increased 
counterfactual thought. Finally I provide the rationale for implementing a 
secondary load task in order to investigate the potentially causal role of 
counterfactual thought in supporting these paradoxes. 
2.2 The Excess Choice Effect 
 As reviewed in Chapter 1, the notion that the provision of choice is 
advantageous for individuals and society is widely accepted (Schwartz, 2000; 
2004). Indeed, according to many psychologists, freedom and autonomy are 
essential to well-being, and choice is critical to freedom and autonomy (Ryan & 
Deci, 2001). Modern societies provide high levels of choice across a range of life 
domains which previously had limited choice including consumer goods 
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(Schwartz, 2004), education and employment (Iyengar et al., 2006), health care 
(Propper et al., 2005), pensions (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) and religion (Wolfe, 
2001). Nevertheless, such unprecedented levels of choice are not necessarily 
associated with higher well-being. Life satisfaction, for instance, has stayed 
constant in many western countries despite economic growth and expansions in 
choice (Layard, 2005; Centre for Economic Performance, 2006).  
 As previously discussed, psychological research is beginning to address 
this apparent paradox. One avenue involves investigation of the ECE, in which 
psychological effects of few vs. many choice options on satisfaction with the 
chosen alternative are explored. As we have seen in Chapter 1, economic theory 
suggests that increasing choice should, all else being equal, increase satisfaction 
with the chosen option, because there is a greater chance of satisfying individual 
preferences (Dolan & White, 2007). However this is bounded and there appears 
to be an optimal threshold beyond which satisfaction with chosen options 
decreases as the option set increases (Shah & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009).Iyengar and Lepper (2000), for instance, demonstrated that 
individuals were more likely to purchase gourmet jams or chocolates when 
offered a limited (6) rather than an extensive (24) array of options, and this effect 
has since been replicated in numerous empirical studies across a range of 
domains including consumer goods (Lee & Lee, 2004, Mogilner et al., 2008; 
Chernev, 2003a; 2003b; Greifeneder et al., 2010), job seeking (Iyengar et al., 
2006), and enrolment in pension schemes (Iyengar et al., 2004; although c.f. 
Scheibehenne et al., 2010).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main aim of the current thesis was to 
investigate an alternative explanation for the ECE, which follows on from 
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research which has noted a link between increased choice and regret (e.g. 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz et al., 2002, Roese & 
Summerville, 2005). Specifically, this refers to an increased tendency to consider 
post-decisional counterfactual alternatives when presented with a large choice 
set. The rationale for this stems from the fact that regret is defined as a 
counterfactual emotion, the experience of which cannot occur without a prior 
counterfactual inference (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Landman, 1993). As the 
number of available options increases the range of alternative states of the world 
that did not actually occur, i.e. counterfactuals, also increases.  
As such it is suggested that previous research which has noted a link 
between increased choice and regret (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) may have 
picked up on one aspect of a general increase in counterfactual thought. 
Supporting this contention, Markman et al., (1993) showed that generating 
counterfactuals heightened general feelings of dissatisfaction. Consequently I 
suggest that it is counterfactual thoughts concerning the realization that better 
choice alternatives may have potentially been foregone which may drive the 
experience of regret and undermine satisfaction. This was investigated in 
Experiment 1 using a secondary cognitive load task in order to manipulate the 
availability of counterfactual alternatives (details of this will be provided in Section 
2.5 below).  
2.3 The Paradox of Reversibility 
A second avenue of current psychological research into the effects of 
choice upon well-being concerns the impact of reversibility, i.e. whether or not a 
person is allowed the opportunity to change their minds post-decision. According 
to economic theory, having the option of reversing your choice post-decision can 
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only be beneficial for the chooser, as it allows greater time for the individual to 
ensure they have made the right choice which fully satisfies their preferences 
(Perloff, 2010). Further to this, Schwartz (2004) states that having the opportunity 
to change your mind post-decision is highly valued amongst decision-makers as 
it lessens the burden of having to make a good decision first time around. 
However, recent psychological research has found evidence that reversibility may 
also undermine satisfaction, and lower the utility experienced from the chosen 
good. This is referred to as the ‘paradox of reversibility’ (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; 
Schwartz, 2004).  
For example, in Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) experiment, students in a 
photography course were asked to take two personally meaningful photos, and 
then choose one to keep. In the reversible choice condition participants were told 
that they would be able to change their minds about their choice at a later time, 
and in the non-reversible condition they were told that their decision was final. 
Results showed that whilst the vast majority of participants said they would opt to 
be in the reversible condition if given a choice, those participants who actually 
were in this condition were significantly less happy with their original choice than 
the ‘non-reversible’ participants. Gilbert and Ebert (2002) suggest this effect may 
occur as having the opportunity to change your mind post-decision inhibits the 
psychological processes that would normally aid the manufacture of satisfaction. 
In other words, if a person is able to change their mind post-decision then they 
will do less work psychologically to justify their decision, in terms of reinforcing 
positive aspects of the chosen alternative, and disparaging the rejected 
alternatives (Schwartz, 2004). An alternative possibility is that reversibility may 
also affect satisfaction as a direct result of increased counterfactual thinking due 
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to the opportunity of being able to change one’s choice. But what links these two 
seemingly disparate phenomena? 
2.4 The Counterfactual Opportunity Principle 
An increased tendency to engage in a process of post-decisional 
counterfactual thought may play a key role in these two paradoxes because of 
the same ‘opportunity principle’ (Roese & Summerville, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 
2008). Both situations may be perceived to provide the “opportunity” for 
corrective action following a suboptimal choice (Epstude & Roese, 2008). In 
terms of the ECE, the more choices there are the more opportunities are 
available and consequently the greater the number of counterfactual possibilities. 
In terms of choice reversibility the situation is perceived to be changeable 
compared to conditions where this opportunity is not available. Consequently the 
counterfactual alternative will remain salient even after an initial decision has 
been made. In short, both situations are characterised by a greater number of 
perceived opportunities for correct(ive) action and associated counterfactual 
thoughts. If my central hypothesis is correct then a) I should find more 
counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice, and for reversible than non-
reversible decisions, leading to a decrease in satisfaction and b) reducing the 
ability to systematically generate counterfactuals should reduce the effects of 
excess choice and reversibility upon post-decisional satisfaction levels.  
2.5 Manipulating Counterfactual Thought  
As discussed in Chapter 1, one possible way of undermining the 
systematic generation of counterfactuals is through the introduction of a cognitive 
load dual-task (Ward & Mann, 2000). Previous research (e.g. De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007) has found that activities which involve effortful processing 
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become harder when cognitive resources are burdened through a cognitive load 
dual-task. Although counterfactuals may vary in the degree to which their 
generation relies upon effortful processing (see for example, Kahneman, 1995; 
Goldinger et al., 2003), a point to which I will return in the discussion section of 
this chapter, there is consistent evidence that reasoning about counterfactual 
possibilities draws upon executive processes, including working memory. As 
previously discussed, this has been shown in developmental research where the 
link between working memory and counterfactual thinking is well established 
(see, for example, Müller et al., 2007; Beck, et al., 2009), and has been shown to 
extend to judgements that are often considered to be influenced by the automatic 
activation of counterfactual thoughts (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008). In addition, 
patients with dysexecutive syndrome associated with prefrontal lobe lesions, and 
frontal lobe disorders such as Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia 
demonstrate relatively specific deficits of counterfactual thinking (see, for 
example, Gomez-Beldarrain et al., 2005; McNamara et al., 2003; Hooker et al., 
2000).  
 Thinking counterfactually depends upon considering multiple possibilities 
(Byrne, 2005), and as we have seen in Chapter 1, the mental representation of 
counterfactual thoughts is subsequently considered to draw upon the resources 
of working memory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). For example, in an 
experiment involving food consumption levels (Ward & Mann, 2000), it was found 
that load could lead normally restrained eaters to consume more food. The 
authors explain this may be due to the fact that load prevented participants from 
engaging in ‘monitoring’ behaviour – the process by which an individual 
51 
compares their current state with the standard or ideal state (i.e. counterfactual 
thinking). 
2.6 Predictions and Summary of Aims 
Consequently it was predicted that under low load, participants would 
generate more counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice (Experiment 
1), and for reversible than non-reversible decisions (Experiment 2), and that this 
would lead ‘extensive choice’ and ‘reversible’ participants to experience 
decreased satisfaction with their decisions. However under high load, where the 
capacity for generating counterfactual alternatives should be reduced, the effects 
of extensive choice and reversibility on decreasing satisfaction should also be 
lessened. These specific predictions will be explored in follow-up analyses. 
Notably, as reviewed in Chapter 1, it is possible that load may also impact 
upon other potential explanations for the ECE – in terms of increasing the 
likelihood individuals feel unable to process all the information presented to them 
(Simon, 1956; Huffman & Kahn, 1998; Botti & Iyengar, 2006), meaning that 
decisions may perceived as being even harder to justify (Scheibehenne et al., 
2009; Sela et al., 2009), or to the use of potentially maladaptive simplifying 
decision strategies (Payne et al., 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, 
crucially, one would predict the addition of a high load to increase the likelihood 
of experiencing an ECE, if any of the above factors were driving the effect. 
Whereas on the other hand if counterfactuals are driving the effect, and these are 
limited through cognitive load, then one would predict the addition of load to 
reduce any experience of the ECE. As such, whether any experience of the ECE 
is heightened or reduced under high load will give us an initial insight into 
underlying factors contributing to the effect. Separate mediation analyses 
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conducted under low and high load will then determine whether any impact of 
choice level on satisfaction is being driven by a process of counterfactual 
thought. 
In summary, the experiments presented in this chapter had three specific 
aims. The first of these was to examine the impact of counterfactual thinking on 
choice satisfaction by manipulating the potential for counterfactual generation 
during choice evaluation through cognitive load. Second, by investigating both 
the excess choice and reversibility paradoxes using the same empirical approach 
it was then possible to examine whether the same underlying process, i.e. 
counterfactual generation, underpins two quite seemingly different paradoxes. 
Third, as detailed below, the paradoxes were examined in a creative context 
whereby participants were asked to select drawing implements to complete a 
creative task (see also Chua & Iyengar, 2008). This allowed for an examination of 
the evidence for ECE and reversibility effects beyond the more thoroughly 
researched domain of consumer choices in order to explore how excess choice 
affects satisfaction with means (i.e. implements to complete a task) as well as 
ends (i.e. consumed products). 
Notably, previous research has examined the link between choice and 
creative performance in the past, and results have shown that increased choice is 
correlated with enhanced creative performance. For example, Amabile and 
Gitomer (1984) found that children produced more creative collages when they 
were given a choice of materials to use, than when they were given no choice. 
However, the current experiment does not take variability in creative performance 
into account, as instead the focus is solely on satisfaction with implement choice 
(according to varying choice factors), merely within a creative context. 
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2.7 Experiment 1 Overview 
 Experiment 1 examined whether counterfactual generation was greater 
under extensive vs. limited choice and whether this may account for the ECE. 
Participants were given a choice of drawing implements from an extensive vs. 
limited selection, and following completion of a creative drawing task rated 
satisfaction with their chosen implement. Participants were also asked to explain 
their reasons for their satisfaction, and from this ‘thought-listing’ measure I was 
able to record the number of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thoughts. In 
order to further explore the role of counterfactuals half of the participants 
evaluated their chosen option under normal circumstances and half evaluated it 
while simultaneously engaged in a secondary listening task. The aim of this task 
was to limit the ability of participants to systematically generate more or fewer 
counterfactual alternatives as a function of choice condition. If counterfactuals are 
important, and if the load manipulation affects their systematic generation, then 
we should see the ECE under low but not high load.  
2.8      Method 
2.8.1 Pilot testing 
A series of pilot tests were conducted in order to identify a) the most 
effective secondary task for manipulating cognitive load, b) the most effective 
means of measuring counterfactual generation, and c) which 6 of the 24 drawing 
implements and sculpting materials to use in the limited choice conditions.
2.8.1.1 Participants 
Ten participants (6 women and 4 men, mean age = 31, with a range of 19 
to 67 years), recruited via a method of convenience sampling, completed the pilot 
tests in return for a chocolate bar as payment.  
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2.8.1.2 Materials 
Three mathematical ‘worksheets’ (see Appendix 2.1) each containing 25 
simple sums were constructed by the experimenter for use in one aspect of pilot 
testing. A musical software programme ‘Fruityloops’ was used to construct a 
musical recording for use in a cognitive load task pre-test. This recording was put 
onto blank CD, and was played to participants on a CD player. In addition, the 
song ’48 Hours’ by the band ‘Negativland’, was downloaded from the internet and 
also put onto a CD. Two different counterfactual questionnaires were also piloted, 
both in the form of printed hand-outs (see Appendices 2.2 and 2.3). In addition, 
24 different ‘drawing implements’, 24 ‘sculpting materials’ (see Appendices 2.5 
and 2.6 for a full list of all materials), and a stop-watch were also used. 
2.8.1.3 Design 
 A repeated-measures within-subjects design was used, with each 
participant completing all 3 stages of pilot testing. For the counterfactual 
generation questionnaires aspect a between subjects design was used, with each 
participant completing only 1 of 2 different piloted questionnaires.   
2.8.1.4 Procedure 
Secondary Cognitive Load Task 
 For the first part of pilot testing, three alternative secondary tasks already 
established within the literature as providing means of manipulating cognitive 
load were piloted. These were chosen from a large selection of similar tasks (e.g. 
Ward & Mann, 2000; Parent, Ward & Mann, 2007; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007) 
on the basis that they all met a crucial design criterion – they were all auditory 
tasks. As such, participants would be able to continue writing whilst 
simultaneously partaking in the load task. The three piloted tasks were: a) a 
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musical ‘piano notes’ task, similar to that devised by Knowles and Condon 
(1999), in which participants were required to listen to a recording of a series of 
musical notes and press a buzzer every time they heard a piano note played, b) 
another music-based task devised Baumeister, Schmeichel, DeWall and Vohs 
(2007), which involved participants listening to the song ’48 Hours’ by a band 
called ‘Negativland’, and pressing a buzzer every time they heard the word ‘time’ 
mentioned, and c) an alphabet task, similar to that devised by Healy, 
Wohldmann, Parker and Bourne (2005), which required participants to recite the 
alphabet backwards by every third letter.  
In order to examine the relative effectiveness of each of these tasks at 
inducing a high cognitive load, three sets of 25 simple mathematical sums were 
drawn up by the experimenter. Participants were instructed to try and complete 
as many of the sums as possible, whilst simultaneously undertaking each of the 
secondary tasks in turn, for a period of three minutes each. The number of sums 
successfully completed was then used as an indication of the most effective 
means of inducing a high cognitive load. 
Counterfactual Generation Questionnaires 
 For this second aspect of pilot testing, 2 different ‘counterfactual 
generation’ questionnaire designs were tested, in order to determine the most 
effective method to encompass in the main experiment. The two methods tested 
were both of an –‘open-ended’ nature (similar to that used by Crawford & 
McCrea, 2004), in that neither questionnaire directly instructed participants to 
generate counterfactuals. This first type of questionnaire (referred to from now on 
as ‘open-ended’), simply asked participants to list their thoughts about each 
satisfaction judgement, whilst the second type of questionnaire (referred to from 
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now on as ‘semi-structured’) asked participants to list three reasons for each 
satisfaction judgement (see Appendices 2.2 and 2.3 for both types of 
questionnaire). Notably, ‘structured’ counterfactual questionnaires (such as that 
used by White & Lehman, 2005), which explicitly instruct participants to generate 
counterfactuals, were not selected for pilot testing as it was deemed this would 
not provide the reader with an accurate representation of the number of 
spontaneously occurring counterfactual thoughts (a critical dependent variable 
throughout the current thesis).  
Participants completed a ‘mini-experiment’ in which they were asked to 
select a drawing implement from the selection in front of them, which they then 
used to complete a creative task (‘interpreting’ a cartoon image). After completing 
this ‘interpretation’ task participants were asked to rate their satisfaction with their 
implement choice (Appendix 2.4), and following this were given one of the 2 
counterfactual generation questionnaires to complete (Appendices 2.2 and 2.3). 
In both cases participants were asked to reflect back on the responses they had 
given on the first questionnaire, and to explain their reasons for each ‘satisfaction 
judgement’, and the number of overall responses given was recorded. 
The Limited Choice Set 
 The final stage of pilot testing was designed to determine which 6 of the 24 
implements should be used in the ‘limited choice’ conditions. To do this, 
participants were presented with the 24 different drawing implements and 24 
different sculpting materials to be used in the extensive choice sets. Participants 
were asked to imagine that they would shortly undertake a creative task, which 
would involve them selecting one drawing implement, and (later – as part of a 
separate task) one sculpting implement, which they would then be required to 
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use in order to draw or ‘interpret’ a basic cartoon image. In line with the 
procedure used by Shar and Wolford (2007) participants were then asked to 
rank-order each of the drawing implements and sculpting materials from 1 (most 
effective) to 24 (least effective) in terms of how effective they believed each 
implement would be, and as such, how likely it was that they would select that 
implement for use in the experiment(s). 
2.8.1.5 Pilot Experiment Results and Discussion 
Secondary Cognitive Load Task 
 The order of secondary tasks ranking from hardest to easiest in terms of 
the number of successfully completed sums in the 3 minute period was found to 
be: a) the alphabet task, b) the ‘piano notes’ task, and c) the ‘Negativland’ task 
(Ms= 3.3 vs. 8.12 vs. 13.73 respectively). On the basis of this, and participants 
comments following completion of this aspect of pilot testing, it was deemed that 
the alphabet task was in fact too hard, with some participants struggling to 
complete any of the sums in the allocated time. As such this task was ruled out 
from use in the main experiment, so that participants would still be able to 
simultaneously concentrate on the primary experimental task. Conversely, the 
‘Negativland’ task was deemed to be too easy for use in the main experiment, 
and following the procedure used by Baumeister et al., (2007), actually appeared 
to involve very limited participation from subjects at times. As such, the musical 
‘piano notes’ task was selected as the most effective means of inducing a high 
cognitive load in the main experiment. In addition, this task was also considered 
to be the most appropriate for use in the main experiment, as its musical basis 
fitted in well with the experiments’ ‘creative theme’. Consequently, participants’ 
may have been less likely to be suspicious of the purpose of this ‘secondary 
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task’, and more likely to fully engage with it, if they viewed it as an integral part of 
the main experiment. In addition, it was deemed this task would be most useful 
as the task instructions could be manipulated to place participants under either a 
high or a low cognitive load, as such ensuring that both groups of participants 
receive the same quantity of instructions, keeping the experimental conditions as 
similar as possible.  
Upon consideration of participants’ comments upon completion of the 
‘piano notes’ secondary task it became apparent that one note every three 
seconds (as per the Knowles & Condon, 1999, experiment) was, in several 
participants’ own words ‘a little too easy’, giving participants a fairly decent 
amount of time in between notes to concentrate on completing the sums. As 
such, to further increase cognitive load in the main experiment, and to ensure 
participants really were under a high cognitive load, the musical recording was 
altered slightly, so that a single note was played every two seconds, instead of 1 
every 3 seconds (as per Knowles & Condon, 1999). This meant that, as well as 
having more notes to think about in general, the number of ‘target’ piano notes 
was also increased. The ratio of piano notes to ‘other’ notes was kept the same, 
however, and increased to 4.5 every minute (9 every 2 minutes), where it had 
previously been 3 piano notes every minute. As such, the recording, and the task 
itself, was kept as similar as possible to the original methodology. 
Counterfactual Generation Questionnaires 
Participants were found to disclose considerably more information 
regarding the reasons behind their satisfaction judgements when they were given 
the semi-structured rather than the open-ended questionnaire (average number 
of reasons disclosed per satisfaction judgement: 2.6 vs. 1.2 respectively). 
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Consequently the semi-structured method was selected for use in the main 
experiment, as it appeared to encourage a more thorough consideration of all the 
determining factors behind each satisfaction judgement. In addition, upon 
reviewing participants’ comments after having completed this aspect of pilot 
testing, it became apparent that the time gap between answering the first 
satisfaction rating questionnaire, and the second counterfactual generation 
questionnaire made it ‘somewhat difficult to remember’ the precise reasons 
behind each rating at the time of judgement. The final questionnaire was 
subsequently designed with this information in mind, so that participants would 
rate their satisfaction, and then directly underneath this list their reasons for that 
judgement (see Appendix 2.7 for final questionnaire design). 
The Limited Choice Set 
This data was averaged and used to form 2 ‘effectiveness rating’ scales, in 
which each implement was given a final rank from 1 to 24 (see Appendices 2.5 
and 2.6). Upon examination of the scales, it became clear that the top 2 drawing 
implements were outstandingly clear favourites. As such it was decided that 
these 2 implements (the ‘felt-tip’ and ‘pencil crayon’) should be eliminated from 
the selection of implements used in all conditions in the final experiment, in order 
to ensure the choice sets contained a more equivalent set of options. 
Consequently in the limited choice conditions participants would be presented 
with a choice between 6 options, whilst those in the extensive choice conditions 
would have a (slightly reduced) choice of 22 options. In order to keep the two 
creative tasks as similar as possible, the top 2 ‘sculpting materials’ (‘Plasticine’ 
and ‘pipe cleaners’) were also dropped from use in the second creative task in 
the main experiment. Finally, on the basis of the effectiveness scales, 6 
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implements were selected for use in the limited choice conditions. Following the 
procedure used by Shar and Wolford these were 2high (1 and 2 in effectiveness 
ranking lists), 2 medium (places 10 and 11), and 2 low (places 21 and 22) ranking 
implements (please see Appendices 2.5 and 2.6 for final lists of implements used 
in both choice sets). 
2.8.2 Experiment 1 
2.8.2.1 Participants
One hundred Psychology undergraduate students (61 women and 39 
men, mean age = 24, with a range of 18 to 67 years) at Plymouth University took 
part in the experiment in exchange for course credit. 
2.8.2.2 Design 
 The experiment had a 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) X 2 (load 
level: low vs. high) X 2 (task: task one vs. task two) mixed factorial design with 
repeated measures on the last factor. Two tasks were used with the aim of 
testing whether results would generalise across tasks. Notably, there is evidence 
within the counterfactual literature that using more than one task may lead to an 
increased tendency to generate counterfactual alternatives in preparation for, or 
anticipation of, a second task (see, for example, Markman et al., 1993; Roese & 
Olson, 1995). However, as the two tasks used in this experiment involve different 
types of creative choices, using different types of materials (i.e. one selection of 
pens to draw with and one selection of materials to sculpt something out of), it is 
therefore unlikely that participants would generate counterfactuals as a form of 
mental preparation for the second task, as at the moment of reflection following 
the first task they will be unaware of what the second task will involve, or what 
type of materials will be on offer. Consequently, the generation of counterfactual 
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alternatives cannot be based upon the success or failure of the choice in the first 
task in this manner. Nevertheless the presentation of the order of tasks was 
counterbalanced in order to reduce any potential order effects upon either 
satisfaction or counterfactual generation. 
2.8.2.3 Materials 
As previously detailed, on the basis of pre-testing, 22 different drawing 
implements were used in task one. These included a mixture of paint-roller pens, 
felt tip pens, twig pencils, wax crayons, and coloured chalks. No implements 
which participants may have had strong prior preferences towards, such as biros, 
were included. 22 different sculpting materials were used in task two, including a 
mixture of coffee beans, string, mini pom-poms, cat biscuits and split-peas. A 
similar amount of each material type was placed inside a see-through plastic cup. 
Again no materials which participants had strong prior preferences towards, such 
as Lego bricks, were included (see Appendices 2.5 and 2.6 for a full list of all 
materials used). 
Load Manipulation – Participants listened to a recording of four musical 
instruments playing one note every two seconds, via headphones, and pressed a 
key every time a piano note was played. This task was similar to that devised by 
Knowles and Condon (1999), and was selected from three tasks used at the pre-
testing stage as being the most effective means of manipulating cognitive load. 
2.8.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were informed they would be taking part in an experiment on 
‘individual differences in creativity’, to avoid focusing on the main issue of choice 
(Appendix 2.8) and were randomly allocated to one of the four conditions. Before 
starting the experiment participants were given a short practice session of the 
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cognitive load manipulation task in order to ensure they understood the 
instructions. Participants were instructed to listen to a recording of a series of 
musical notes, and to either press a buzzer every time they heard a piano note 
played (high-load conditions), or to simply ignore the musical distraction (low-load 
conditions) (Appendix 2.9). Participants’ responses to this secondary task were 
recorded using a software programme designed to measure time of response 
and whether or not the response given was accurate. However unfortunately the 
programme corrupted, meaning the data for this task were lost, and subsequently 
no further discussion of accuracy of performance on this secondary task across 
conditions is provided. However, through observation the experimenter could 
determine that all participants were engaged in the secondary task, and were all 
pressing the buzzer at random intervals (high load conditions). Unfortunately I 
cannot determine whether these responses were accurate, however as the main 
aim of this secondary task was simply to place participants under a form of either 
high or low cognitive load, and as all participants appeared to be engaged in the 
task, it would appear the task was largely successful in this respect. 
Participants then began the first of two creative tasks. This was either a 
‘drawing’ task, or a ‘sculpting’ task. For the drawing task, participants were 
presented with a limited (6) or an extensive (22) selection of drawing implements, 
and were instructed to “select one implement which you feel would best allow you 
to interpret a basic cartoon image according to your own artistic preferences” 
(Appendix 2.10). After making a choice they were presented with the cartoon 
image (a sheep in a field, see Appendix 2.11) and were instructed to study the 
image for one minute (Appendix 2.12). The image was then removed and 
participants were given five minutes to complete their interpretation(see Appendix 
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2.13 for a sample ‘interpretation’). Upon completion they answered the 
questionnaire whilst under a high or a low cognitive load.  
Choice satisfaction was measured using three items adapted from Iyengar 
and Lepper (2000) with responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree): “I am happy that I made the right choice from the selection of 
implements available”, “I feel my choice of implement prevented me from 
expressing myself artistically” (reversed), “If I could start the experiment again I 
would select the same implement” (Appendix 2.7). The internal consistency of the 
three items was high for this task (α =.83). As such data from the three items are 
collapsed to give a single satisfaction measure.  After each item participants were 
asked to give “at least two reasons why you responded in that particular way”. 
These responses were later coded and used as evidence of counterfactual 
thinking.   
Following this, participants were given a filler task to perform for five 
minutes. The aim of this filler task was to direct participants’ focus away from the 
task they had just completed, and thus reduce any potential interference effects 
during the final creative ‘sculpting’ task. In addition, this filler task served another 
important function. Previous research has shown that viewing pictures of nature 
can have restorative effects (Berto, 2005). Indeed, Berman, Jonides and Kaplan 
(2008) found that viewing pictures of nature could improve directed-attention 
abilities, and as such help to boost depleted self-regulatory resources. Based 
upon this, a similar task was adopted for use as a filler in the current experiment, 
with the aim of helping to increase potentially depleted self-regulatory resources, 
and as such reduce any potential fatigue effects which may otherwise interfered 
with performance during the second creative task.  
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The task itself required participants to watch an on-screen slide show, 
consisting of thirty photographs of natural settings, for example of lakes, 
mountains, and woodland. In order to ensure that participants would actively 
study the images, the task was adapted so that participants were required to rate 
each image in terms of how tranquil they thought it was on a scale of 1(not at all 
tranquil) to 7 (extremely tranquil) (Appendix 2.14). Each image was displayed for 
eight seconds (with a two second blank screen separating the images).  The 
theme of tranquillity was selected in order to emphasise the peacefulness of the 
images, which according to Berman et al., (2008) may be one reason why natural 
environments help to restore directed-attention abilities.  By presenting the task in 
this manner and giving participants a questionnaire to complete, it was deemed 
that participants would be more likely to view the task as an important aspect of 
the main experiment, and as such may engage with the task more fully than if 
they had suspected it to be a filler task. However, the data from this task is not 
used for any further analysis. This task lasted for exactly five minutes. 
 Upon completion of this participants moved on to the second creative task. 
For the ‘sculpting’ task, participants were required to select one material to use to 
create a 3D model/interpretation of a cartoon image (a fish, see Appendix 2.15). 
Again, participants were given one minute to study the image and a further five 
minutes to interpret it (see Appendix 2.16 for a sample ‘interpretation’). They 
were then asked to complete a second questionnaire, which was identical to the 
first except that the phrase ‘drawing implement’ was replaced with the phrase 
‘modelling material’. Again, internal reliability across the three items was high for 
this task (α =.89) and the questions were answered either under low or high load. 
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Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation (see 
Appendix 2.17). 
2.8.2.5 Coding Counterfactuals 
Participants’ responses to the ‘thought listing’ aspect of the questions were 
coded by two independent coders prior to commencing with analyses. Six 
categories were generated. These were; ‘Choice Counterfactuals’, which involved 
the explicit comparison of the chosen option with foregone alternative(s), for 
example: “Maybe salt could be a better alternative”. ‘Problem Counterfactuals’, 
which involved a counterfactual consideration of how performance could have 
been improved, had an aspect of the task been different, e.g.: “I could have been 
more creative if I could have used more than one medium”. ‘Positive Implement 
Appraisals’, which involved positive descriptions of the chosen implement, e.g.: “I 
found the pen easy to use”. ‘Negative Implement Appraisals’, which involved 
negative descriptions of the chosen implement, e.g.: “Hard to hold comfortably”. 
‘Positive Comparisons’, which involved drawing a comparison between the 
chosen option and other options, e.g.: “easier to use than some others”. Finally 
‘Other Responses’ included any response which did not fit into any of the five 
main categories, e.g.: “I’m rubbish at drawing anyway so I can’t blame the 
implement”. 
All statements were then coded by one of the original coders and a third 
coder who had not been involved in developing the coding framework. High 
levels of agreement were observed between the two judges: Kappa = .83, 
p<.001. As inter-rater reliability was established, the coded counterfactual 
responses from the first judge were used for further analysis. The category of 
response which is of particular interest for the purposes of this experiment is 
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‘Choice Counterfactuals’. Preliminary analysis found no substantive differences in 
results whether we used the absolute number of counterfactuals a person 
generated or the proportion of all statements which were counterfactuals. The 
analysis below therefore used the raw number generated to provide the reader 
with a clearer indication of overall counterfactual prevalence (however for 
completeness, details of counterfactual analyses using proportions of 
counterfactual responses generated are presented in Appendix 2.22). Of all 
statements recorded 18% were counterfactuals, and of all counterfactuals 
recorded 89% were choice counterfactuals. 
2.9     Results and Discussion 
2.9.1 Satisfaction Analyses 
 The data from both tasks were analysed both combined and separately 
using a multivariate approach. This was done in order to a) get a detailed 
overview of the effects of choice level and counterfactual generation across the 
two tasks, and b) determine whether the two tasks appeared to have been 
equally successful methods of manipulating satisfaction with choice. For the first 
part of the analysis, a 2 (choice: limited vs. extensive) X 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 
(task: picture vs. model) mixed factorial ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last factor was conducted (Table 2.1). 
67 
Table 2.1. Mean and standard deviations of participants’ satisfaction ratings and 
counterfactuals generated. 
Low load High load
Counterfactuals Satisfaction Counterfactuals Satisfaction
Task Choice Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Picture Limited .48 (.92) 5.36 (1.56) .64 (.86) 4.60 (1.91)
Extensive 1.20 (1.26) 3.81 (1.49) 1.04 (1.40) 4.62 (1.67)
Model Limited .84 (.80) 4.73 (1.73) 1.00 (1.29) 3.67 (1.99)
Extensive 1.28 (1.40) 4.24 (1.60) .64 (.86) 4.98 (1.76)
There were no significant main effects of choice level, load level, or task: 
F(1,96) < 1, p > .05 in each case. Overall, satisfaction was similar under limited 
vs. extensive choice (Ms= 4.60; 4.42), under low vs. high load (Ms= 4.54, 4.47) 
and for the drawing and modelling tasks (Ms= 4.60, 4.41). An unpredicted 
interaction was found between task and choice: F(1,96) = 5.48, p= .02, η² = .05, 
suggesting that choice level was more important for the drawing task than the 
modelling task. However there was no interaction between task and load: F(1,96) 
= .14, p= .71, η² = .001, and the three was interaction between task, load and 
choice was also found to be non-significant: F(1,96) = .06, p= .81, η² = 
.001.Nevertheless follow-up analyses were conducted on the interaction between 
task and choice in order to determine whether the manipulation of choice level 
appeared to have worked equally well across tasks. 
T-tests revealed that for the drawing task, the manipulation of choice level 
worked as intended. Specifically, participants were found to be more satisfied 
with limited than extensive choice under low load (t(48) = 3.58, p= .001), and this 
effect was no longer significant under high load (t(48) = -.05, p= .96) (see Table 
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2.1). However a slightly different pattern of results was found for the sculpting 
task. In this task no effect of choice level was found under low load: (t(48) = 1.05, 
p= .30), and yet under high load, a significant effect of choice was found: (t(48) = 
-2.48, p= .02). Crucially this effect was found to be in the opposite direction to 
that predicted under low load, such that satisfaction was higher with limited than 
extensive choice. As such it appears that choice level did have a different impact 
across tasks, and in this respect it may be that the ECE is to some extent task 
dependent. However in order to get a balanced overview of the effects of choice 
level on satisfaction and counterfactual thought across tasks I nevertheless 
concentrate on the effects collapsed across task type during later follow-up 
satisfaction, counterfactual (Section 2.9.2), and mediation (Section 2.9.3) 
analyses. 
Finally, in line with predictions the repeated measures ANOVA also 
revealed a significant interaction between choice and load level: F(1,96) = 12.84, 
p= .001, η² = .12 (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Participants’ mean stated satisfaction ratings as a function of choice 
set size and load manipulation (both tasks collapsed).Standard errors are 
represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column.
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A simple main effects analysis was then conducted on the significant 
interaction found between choice and load, in order to examine satisfaction 
between limited and extensive choice: a) under low load to examine the 
replicability of past findings and b) under high load to examine whether the choice 
effect continued to be robust under high load. Under low load, satisfaction was 
found to be higher under limited vs. extensive choice (Ms= 5.05, 4.03, F(1,96) = 
9.32, p= .003, η² = .09). This finding replicates previous research into the ECE. 
Under high load, the effect of choice level was also found to be significant: 
F(1,96) = 4.06, p= .05, η² = .04. Crucially, however, collapsing across tasks this 
was found to be in the opposite direction, such that satisfaction was higher for 
extensive than limited choice (Ms= 4.81, 4.13 respectively). These findings are 
subsequently more consistent with people's stated preferences for more vs. less 
choice.  
2.9.2 Counterfactual Analyses 
 The impact of choice level upon the total number of counterfactuals 
generated was then examined using a 2 (choice: limited vs. extensive) X 2 (load: 
low vs. high) x 2 (task: picture vs. model) mixed factorial ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor (Table 2.1). Analysis revealed a marginal main effect 
of choice level: F(1,96) = 2.99, p= .09, η² = .03, with more counterfactual thoughts 
being generated following extensive than limited choice (Ms= 1.04, .74). 
However, there was no main effect of load: F(1,96) = .48, p= .49, η² = .005 or 
task: F(1,96) = .49, p= .49, η² = .005, with similar numbers of counterfactual 
thoughts being generated under low vs. high load (Ms= .95, .83) and for the 
drawing and modelling tasks (Ms= .84, .94). In addition, the interaction between 
70 
choice and load was found to approach significance: F(1,96) = 2.61, p= .11, η² = 
.03.  
Paralleling earlier satisfaction analyses once again there was no three way 
interaction between task, load and choice: F(1,96) = .70, p =.41, η² = .01, and no 
interaction between task and load: F(1,96) = .70, p =.41, η² = .01. However, an 
unpredicted marginal interaction was found between task and choice: F(1,96) = 
3.29, p =.07, η² = .03. Again this appeared to suggest that the impact of choice 
level upon the number of counterfactuals generated was more important for Task 
1 than Task 2. Follow-up analyses were subsequently then conducted on this 
marginal interaction in order to explore whether this was the case.  
T-tests revealed that for the drawing task the impact of choice level upon 
counterfactual generation was broadly in line with predictions. Specifically, under 
low load counterfactual generation was significantly higher under extensive than 
limited choice (t(48) = -2.31, p= .03) (see Table 2.1), whilst under high load there 
was no impact of choice on counterfactual generation (t(48) = -1.22, p= .23). 
However for the sculpting task, no effects of choice level were found under low 
(t(48)= -1.36, p= .18) or high load (t(48) = 1.16, p= .25). Again this appears to 
suggest that the impact of choice level upon counterfactual generation may be 
context dependent, to some extent. Nevertheless following the analytic procedure 
outlined in earlier satisfaction analyses, in order to get a balanced overview of the 
impact of choice level upon counterfactual generation across tasks I examine the 
effects collapsed across tasks during later counterfactual follow-up, and 
mediation (Section 2.9.3) analyses. 
A simple main effects analysis was then conducted on the marginal 
interaction between choice and load in order to examine specific predictions that 
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choice level would only influence the number of counterfactuals generated under 
low but not high load, collapsed across tasks. Analysis revealed that under low 
load the number of counterfactuals generated was significantly higher following 
extensive than limited choice (Ms= 2.48, 1.32; F(1,96) = 5.59, p=. 02, η² = .06). 
Subsequently this provides support for predictions that under low load, more 
counterfactuals would be generated following extensive than limited choice. 
Under high load this effect of choice upon counterfactual generation was no 
longer significant (Ms= 1.68; 1.64; F(1,96) = .007, p=. 94, η² < .001).
2.9.3 Is the Moderating Effect of Load due to its Effect on Counterfactual 
Generation? 
To investigate whether these differences in counterfactual generation 
accounted for the differences between the choice effects on satisfaction under 
high vs. low load two mediation analyses were conducted, one for low load and 
one for high load. If my predictions are correct then choice level should influence 
the generation of counterfactuals and thus mediate the satisfaction effect only 
under low but not high load. As previously discussed I again collapse across task 
in the following analyses.  
Following Baron and Kenny (1986) each analysis had three steps: Step 1 
regressed choice level on satisfaction, Step 2 regressed choice level on 
counterfactuals and Step 3 regressed both choice level and counterfactuals onto 
satisfaction. The results of the two analyses are summarised in Figure 2.2 with 
the results from Step 1 shown in brackets and those from Step 3 in italics. The 
paths for low load are shown in the upper half of the figure and those for high 
load in the bottom half.  
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Choice
(0 = Limited;
1 = Extensive)
Counterfactuals
Satisfaction (Low load)
Counterfactuals
-.37**
.01ns -.50***
.33*
Satisfaction (High Load)
Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model under low load. The lower half (dashed arrows) = 
mediation model under high load. Figures are standardised beta weights. Ns = not significant, †= p<.10, *= 
p<.05, **= p<.01, **= p<.001.
Figure 2.2. Mediation analysis showing the role of counterfactuals in mediating 
the effect of choice set size on stated satisfaction for participants under low but 
not high load. 
Step 1 replicated the above analyses such that the effect of choice on 
satisfaction was negative under low load (β = -.44, p< .001), i.e. satisfaction was 
lower under extensive than limited choice, but positive under high load (β = .26, p
= .07), i.e. satisfaction is higher under extensive than limited choice. Step 2 
replicated counterfactual analyses such that choice was found to influence the 
number of counterfactuals generated under low (β = .33, p = .02) but not high 
load (β = .01, p = .94). Further, the positive effect of choice under low load shows 
that more counterfactuals were generated under extensive than limited choice. 
Step 3 suggests that the number of counterfactuals generated negatively affected 
satisfaction under both low (β = -.37, p = .006) and high load (β = -.50, p< .001), 
but that there was only a drop in the effect of choice under low (βs = -.44 vs. -.32) 
but not high load (βs = .26 vs. .26). Sobel tests further supported the argument 
that counterfactuals were mediating the effect of choice on satisfaction under low 
(z = 1.85, p = .032 (one tailed)) but not high load (z = .08, p = .47). Further, Step 
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3 also shows that under high load, when taking counterfactual thinking into 
account, choice level became a significant predictor of satisfaction, but in the 
opposite direction to that noted under low load – specifically as choice level 
increased, so too did satisfaction (β = .26, p = .034).  
 The experiment replicates previous research into the ECE in the novel 
context of creativity. Although Chua and Iyengar (2008) demonstrated that high 
choice may limit creativity I believe this is the first experiment to show the ECE 
for selection of tools to perform a creative task. Perhaps more importantly, the 
findings also demonstrate that the ECE disappeared under high cognitive load, 
thus identifying load as another important moderator of the ECE (Scheibehenne 
et al., 2009; 2010). Given that many people may reflect upon real-world decisions 
under conditions of high load conditions (e.g. someone evaluating shopping 
purchases in a hectic shopping environment, or in a noisy kitchen with their 
children when they get home) compared to the relatively low load conditions of an 
experimental lab (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Chernev 2003a; 2003b) this may 
help to explain inconsistencies in previous research (Scheibehenne et al., 2009; 
2010). In line with predictions there was also evidence that the reason why 
satisfaction was lower under high choice and low load was due to the number of 
counterfactuals generated. Irrespective of load, more counterfactuals meant 
lower satisfaction (Anderson, 2003), but only under low load did the number of 
options to consider systematically alter the number of counterfactual thoughts 
generated. 
An unexpected finding was that satisfaction with high choice was actually 
higher than low choice under high load. This reversal of the ECE is consistent 
with economic theory and lay perceptions that more choice makes people 
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happier. Specifically it may be that the presence of many choice options is seen 
as a good thing and this perception is only "undone" if one is able to then 
systematically generate counterfactuals. Under high load systematic 
counterfactual generation is inhibited and thus the initial reactions are not 
overturned and satisfaction with extensive choice remains high. If true, then the 
ECE is not as paradoxical after all if lay people are commenting on their 
preferences for extensive choice under normal everyday (high load) conditions, 
whereas psychologists have explored these issues under relatively low load 
conditions with low ecological validity. This is an avenue for future research to 
explore. 
2.10 Experiment 2 Overview  
Given that the ECE was found to be mediated by an increase in 
counterfactual thought in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was designed to 
investigate whether the same process might account for another paradoxical 
finding within the choice literature – the paradox of reversibility. It was predicted 
that when presented with a reversible choice, participants would engage in more 
counterfactual thinking than if they were told their decision was non-reversible. 
Further it was predicted that this increase in counterfactual thinking would lead 
‘reversible’ participants to experience decreased satisfaction with their choice. In 
addition, if counterfactuals could be made less available under reversibility, 
through the addition of a high cognitive load, then this should lead to a 
subsequent increase in satisfaction levels. 
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2.11      Method 
2.11.1 Participants 
Ninety-four Psychology undergraduate students at Plymouth University (49 
women and 45 men, mean age = 25, with a range of 18 to 58 years) completed 
the experiment in return for course credit.
2.11.2 Design 
 The experiment had a 2 (reversibility level: reversible vs. non-reversible) X 
2 (load level: low vs. high) between subjects design. Given the similarity in results 
across the two tasks in Experiment 1, only the drawing task was used here.  
2.11.3 Materials 
 Since the aim of this experiment was to investigate the role of 
counterfactuals for choice reversibility rather than choice amount the same 10 
options were provided to all participants. This number of options was selected 
based upon previous research into the optimal levels of choice for satisfaction 
(Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009). On the basis of pre-testing 
ten moderately preferred implements were selected, including a twig pencil, an oil 
pastel, a gel pen, a wax crayon, and a paint pen (Appendix 2.5). The load 
manipulation was the same as for Experiment 1.  
2.11.4 Procedure 
The basic procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with the following 
change. During briefing participants were lead to believe they would have to 
complete two creative ‘interpretations’ of different cartoon images (Appendix 
2.18), when in actual fact they only had to complete one. This was done in order 
to create a choice context in which a manipulation of reversibility would be 
possible. Participants were presented with the selection of 10 drawing 
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implements, and were instructed to “select one implement which you feel would 
best allow you to ‘interpret’ a cartoon image, according to your own artistic 
preferences” (Appendix 2.10). After having made this selection participants were 
instructed either that they would (reversible conditions) or would not (non-
reversible conditions) be able to exchange the implement they had just selected 
later on in the experiment (Appendix 2.19). Participants were deliberately given 
this information relating to reversibility after having made their choice based upon 
the recommendations of Gilbert and Ebert (2002), as prior knowledge may have 
elicited different decision making processes which may otherwise have impacted 
upon results. 
After making their choice, participants completed the drawing task as per 
Experiment 1. They were then placed under either a high or a low cognitive load 
to complete the satisfaction questionnaire. This was identical to the questionnaire 
used in Experiment 1 with one addition. Based upon previous research (Gilbert & 
Ebert, 2002; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006) we felt it was also important to 
assess participants’ "revealed satisfaction" (i.e. whether or not they wanted to 
change their original choice before starting the next task). With this in mind, 
participants in reversible conditions were instructed: “You now have the 
opportunity to change your implement choice before starting work on your next 
image ‘interpretation’. Would you like to select a different implement for use in the 
next part of the experiment?” Whilst participants in the non-reversible conditions 
were instructed:  “At this point in the experiment some participants are given the 
opportunity to change their choice of implement. Had you been placed in this 
condition would you have taken up the opportunity to select a different implement 
before starting work on image two?” (see also Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Participants 
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were required to give a simple Yes/No response (see Appendix 2.20). 
Participants were then told they wouldn't actually have to do a second drawing 
before being fully debriefed (see Appendix 2.21). 
Notably, in Markman et al.,’s (1993) research it was demonstrated that 
people typically generate more counterfactual thoughts if they believe they will 
have the opportunity to carry out the same task again. This is relevant to the 
current experiment as participants were informed they would be carrying out a 
second, very similar task, upon completion of the first. Crucially, however, the 
current experiment differs from this research due to the manipulations of load and 
reversibility. As such, although we might expect to see a general increase in due 
to the anticipation of a second task, this is predicted to occur equally across all 
conditions, and should not impact upon the experimental manipulations such that  
counterfactual generation is predicted to be a systematic function of whether 
participants are presented with a reversible or a non-reversible choice, and 
further, that any effect of reversibility upon counterfactual generation and 
subsequent satisfaction will be reduced under high cognitive load. 
2.11.5 Coding Counterfactuals
Participants responses to the ‘thought listing’ aspect of the questionnaire 
items were coded according to the same criteria established in Experiment 1 with 
the "Choice Counterfactuals" being the target of further analysis. Of all 
statements recorded 13% were counterfactuals, and of all counterfactual 
responses recorded 90% were choice counterfactuals. Notably, this pattern of 
response is very similar to that found in Experiment 1. 
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2.12    Results and Discussion 
2.12.1 Does Load Moderate the Choice Reversibility Effect? 
 As noted above, satisfaction in this experiment was examined in two ways: 
a) revealed satisfaction, i.e. whether the person would want to reverse their 
original choice if they could; and b) stated satisfaction based on the responses to 
the questions used also in Experiment 1. Revealed satisfaction results were 
consistent with the hypothesis that reversibility would be important under low but 
not high load. Under low load 87% of people who had initially expected that they 
could change their implement for the second task (reversible) opted to do so, 
whereas only 54% of people who did not originally expect this possibility (non-
reversible) said they would like to change, χ2 (1) = 6.04, p = .014. Under high 
load, the percentages opting to change were not significantly different, χ2 (1) = 
1.08, p = .30 (reversible = 75%; non-reversible = 61%).  
 Stated satisfaction was then examined using a 2 (reversibility: reversible 
vs. non-reversible) X 2 (load: low vs. high) between participants ANOVA (Table 
2.2), with a follow-up simple main effects analyses designed to examine 
satisfaction between non-reversible and reversible options a) under low load to 
examine the replicability of past findings and b) under high load to examine 
whether the paradox of reversibility continued to be robust under load.  
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Table 2.2. Mean and standard deviations of participants’ satisfaction ratings and 
counterfactuals generated. 
Low load High load
Counterfactuals Satisfaction Counterfactuals Satisfaction
Task Choice Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Picture Non-reversible .50 (.98) 5.00 (1.53) .52 (.79) 4.64 (1.34)
Reversible 1.04 (.98) 4.46 (1.22) .75 (.90) 4.42 (1.65)
Contrary to predictions, there was no main effect of either reversibility, 
F(1,90) = .41, p= .53, η² = .004, or load F(1,90) = .01, p=.94, η²> .001 and no 
significant interaction F(1,90) = .01, p=.94, η²> .001. Satisfaction was very similar 
between reversible (M=4.44) and non-reversible (M=4.82) conditions, and under 
low (M=4.73) vs. high (M=4.53) load. Neither of the simple effects comparisons 
were significant (F’s < .25, p’s > .61). In sum load moderated the choice 
reversibility effect only for revealed but not stated satisfaction.  
2.12.2 Counterfactual Analysis 
 The impact of reversibility upon the total number of counterfactuals 
generated was then examined using a 2 (reversibility: reversible vs. non-
reversible) X 2 (load: low vs. high) between participants ANOVA (Table 2.2) (for 
completeness, counterfactual analyses using the proportion of counterfactual 
responses generated are provided in Appendix 2.23). In line with predictions, a 
main effect of reversibility was found: F(1,90) = .4.19, p= .04, η² = .04 . The total 
number of counterfactuals generated was found to be lower overall in the non-
reversible than reversible conditions (Ms = .51, .89 respectively). However, 
contrary to predictions there was no main effect of load, F(1,90) = .52, p=. 47, η² 
=.006, and no significant interaction, F(1,90) = .70, p=. 41, η² = .008. 
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A simple main effects analysis was then carried out on the non-significant 
interaction (see Winer, 1971, for the justification of this procedure) in order to 
examine specific predictions that: a) under low load counterfactual thought would 
be greater following reversible than non-reversible choice, and b) under high load 
any impact of reversibility upon counterfactual generation would be reduced. 
Under low load the number of counterfactuals generated was found to be 
significantly higher following reversible than non-reversible choice: Ms= 1.04, .50; 
F(1,90) = 4.15, p=. 05, η² = .04, consistent with predictions. In addition, under 
high load this effect of reversibility upon the number of counterfactuals generated 
was no longer found to be significant: F(1,90) = .73, p=.39, η² = .008, with similar 
numbers of counterfactual thoughts being generated following reversible and 
non-reversible choice (Ms= .75, .52). 
2.12.3 Is the Moderating Effect of Load on Revealed Satisfaction due to its Effect 
on Counterfactual Generation? 
 To examine the load effect on revealed satisfaction I again used a three 
step mediation approach. Binary logistic regressions were used in the steps 
predicting revealed satisfaction (yes = same choice; no = change choice).  The 
results of the two analyses are summarised in Figure 2.3 with the results from 
Step 1 shown in brackets and those from Step 3 in italics.  
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(-.33ns) / -.27ns
(-.87*) / -.64*Choice
(-1 = Non-reversible;
1 = Reversible)
Counterfactuals
Revealed satisfaction (Low load)
Counterfactuals
-1.33*
.11ns -1.78*
.27†
Revealed satisfaction (High Load)
Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model under low load. The lower half (dashed arrows) = mediation model 
under high load. Figures are unstandardised Bs. Significance of paths to Revealed Satisfaction based on Wald tests. Ns = 
not significant, †= p=.06, *= p<.05, **= p<.01, **= p<.001.
Figure 2.3. Mediation analysis showing the role of counterfactuals in mediating 
the effect of reversibility of choice on revealed satisfaction for participants under 
low but not high load. 
Step 1 replicated satisfaction analyses such that the effect of reversibility 
on revealed satisfaction was only significantly negative under low load (B = -.87, 
p = .02). That is, people were less likely to stick with their original option if they 
were expecting to be able to change it, but not under high load (B = -.33, p = .30). 
In line with counterfactual analyses, Step 2 suggests that reversibility influenced 
the number of counterfactuals generated more under low (β = .27, p = .06) than 
high load (β = .14, p = .36). Finally Step 3 suggests that the number of 
counterfactuals generated negatively affected revealed satisfaction under both 
low (β = -1.33, p = .05) and high load (β = 1.78, p = .02), but that there was only a 
drop in the effect of reversibility under low (βs = -.87 vs. -.64) but not high load 
(βs = -.33 vs. -.27). The mediation effect of counterfactuals based on a Sobel test 
was, however, only marginally significant, z = 1.38, p = .08.  
 This experiment provides further support for the reversibility paradox 
(Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Specifically, under low load participants were more likely 
to stick with their initial choice for a second task if the ability to reverse their 
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option was unexpected (non-reversible) vs. expected (reversible).This finding is 
not simply due to the slight difference in instructions for the two conditions since it 
was not prevalent under high load. Moreover, the fact that 54% of those in the 
"non-reversible" condition said they would have liked to change if they could 
supports the notion that non-reversible participants easily understood the 
question. Rather, the difference seems to be caused by the propensity to 
systematically generate counterfactual thoughts under reversible vs. non-
reversible expectations under low but not high load. Indeed, a comparison of 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 reveals a remarkably similar pattern of data for both high vs. 
low choice (Figure 2.2) and reversible vs. non-reversible options (Figure 2.3). In 
all conditions more counterfactuals were associated with lower satisfaction and 
the role of counterfactuals appeared stronger under low than high load.  
In contrast to the revealed satisfaction results, however, no significant 
effects of reversibility were found for stated satisfaction levels. Although not 
initially predicted this result is nonetheless also consistent with the counterfactual 
opportunity principle (Roese & Summerville, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
Specifically, when opportunities exist for corrective action then behaviour 
regulation, rather than affect regulation, tends to be the dominant focus of 
counterfactual thought. Consequently, in a situation like the present one where 
participants are expecting to be able to change their choice for a subsequent task 
their counterfactual thoughts may have been more focused on what they needed 
to do in terms of future behaviour, i.e. stick or change, than attempting to regulate 
any emotional outcomes. This account is also consistent with the findings of 
Experiment 1 whereby choice level was found to impact upon participants’ stated
satisfaction levels via counterfactual generation. In this case, participants were 
83 
not expecting to be able to change their choice implement in order to carry out 
the same task again. As such, we would expect to find that affect regulation, 
rather than behaviour regulation, would become to primary focus of 
counterfactual thought, consistent with the counterfactual opportunity principle 
(Roese & Summerville, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
2.13     General Discussion 
 Previous research has identified that contrary to economic theory and lay 
beliefs, increased choice and the option of reversibility may be detrimental to 
chooser satisfaction levels (Schwartz, 2004; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et 
al, 2004; 2006; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). The experiments detailed in the current 
chapter were designed to investigate the potentially causal role of counterfactual 
thought in driving these effects. In addition to monitoring the number of 
counterfactuals generated under conditions of limited vs. extensive choice 
(Experiment 1) and under expectations of reversible vs. non-reversible choice 
(Experiment 2) half of the participants rated their satisfaction with their chosen 
alternatives under high cognitive load. The aim of this load manipulation was to 
undermine the systematic generation of counterfactuals and thus "undo" the 
normally deleterious effects of excess choice and expected reversibility on option 
satisfaction.  
Results from Experiment 1 indicated that under normal (low load) 
conditions people were generally more satisfied with their chosen drawing 
implement when they had selected it from only a few (6) rather than many 
alternatives (22). This replicates the ECE found for jams, chocolates and essays 
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) in the novel, more creative, context of drawing, whilst 
extending this literature to include satisfaction with means (i.e. drawing 
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implements used to create a picture) rather than the final outcome of a decision 
itself (e.g. taste of a chocolate or performance on an essay). Some differences 
were found across task-type, which suggested that the ECE may be task 
dependent to some extent. Nevertheless when collapsing across tasks the ECE 
was found to persist. Given the difficulty in replicating the ECE elsewhere this 
was encouraging (e.g. Scheibehenne et al., 2010). Under high load however 
participants were more satisfied with their drawing implement when they had 
selected it from the extensive choice set. Crucially for the central hypothesis of 
the current thesis, the effect of choice set size on satisfaction was mediated by 
the number of counterfactual alternatives generated under low but not high load. 
The number of counterfactuals generated was an important influence on 
satisfaction under both load conditions but only when load was low were these 
counterfactuals systematically related to choice set size.  
Importantly, the finding that the ECE was reversed, not exacerbated, 
under high load, provided further support for the primary hypothesis of the current 
thesis. This is because one would expect the ECE to have been heightened 
under high load if the effect were instead being driven by other potential 
explanations. For example, regarding explanations involving information 
processing and limited cognitive capacity (Simon, 1956; Huffman & Kahn, 1998) 
one would predict that individuals would feel even less able to process all of the 
information presented to them when under high cognitive load, which should 
exacerbate experience of the effect. Further, this may mean that decisions are 
perceived as being even more difficult to justify (see, for example, Scheibehenne 
at al., 2009; Sela et al., 2009), or to an increased reliance on maladaptive 
simplifying decision strategies (see, Payne et al., 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 
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1974). In either case one would predict that the addition of a high load should 
increase likelihood that individuals would exhibit an ECE. Therefore, the finding 
that load did not exacerbate the effect provided initial evidence in support of the 
primary hypothesis of the current thesis, which was later substantiated by 
mediation analyses. 
Results from Experiment 2 indicated that under low load people were less 
likely to want to change their original choice if this possibility was previously 
unexpected. It was hypothesised that people in this condition would tend to 
generate less counterfactuals’ than those who were expecting the ability to 
reverse their original decision and this should account for their lower propensity 
to want to reverse their decision. Results were found to be largely consistent with 
this account. First, the number of counterfactuals generated under low load was 
found to be significantly higher in the reversible-expected than in the reversible-
unexpected condition. However, although adding counterfactuals to the mediation 
model reduced the direct effect of condition on satisfaction from significance to 
non-significance the Sobel test of mediation was only marginally significant. 
Nevertheless, and as predicted, there was no systematic relationship between 
condition and counterfactual generation under high load. Moreover, as with 
Experiment 1 the number of counterfactuals generated under high load was also 
found to be related to satisfaction, it was simply that the load manipulation 
undermined their systematic generation as a function of whether the ability to 
reverse one's options was expected or unexpected.  
These experiments suggest that excess choice and choice reversibility 
may both affect satisfaction via increased counterfactual thought. Whilst the claim 
that counterfactual thinking underpins levels of reported satisfaction in decision 
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making contexts is common (see, for example, Schwartz et al., 2002; Anderson, 
2003; Gingras, 2003), the present experiment provides direct evidence of a link 
between the number of counterfactual alternatives generated and reported 
satisfaction. However, as reviewed in Chapter 1, the link between counterfactuals 
and choice satisfaction is not universally accepted. Sagi and Friedland (2007) 
have argued that counterfactual thinking does not contribute to judged regret in 
choice tasks. They showed that regret was related to the number of positive 
attributes possessed by the full set of non-chosen options and that this even 
extended to unpopular options that would rarely be chosen. As participants would 
be unlikely to generate a counterfactual for an unpopular option, they claimed 
that counterfactual thinking was unlikely to contribute to judgments of regret. 
There are a number of reasons why I believe these findings are not decisive 
regarding the role of counterfactuals in choice satisfaction. First, it could be 
argued that evidence showing that the characteristics of non-chosen options 
contributes to choice evaluation is in itself consistent with the idea that 
participants represent the non-chosen items as counterfactual alternatives. We 
may often, for example, consider alternative choices in a fleeting and superficial 
manner before dismissing them or they may be considered in depth and 
ruminated upon. In both cases, however, these considerations will contribute, 
perhaps to differing extents, to our feelings regarding a decision. It is also worth 
pointing out that in contrast to the experiments presented here, Sagi and 
Friedland (2007) only examined decision contexts with a maximum of 3 options, a 
much more limited set than in the present studies. In addition, their study was 
scenario-based and participants were presented with a chosen option at the 
outset which they were then asked to assign a level of regret. Whilst scenario 
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based studies are common in research on counterfactual thinking (see, for 
example, Byrne, 2005), there is some evidence that they can be misleading 
regarding the cognitive processes underlying the evaluation of ‘real’ choices (see, 
for example, Feeney & Handley, 2006). Finally, Sagi and Friedland did not 
incorporate a direct measure of counterfactual thinking in their study, unlike the 
experiments presented here, and consequently there is no direct evidence that 
their participants were not engaging in a process of counterfactual thinking. 
Future research could explore this further by examining the role of counterfactual 
thinking in scenario based studies of this kind, perhaps by employing self-report 
measures of the kind used in the present studies.  
A key assumption underlying the approach taken in this experimental work 
is that evaluating choice satisfaction depends upon an effortful process of 
counterfactual generation and evaluation. Whilst there is some evidence that 
counterfactual thinking draws upon the resources of working memory and 
executive function (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Ward & Mann, 2000) there is 
also evidence that intuitive biases in judgment often arise because of automatic 
activated counterfactual processes. For example, consider the case of an 
employee, Paul, who leaves work at the normal time and is involved in an 
accident that is demonstrably the fault of another driver. Compare this situation to 
one in which Paul leaves work early to watch a movie and the same outcome 
occurs. In which case would you assign greater levels of compensation? 
Typically in studies of this kind greater blame, responsibility and less 
compensation is assigned in the latter case, where counterfactuals are 
presumably more available because of the exceptionality of Paul’s behaviour in 
the second scenario (see Byrne, 2005, for a review).  
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Goldinger et al., (2003) demonstrated that secondary load led to an 
increase in the level of compensation and blame associated with the exceptional 
scenario, particularly for participants of lower working memory span. They claim 
that this finding shows that counterfactuals for the exceptional scenario are 
generated automatically. Those participants who have access to fewer available 
resources are less able to inhibit these counterfactuals and are consequently 
more affected by them. Whilst it is undeniably the case that some counterfactuals 
are so salient that they come to mind very rapidly, counterfactuals nevertheless 
vary in the degree to which their generation depends upon controlled processing. 
The comparison of two scenarios, where one involves an exceptional event, may 
well make a counterfactual readily available. However, the current experiments 
were carefully designed to ensure that participants were making choices between 
similar options, where there was no single option with distinctively more attractive 
features. Consequently I would argue that the decision is a challenging one, 
where evaluating satisfaction would involve careful and considered evaluation of 
the features of alternative choices. Furthermore, Goldinger et al. (2003) used an 
approach which involved the evaluation of two different decisions scenarios, 
which is quite different to a task that involves making a single decision that has 
meaningful consequences for subsequent activity. It is quite possible that such 
scenario based judgments encourage a comparative process which may play a 
limited role in everyday counterfactual thinking (see, for example Feeney & 
Handley, 2006).   
To conclude, the current research replicates Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000) 
work showing that more options can lead to lower satisfaction and furthers 
previous research into the reversibility paradox (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002) by 
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demonstrating that people are less likely to stick with their original choice if they 
believe they will be able to change their mind in the future. Importantly, however, 
these effects were only replicated under low load, i.e. the normal conditions in 
prior research. Under high load the effects disappeared. This pattern is 
accounted for by demonstrating that while under low load people generate more 
counterfactuals for the high choice and reversible than low choice and non-
reversible conditions, consistent with the counterfactual opportunity principle 
(Roese & Summerville, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008). By contrast, there was no 
relationship between choice level or reversibility and counterfactual generation 
under high load.  
Chapter 3 aims to extend these findings in an investigation designed to 
examine the long term implications of the ECE upon chooser satisfaction and 
well-being. Based upon the results of Experiment 1 which highlighted the 
underlying causal role of counterfactual thought in driving the ECE, it was 
predicted that any ECE which may be apparent in the short term would reduce 
over time, due to the predicted temporal pattern to the experience of 
counterfactual thoughts and emotion. Following this, Chapters 4 and 5 consider 
additional alternative means of manipulating factors which should influence the 
availability of counterfactual alternatives, relating to the presentation of default 
options and choice outcome valence, respectively, in order to further explore the 
boundaries of the relationship between counterfactual thought and the ECE.   
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Chapter 3 – A Longitudinal Investigation into the Excess Choice Effect 
Introduction 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter I describe a longitudinal investigation into the ECE, which 
was designed to build upon the findings of Chapter 2, and upon previous 
research, by examining whether the effects of choice level upon satisfaction a) 
persist over time, b) would transfer to the different and novel domain of health 
psychology, and c) could have any impact upon physical well-being, in terms of 
reported improvement in the severity of physical symptoms, as well as the 
previously replicated effects upon psychological satisfaction. I will begin by 
providing the rationale for investigating the long term implications of the ECE, 
before discussing the theoretical counterfactual account on which subsequent 
predictions are based. Following this I will provide the rationale for transferring to 
the domain of health psychology in order to examine any impact of choice level 
upon physical, as well as psychological well-being. 
3.2 Existing Research on the Longitudinal Effects of Choice 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, there is increasing empirical evidence 
to suggest that extensive choice can be detrimental to short-term chooser 
satisfaction and well-being (Lenton, Fasolo & Todd, 2008; Botti & Iyengar, 2006; 
Iyengar &Lepper, 2000; Iyengar, et al., 2006; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Shar & 
Wolford, 2007; Lee & Lee, 2004; Chernev 2003a; 2003b; Greifeneder et al., 
2010; results detailed in Experiment 1). Given that a relatively large amount of 
research has been conducted into the short-term and instantaneous effects of 
choice level upon satisfaction, and also given the fact that many real-life 
decisions faced by modern consumers have long lasting implications (particularly 
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in the highly consequential fields of employment, health care, and pensions, for 
example) it is perhaps somewhat surprising that no studies, to date, have tried to 
investigate the long term implications of the ECE. If a person is dissatisfied with a 
decision made from an extensive selection of options at the initial time of choice, 
do these feelings persist or dissipate over time? Schwartz (2004) theorized that 
ever-increasing choice and the autonomy that comes with it may have a deep 
rooted impact upon psychological well-being – in terms of contributing to the 
reductions in life satisfaction and increases in depression that are found across 
many modern societies. Schwartz (2004) suggests this may be due to the fact 
that increased autonomy leads to increased expectations, and that this contrast 
between expectations and actual experiences may lead people to blame 
themselves for their perceived ‘failures’. However as yet, empirical evidence for 
any long term effects of extensive choice on satisfaction and well-being is very 
limited. In light of this lacuna the main aim of the current experiment was to test 
the longevity of the effects of choice, in order to provide a clearer picture of 
potential long term consequences to chooser well-being, and thus determine the 
true extent of the ‘problem’ of extensive choice. 
3.2.1 The Longitudinal Experience of Counterfactual Emotion 
The current experiment is longitudinal according to the American 
Psychological Association’s (2012) definition that it: “follows the same individuals 
or groups of subjects over an extended period of time”, and was designed to build 
upon the previous findings of Experiment 1, wherein the ECE was found to be 
mediated by counterfactual thought. Whilst there is little direct empirical evidence 
regarding the longitudinal effects of excess choice, a number of studies have 
been conducted into the longevity of counterfactual thought, specifically with 
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regard to the experience of counterfactual emotion. As previously discussed, 
counterfactual thoughts are evaluative reflections on “what might have been” 
(Roese & Olson, 1995; Epstude & Roese, 2008), which are typically associated 
with the experience of a range of negative affect, including regret, shame, guilt 
and disappointment (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen 
& Reinderman, 1998; Niedenthal et al., 1994; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008). Of 
these, the counterfactual emotion that has received most attention from decision 
theorists is that of regret (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). Research has focused 
on the role of responsibility within the experience of regret (Sugden, 1985), 
typically finding that regret involves some degree of personal responsibility for the 
decision outcome (see for example, Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 
2000; Ordóñez & Connolly,2000), whilst other research has focused on structural 
aspects of the emotion such as whether we are more likely to experience regret 
following controllable or uncontrollable circumstances (Girotto, Legrenzi & Rizzo, 
1991; Markman et al., 1995; Roese & Olson, 1995), or as a result of action or 
inaction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Byrne & McEleney, 2000; Avni-Babad, 
2003; Chapter 4 of this thesis).  
The current experiment is based upon another key aspect of current regret 
research – which concerns the temporal pattern to our experience of this 
counterfactual emotion. According to Landman and Manis (1992), the vast 
majority of people regret choices made at some stage or other in their lives. In 
many cases, people continue to experience painful regret years after having 
made the ‘wrong decision’ (Wrosch, Bauer & Scheier, 2005). Notably, people 
typically exhibit reduced emotional responses to remembered life experiences 
over time (Walker, Vogl & Thompson, 1997). This is known as the ‘fading affect 
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bias’. However, regret appears to be uniquely resistant to the ‘fading affect bias’, 
with feelings of regret remaining potent for months or even years after making a 
bad decision (Beike & Crone, 2008).  
In several instances evidence has been found that regrets following 
failures to act, or omissions, persist longer than regrets following actions, or 
commissions. For example, Kinnier and Metha (1989) asked participants what 
they regretted most when they looked back over their lives. The authors found 
that the vast majority regretted failures to act, in terms of not having taken their 
education more seriously, not being more assertive and not spending more time 
with family. Similarly, Gilovich and Medvec (1994, Study 1) conducted a 
telephone survey in which participants were also asked about their regrets of 
action and inaction. The authors found that failures to act, such as missed 
educational, romantic, and career opportunities, failure to seize the moment, and 
not spending enough time with friends and relatives, were more frequently 
regretted than actions, such as bad educational, career, and romantic choices, 
and unwise financial decisions. In addition, in a separate survey, when asked to 
think about their one most regretted action and their one most regretted inaction, 
participants consistently reported greater regret for what they failed to do 
(Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, Study 5). Similarly, in Feldman et al.,’s (1999) 
experiment, participants were also asked to write descriptions of strongly 
regretted events in their lives. The authors found that whilst the intensity of regret 
was equal for actions and inactions, participants’ consistently reported more 
retrospective regrets for inaction than for action.    
Following this Roese and Summerville (2005) state that a key component 
of why regrets of inaction may last longer than regrets of action is because 
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inactions reflect greater perceived opportunity. In their meta-analyses Roese and 
Summerville (2005) found that the six biggest regrets in life related to (in 
descending order) education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure, 
which the authors state is due to the fact that these are the areas in which 
opportunity for corrective action remains highest. In addition, Byrne and 
McEleney (2000, Study 2) found that when decision outcomes were both known 
and negative, actions were regretted more than inactions in the short term, but 
over time this effect reversed and inactions were regretted more than actions. 
Gilovich et al., (2003) found that this effect generalised across cultures, with 
participants in China, Japan and Russia also more likely to regret inactions rather 
than actions over time, in line with US and UK research. 
Consequently, whilst there is substantial evidence to suggest that in the 
short term people tend to regret actions more than inactions (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982a; Landman, 1987; Avni-Babad, 2003; Connolly, et al., 1997; Byrne 
& McEleney, 2000; I provide an extensive review of this literature in Chapter 4), in 
the long term evidence suggests that the regret associated with actions 
dissipates to a certain extent, and it is inactions which are found to lead to the 
greatest experience of regret.   
3.2.2 Why Does the Experience of Regret Following Inaction Persist Longer than 
Regret Following Action? 
Gilovich et al., (1995) showed that one reason why people regret inactions 
more than actions in the long term is that cognitive dissonance reduction is more 
active for actions. This may be partly attributable to the fact that inaction is 
typically viewed as the status quo, with action a comparative departure from the 
norm (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986) (I provide a full review of this literature in 
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Chapter 4). It has been argued that this distinction may lead individuals to feel a 
greater sense of personal responsibility for actions than inactions (see, for 
example, Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), thus eliciting a greater amount of cognitive 
dissonance, and associated dissonance reduction. Further, because actions are 
psychologically fixed by their factual status, they typically have one focal 
imagined alternative, i.e. not having acted (Roese & Summerville, 2005). As 
such, the highly salient consequences of factual actions may also mean 
individuals are more likely to engage in a process of dissonance reduction, in 
order to reduce the sting of those consequences. By contrast, regrets of inactions 
are more psychologically open, more imaginatively boundless, and this openness 
to opportunity means people are less able to engage in a psychologically 
beneficial process of dissonance reduction. Furthering this, Gilovich and Medvec 
(1995) suggest that the theoretical mechanisms behind the reduction in the 
experience of regret include both behavioural repair work, whereby people 
undertake steps to correct their regretted actions, and psychological repair work, 
in terms of identifying ‘silver linings’ and cognitive dissonance reduction (see 
also, Gilovich et al., 1995; 2003; Festinger, 1957; Cooper & Fazio, 1984).  
3.2.3 Predicted Impact on the Excess Choice Effect 
Building upon what we know about the temporal pattern to the experience 
of regret, and also given the findings of Experiment 1 in which it was 
demonstrated that counterfactual thought was influential in determining the 
prevalence of the ECE, it was predicted that any ECE which may be apparent in 
the short term (following an ‘active’ choice) would reduce over time. In order to 
assess this, satisfaction with choice will be measured initially, and at follow-up 
stages 7 and 14 days after having made that choice. The degree to which 
96 
participants reported thinking about counterfactual alternatives will also be 
assessed, in order to examine whether any differences in satisfaction appear to 
correspond to predicted differences in counterfactual thought.  
3.3 The Excess Choice Effect and Intermediate Choice 
The current experiment aimed to build upon the methodology used in 
Chapter 2, and extend research into the ECE which has focused on more 
intermediate choice set sizes (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja and Hogarth, 
2009). As such, satisfaction was examined according to a very limited (2), optimal 
(12) and extensive (38) number of options, rather than simply limited (6) versus 
extensive (22) choice, as per Experiment 1. These specific choice set sizes were 
selected on the basis of the procedures used by Shar and Wolford (2007), and 
Reutskaja and Hogarth (2009), who found that satisfaction was a curvilinear 
function of the number of options available; with the optimal choice set size for 
satisfaction being an intermediate level of around 12 options, and both very 
limited choice and extensive choice being equally detrimental to satisfaction. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, very limited choice has been associated with reduced 
chooser satisfaction and well-being on the basis that it may reduce a persons’ 
sense of perceived control and responsibility for their own fate (see Deci &Ryan, 
1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988). The current research was designed to examine 
whether this same pattern of results would be found in the novel domain of health 
psychology.  
3.4 Health Psychology and Physiological Well-Being 
By transferring to the field of the health psychology it was then also 
possible to determine whether choice level could have any impact upon physical, 
as well as psychological well-being. In order to create a decision with longitudinal 
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implications participants chose a placebo treatment (a ‘Bach’s flower essence’) 
from a selection of either 2, 12 or 38 options, which they were asked to use every 
day for a two week period. Measures of psychological and physiological 
satisfaction with choice (in terms of any improvement in the severity of reported 
symptoms), and counterfactual thought were recorded at the start, middle (day 7) 
and end (day 14) of the two week period. By using placebo treatments in this 
manner a choice scenario was created whereby participants would continue to 
evaluate the effects of their choice for a substantial period of time, in contrast to 
the more short-term consequences of decisions assessed in most previous 
choice research (e.g. using consumer goods, Iyengar & Lepper, 2000;Reutskaja 
& Hogarth, 2009; Shar & Wolford, 2007). The rationale for the specific placebo 
treatment used in the current research is now provided, following a general 
introduction into placebo treatments.  
3.4.1 Placebo Treatments 
According to Kirsch (2005) ‘placebos’ are sham treatments that are used 
clinically to placate a patient, or experimentally to establish the efficacy of a drug. 
Placebos are widely used in medical research (Hróbjartsson & Norup, 2003), and 
the ‘placebo effect’ subsequently refers to any portion of that treatment which 
was produced purely via psychological means. Placebo treatments have been 
shown to improve subjective and objective measures of disease in a large 
number of patients with a range of clinical disorders (Eccles, 2002; Brown, 1998). 
For example, previous research has found placebo effects in the treatment of 
depression (Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1998; Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholls, 
2002), asthma (McFadden, Luparello, Lons, & Bleecker, 1969; Neild & Cameron, 
1985; Spector, Luparello, Kopetzky, Souhrada, & Kinsman, 1976), pain 
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(Huskisson, 1974; Nagao, Komia, Kuroanagi, Minaba, & Susa, 1968; Linde, Witt, 
Streng, Weidenhammer, Wagenpfeil, Brinkhaus, Willich, & Melchart, 2007), 
respiratory tract infections (Eccles, 2002), and a wide variety of other ailments 
and illnesses including Alzheimer’s disease, rheumatoid arthritis and the common 
cold (see Hróbjartsson & Gøtzsche, 2001, for a review).  
Kirsch (1985; 2005) suggests that placebo effects work on the basis of the 
response expectancy hypothesis, in that they are produced by the self-confirming 
nature of what one expects to feel following a course of treatment (see also, 
Morris, 1999). Following this, research has shown that placebo treatments are 
most effective when both patients and doctors believe that a powerful treatment 
is being used (Roberts, Kewman, Mercier, & Hovell, 1993), and subsequently 
both expect that treatment to work (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997; Linde et al., 
2007). The degree of belief a patient has regarding the efficacy of their treatment 
has been shown to be influenced by a range of factors, including; the method of 
administration (pill versus injection; de Craen, Tijssen, de Gans, & Kleijnen, 
2000), the level of dosage a person is asked to consume (de Craen, Moerman, 
Heisterkamp, Tytgat, Tijssen, & Kleijnen, 1999; Kirsch & Weixel, 1988), whether 
the placebos contain a recognised brand name or not (Branthwaite & Cooper, 
1981), the enthusiasm of the doctor (Kaptchuk, Kelley, Conboy, Davis, Kerr, 
Jacobson, Kirsch, Schyner, Nam, Nguyen, Park, Rivers, McManus, Kokkotou, 
Drossman, Goldman, & Lembo, 2008) and the colour of the placebo pill (see de 
Craen, Roos, de Vries, & Kleijnen, 1996, for a review). Other personality 
predictors have been found to include absorption and spirituality (Hyland, 
Geraghty, Joy & Turner, 2006), and motivational concordance (Hyland, Whalley 
& Geraghty, 2007). Via impact upon expectancy each of these factors has been 
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shown to subsequently contribute to the effectiveness of a placebo treatment. 
The current research was also interested to discover whether initial choice level 
could have any impact upon the experience of a placebo effect.  
3.4.2 Bach’s Flower Essences
The specific placebo treatments used in the current research were Bach’s 
flower essences. These essences are dilutions of flower material, developed by 
Bach (1931), who believed that floating flowers in water would result in the water 
acquiring an esoteric property, specific to that flower, which then had a curative 
effect when taken by patients. Flower essences were selected for use in the 
current experiment as although many people believe them to be an active 
treatment, research has shown them to be no different from placebo (Walach, 
Rilling & Engelke, 2001; Armstrong & Ernst, 1999; Hyland et al., 2006; 2007). In 
addition, using flower essences meant that all 38 possible choice outcomes (i.e. 
all 38 different types of flower essence) were objectively equal placebo 
treatments, meaning the choice presented to participants was an illusory one.  
This was an important methodological advance from the previous choice 
literature which has typically examined satisfaction according to choice level 
using objectively different outcomes (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Shar & 
Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Chernev 2003a; 2003b; Greifeneder 
et al., 2010; Arunachalam et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2007). Indeed, only one 
study (Mogilner et al., 2008) as far as I am aware, has previously examined the 
impact of choice upon satisfaction using an illusory choice set. In this experiment, 
participants were shown a menu consisting of either a limited (5) or an extensive 
(50) number of different coffee options. After making their selection, participants 
were all given a small amount of the same coffee to try, allowing for a controlled 
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examination of the effects of assortment size upon satisfaction. The current 
research subsequently aimed to extend this procedure in order to examine the 
impact of limited (2), intermediate (12) and extensive (38) choice upon outcome 
satisfaction. By ensuring all participants experienced an outcome which was 
objectively the same in this manner, it was then possible to provide a thoroughly 
controlled examination of the impact of choice set size manipulations upon 
outcome satisfaction.   
Finally, as previously mentioned, by using placebo treatments it was then 
also possible to further previous research into the ECE by determining whether 
choice level could have any impact upon reported physiological symptoms, i.e. 
any impact upon the likelihood of participants experiencing a placebo effect. This 
was done by asking participants’ to rate the severity of their symptoms at all three 
times of testing, i.e. at the initial choice stage, and at follow-up stages after 7 and 
14 days of using the treatment. In this manner it was then possible to ascertain a 
measure of improvement in reported symptomatology over time. The procedure 
used was a replication of previous research (Hyland et al., 2006; 2007), but with 
the addition of the novel manipulation of initial choice level. 
3.5 Predictions 
 Given the previous research demonstrating a reduction in the experience 
of regret following actions over time (Kinnier & Metha, 1989; Gilovich et al., 1995; 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; 1995; Roese & Summerville, 2005) it was predicted 
that the ECE would not remain robust over time. Specifically, it was predicted that 
at the initial time of choice satisfaction would be an inverted U-shaped function of 
the number of alternatives available, and that participants would be most satisfied 
if they chose their flower essence from a selection of 12 rather than 2 or 38 
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options. This prediction was based upon the quadratic function found in earlier 
studies (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009), and upon the 
impact of choice level on counterfactual thought demonstrated in Experiment 1. It 
was also predicted that this ECE would reduce over time due to the temporal 
pattern to the experience of regret following actions. These specific predictions 
will be explored in follow-up analyses. In addition I was also interested to find out 
whether choice level might influence the extent to which participants experienced 
a placebo effect, in terms of causing any improvement in the reported severity of 
physiological symptoms over time. 
3.6      Method 
3.6.1 Participants 
 83 undergraduate students at Plymouth University (53 women and 30 
men, mean age = 26, with a range of 20 to 69 years) took part in the experiment 
in return for course credit, and a free sample of Bach’s Flower Essence. 
3.6.2 Materials 
The data were recorded using the online ‘UoP Health Psychology Online 
Research Centre’ questionnaire system created by Dr. Ben Whalley, available at: 
http://voice.psy.plymouth.ac.uk.
Participants were presented with a choice between either 2, 12 or 38 Bach 
flower essences. Bach’s flower essences were used following previous research, 
as these are the ‘original and most widely recognised flower essence’ (pp. 55 
Hyland et al., 2006).  
3.6.3 Procedure 
 Participants were informed the experiment was investigating the 
effectiveness of Bach’s Flower Remedies as a treatment for minor physiological 
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and psychological complaints including “stress, fatigue, aches and pains”, and 
were asked to sign up if they had been experiencing any of these symptoms 
(Appendix 3.1). Participants attended an initial laboratory session in which they 
enrolled on the online questionnaire system, completed the first section of 
questionnaires (Appendix 3.2), and picked their flower essence from a selection 
of either 2, 12 or 38 options. Each option was presented with a short (one – two 
sentence) on-screen description of its proposed healing properties, as provided 
by Bach (1931). Participants were asked to take their time considering the 
options, and to pick the essence which they felt would be most relevant to their 
symptoms, and subsequently would most like to trial.  
 After making their choice, the experimenter made up an individualised 
essence by adding two drops of their chosen “stock essence” to a 10 cc bottle of 
diluted brandy (60%, with 40% water). This procedure is based on that used in 
previous research using flower essences (e.g. Hyland et al., 2006), and follows 
the guideline provided by the manufacturer for creating a ‘genuine’ essence. 
Participants took this individualised essence home with them, and were 
instructed to take one to two drops three times a day for two weeks (Appendix 
3.2), and to complete further online questionnaires on days 7 and 14 which they 
received via email. As Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava and John (2004) 
demonstrated, data collection via email is both valid and consistent with other 
more traditional methods of data collection.  All participants were then fully 
debriefed and reminded of their right to withdraw via email at the end of the two 
week period (see Appendix 3.7). 
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3.6.4 The Questionnaires and Dependent Measures 
The questionnaires were designed to provide a measure of satisfaction 
with choice (DV1), and contained the following key item (adapted from Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000) which was asked at both the initial (‘Time 1’) stage, and at the 
repeat 7 (‘Time 2’) and 14 (‘Time 3’) day stages: ‘How satisfied are you with the 
flower essence you have chosen?’ Participants were required to give answers on 
a 7 point Likert-scale, ranging from 1 (very dissatisfied/not at all) to 7 (very 
satisfied/a great deal) (Appendix 3.2). 
Participants were also asked to provide an indication of the extent to which 
they thought about counterfactual alternatives whilst making their choice (DV2). 
This was done using a self-report measure adapted from Gilbar, Plivazky and Gil 
(2010), in which participants were asked: ‘How much did you think about the 
other options which were available to you?’ This was also measured at both the 
initial (‘Time 1’) stage, and at the repeat 7 (‘Time 2’) and 14 (‘Time 3’) day stages, 
and again participants were required to answer on a 7 point Likert-scale (ranging 
from 1 not at all to 7 a great deal) (Appendix 3.2). 
Finally, the questionnaires were also designed to provide a physiological 
measure of satisfaction, with regard to any reported improvement in the severity 
of participants’ physical symptoms (DV3). Participants were asked (at all 3 time 
stages): ‘How much are your symptoms bothering you today?’ Again participants 
were asked to respond using a 7 point Likert-scale, ranging from 1 (not very 
much) to 7 (a great deal) (Appendix 3.2). 
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3.7      Results 
3.7.1 Excluded Data 
Due to high levels of non-response (31%) at the study mid-point (7 days) I 
only focus on responses at Time 1 (Day 1) and Time 3 (Day 14). For 
completeness, preliminary analyses on the Time 2 (Day 7) data are provided in 
Appendix 3.3. 
3.7.2 Satisfaction Analysis 
For the first analysis, a one way ANOVA with planned contrasts was 
conducted in order to assess satisfaction levels at Time 1. A significant main 
effect of choice level was found: F(2,80) = 3.13, p = .05, η² = .07. Based on the 
quadratic function found in earlier studies (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja 
& Hogarth, 2009) I hypothesised that satisfaction would be very similar for both 
minimal choice (2 options) and extensive choice (38 options) while satisfaction for 
moderate choice (12 options) would be greatest. Thus to test this quadratic 
prediction I conducted planned contrasts of the form (-.5 , 1, -.5) to see whether 
the medium level choice (12) differed significantly from the two extremes. In line 
with these predictions, satisfaction with 12 options was found to be significantly 
higher than satisfaction with 2 and 38 options: F(1,80) = 4.71, p = .03, η² = .06 
(Ms= 5.03, 4.10, 4.66 respectively). This replicates the short term ECE, and 
provides support for previous research (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009), which has shown that satisfaction appears to be an inverted U-
shaped function of the number of alternatives available. Notably, the relatively 
average satisfaction ratings for the 2 and 38 options conditions, of around 4 on a 
scale of 1 – 7, reflect that participants in these conditions were neither particularly 
satisfied nor dissatisfied with their choices. Rather it appears to be that the main 
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difference was the increased, above average satisfaction ratings generated by 
participants in the 12 option condition. 
I then went on to check for the presence of an interaction between time 
and choice. However, as 11 participants (13.3%) failed to complete the Time 3 
questionnaire, it was not possible to assess changes in their satisfaction levels 
over time. As this was considered a fairly significant drop-out rate, additional 
analyses were conducted in order to determine whether these 11 participants 
differed in any way from the remaining participant group, and details of this are 
provided in Appendix 3.4. As such, data from the remaining 72 participants, from 
Time 1 to Time 3, is now subject to further analysis.  
A 3 (Choice Level: Low, Medium, High) x2 (Time: Time 1, Time 3) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last factor revealed a significant main effect of 
time upon satisfaction: F(1,69) = 25.43, p< .001, η²= .27, with satisfaction with 
choice in general being higher at Time 1 than at Time 3 (Ms= 4.86, 3.60). No 
significant main effect of choice level was found: F(2,69) = .70, p = .50, η²= .02. 
Similar average levels of satisfaction were found across the 2, 12 and 38 option 
conditions (Ms = 4.16, 4.42, 4.07). In addition, a marginal interaction was found 
between time and choice level: F(2,69) = 2.49, p = .09, η²= .07, see Figure 3.1 (a 
full table of means is provided in Appendix 3.5). 
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Figure 3.1. Bar chart displaying participants’ mean psychological satisfaction 
ratings as a function of choice set size at Time 1 and Time 3. Standard errors are 
represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column. 
Two follow-up one way ANOVA’s with planned contrasts were then carried 
out on the marginal interaction in order to examine specific predictions regarding 
the effects of choice level upon satisfaction a) at Time 1, and b) at Time 3. At 
Time 1 there was a significant main effect of choice level upon satisfaction: 
F(2,69) = 3.22, p= .05, η²= .09. Once again planned contrasts of the form (-.5, 1, -
.5) were conducted in order to examine predictions that satisfaction with 
moderate choice (12 options) would be greater than satisfaction with either a very 
limited (2) or an extensive (38) number of options. Replicating earlier analyses 
using all 83 participants, the first of these planned contrasts revealed that at Time 
1, satisfaction with 12 options was significantly higher than satisfaction with 2 and 
38 options: F(1,69) = 6.23, p= .02, η²= .08 (Ms= 5.28, 4.38, 4.70 respectively), 
thus providing further support for predictions and for the short-term ECE.  
 At Time 3 no main effect of choice level upon satisfaction was found: 
F(2,69) = .47, p= .63, η²= .01, and planned contrasts revealed that satisfaction in 
the 12 option condition was no longer significantly different from satisfaction in 
the 2 or 38 option conditions: F(1,69) = .12, p= .73, η²=.002 (Ms= 3.55, 3.94, 3.44 
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respectively). This provides initial evidence to suggest that the effects of choice 
level upon satisfaction are not long-lasting, as over a two week period satisfaction 
evened out regardless of initial choice level.  
3.7.3 Counterfactual Analysis 
 Based upon the theoretical model of counterfactual thought discussed 
earlier, and upon the results of Experiment 1, it was predicted that any 
differences in satisfaction would be attributable to differences in the extent to 
which participants engaged in counterfactual thought. A self-report style measure 
was used to provide an indication of this. Data from this question was analysed 
using a 3 (Choice Level: Low, Medium, High) x2 (Time: Time 1 vs. Time 3) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. A significant main effect of 
time upon counterfactual thought was found: F(1,69) = 92.21, p< .001, η²= .57. In 
line with predictions, in general participants reported engaging in more 
counterfactual thought at Time 1 than at Time 3 (Ms= 4.93, 2.61), see Figure 3.2 
(a full table of means is provided in Appendix 3.5). However, no main effect of 
choice level upon counterfactual thought was found: F(2,69) = 1.03, p= .36, η²= 
.03, with similar average amounts of counterfactual thoughts reported across the 
2, 12 and 38 option conditions (Ms= 3.47, 3.69, 4.04). In addition no time/choice 
level interaction was found: F(2,69) = .49, p= .61, η²= .01 (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2. Bar chart displaying participants’ mean levels of reported 
counterfactual thought as a function of choice set size at Time 1 and Time 3. 
Standard errors are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each 
column. 
Subsequently although the overall drop in the counterfactual thoughts at 
Time 3 appears to be in line with predictions, as no differences in the extent to 
which participants reported thinking about counterfactual alternatives were found 
according to choice level at Time 1, results from this self-report measure do not 
parallel earlier satisfaction analyses. The positive correlations found between 
satisfaction and counterfactual thought (both at Time 1: r = .40, p< .001, and 
Time 3: r = .22, p= .07) may give us some insight as to why this may be the case, 
as this suggests that perhaps counter-intuitively (given the findings of Chapter 2), 
increased choice was associated with decreased counterfactual thought. 
However this is a point to which I will return in greater detail during the discussion 
section of this chapter (Section 3.8).  
3.7.4 Symptom Analysis  
Data for symptoms were then analysed, in order to see whether initial choice 
level had had any impact on reported physical symptoms. A one way ANOVA 
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with planned contrasts was carried out.  Severity of symptoms at Time 1 
(recorded before participants had made their choice of essence) was included as 
a covariate in order to take account of individual differences in analyses1.  
Results revealed a significant main effect of choice level on reported 
symptoms at Time 3: F(2,68) = 3.10, p= .05, η² = .08. Symptoms were found to 
be lower if participants initially chose their essence from the 12 rather than the 2 
or 38 selection (Ms= 2.69, 3.44, 3.63 respectively, estimated marginal means 
using prior symptoms as covariate, M= 3.65), and planned contrasts revealed this 
difference to be significant: F(1,68) = 5.38, p= .02, η² = .07. This appears to be in 
contrast to earlier predictions that any ECE would reduce over time, subsequently 
providing evidence to suggest that choice level does have long lasting effects, 
and can affect physiological as well as psychological well-being.  
However, it is important to note that the above results may demonstrate a 
regression to the mean, in the sense that symptoms may have reduced naturally 
over time. This is perhaps particularly relevant given that the participants were 
initially selected on the basis that they were currently experiencing various minor 
psychological or physiological ailments. As no control group was included in this 
experiment, it is therefore difficult to determine whether responses in the 12 
option condition may perhaps be in line with a natural decline in symptoms over 
time, meaning responses generated in the 2 and 38 option conditions may be the 
anomalies: perhaps with a choice between 2 or 38 options leading to detriments 
to what may otherwise be a natural reduction in symptoms. In order to test for this 
the current experiment should be repeated, but with the inclusion of a control 
group who are just given one essence and are asked to use this for a period of 
1For completeness, the symptom analyses were also run with the covariate taken out, and details of this are provided 
in Appendix 3.6. 
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weeks. From this it would then be possible to determine whether it is 12 options 
leading to an improvement in symptoms over time, or 2 and 38 options restricting 
improvement, which may account for these findings.  
3.8     Discussion 
The current research replicated the short-term ECE within the novel 
domain of health psychology. In addition, the current experiment found evidence 
that the initial effects of choice level upon psychological satisfaction do not 
appear to be long lasting, and evened out over a two week period. This appeared 
to be in line with predictions, and with counterfactual theory. However, the 
counterfactual findings from the current experiment were equivocal, perhaps due 
to limitations in the measure used to provide an indication of counterfactual 
thought. As such, further research will be needed in order to gain direct empirical 
support for the role of counterfactual thought in driving this reduction in the ECE 
over time. Finally, perhaps the most interesting finding was a difference in 
reported physiological symptomatology, 14 days after the initial time of choice. 
Specifically, participants who chose their flower essence from a moderate choice 
set of 12 options were found to report significantly greater improvement in their 
physiological symptoms at the end of the 2 week period, than participants who 
chose from either 2 or 38 options. This furthers the previous choice literature by 
demonstrating that a) choice level can have a long term impact upon chooser 
well-being, and b) that choice can affect physiological as well as psychological 
well-being. Each finding is now considered in greater detail. 
In line with previous research (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009), the current research found evidence for the optimizing effects of 
intermediate choice, and detrimental effects of extensive and very limited choice 
111 
upon short term satisfaction. The fact that extensive and very limited choice were 
found to both be highly detrimental to satisfaction is an important point of 
contention with economic rational choice theory, demonstrating that once choice 
has exceeded an optimal level there is no further apparent benefit beyond that 
gained by having a choice of only 2 options in the first place. This finding may 
also help to explain why Scheibehenne et al., (2009) failed to find an ECE in their 
experiment which asked participants to choose whether to donate money to 
charity or keep it for themselves. In this experiment participants were presented 
with a choice of either 2 or 30 options. The authors found no difference in the 
likelihood of participants choosing to donate according to choice set size, which 
they interpret as evidence against the ECE. However, as the present research 
shows, it may be the case that the choice set sizes used were inappropriate for 
an investigation into the ECE, as very limited choice is shown to be equivalent to 
extensive choice. In order to truly examine the ECE a more intermediate level of 
choice must be provided as a point of comparison with these two extreme ‘ends 
of the scale’.
Regarding the long term impact of choice, psychological satisfaction two 
weeks after having made the initial choice was found to be the same regardless 
of whether participants chose from 2, 12 or 38 options, demonstrating that the 
ECE noted at the initial time of choice does not persist over time. This appears to 
be in line with counterfactual theory, specifically with evidence suggesting that 
there will be a reduction in the experience of counterfactual emotion following 
action over time (Kinnier & Metha, 1989; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; 1995). 
Gilovich and Medvec (1995) suggest that the amount of regret experienced 
following action will reduce either as a result of behavioural or psychological 
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repair work. As participants in the current experiment were unable to partake in 
any behavioural ‘repair work’, as their decisions were non-reversible, it appears 
that they may have undertaken psychological ‘repair work’ in terms of attempting 
to reduce the cognitive dissonance associated with negative choice outcomes 
(i.e. the lower satisfaction experienced with either 2 or 38 options). Supporting 
this, Anderson, Taylor and Holloway (1966) found that with increased choice 
came increased cognitive dissonance – causing participants to re-evaluate their 
chosen option as more desirable, and their rejected options as less desirable 
post-choice. However, as no direct measures of dissonance reduction were 
included in this experiment this suggestion is largely speculative, and further 
research will be needed in order to investigate any potential link between 
extensive choice and an increased tendency to engage in psychological ‘repair 
work’ over time.   
Pertaining to the point at which the ECE begins to fade, preliminary 
analyses conducted on the Time 2 measure suggest that the ECE may have 
reduced as early as 7 days after having made the initial choice(see Appendix 
3.3). However, further research using an increased sample size would be needed 
in order to determine whether this is the case, or indeed to determine the exact 
point at which the effects of choice upon psychological satisfaction begin to fade. 
Nevertheless, in line with counterfactual theory the current data show that the 
ECE does not remain robust over time, and is reduced to non-significance after a 
two week period, even when participants continued to evaluate the 
consequences of their choice for the duration of that time period. 
Results from the self-report measure of counterfactual thought were not 
found to support the satisfaction data. However, as previously mentioned, the 
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positive correlations between satisfaction and the extent to which participants 
reported thinking about counterfactual alternatives may give us some insight as 
to why this may be the case. At both times of testing evidence was found that 
increased satisfaction was associated with increased counterfactual thought. This 
finding is counter-intuitive, given the findings of Chapter 2, and indicates that the 
wording of the counterfactual question may have (wrongly) placed emphasis on 
the extent to which participants considered the other factual options available to 
them at the time of making their choice, as opposed to generating a measure of 
post-decisional counterfactual thought. Participants were asked ‘How much did 
you think about the other options which were available to you?’ As similar 
numbers of counterfactual thoughts were reported for 2, 12 and 38 options it 
appears the more participants considered the other options as factual possibilities 
at the time of choice, the more satisfaction they experienced with their chosen 
essence. As such it appears that this was an ineffective means of measuring the 
underlying construct of counterfactual thought, which instead may be most 
appropriately measured using a thought-listing task (as per Chapter 2). 
Subsequently I will not use this self-report measure to provide an indication of 
counterfactual thought in any future experiments. Therefore whilst the satisfaction 
data appear to be consistent with counterfactual theory, the current self-report 
data do not lend any further support to this. Subsequently future research may 
wish to repeat the current experiment but with the inclusion of an open-ended 
thought-listing CFT measure (as per Chapter 2) in order to gain empirical 
evidence for this claim. 
Although the finding that there was a reduction in the ECE over time itself 
appears to be in line with counterfactual theory, the fact that there was an overall 
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drop in psychological satisfaction over time suggests that something else other 
than counterfactual thought may have been driving satisfaction down at Time 3. 
There are a number of potential explanations for this. These are based upon 
contextual differences between the environments in which participants completed 
the Time 1 and Time 3 questionnaires. For instance, satisfaction at Time 1 may 
have been driven up on the whole due to, a) the fact that participants had just 
been given something (i.e. their flower essence) for free (– the memory of this 
may have been less influential in judgements made at Time 3), b) the positive 
social interaction with the experimenter at Time 1 (which was not present at Time 
3), or c) the mere presence of an experimenter at Time 1 may have led to an 
observation bias, or ‘Hawthorne effect’ (Landsberger, 1958; Gillespie, 1991), 
whereby research has demonstrated that participants’ behaviour can be affected 
simply by being aware that an experimenter is paying attention to them. In each 
case these positive experiences at Time 1 may have acted as anchors leading to 
increased satisfaction ratings (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Simonson & 
Tversky, 1992). Or, finally d) it may be the case that at Time 1 participants may 
have had increased expectations about the potential results of the treatment, 
leading to an overall increase in satisfaction, whilst at Time 3 participants may 
have felt their expectations weren’t met, potentially also contributing to the drop in 
overall satisfaction.  
In order to test these explanations future research may wish to repeat the 
current experiment, either a) ensuring participants are given something for free at 
both times of testing (i.e. an additional prize for participation at Time 3), or b) with 
both questionnaires completed in the same setting – i.e. either both in or out of 
the laboratory, in order to hold constant any potential anchoring effects involving 
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interactions with the experimenter. The latter explanation may be tested for by 
assessing whether participants expectations about the treatment were met or not 
at the end of the 14 day period. If the overall drop in satisfaction is due to 
disconfirmed expectations, then this provides a potentially important addition to 
the previous health literature – which has identified that a key factor contributing 
to placebo effectiveness is expectancy (Kirsch, 1985; 2005; Morris, 1999). 
Participants must believe the placebo is going to work in order for it to be 
effective. However in the current experiment, I found evidence for a placebo 
effect, in terms of improvement in the severity of physical symptoms. Therefore it 
would appear most likely that the drop in satisfaction was the product of a 
situational anchoring bias rather than disconfirmed expectancies, as one would 
not necessarily predict to find a placebo effect where expectations are 
disconfirmed. 
Whilst no evidence was found for any long lasting impact of choice level 
upon psychological satisfaction, choice level was nevertheless still found to have 
a long term effect on physiological well-being. Results from the symptom 
analyses suggest that choice level may have a deeper rooted impact, which 
appears to have resulted in experience of greater improvement in physical 
symptoms, crucially following use of the (objectively) same placebo treatment. 
This is a somewhat unexpected finding given that the effects of choice level upon 
psychological satisfaction were not found to persist over time. Thus it appears the 
success of a placebo treatment, in terms of the extent to which participants report 
experiencing improvement in symptom severity, may be influenced by the size of 
the choice set that participants initially chose from. This not only contributes 
towards research into factors affecting the effectiveness of placebo treatments, 
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but also to the ECE literature, by demonstrating that choice level can impact upon 
physical as well as psychological well-being.  
These findings have several implications. Firstly, by examining the 
longitudinal impact of choice level, the current study extends our knowledge of 
the true ‘problem’ of extensive choice (Schwartz, 2004). In line with Schwartz’s 
(2004) suggestion, it appears that choice level may indeed have a long term 
impact upon well-being. Schwartz (2004) proposed that extensive choice could 
lead to increased expectations, and subsequently decreased well-being when 
decision outcomes don’t match up. The current data provide empirical support for 
this claim. As previous research has shown, expectations are key to eliciting a 
placebo effect. As such it appears that choice level may have impacted upon 
well-being via its impact upon expectations. When presented with an intermediate 
number of options participants may have experienced optimal expectations about 
their decision outcome, due to the fact they may have felt able to cope with the 
number of options they had to choose from. This expectation level may 
subsequently have been matched by their experiences, resulting in greater 
experience of a placebo effect, and greater benefit to their physical well-being. 
On the other hand, for an extensive number of options, participants’ expectations 
may have perhaps been unrealistically high (Schwartz, 2004). Upon being 
presented with so many options, participants may have felt so overwhelmed by 
the increased responsibility for picking the best outcome, that their actual 
experience could not match up to their expectations. As previous research has 
shown, if participants’ expectations about the results of a treatment are shown to 
be unrealistic then they will be unlikely to experience any placebo effect 
(Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997), and subsequently no improvement to their physical 
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well-being.  However, as no measure of prior expectations was included in the 
current experiment, this suggestion is speculative, and further research will be 
needed in order to investigate any potential link between different choice levels 
and prior expectations.  
Thus not only does the current research extend our knowledge of the long 
term impact of choice level, but raises the possibility that the underlying 
mechanism behind impact this may involve the influence of choice upon 
expectations. In doing so, these results also add to the previous literature into 
placebo treatments – by highlighting initial choice set size as an additional factor 
potentially contributing to the effectiveness of placebo treatments, alongside 
those factors already established in the health literature. Future research may 
subsequently wish to bear the influence of choice set size in mind when 
designing experiments into the effectiveness of placebo treatments. 
Finally, the current research also highlights the potential importance of 
bearing choice level in mind during the construction of public policy. On the basis 
of economic theory, policy makers have been granting greater numbers of 
options in public goods and services on the basis of the belief that more choice 
can only lead to a better outcome (Botti & Iyengar, 2006). However as the current 
results demonstrate, it appears that not only does extensive choice (and very 
limited choice) lead to reduced satisfaction initially, but may also lead to impaired 
improvement in physical well-being, in comparison to a more optimal level of 
around 12 options. These findings are of particular importance within the relevant 
and highly consequential field of medical decision making (Schneider, 1998; Botti 
& Iyengar, 2006; Fasolo, Reutskaja, Dixon & Boyce, 2010), where it appears that 
choosers may potentially experience greater improvement in physical well-being 
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following a course of treatment if they are offered an intermediate level of choice 
initially. Following Eccles’ (2002) claim that placebo effects form a part of the 
response to any active medical intervention (see also, Margo, 1999), one might 
perhaps predict similar potential benefits to chooser health and well-being of 
using an optimal choice level for decisions involving active health care 
treatments. Notably, however, this is also likely to be largely dependent upon 
situational factors such as whether the most effective treatment methods are 
made available or not, and the degree of variety in the choice set amongst real 
options (i.e. not involving an illusory choice). Nevertheless this remains an 
interesting avenue for future research to explore.    
To conclude, the main aim of the current chapter was to investigate the 
longevity of the effects of choice level upon both psychological and physiological 
well-being. In doing so it was discovered that the short term effects to 
psychological satisfaction do not appear to persist over time. This appears to be 
in line with the predicted temporal reduction to the experience of regret. As noted 
above, however, the counterfactual findings in the current chapter were 
equivocal, perhaps because of limitations in the specific measure used. Although 
I did find an overall drop in counterfactual generation over time, as predicted, the 
ECE found at the initial time of choice was not found to be mediated by 
counterfactual thought, as per Experiment 1. Consequently in further studies I will 
re-adopt the open-ended thought-listing means of measuring counterfactuals 
adapted from Crawford and McCrea (2004), and previously used in Experiments 
1 and 2. In addition, the current research also highlighted that not only did the 
ECE transfer to the novel domain of health psychology, but also that the effect 
had implications reaching beyond psychological satisfaction, by potentially also 
119 
influencing a persons’ self-reported physiological well-being. An optimal choice 
level of 12 options was found to not only lead to improved short term satisfaction, 
but also to improved (reported) physiological well-being over time. The potential 
implications of these findings for our understanding of the ECE, for the 
psychology of health, for the construction of public policy, and for future research, 
have been discussed.  
Notably, the improvement to physiological well-being found in the current 
experiment is a placebo effect, and as such results from the current experiment 
do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that any decision made from an optimal 
choice level will lead to long-term improvements in well-being. The results only 
concern decisions in which participants continued to be affected by the results of 
their choice for an extended period of time, or using placebo (or potentially active) 
health care treatments. Future research will therefore be needed in order to a) 
determine whether there are any long term effects to physiological well-being for 
decisions outside of the field of the psychology of health, for example with regard 
to decisions involving consumer goods, and b) to identify whether optimal choice 
levels might lead to similar improvements in physiology for active health care 
treatments. 
The ECE has subsequently now been replicated in two experiments 
across varying domains (creativity and health psychology). In Experiment 1 it was 
demonstrated that this ECE was mediated by counterfactual thought, and could 
subsequently be reduced under high load, whilst in Experiment 3 the initial ECE 
and reduction in the effect over time also appears to be consistent with 
counterfactual theory. In my next chapter I aim to apply another aspect of 
counterfactual theory to the ‘problem’ of extensive choice (Fasolo et al., 2007) 
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with the aim of investigating a potential means of improving satisfaction with 
extensive choice. This relates to the counterfactual ‘action effect’, which has 
consistently demonstrated that counterfactual thoughts may be more prevalent 
following action than inaction (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1982a; Landman, 1987; 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Avni-Babad, 2003; an extensive review of this literature 
is provided in Chapter 4). Many decisions made in applied settings will involve 
the use of default options as a ‘starting point’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), and as 
Ritov and Baron (1992) showed, choosing to stick with a default may be viewed 
as being akin to inaction (see Chapter 4). In Experiments 4 – 6 I aim to apply this 
aspect of counterfactual theory to the ECE and determine whether choosing to 
stick with a default option might help to improve satisfaction with extensive choice 
sets, following the predicted impact of default options upon the generation of 
counterfactual alternatives. 
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Chapter 4 – Investigating the Potential for Default Options to Improve Satisfaction 
with Extensive Choice 
Introduction 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 In the previous chapters we have seen evidence that extensive choice can 
lead to a decrease in satisfaction with chosen options, and even a decrease in 
the long-term effectiveness of a placebo treatment, compared to a more modest 
amount of choice. However, in the real world it may be highly problematic to try 
and limit the choice set available (e.g. for ethical reasons or market trading 
regulations). Consequently the main aim of the current chapter is to investigate 
how we might structure the choice environment in order to aid people to cope 
with extensive choice, and to explore what effect might this have on satisfaction 
with chosen options. One possible way of doing this is to offer defaults. These 
can be explained as “a set of rules put in place by a governing body, or choice 
architect, which will determine what happens to the decision maker if he or she 
chooses to do nothing” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 83). Research has shown 
that individuals typically display a strong preference towards sticking with a 
default option, if one is provided to them (Hartman, Doane & Woo, 1991; 
Simonson, 1992; Schweitzer, 1995; Madrian & Shea, 2001; Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008 ; a full review of this 
literature is provided in Section 4.2 below), and this has led recent psychological 
research to consider the potential benefits that certain default options might have, 
in terms of ‘nudging’ individuals in welfare promoting directions (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008).  
122 
Notably for the current thesis, default options are potentially important 
because they shed light on the underlying process of counterfactual generation 
hypothesised in the current thesis to be an underlying cause of the ECE. 
Specifically, if someone sticks with a default they are accepting a status quo 
option, which is related to the counterfactual ‘action/inaction’ effect, whereby 
research has shown that individuals may be less likely to generate counterfactual 
alternatives following outcomes achieved via inaction as opposed to action 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Landman, 1987; Gleicher et al., 1990; Byrne & 
McEleney, 2000; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Connolly et al., 
1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1998; Avni-Babad, 2003; I provide a full review of this 
literature in Section4.3 below). As such, it was hypothesised that providing a 
default option might help to improve satisfaction with extensive choice due to the 
predicted impact of default options, i.e. inaction, upon counterfactual generation. I 
provide a thorough introduction into the counterfactual action/inaction effect in 
Section 4.3 below, which forms the theoretical basis for the experiments detailed 
in this chapter, following an introduction to existing research on default options.     
4.2 Existing Research on Default Options  
 According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008) many decisions made in applied 
settings will involve the use of default options as a ‘starting point’. Indeed, the 
authors argue that the use of defaults is often unavoidable, in the sense that for 
any given choice, a governing body or “choice architect” (pp. 3) must set in place 
an associated rule which will obtain if the chooser does nothing. In this sense, 
default options have been defined as being both ubiquitous and powerful (see 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).This point is supported by a substantial body of 
psychological research which has shown that in any instance, a large proportion 
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of individuals will opt to stick with a default option if one is presented to them, 
whether or not that default is good for them. For example, in Hartman et al.,’s 
(1991) experiment, Californian electricity users were asked to rate their 
preferences regarding service reliability and rates. The authors found that when a 
company which was high in reliability was presented as a default option, the 
majority (60%) of participants chose this as their preference. Importantly 
however, the other half of the participants were presented with a low reliability 
company as their default, and still the vast majority opted to stick with the default 
option, with 58% selecting this as their preference. 
 Further, Simonson (1992) found that participants judged they would feel 
more regret if they started searching for a journal article in the last issue, to find it 
in the first issue, than if they started searching chronologically from the first issue, 
to find it in the last issue. Simonson (1992) argues this is because starting from 
the beginning and working chronologically is the default search option. As such 
switching from this is likely to elicit greater experience of negative counterfactual 
emotion. In Schweitzer’s (1995) experiment, the type of investment strategy 
participants chose to recommend to a friend was found to be largely influenced 
by whichever option was presented to them as a default. Similarly, Luce (1998) 
examined the status quo bias within the field of consumer research, and found 
that participants who decided to stick with a default when considering choice of 
which car to purchase, experienced considerably lower levels of negative affect 
post-decision than participants who switched from the default.  
4.2.1 Existing Explanations for Default Preference 
 Numerous potential explanations for this bias towards sticking with default 
options have been suggested. According to Sunstein and Thaler (2003) decision 
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uncertainty may play a role. Sunstein and Thaler (2003) suggest that the fact that 
in many domains people lack clear preferences means that what they choose is 
strongly influenced by the decision context, and default rules are one aspect of 
this. Alternatively, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) claim that people may stick 
with defaults as a result of cognitive dissonance theory – as once an option has 
been selected this raises its value to some extent, causing the individual to 
interpret subsequent information with a bias towards the status quo option. Or, 
people may choose to stick with defaults simply because making an active choice 
is more effortful, and potentially more stressful, leading to inertia (Baron & Ritov, 
1994).  
On the other hand, people may choose to stick with default options simply 
because they perceive the default as a suggestion made by the policy maker, or 
experimenter, implying a recommended course of action (Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003). Alternatively, it has been suggested that people may stick with default 
options as a result of loss aversion – whereby the potential losses associated 
with giving up a default option often loom larger than any potential gains 
associated with other options (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1991; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Finally, and crucially for the current thesis, it has 
been suggested that sticking with a default option is similar to inaction (see Ritov 
& Baron, 1992), and as such, defaults may be associated with increased 
satisfaction in comparison to active choices due to the increased ease with which 
one is able to imagine counterfactual alternatives for action (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Byrne & McEleney, 2000; a review of this literature is provided in Section 
4.3 below). Tykocinski and Pittman’s (1998) experiment provides further support 
for this, highlighting that one reason why people prefer inaction is in order to 
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shield themselves from the potential experience of the counterfactual emotion of 
regret associated with action.  
Whatever the underlying explanation, our tendency to stick with default 
options is easily exploited. For example, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) cite 
examples of how successful businesses frequently cash in on the “immense 
power of defaults” (pp. 85), for example in the case of automatic magazine 
subscriptions. If renewal is automatic, and provided as a default that requires 
‘unticking’, then many people will continue to pay for subscriptions they no longer 
want or need. Also, TV executives are reported to invest a lot of time working on 
network scheduling because they know that once a person has ‘switched on’ to a 
certain channel they are likely to stay there. The authors call this the “yeah, 
whatever” heuristic (pp.35).  
4.2.2 Defaults as Social ‘Nudges’
Following this, recent research has begun to consider the potential 
benefits certain default options might have. Thaler & Sunstein (2008) described 
how defaults are powerful ‘nudges’, which might be used to move people in 
welfare promoting directions. For example, Madrian and Shea (2001) found that 
default options could be used to dramatically increase employee savings. Whilst 
Johnson and Goldstein (2003) found that using an opt-out default, as opposed to 
an opt-in default, could dramatically increase organ donation rates, which they 
conclude could potentially help to save thousands of lives each year. Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) reiterate this, arguing that because default rules are inevitable in 
many situations, policy makers would be wise to bear the power of defaults in 
mind and consider structuring choices in a manner which would promote welfare. 
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The authors refer to this as a libertarian paternalistic approach to choice 
architecture (see Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). 
Therefore to summarise so far, research has shown that individuals 
typically display a bias towards sticking with a default option if one is presented to 
them, and this has been shown to lead to improved satisfaction, and reduced 
experience of negative affect post-decision (e.g. Simonson, 1992; Luce, 1998). It 
has been suggested that default options are akin to ‘inaction’ (Ritov & Baron, 
1992; 1995), and this link is a potentially important one for the current thesis, as it 
sheds light upon the underlying process of counterfactual generation 
hypothesised to be an underlying cause of the ECE. Specifically, if default 
options represent a means of eliciting choice via inaction, then this may lead to 
improved satisfaction with extensive choice, due to the predicted impact of 
‘inaction’ upon counterfactual generation. I provide a specific rationale for the 
different experimental conditions in Section 4.4 below, following a more detailed 
introduction to the counterfactual ‘action/inaction’ effect, which forms the 
theoretical basis for the experiments detailed in the current chapter. 
4.3 The Counterfactual ‘Action Effect’
 Most decisions we make are subject to a degree of uncertainty. Forming 
expectations about the potential outcomes of different courses of action may help 
us to cope with this uncertainty (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). When the outcomes of 
our decisions do not match up to our expectations, in hindsight we might perceive 
that we have made a ‘bad’ decision, and the realisation of this often results in the 
experience of negative affect (Zeelenberg et al., 1998; 2000; Feeney & Handley, 
2006). We might experience regret, shame, or disappointment with our decision 
outcome. Crucially the experience of these emotions depends upon our ability to 
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compare our actual state of affairs with some counterfactual alternative, i.e. our 
ability to imagine how things might have turned out had we acted, or chosen 
differently. Because of this, these are often termed ‘counterfactual emotions’ 
(Niedenthal et al., 1994; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008). According to Bell (1982) the 
counterfactual emotion that seems to be the most relevant in terms of decision-
making is that of regret. One key aspect of the current research into regret is 
focused upon whether we are most likely to experience this emotion as a result of 
action, or as a result of actions foregone (inactions). This is referred to as the 
‘action effect’.  
 A substantial amount of research into the counterfactual ‘action effect’ has 
found that people tend to regret actions more than they regret inaction, because it 
is easier for people to generate alternatives to reality for something they did, 
compared to something they did not do (Byrne, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 1, 
one of the earliest investigations into the effect was Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1982a) experiment, in which participants were asked to consider two 
hypothetical scenarios. In the first, Paul considered switching his stocks from 
Company A to Company B, but decided against it. In the second, George 
considered the same switch in stocks, and decided to make the switch. Thus the 
outcome of Paul’s decision can be seen to stem from inaction, whilst the outcome 
of George’s decision is the result of action. Participants were informed that both 
Paul and George would have been better off by $1200 if they had chosen the 
alternative course of action (or inaction), i.e. Paul would have been better off 
financially had he swapped his stocks, whilst George would have been better off 
had he not swapped his stocks. Participants were asked to judge which investor 
would experience the most regret at this loss of income. The vast majority (92%) 
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of participants believed George, the actor, would feel more regret than Paul, the 
non-actor.  
As previously discussed, a substantial amount of research has replicated 
this effect. For example, using a variety of hypothetical scenarios, Landman 
(1987) demonstrated that good outcomes were viewed more favourably, and bad 
outcomes more negatively when these were achieved through action, than when 
the same outcomes were achieved through inaction (see also, Gleicher et al., 
1990; Byrne & McEleney, 2000; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). 
Further, Avni-Babad (2003) found evidence for the action effect even when 
participants were not provided with prior counterfactual information. Gilovich and 
Medvec (1994) also found evidence for an action effect. In their experiment, 
participants were asked to read a scenario in which two protagonists, Sam and 
Jim are both enrolled at the same University. Both are only moderately satisfied 
where they are, and consider switching to a different university. In the end, Sam 
decides to stay put and Jim opts switch to a different university. Participants are 
informed that the decision turns out badly for both protagonists. Sam is unhappy 
that he stayed and Jim is unhappy that he decided to switch. Participants are 
asked to imagine who would experience the most regret. The authors found 
evidence for an action effect: participants consistently reported that Jim would 
experience more regret as a result of his action, than the comparative regret Sam 
would experience as a result of inaction. 
Similarly, in Connolly et al.,’s (1997) experiment, participants were asked 
to read a hypothetical scenario in which the person described either switched, or 
didn’t switch, from aspects of a required university course. The authors found that 
participants judged that a person who experienced the same outcome as a result 
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of action would experience greater regret in response to a negative outcome, and 
greater elation in response to a positive outcome, than a person who experienced 
the same outcomes as a result of inaction. As the same results were obtained 
whether the action was the result of the persons’ own choice or through random 
computer re-assignment, the authors’ claim this demonstrates that control and 
responsibility for action do not appear to be key to the prevalence of the action 
effect. This consistent replication led Gilovich and Medvec (1995) to conclude 
that the action effect is one of the most robust findings in the counterfactual 
literature.   
4.3.1 Explanations for the ‘Action Effect’
Kahneman and Tversky (1982a) argue that the effect occurs due to the 
fact that actions are more mutable than inactions, leading to ‘emotional 
amplification’, whereby people have a tendency to react more strongly to those 
events for which it is easiest to imagine another outcome occurring. Indeed, 
according to Norm theory’s account (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), actions are 
rendered more mutable than failures to act, as a direct result of inaction being 
perceived as more ‘normal’ than action. In other words, in deciding to act, a 
person is acting ‘abnormally’, and thus counterfactual alternatives become more 
readily available (i.e. the event is more mutable), than if one is considering the 
same outcome caused as a result of inaction. Byrne and McEleney (2000) 
explain how this effect might be attributable to mental models theory. According 
to the mental models theory of thinking, people reason by representing discrete 
sets of affairs that are consistent with the information presented to them in the 
problem scenario (Thompson & Byrne, 2002; Feeney & Handley, 2006). These 
representations are known as “mental models” (Johnson-Laird, 1983), which, 
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according to Craik (1943), may be viewed as small scale models of the world. For 
example, when an individual understands a conjunction such as, ‘there is a 
triangle and there is a circle’ they represent its meaning (its intension), from 
which they can construct a representation of what it refers to (its extension) 
(Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi & Caverni, 1999). The representation 
of the extension takes the form of the mental model, in which the two objects are 
two mental tokens. Typically, mental models represent only true possibilities, 
which may be “fleshed out” to make fully explicit models also containing the false 
components in each possibility (see Johnson-Laird et al., 1999; Byrne, 2005).  
Originally devised to explain the comprehension of discourse and 
deductive reasoning (see Johnson-Laird, 1983), the mental models theory has 
also been applied to probabilistic reasoning (e.g. Johnson-Laird et al., 1999), and 
counterfactual thought. For example, Byrne and McEleney (2000), describe how 
the counterfactual action effect may be the result of the more explicit 
representations people hold for action. In the case of the investment scenario for 
instance, participants will hold in mind two mental models for the actor – his past 
and present situations, whereas for the non-actor only one mental model is held 
in mind, as his past and present situations are unchanged. The authors explain 
that the result of this may be that people attribute less regret to the non-actor as 
no counterfactual alternative is readily available in their mental model, thus 
making inaction less mutable.  
Providing support for this, Tykocinski and Pittman (1998) found that one 
reason why people prefer inaction to action is in order to shield themselves from 
the potential experience of regret following action. In their experiment, 
participants were asked to read a variety of hypothetical scenarios detailing 
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missed attractive opportunities. For example, in one scenario participants are 
asked to imagine they read about a fantastic holiday opportunity, but were too 
slow in getting to the travel agents office, and all of the available places were 
booked. The authors found that this initial inaction was likely to lead to continued 
inaction when participants were later presented with a similar, but considerably 
less attractive (in terms of cost) package deal. The authors term this effect 
inaction inertia, and suggest that this effect occurs as participants’ anticipate 
experiencing increased regret if they choose to act and take up an opportunity 
which was less attractive than the opportunity which was previously missed. 
However, when participants were provided with negative feedback information 
about the original missed opportunity (for example, that the original tour guide fell 
ill and was replaced with a humourless substitute), the inaction inertia was found 
to subside. Participants in this negative feedback condition were found to be 
significantly more likely to take up the second, less attractive offer in comparison 
to participants who received no such feedback. The authors suggest this is 
because this information “absolves one of anticipated regret” (pp. 615), thus 
removing the problematic feature that would otherwise have led to continued 
inaction. As such, this study provides further evidence for the contention that 
people may prefer inaction over action due to the fact that action is associated 
with the greater experience of counterfactual thought and emotion.              
Alternatively, these results have also been explained in terms of the status 
quo bias. According to Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), the term status quo 
bias refers to people’s tendency to “do nothing, or maintain one’s previous 
decision” (pp. 8). In their experiment, participants were asked to read a 
hypothetical scenario detailing possible investment opportunities. Participants 
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were either informed about the options with no additional information, or were 
presented with the same options, but with one designated as the status quo. The 
authors found evidence for a status quo bias – participants were found to have a 
strong tendency to maintain the status quo (i.e. to not switch from the default 
option), whilst in the other condition the options were regarded as equally 
attractive.  
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) established a status quo bias 
simply by placing the object to be valued on the subjects’ desk. Kahneman et al., 
(1991) suggest that this status quo bias is attributable to the endowment effect, 
and loss aversion, whereby the loss of the status quo looms larger than the 
potential gain of alternative options, as the choice is judged on the basis of a 
neutral reference point. If an individual is already given a default option then they 
will attribute a greater value to it, making any act to switch from the default (and 
break the status quo) a more risky option, as the chooser stands to lose 
something they already perceive as being theirs.  
However, the account provided by Norm Theory finds support from the 
work of Ritov and Baron (1992; 1995) who noted that the investment scenario 
confounded inaction with this status quo bias, as in each case the target 
described is given a default state, those who decide to act are essentially 
breaking the status quo, whilst those who decide not to act are maintaining the 
status quo. In their experiment, Ritov and Baron (1992) used a variety of 
hypothetical scenarios in order to determine whether the results of the investment 
scenario were due to status quo bias, or a general preference for inaction. The 
authors found that subjects reacted more negatively to action whether the status 
quo was maintained or not, and preferred inaction to action even when inaction 
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was associated with change. The authors term this general preference towards 
inaction ‘omission bias’, providing support for Norm Theory’s account, rather than 
merely a preference towards maintaining the status quo. 
4.3.2 Evidence Against the ‘Action Effect’
Other research has identified limitations to the action effect. For example, 
in N’gbala and Branscombe’s (1997) experiment participants were presented with 
a version of the investment scenario, however they received a version detailing 
either the action-alone aspect of the scenario, the inaction-alone aspect, or both 
the action and inaction aspects (comparative scenario). In addition, the authors 
included a measure of mutability, in order to test Norm Theory’s prediction that 
actions were regretted more because they were more readily mutated than 
inactions. The authors found evidence that actions were regretted more than 
inactions only in comparative judgements, where information about action was 
presented alongside the alternative, inaction version of the story. In addition, the 
authors demonstrated that whether the action/inaction versions of events were 
presented alone or together, they were both mutated with equal frequency, 
seemingly contrary to Norm Theory’s account.  
The authors claim that these results are consistent with Gavanski and 
Well’s (1989) theory about ‘default events’, in which the default event is “that 
which readily comes to mind as an alternative to a factual event” (pp. 162). 
According to N’gbala and Branscombe (1997) actions and inactions would be 
mutated with equal frequency when presented alongside a default event. In the 
case of the investment scenario, the antecedents of the outcomes (i.e. action or 
inaction) were each presented alongside a default alternative. That is, 
participants were informed that the actor could have improved his outcome by 
134 
not-acting, whilst the non-actor could have improved his outcome by acting. By 
demonstrating that participants only judged the actor to feel more regret than the 
non-actor when a comparative judgment could be drawn, and by providing a 
measure of mutability, the authors conclude that their results illustrate that the 
action effect is not the result of actions being perceived as more abnormal, but 
rather that the non-actors decision was judged to be more wise than the 
alternative decision to act.  
Similarly, in Zeelenberg et al.,’s (2002) experiment, participants read 
versions of a hypothetical scenario in which a soccer coach decided whether or 
not to change the line-up of his team. The authors demonstrated that participants 
only experienced more regret as a result of action when information about prior 
outcomes was positive, or absent. In cases where information about prior 
outcomes was negative, i.e. when participants read information detailing how the 
soccer team had lost their previous match, action was deemed to be more 
‘normal’ – resulting in more regret being attributed to inaction. The authors term 
this an inaction effect. Paralleling this, in a study using default options, Inman and 
Zeelenberg (2002) found that when prior information about the available 
alternatives was both available and negative then satisfaction could be improved 
if participants chose to switch to a different option, rather than opting to stick with 
a default. The authors argue that this is because in this instance action is 
perceived as more normal than inaction. As such the influence of prior 
information regarding the valence of choice outcomes will be an important 
methodological consideration for the current experiments. This is a point to which 
I will return in Section 4.5 below. 
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Finally, Gilovich and Medvec (1994) found that whilst actions were 
regretted more than inactions in the short term, over time a reversal of this effect 
occurs, and participants exhibited an inaction effect (see also, Kinnier & Metha, 
1989; Feldman et al, 1999; Roese & Summerville, 2005). The authors suggest a 
variety of causal mechanisms which may be responsible for this reversal of the 
action effect, including factors which may reduce the pain of actions more so than 
the pain of inactions: a) behavioural repair work in terms of compensating for 
regrettable actions, and b) psychological repair work in terms of identifying silver 
linings and increased cognitive dissonance reduction. As well as factors which 
may increase the pain of inactions more than the pain of actions: a) that failures 
to act become harder to justify than decisions to act, and b) that the 
consequences of failures to act are seemingly infinite, leading to a greater 
potential for future counterfactual thought than decisions to act, which according 
to Gilovich and Medvec (1995), may be reflected upon as having seemingly finite 
consequences (see also, Gilovich et al., 1995; 2003).       
  Therefore to summarise so far, whilst there is considerable evidence for 
the action effect there is also a substantial body of research demonstrating the 
limitations of the effect. When prior information about inaction is negative, or 
when one is not able to directly compare action with inaction, then the effect is 
not found to occur, and theoretical explanations for this have been discussed. In 
most other instances, however, it appears that the action effect is fairly robust 
and widely replicated, and this has been attributed to counterfactual mutability 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Byrne & McEleney, 2000; Byrne, 2005).  
 As previously discussed, Experiments 4 – 6 detailed in this chapter were 
subsequently designed to apply this aspect of counterfactual theory directly to the 
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field of decision making by comparing people’s active choices, with their 
decisions to not act – in terms of choosing to stick with a default option. Only one 
study (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), as far as I am aware, has previously linked default 
options directly with counterfactual thought. In this experiment, participants read 
a hypothetical scenario in which the protagonist, Paul, wished to purchase a 
laptop computer. Participants read how Paul made the decision to either stick 
with, or switch from, a default option (Study 3). Tsiros & Mittal (2000) found that 
participants were significantly more likely to generate counterfactual thoughts 
following a decision to switch from the default option. Further, supporting the 
overarching hypothesis of the current thesis, this increased tendency to engage 
in counterfactual thought was found to drive the experience of regret which 
ultimately undermined satisfaction. The current experiment(s) aimed to extend 
these findings directly to the ECE. Further, I aimed to contribute towards a 
greater understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind any potential 
benefits of default options, through the application of the counterfactual action 
effect literature.  
4.4 Rationale for the Current Experiment(s) 
The current experiments were designed to investigate the potential for 
default options to improve satisfaction with extensive choice. On the basis of the 
theoretical counterfactual account provided above, and following the findings of 
Experiment 1, it was predicted that satisfaction with an extensive number of 
options would be low when made via an active choice (also supported by 
Experiment 3), as a direct result of increased counterfactual thought. However, it 
was predicted that presenting one option as a default might cause satisfaction 
levels to increase comparatively, due to the fact that in sticking with a default 
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option (and deciding not to act to break the status quo), counterfactual 
alternatives may be less readily available.  
Notably, participants in the default choice condition may also choose to 
switch from the provided default option, essentially making these ‘switchers’ akin 
to active choice participants. As such it is predicted that any participant who 
chooses to switch from the default will also experience decreased satisfaction in 
comparison to participants who opt to stick with the default, due to the fact that 
‘switchers’ will then be required to make an active choice between the remaining 
options for themselves. However, based upon the previous literature into default 
options it is also predicted that very few participants placed in the default choice 
condition will opt to switch from that default. To summarise, it is predicted that the 
decreased satisfaction levels often associated with extensive choice (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000; Shar & Wolford, 2007, Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; results detailed 
in Experiments 1 and 3) might be improved if participants choose to stick with a 
default option, due to the predicted impact of inaction upon counterfactual 
thought.       
4.5 Methodological Considerations 
 In the current experiments, rather than comparing extensive with limited or 
optimal choice (as per Experiments 1 and 3 respectively), I will now only be using 
extensive choice as: a) the dissatisfaction associated with extensive choice is the 
main focus of the ECE literature, b) this is where counterfactual thought levels 
were demonstrated to be highest (Experiment 1), and c) because the ECE has 
been previously established in Experiments 1 and 3. In this Chapter I attempt to 
manage the dissatisfaction associated with extensive choice via ideas from the 
counterfactual literature, and the presentation of a default option. As such, the 
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current experiments differ slightly from the typical ECE literature by comparing 
different extensive choice types with a no choice control group, with the overall 
aim of attempting to improve satisfaction with extensive choice. Consequently for 
both the active and default choice conditions, participants will be presented with a 
choice between an extensive number of 24 options.  
As previously discussed (see Section 4.3.2), in Inman and Zeelenberg’s
(2002) study of default choice, it was found that when prior information about the 
available alternatives was both available and negative then satisfaction could be 
improved if participants chose to act, i.e. to switch from the provided default. 
Consequently bearing this in mind, in the current experiments participants will be 
making a choice with no prior information regarding the valence of choice 
outcomes on which to base their decision from the outset, making it in line with 
most of the previous literature into defaults and inaction. Finally, based upon 
Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000; see also Chernev 2003a; 2003b) investigation into 
the ECE the current experiments consider satisfaction with chocolate choice, 
according to manipulations in choice type (active versus default). As previously 
stated, a control group will also be implemented who will just sample one of the 
chocolates in order to gain a base level of satisfaction with choice. Counterfactual 
thought will be assessed in the active choice and default choice conditions, using 
the same open ended thought-listing procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Because it will not be possible to assess counterfactual thought in the control 
group, as they have no alternatives with which to compare their outcome, the 
extent to which participants experienced the counterfactual emotion of regret will 
also be measured. In this manner it will then be possible to compare an aspect of 
counterfactual experience between the choice and no choice control conditions.  
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4.6        Experiment 4 
4.6.1                      Method 
4.6.1.1 Participants 
84 paid participants (46 women and 38 men, mean age = 30, with a range 
of 18 to 65 years) recruited by Plymouth University’s paid participant pool, took 
part in the experiment, each receiving £4 in exchange for 30 minutes 
participation. 
4.6.1.2 Materials 
The extensive choice set consisted of 24 different luxury chocolates from 
Hotel Chocolat (a high end chain of chocolate stores in the UK). Hotel Chocolat 
was selected as they provide a wide variety of different flavoured luxury 
chocolates, which are decorated so that each different flavour has a unique 
appearance. This was important in order to further emphasise the different 
options in the extensive choice set. Further, Hotel Chocolat is a relatively new 
company (launched in 2003), and as they sell luxury, relatively expensive, 
chocolates it was deemed likely that most participants would be relatively 
unfamiliar with the majority of options presented to them, in comparison to using 
a better known brand. As such it was deemed this was likely to provide a more 
valid measure of choice satisfaction, as choices would be less likely to be 
affected by previous experience. The exact selection of chocolates used was 
determined through market research, whereby I asked the manager of Hotel 
Chocolat to provide me with information regarding the best, and worst selling 
chocolate flavours. On the basis of this, the top and bottom 5 flavours were 
excluded from use in the experiment. This was an important consideration as 
including these flavours could have impacted upon the types of choices 
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participants made – i.e. to specifically choose, or avoid certain options. In this 
manner it was determined that choices would be made from an extensive 
selection of options that were relatively more similar in terms of attractiveness. 
The chocolates were presented in paper cake cases (see Appendix 4.1), and 
were each accompanied by a short (one – two sentence) flavour description, as 
provided by Hotel Chocolat.      
4.6.1.3 Procedure 
 Participants were informed that the experiment was designed to provide 
market research to an up-and-coming (unnamed) chocolate company (Appendix 
4.2), and were placed into one of three conditions: active choice/ default choice/ 
control. In the active choice condition, participants were presented with the 
extensive selection of 24 chocolates, and were instructed to carefully consider 
each option presented to them, before selecting the option they most liked the 
look of, and subsequently would most like to sample (Appendix 4.3). In the 
default group, participants were presented with the same extensive selection of 
24 chocolates, however this time one of these was presented as a ‘default’ 
option. These participants were instructed that ‘the default option in front of you 
has been pre-selected for you to sample. Are you happy to try this pre-selected 
chocolate or would you like to switch to a different chocolate type?’ (Appendix 
4.4) to which participants were required to answer ‘stick’ or ‘switch’. If participants 
chose ‘switch’ they received further instructions (Appendix 4.5) detailing the same 
procedure as that used by ‘active choice’ participants, in order to select the option 
they most liked the look of from the remaining 23 options presented in front of 
them.  
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A matched yoked design was used so that in each case, the default option 
initially provided to participants was the same chocolate as that which was 
selected by the previous ‘active choice’ participant. In this manner it was then 
possible to determine any impact of defaults upon satisfaction with the objectively 
same outcome. Finally, participants in the control condition were simply 
presented with one chocolate, with no mention of other options (Appendix 4.6). 
Again this was the same chocolate flavour as that which was selected by the 
previous ‘active choice’ participant. 
Participants in each condition were asked to sample their chosen 
chocolate, and to then answer a questionnaire designed to measure satisfaction 
with chocolate choice (DV1). This was done using three items adapted from 
Iyengar & Lepper (2000): ‘The chocolate I sampled was tasty’, ‘I was not satisfied 
with the chocolate I sampled (reversed)’, and ‘I enjoyed the chocolate I sampled’. 
Each question called for ratings on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (Appendix 4.7). The internal consistency 
of the items was high (α =.87), therefore data from the three items is collapsed to 
give a single satisfaction measure. In addition to this, counterfactual thought was 
also assessed in the ‘active’ and ‘default’ conditions (DV2). Using the same open-
ended thought listing method used in Chapter 2, participants in the active and 
default choice conditions were asked to list “at least two reasons why you 
responded in that particular way” after each satisfaction item. These responses 
were later coded and used as a measure of spontaneously occurring 
counterfactual thought.  
It was not possible to assess counterfactual thinking in control participants, 
as these participants were not required to make any choice, and subsequently 
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did not have any other options with which to compare the chocolate they 
sampled. As such these participants were given a shorter questionnaire, which 
asked for the same satisfaction ratings, but without the counterfactual thought 
listing aspect (see Appendix 4.8). Because of this methodological difference 
between the active/default and control conditions, an additional emotional 
indicator of counterfactual thought was also assessed. This was done by asking 
participants in all three conditions, about their experience of the counterfactual 
emotion of regret (DV3), which was also adapted from Iyengar & Lepper (2000). 
Participants were asked ‘Do you regret eating the chocolate you sampled?’ and 
were required to answer using a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much).    
Finally, again following the procedure used by Iyengar and Lepper (2000, 
Study 3; see also Chernev, 2003a) participants also answered a question 
designed to give a behavioural measure of satisfaction (Appendix 4.7). 
Participants were asked ‘As you know payment for participating is £3 cash. You 
can now choose between getting £3 cash, or alternatively you can have a box of 
six chocolates that is worth £3. Would you like to stick with cash payment or 
switch to chocolates?’ Participants’ decisions to ‘No thanks – stick with cash’ vs. 
‘Yes please – switch to chocolates’, was then used as a behavioural indicator of 
satisfaction with choice, with those participants choosing to switch to chocolates 
presumably more satisfied with their chocolate than participants who opted to 
stick with cash (see Chernev, 2003a). After completing this questionnaire, 
participants were debriefed and reminded of their right to withdraw (Appendix 
4.9). In addition, at this stage participants who chose the chocolates over cash 
were informed this was a satisfaction measure, were given their cash payment, 
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and informed that the chocolates could in fact be purchased for £3 from the local 
Hotel Chocolat store if they still wished to do so. 
4.6.1.4 Coding Counterfactuals 
Participants responses to the counterfactual thought-listing aspect of the 
questionnaire were coded according to the same criteria established in Chapter 
2. Responses were coded into six main categories: choice counterfactuals, 
problem counterfactuals, positive appraisals, negative appraisals, positive 
comparisons, and other responses. Once again the category of response which 
is of particular interest for this experiment is ‘choice counterfactuals’. Following 
Chapter 2, once again no differences were found according to whether used the 
absolute number of counterfactuals a person generated or the proportion of all 
statements which were counterfactuals. The analysis below therefore used the 
raw number generated to provide the reader with a clearer indication of overall 
counterfactual prevalence (however for completeness, details of counterfactual 
analyses using proportions of counterfactual responses generated are presented 
in Appendix 4.15). 
4.6.2           Results 
As only 8 participants in the default group (9.5% of all participants) 
decided to switch to another chocolate type, these participants are now excluded 
from further analyses, in the interests of statistical power, and in order to focus on 
any differences between ‘default stick’ (i.e. ‘inactive’ choice participants), and 
active and control participants.  
4.6.2.1 Satisfaction Analysis 
 A one way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of choice type upon 
satisfaction: F(2,73) = 7.66, p = .001, η² = .17 (see Figure 4.1). Bonferroni post-
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hoc tests revealed that satisfaction was significantly lower in the control group 
(M= 4.86, SD = 1.67) than in either the active choice (M= 6.13, SD = 1.03, p = 
.001), or default stick (M= 5.87, SD = .86, p< .001), conditions, whilst the pairwise 
comparison between the active choice and default stick conditions was found to 
be non-significant (p= 1.00).  
Figure 4.1. Bar chart displaying the effects of choice type manipulations upon 
mean satisfaction ratings. Standard errors are represented in the figure by the 
error bars attached to each column.
These findings are interesting given that participants in the control group 
sampled the same chocolate as participants in the other two conditions, due to 
the matched yoked design. These results subsequently appear to highlight the 
value of simply being aware that other options are available to you, even if you 
don’t then decide to exercise that choice (i.e. in the default-stick condition). These 
results also appear to be contrary to predictions that satisfaction would be 
increased if participants opted to stick with the default option, in comparison to 
the active choice condition, as no differences were found between active and 
default participants.  
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4.6.2.2 Regret Analysis 
A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of choice type upon regret: F(2,73) 
= .64, p = .53, η² = .02. Although regret levels were found to be slightly higher in 
the control group than in the active or default stick conditions (Ms= 2.29, 1.82, 
1.80 respectively), Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed no significant differences in 
regret between conditions (all p’s >.05).  
4.6.2.3 Counterfactual Analysis 
Data from the counterfactual ‘thought-listing’ aspect of the questionnaire 
were then analysed in order to examine the prediction that inactive (default) 
choice participants would generate fewer counterfactual thoughts than active 
choice participants. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of choice type upon 
the total number of counterfactuals generated: F(1,46) = 2.25, p = .14, η² = .05.  
Counterfactual generation was found to be similar in the active choice, and 
default stick conditions (Ms= .07, .25). This appears to go against earlier 
predictions that participants in the default condition would generate fewer 
counterfactuals than participants who made an active choice. However the very 
low levels of counterfactuals generated overall (c.f. the counterfactual rates in 
Experiments 1 and 2 using the same method) parallels the earlier finding that 
there were no differences in satisfaction according to the active/default choice 
manipulation. These results may be due to the luxury nature of the products 
sampled. Specifically, if participants perceived the chocolates to be a generally 
pleasing, high quality selection then this may explain why little variation was 
found in the satisfaction ratings (with the exception of the control group).  
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4.6.2.4 Behavioural Satisfaction 
The behavioural satisfaction data relating to participants decisions to stick 
with cash as payment or switch to chocolates were then analysed using binary 
logistic regression. Once again results revealed no significant differences in 
decision to switch to chocolates according to condition: B = .23, p= .50. 
Participants were just as likely to switch to chocolates in the active, default stick 
and control conditions (Ns = 6, 6, 4). As such the active/inactive choice 
manipulation appears to have had no notable effects upon either psychological 
(stated) satisfaction, or upon behavioural (revealed) satisfaction. Experiment 5 
was subsequently designed as a replication of the current experiment, but this 
time using relatively unpleasant, cheap chocolates, so that satisfaction levels 
would not be so (perhaps unrealistically) high from the outset, and subsequently 
perhaps more open to the influence of choice type manipulations.  
4.6.3      Discussion
The current experiment illustrated that the vast majority of the participants 
in the default condition opted to stick with the default option, providing support for 
previous research into the omission bias, and the effectiveness of default options 
(Baron & Ritov, 1994; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). 
However, contrary to predictions, no differences in satisfaction (stated or 
behavioural) were found between the active and default choice conditions: in both 
conditions participants were found to be extremely happy with their choices. This 
is paralleled by the fact that there were no notable differences in counterfactual 
thought or regret between these two conditions.  
It is possible that no effects of choice type were found either due to a) the 
luxury nature of the products sampled, orb) the fact that all of the chocolates 
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were labelled. Using luxurious chocolates meant it was possible that all of the 
choice outcomes were perceived as being particularly nice, or of a high quality, 
and these positive choice outcomes may have led to an overall reduction in CFT, 
as previous research has shown counterfactual thoughts may be cued more 
readily following negative outcomes (e.g. Sanna & Turley, 1996; Roese 1994; 
1997). Further, the fact that the chocolates were labelled may have also reduced 
counterfactual thought as this may have meant the choice outcomes were more 
certain. Previous research has demonstrated that when decisions are uncertain 
people form expectations about potential outcomes, and that a key trigger for 
counterfactual thought is the mis-match between expectations and experience 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1998; 2000; Sanna & Turley, 1996). As all of the chocolates 
were labelled in this experiment, participants’ expectations were likely to match 
their experiences, meaning they may have been less likely to generate 
counterfactual thoughts, and more likely to experience increased satisfaction with 
their choice outcome as a result. 
The current experiment did highlight that the control group were 
significantly less satisfied than participants in either of the choice conditions. Due 
to the matched yoked design this was with exactly the same outcome, allowing 
us to establish that these noted differences in satisfaction were due to the choice 
type manipulations. These results appear to be in line with previous research 
which has shown the detrimental effects of no choice upon chooser well-being. 
For example, in Zuckerman et al.,’s (1978) experiment it was found that 
participants who were given a choice of which task they wanted to complete 
experienced increased intrinsic motivation and overall task performance, when 
compared to a control group who were told which tasks to undertake. 
148 
Subsequently, these results appear to demonstrate the value of choice, at least 
when the outcome of that choice is positive. By directly comparing the control 
group with the default group we can see there is an apparent value to participants 
of simply being aware that other options were available to them. Interestingly, 
even if participants didn’t then decide to exercise that choice (i.e. the default-stick 
participants), satisfaction with the same outcome still increased by a whole point. 
 In all, the results from the current experiment raise some interesting points 
for further investigation. Participants were found to be equally satisfied with active 
or default choice, however as previously discussed this may have been the 
product of the luxury nature of the products sampled, or the fact that the product 
labels could have led to increased alignment between expectancy and 
experience. Subsequently Experiment 5 was designed as a partial replication of 
this experiment, but using less enjoyable, cheaper chocolates, and crucially, 
without labels, in order to manipulate outcomes so satisfaction levels weren’t so 
high, and thus potentially encourage counterfactual thought. In this manner I 
hoped to then determine a) whether default options might yet lead to improved 
satisfaction in comparison to active choices, and b) whether the apparent value of 
choice identified in the current experiment would generalise to situations in which 
the outcome was less directly positive for the participant. 
4.7     Experiment 5 
4.7.1 Rationale for Experiment 5  
 Contrary to predictions, Experiment 4 failed to find a significant difference 
in counterfactual thoughts or satisfaction between default and active choice 
participants. It was suggested that this may have been because the outcomes 
were simply too positive to generate many counterfactuals at all – a suggestion 
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backed up by the low counterfactual rate (c.f. the counterfactual rates in 
Experiment’s 1 and 2 using the same method). The current experiment therefore 
aimed to build upon the methodology used in Experiment 4, in order to 
investigate whether the predicted pattern might emerge when the choice 
outcomes were less directly positive for the chooser. Accordingly, the 
methodology used in Experiment 4 was altered in 4 main ways. Firstly, the 
valence of choice outcomes was changed. Frijda (1986) defines valence as the 
intrinsic degree of attractiveness vs. aversiveness of an object or situation. 
Subsequently following this definition, in Experiment 5 a cheaper, relatively 
unpleasant-tasting chocolate type was used. The particular brand was selected 
on the basis of pilot testing (details of which are provided in Section 4.7.3 below). 
Secondly, all labels were removed from the chocolates, in order to reduce the 
potential impact of increased alignment between expectations and experience.  
Thirdly, following the procedure used by Mogilner et al., (2008), and the 
use of an objectively illusory choice in Experiment 3, all of the chocolates used in 
this experiment were identical to one another. This was done in order to remove 
any further potential impact of appearance on expectations and resulting 
satisfaction. Participants were informed the chocolates contained a selection of 
flavours, and were given a list of potential choice outcomes. However, as all the 
chocolates used were actually the same flavour, this allowed for a thoroughly 
controlled examination of manipulations in choice type alone upon satisfaction 
with the objectively same outcome (as per Experiment 3). 
 Finally, the behavioural measure of satisfaction used in Experiment 4 was 
also altered (see Appendix 4.10). This was altered because it was deemed that 
asking participants whether they would like cash or chocolates as payment for 
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participation may not have provided an accurate measure of satisfaction, as a 
substantial number of participants reported to have opted for the cash in order to 
keep their options open (as they could then buy the chocolates at a later stage). 
As such in this experiment, participants were simply asked whether or not they 
would like to take an additional chocolate home with them: “As you know, 
payment for participating in the study is one participation point. As an extra thank-
you for participating you have the option of taking an extra one of the chocolates 
you selected home with you. Would you like to take one of the chocolates you 
selected home with you?” Participants Yes/No responses were then used as a 
behavioural indicator of satisfaction. 
4.7.2 Hypotheses 
 The same predictions followed as for Experiment 4. Specifically it was 
hypothesised that participants who made an active choice would be less satisfied 
with their choice of chocolate than participants who chose to stick with a default 
option, and that this difference would be the result of the increased counterfactual 
thought associated with active (extensive) choices.   
4.7.3      Method 
4.7.3.1 Pilot Test
A pilot test was conducted in order to determine the least preferred 
chocolate type from a selection of six of the cheapest, generally least preferred 
chocolates available from stores at that time. These were: coffee and orange 
flavoured chocolates, and whiskey, brandy and Cointreau liqueur chocolates (all 
from Poundland), and budget Turkish delight chocolate from Sainsbury’s. 10 pilot 
participants (7 women and 3 men, mean age = 26, with a range of 19 to 46 
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years), recruited via a method of convenience sampling, sampled each of the 
chocolates in a randomized order, and rated their satisfaction with each sample. 
It was determined that the Cointreau liqueur chocolates were the least preferred 
chocolate type, therefore these were selected for use in the current experiment. 
4.7.3.2 Participants 
135 Psychology undergraduates (83 women and 52 men, mean age = 24, 
with a range of 18 to 55 years) at Plymouth University took part in the experiment 
in exchange for course credit.  
4.7.3.3 Materials 
Based on pilot testing, 24 cheap ‘Cointreau’ liqueur chocolates, from 
Poundland were used to form the extensive choice set. 
4.7.3.4 Procedure 
The procedure used in Experiment 4 was replicated, with the exception of the 
discussed alterations to a) the type of chocolates used, b) the visual presentation 
of the choice set (in terms of the illusory choice and removal of labels), and c) the 
questionnaire. Participants were informed that the experiment was investigating 
‘taste perception and individual differences’ (Appendix 4.2), and that the selection 
of chocolates in the table in front of them contained “a variety of flavours 
including some liqueur chocolates, some fruit flavoured chocolates, some truffles, 
some caramels, and other assorted flavours” (Appendix 4.11). As before, 
participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions: active choice, 
default choice or control. In the active choice condition were instructed to 
carefully consider all the options, and to “pick the one you most like the look of 
and subsequently would most like to sample” (Appendix 4.11). Participants in the 
default condition were presented with a default option, which they were informed 
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had been “pre-selected for them to sample”, and were given the opportunity to 
stick/switch from this default option to one of the other 23 chocolates presented 
to them (Appendix 4.12). Finally in the control group participants were again just 
presented with one chocolate, and were asked to sample that chocolate 
(Appendix 4.6). As all of the chocolates used were identical this time, this allowed 
for a thoroughly controlled investigation of the impact of choice type upon 
satisfaction with the same objective outcome.    
 Participants then ate their selected chocolate, and answered the same 
questionnaire as was used in Experiment 4 (see Appendices 4.7 and 4.8),which 
was designed to measure satisfaction with choice (DV1), using the following 
three key items adapted from Iyengar & Lepper (2000): ‘The chocolate I sampled 
was tasty’, ‘I was not satisfied with the chocolate I sampled (reversed)’, ‘I enjoyed 
the chocolate I sampled’. Each question called for ratings on a seven point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The internal 
consistency of the items was high once more (α =.92), and data from the three 
items is therefore collapsed to give a single satisfaction measure. The 
questionnaire was also designed to provide a measure of the counterfactual 
emotion of regret. This was done by asking participants in all three conditions: 
‘Do you regret eating the chocolate you sampled?’ Again participants were 
required to answer using a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). In addition, participants in the active and default choice conditions 
were again asked to list reasons for their responses after each satisfaction item. 
These responses were later coded according to the same criteria established in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (and also used in Experiment 4), and used as an indicator 
of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thought. As control participants were 
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unable to answer this aspect of the questionnaire, they were given a shortened 
version of the questionnaire, which just called for the satisfaction and regret 
ratings (Appendix 4.8). In addition to this, as previously mentioned, all 
participants were also required to answer an alternative question designed to 
provide a behavioural measure of satisfaction (please see Section 4.7.1). Finally, 
participants were debriefed (Appendix 4.9) and reminded of their right to 
withdraw. 
4.7.4                      Results
Only 5 participants in the default group (3.7% of all participants) opted to 
‘switch’ to another chocolate type. They are subsequently excluded from further 
analyses, following the procedure used in Experiment 4. As such analyses now 
focus on data from the remaining 130 active, inactive (default-stick), and control 
group participants. 
4.7.4.1 Valence Manipulation  
An independent samples t-test revealed participants were significantly 
more satisfied overall in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 5 (Ms= 5.59 vs. 2.88, 
t(204) = 11.41, p<.001), demonstrating that the manipulation of outcome valence 
was successful. Following this, the remainder of the analysis detailed below 
focuses upon data from the current experiment (5) only. 
4.7.4.2 Satisfaction Analysis 
A one way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of choice type upon 
satisfaction: F(2,127) = 10.62, p < .001, η² = .14 (see Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2. Bar chart displaying the effects of choice type manipulations upon 
mean satisfaction ratings. Standard errors are represented in the figure by the 
error bars attached to each column.
Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that satisfaction was significantly higher 
in the control group (M= 3.80, SD = 1.85) than in either the active choice (M= 
2.47, SD = 1.65, p= .001), or default stick (M= 2.31, SD = 1.45, p< .001), 
conditions. Yet, once again there were no notable differences in satisfaction 
between the active and default choice groups (p = 1.00).However, contrary to the 
results of Experiment 4, this time satisfaction in the control group (with the same 
outcome) was found to be over a point higher than satisfaction in the active and 
default conditions. This appears to suggest that when outcomes are negative for 
the chooser it may be best to have no choice, as both active and default choices 
(with an extensive number of options) appear to be equally detrimental to 
satisfaction. 
4.7.4.3 Counterfactual Analysis 
Data from the counterfactual ‘thought-listing’ aspect of the questionnaire 
were then analysed in order to examine the prediction that inactive (default) 
choice participants would generate fewer counterfactual thoughts than active 
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choice participants. A one way ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of choice type 
upon the total number of counterfactuals generated: F(1,83) = 3.04, p = .09, η² = 
.04. The number of counterfactual thoughts generated was found to be marginally 
higher in the active than in the default stick condition (Ms= .31, .13). This is in line 
with predictions that counterfactual thoughts would be generated more readily 
following action than inaction (i.e. sticking with a default) (for completeness, 
counterfactual analyses using the proportion of counterfactual responses 
generated are provided in Appendix 4.16). However, contrary to predictions, this 
marginal increase in counterfactual generation does not appear to have led to 
any notable differences in satisfaction. I will return to potential explanations for 
this apparent contradiction in findings during the discussion of this experiment 
(Section 4.7.5). 
4.7.4.4 Regret Analysis 
Following the finding that participants in the control group were a whole 
point higher than either of the choice conditions in terms of satisfaction, the regret 
data were then explored. A one way ANOVA revealed a main effect of choice 
type upon regret: F(2,127) = 16.89, p <.001, η² = .21. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
revealed that regret was significantly lower in the control group (M= 3.11, SD = 
2.20) than in either the active choice (M= 5.36, SD = 1.90, p < .001), or default 
stick (M= 5.10, SD = 1.85, p < .001), conditions.  The pairwise comparison 
between the active and default stick conditions was not found to be significant (p 
= 1.00). These findings subsequently appear to parallel earlier satisfaction 
analyses. 
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4.7.4.5 Mediation Analysis 
In order to investigate whether these differences in regret accounted for 
the differences in satisfaction according to the choice/no choice manipulation, a 
mediation analysis was then conducted. If my predictions are correct, then the 
decreased satisfaction associated with any (extensive) choice should be 
mediated by an increase in the experience of the counterfactual emotion of 
regret. As no differences were found between the active and default conditions in 
terms of either satisfaction or regret, data from these two conditions are now 
collapsed to give a single (extensive) ‘choice’ condition with which to compare the 
‘no-choice’ control group for the purposes of the following mediation analysis.
Following Baron and Kenny (1986) a three step mediation model was 
conducted. Step 1 regressed choice level (choice vs. no choice) on satisfaction, 
Step 2 regressed choice vs. no choice on regret, and finally Step 3 regressed 
both choice vs. no choice and regret onto satisfaction. The results are 
summarised in Figure 4.3 with the results from Step 1 shown in brackets and 
those from Step 3 in italics.  
Figure 4.3. Mediation analysis showing the role of regret in mediating the effect of 
choice type (choice vs. no choice) on satisfaction. 
Choice
(0 = No choice;
1 = Any choice)
Regret
Satisfaction(-.38***) / -.04 ns
-.74***.46***
Note. Figures are standardised beta weights. Ns = not significant, *= p<.05, **= p<.01, ***= p<.001.
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Step 1 replicated the earlier finding that satisfaction with no choice was 
greater than satisfaction with any choice (Ms = 3.80 vs. 2.39; β = -.38, p<.001). 
Step 2 also replicated the earlier finding that regret was significantly lower 
following no choice than any choice (Ms = 3.11 vs. 5.23; β = .46, p< .001). Step 3 
highlighted that regret negatively affected satisfaction irrespective of the 
choice/no choice manipulation (β = -.74, p< .001). More importantly the main 
effect of choice/no choice was no longer significant (β = -.04, p = .56) once regret 
was added to the model. A Sobel test confirmed that regret was mediating the 
effect of choice/no choice upon satisfaction (z = 5.18, p<.001, two tailed).  
4.7.4.6 Behavioural Analysis 
Participants Yes/No responses to the behavioural question were then 
analysed using binary logistic regression. Results revealed no significant 
differences in participants’ decisions to take a chocolate home with them 
according to condition: B = .08, p= .73. Participants were equally likely to opt to 
take a chocolate home with them in the active, default stick and control conditions 
(Ns = 12, 8, 15 respectively). Therefore, as per Experiment 4, the active/default 
choice type manipulation again appears to have had no notable effects upon 
either psychological or behavioural satisfaction.  
4.7.5     Discussion
 The current experiment replicated the finding of Experiment 4 that the vast 
majority of the participants in the default condition opted to stick with the default 
option. This provides further support for previous research into the omission bias, 
and the effectiveness of default options in guiding behaviour (Baron & Ritov, 
1994; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). Satisfaction in 
this experiment was significantly lower overall than in Experiment 4, 
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demonstrating that the manipulation of valence was successful. However yet 
again, no differences in satisfaction (either stated or behavioural) were found 
between participants in the active and default-stick conditions. This is contrary to 
predictions, highlighting that it does not appear to be possible to improve 
satisfaction with extensive choice by implementing a default option. Participants 
were found to be equally unsatisfied with their choice outcome whether it was 
selected via active choice, or whether they chose to stick with the default. This 
finding contributes towards the default literature in terms of the impact of defaults 
upon postdecisional satisfaction (c.f. Simonson, 1992; Luce, 1998), and also to 
the ECE literature by highlighting that people may be as satisfied with a default 
given to them by an experimenter, as if they had made the choice for themselves 
(at least, from an extensive number of options). 
   However, although no notable differences were found in terms of 
satisfaction, a marginal difference was found in terms of the extent to which 
participants were found to engage in counterfactual thought. Following previous 
research (e.g. Sanna & Turley, 1996; Roese 1994; 1997), results from 
Experiment 5 demonstrate that counterfactual thoughts were more likely to be 
triggered when outcomes were more negative for the participant, and where 
expectations were perhaps violated to some extent (as the removal of chocolate 
labels may have meant participants’ were less able to form accurate expectations 
about potential choice outcomes). As predicted, when counterfactuals were cued, 
I found evidence for an action effect – with participants in the active choice 
condition generating marginally more counterfactual thoughts than participants in 
the default-stick condition. This provides support for previous research (e.g. 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Luce, 1998), and for the rationale behind the use 
159 
of defaults as a potential method of improving satisfaction with extensive choice. 
However, following the results of Experiment 1, it was predicted that any 
decrease in counterfactual thought would also lead to an associated increase in 
satisfaction, but this was not found to be the case. Participants in the default-stick 
condition were found to be equally dissatisfied as the active choice participants. 
This suggests that something else other than counterfactual thought must have 
been driving down the satisfaction levels in the default-stick condition.  
One potential explanation for this stems from the fact that previous 
research has shown that one reason people stick with defaults is because they 
feel the default is the suggestion, or recommendation of the experimenter (e.g. 
Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). As such, it may be the case that the negative 
decision outcome led participants to feel somewhat ‘let-down’ by the 
experimenter, perhaps driving down satisfaction to a level at which it became 
equivalent to that of active, extensive choice. One might expect that the 
experimenter has chosen that default for a reason, and in sticking with the default 
participants clearly trusted and followed that recommendation, perhaps feeling let 
down or cheated by the outcome as a result. Therefore it may be the case that if 
a default was provided which was an objectively ‘better’ option than the default 
provided in the current experiments, perhaps providing the participant with a 
more neutral taste experience, then satisfaction in the default-stick condition 
might yet increase alongside the associated decrease in counterfactual thought.  
Whilst previous research has shown that for negative experiences people 
are often still happiest if this outcome is the result of inaction (e.g. Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986; Landman , 1987; Connolly et al., 1997), most of these experiments 
detailed are the result of participants reading about hypothetical scenarios, and 
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predicting how they would feel if either situation was to happen. However, we 
know that people are notoriously bad at predicting how future experiences will 
make them feel (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Whatley, 1998; Gilbert & 
Ebert, 2002; an extensive review of this literature is provided in Experiment 7), 
and subsequently it may be the case that with an outcome as tangible as a 
horrible tasting chocolate, people might feel equally bad in reality if they choose 
to stick with a default. With active choices this decreased satisfaction may be 
attributed to increased counterfactual thought, whilst for inactive choices this may 
be the result of potential feelings of betrayal following the recommendations of an 
expert. Subsequently defaults may still have the potential to improve satisfaction 
with extensive choice, on the basis that participants in the default-stick condition 
were found to engage in marginally less counterfactual thought than active choice 
participants. However, the negative outcome experienced as a result of this may 
have led to lower satisfaction levels than one might normally predict having stuck 
with a default. More research is therefore needed a) in real choice situations, in 
which the default option does not result in a directly negative experience for the 
chooser, and b) in which reasons for sticking with the default are directly 
assessed, in order to test the validity of this hypothesis, and determine whether 
defaults might yet lead to improved satisfaction with extensive choice in some 
instances.  
 Contrary to the findings of Experiment 4 in which the control group were 
found be to significantly less satisfied than the two choice conditions, in the 
current experiment the reverse pattern of results was found. Specifically, 
participants in the control group were found to be significantly more satisfied with 
the same objective outcome, than participants in either of the choice conditions. 
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This is contrary to previous research which has noted a value of some choice 
over no choice (e.g. Zuckerman et al., 1978). These results appear to suggest 
that when outcomes are negative for the chooser, there is actually a cost of 
choice – people are happier if they haven’t had to choose the outcome for 
themselves. This finding is in line with the work of Botti and Iyengar (2004) who 
found that when faced with a choice between negative outcomes (in terms of 
unpleasant-sounding yogurt flavours such as sage, chilli powder, tarragon and 
celery seeds), no choice was preferable to any choice. However in Botti and 
Iyengar’s (2004) experiment, participants were aware that the options presented 
to them were all negative at the moment of choice, whilst in the current 
experiment they were not aware of the valence of their choice outcome until the 
moment of tasting the chocolate. This perhaps makes the current experiment 
more similar to most real-life decision scenarios, in which people would rarely 
have to make a forced choice between obviously unappealing food flavourings. 
Also, furthering the findings of Botti and Iyengar (2004), the current experiment 
found evidence that this decreased satisfaction associated with any choice (over 
no choice) was the result of an increase in the counterfactual emotion of regret. 
When participants had no choice this reduced regret, leading them to experience 
increased satisfaction with the same objective outcome, lending explanation to 
the apparent cost of choice associated with negative outcomes.    
 Consequently, drawing upon the results of both Experiment 4 and 
Experiment 5 it appears that when outcomes are positive, there may be a value 
of choice, whilst on the other hand when outcomes are negative, there may be a 
cost of choice. However, it is not yet possible to draw a definite conclusion about 
this on the basis of the current data, as methodological differences between 
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Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 may mean that the results are not the product of 
manipulations in valence alone. For example, in Experiment 4, as well as tasting 
better, all of the chocolates looked different to one another, and were all labelled, 
whilst in Experiment 5 they looked identical and were not labelled. As such we 
might argue that expectations about predicted taste could have also had an 
impact on satisfaction. In addition, in both Experiment’s 4 and 5 the choice and 
no choice control conditions were not identical to one another, as participants in 
the choice conditions answered a longer questionnaire designed to provide a 
measure of counterfactual thought, whilst participants in the control conditions 
answered a much shorter questionnaire by comparison. This might subsequently 
also go some way to explaining the increased satisfaction reported in the 
negative outcome control group. Therefore, Experiment 6 was designed as a 
replication of Experiments 4 and 5, but with a direct manipulation of valence 
(positive versus negative choice outcome), in which all of the chocolates in the 
respective conditions look identical to one another, are all without labels, and in 
which all participants answer the same questionnaire, in order to draw more 
definite conclusions about the potential cost/value of choice with different 
outcomes.    
4.8     Experiment 6 
4.8.1 Rationale for Experiment 6  
The current experiment aimed to build upon the methodology used in 
Experiments 4 and 5 in order to establish whether the apparent value of choice 
associated with positive outcomes, and cost of choice noted with negative 
outcomes, were robust effects, and as such whether they would replicate using 
an identical methodology for the two choice outcomes. The previous 
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methodologies were altered in three main ways. Firstly, as participants in 
Experiment 4 were presented with a selection of 24 different chocolates, whilst in 
Experiment 5 this choice was illusory, in the current experiment all positive vs. 
negative choice outcomes (i.e. the luxury vs. unpleasant chocolate types) were 
identical to one another (in respective conditions), and all labels were removed, 
thus removing any impact of appearance, and prior expectations based on labels. 
In this manner both groups of participants experienced an objectively equal 
illusory choice (as per Experiments 3 and 5), allowing for a thoroughly controlled 
examination of manipulations in valence and choice type upon satisfaction with 
the objectively same outcome(s).   
Secondly, both in Experiment’s 4 and 5 participants in the active and 
default choice conditions answered a different questionnaire to participants in the 
control conditions. This is because the active and default participants were 
required to list ‘reasons for their responses’, in order to gain a measure of 
counterfactual thought. This may have led to some differences in response 
between the choice conditions, and the control condition, who answered a much 
shorter questionnaire by comparison. Therefore in the current experiment, all 
participants answered the same shortened questionnaire as was initially 
answered by control participants in Experiment’s 4 and 5 (Appendix 4.8), 
designed to measure satisfaction and regret, and without the counterfactual 
thought-listing aspect. 
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4.8.2              Method 
4.8.2.1 Participants 
135 Psychology undergraduates (76 women and 59 men, mean age = 23, 
with a range of 18 to 51 years) at Plymouth University took part in the experiment 
in exchange for course credit.  
4.8.2.2 Design 
A 2 (outcome valence: ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative’) X 3 (choice type: active vs. 
default vs. control) design was used, whereby participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the six conditions.      
4.8.2.3 Materials 
24 luxurious chocolates from Hotel Chocolat (all the same ‘Dizzy Praline’ 
flavour) and 24 different cheap Cointreau chocolates from Poundland were used 
to form the two extensive choice sets. Again chocolates were presented in 
individual paper cake cases (see Appendix 4.1). 
4.8.2.4 Procedure
Participants were informed that the experiment was designed to 
investigate ‘taste perception and individual differences’ (Appendix 4.2), and that 
they would be required to undertake a chocolate taste test before being asked a 
series of questions about their taste experience. Once again, participants in the 
active choice condition(s) were asked to carefully consider the 24 options 
displayed in front of them, and to “pick the option you most like the look of, and 
would most like to sample” (see Appendix 4.3). Participants in the default 
condition(s) were allocated a default option, and given the opportunity to stick 
with, or switch from the default option to a different chocolate (Appendices 4.4 
and 4.5). Finally, participants in the control condition(s) were simply given a 
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chocolate to sample, with no mention of any other options, or any opportunity to 
change (Appendix 4.6). 
After making their selections (choice conditions), participants were asked 
to sample their chocolate, and to then answer the questionnaire designed to 
measure satisfaction with choice outcome (DV1), and regret (DV2) (Appendix 
4.8). Satisfaction was assessed using the same three items adapted from Iyengar 
and Lepper (2000): ‘The chocolate I sampled was tasty’, ‘I was not satisfied with 
the chocolate I sampled (reversed)’, ‘I enjoyed the chocolate I sampled’. Each 
question called for ratings on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Once again the internal consistency of the items 
was high (α =.95), and as such data from the three items was collapsed to give a 
single satisfaction measure. Finally, regret was measured by asking participants 
‘Do you regret eating the chocolate you sampled?’ on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much). After answering this questionnaire participants were debriefed 
(Appendix 4.9), and reminded of their right to withdraw. 
4.8.3             Results 
For positive outcomes, only one participant opted to switch from the 
default option (1.3% of all positive outcome participants). For negative outcomes, 
no-one opted to switch from the default. Consequently, following the procedure 
used in Experiment’s 4 and 5, data from the participant who opted to switch in the 
positive outcome condition is now excluded from further analysis. 
4.8.3.1 Satisfaction Analysis 
A 2 (valence: ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative’) X 3 (choice type: active vs. default 
vs. control) ANOVA and follow-up simple main effects analysis were carried out 
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(Table 4.1). This simple main effects analysis examined the effects of choice type 
upon satisfaction a) for ‘positive’ outcomes and b) for ‘negative’ outcomes. 
Table 4.1. Mean and standard deviations of participants’ satisfaction and regret 
ratings according to choice type.
Positive Outcomes Negative Outcomes
Satisfaction Regret Satisfaction Regret
Choice Type Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Active 6.03 1.22 1.60 1.29 3.57 2.06 4.05 2.48
Default 6.09 .87 1.14 .47 3.50 1.36 3.25 2.29
Control 5.81 .99 1.48 1.05 4.73 1.64 1.70 1.26
There was a significant main effect of valence: F(1,128) = 72.29, p < .001, 
η² = .36 (overall satisfaction was higher for ‘positive’ than ‘negative’ outcomes 
(Ms= 5.97, 3.93), demonstrating that the manipulation of choice outcome valence 
was successful); but no main effect of choice type; F(2,128) = 1.80, p = .17, η² = 
.03 (overall satisfaction was similar in the active, default and control conditions 
(Ms= 4.93, 4.86, 5.35)). In line with predictions, a significant valence/choice type 
interaction effect was also found: F(2,128) = 4.11, p = .02, η² = .06 (see Figure 
4.4).  
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Figure 4.4. Bar chart displaying the interaction between valence and choice type. 
Standard errors are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each 
column.
A simple main effects analysis carried out upon this interaction revealed 
that for ‘positive’ outcomes there was no effect of choice type upon satisfaction: 
F(2,128) = .28, p = .76, η² = .004: satisfaction was similar in the active, default 
and control conditions(see Table 4.1). However, for negative outcomes, a 
significant effect of choice type was found:  F(2,128) = 5.04, p<.01, η² = .07. 
Satisfaction was found to be significantly higher in the control condition than in 
the active or default choice conditions (Table 4.1). Breaking this down further, 
pairwise comparisons revealed that whilst no difference in satisfaction was found 
between the active and default conditions (p= .88, see Appendix 4.13), 
participants in both the active and default choice conditions were found to be 
significantly less satisfied than the control group (p’s = .009, .006 respectively, 
see Appendix 4.13). 
These results subsequently demonstrate that the benefit of choice found in 
Experiment 4 did not replicate as predicted. This is supported by the regret data, 
whereby a simple main effects analysis revealed that for positive outcomes there 
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was no effect of choice type upon regret: F(2,128) = .54, p = .59, η² = .008. 
Regret levels were found to be similarly low in active, default and control 
conditions (see Table 4.1). On the other hand, in line with predictions, the noted 
cost of choice found in Experiment 5 does appear to have replicated. Participants 
were once again found to be significantly more satisfied with the same negative 
outcome if they didn’t have to choose it for themselves. This is also paralleled by 
the regret data which was substantially higher following negative than positive 
outcomes (Ms= 3.00, 1.42 respectively). In addition, for negative outcomes, the 
simple main effects analysis revealed a significant main effect of choice type 
upon regret: F(2,128) = 11.41, p<.001,η² = .15. Breaking this down, pairwise 
comparisons revealed that whilst no difference in regret was found between the 
active and default conditions (p= .11, see Appendix 4.13), participants in both the 
active and default choice conditions were found to experience significantly more 
regret than the control group (p’s = <.001, .002 respectively, see Appendix 4.13). 
4.8.3.2 Does Regret Mediate the Impact of Choice Type upon Satisfaction 
Following Negative Outcomes? 
In order to investigate the potentially mediating effect of regret upon 
satisfaction according to the choice vs. no choice manipulation for negative 
outcomes a mediation analysis was then carried out. Again following Baron and 
Kenny (1986) this analysis had three steps: Step 1) regressed choice vs. no 
choice on satisfaction, Step 2) regressed choice vs. no choice on regret and Step 
3) regressed both choice vs. no choice and regret onto satisfaction (see Figure 
4.5). 
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Choice
(0 = No choice;
1 = Any choice)
Regret
Satisfaction(-.32**) / -.02 ns
-.73***.41***
Note. Figures are standardised beta weights. Ns = not significant, *= p<.05, **= p≤.01, ***= p≤.001.
Figure 4.5. Mediation analysis showing the role of regret in mediating the effect of 
choice type (choice vs. no choice) on satisfaction for ‘negative’ outcomes.
Step 1 replicated the earlier finding that satisfaction with no choice was 
greater than satisfaction with any (extensive) choice (Ms= 4.73 vs. 3.54; β = -.32, 
p = .01). Step 2 revealed that in line with predictions, regret was found to be 
significantly lower following no choice than any choice (Ms= 1.70 vs. 3.65; β = 
.41, p= .001). Step 3 illustrated that regret negatively affected satisfaction 
irrespective of the choice/no choice manipulation (β = -.73, p< .001). Finally Step 
3 also revealed that the main effect of choice/no choice was no longer significant 
(β = -.02, p = .81) when regret was added to the model, showing initial evidence 
of mediation. In line with predictions, a Sobel test confirmed that regret was 
mediating the effect of choice/no choice upon satisfaction (z = 3.10, p< .001 (two 
tailed)). 
4.8.4     Discussion
Across all 3 experiments detailed so far in this chapter I have failed to find 
any evidence that defaults result in higher levels of satisfaction than active 
choices with no defaults. This was found to be the case even though Experiment 
5 found marginal evidence for a counterfactual action effect, with marginally more 
counterfactuals generated following active than default choices. It has been 
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suggested that this may be due to the negative task outcome leading to feelings 
of betrayal for following the recommendations of an expert, leading to lower 
satisfaction than one might otherwise have predicted following inactive choice (in 
this case, deciding to stick with a default). Notably however, this effect was 
marginal, and was not found to replicate in Experiment 6 in terms of the 
associated experience of regret, with both active and default choice participants 
reporting to experience similar levels of this counterfactual emotion. Nevertheless 
the experiments do replicate two important findings in the literature: a) the power 
of defaults in guiding choice and b) the valence effect for counterfactuals, since 
counterfactual generation was higher following either active or default choice 
when outcomes were negative than positive. In particular the current experiment 
(Experiment 6) brought together the findings from Experiments 4 and 5 into a 
single experiment enabling a direct comparison of the valence issues under a 
standardised methodology. These findings are now considered in greater detail. 
Firstly, as the results of Experiment 6 demonstrate, once again the vast 
majority (98.7%) of participants in the positive outcome default condition, and 
100% of participants in the negative outcome default condition, opted to stick with 
the default option. As this effect has now been replicated in three separate 
experiments, the current chapter provides substantial support for previous 
research into the omission bias, and the power of default options to both 
influence and guide behaviour (e.g. Baron & Ritov, 1994; Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). In addition, contrary to predictions, 
participants were found to be equally satisfied with both positive and negative 
decision outcomes whether they made the choice for themselves, or whether 
they were given a default, again demonstrating that extensive choice appears to 
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be of no further benefit to the consumer than making a decision to stick with the 
recommendations of an expert, or experimenter.
The ‘value of choice’ identified in Experiment 4 was not found to replicate. 
Participants were found to be equally satisfied with their chocolate whether they 
made an active choice, were given a default, or whether they were simply given 
one chocolate to sample. This is paralleled by the fact that in all positive outcome 
conditions participants reported very low levels of regret. This provides support 
for previous research showing that counterfactual thought, and the experience of 
regret is more likely following negative outcomes (Sanna & Turley, 1996; Roese, 
1994; 1997). When outcomes were positive it didn’t matter if participants made 
the choice for themselves, or if they had no influence upon the outcome, the 
positive experience resulted in low levels of counterfactual emotion, and 
subsequently high satisfaction. These results hint at the possibility that valence 
might moderate the ECE, due to its impact upon counterfactuals. One might not 
find an ECE when outcomes are directly positive for the chooser. However further 
research will be needed in which valence is manipulated and extensive choice is 
compared directly with limited choice (as opposed to no choice) in order to 
establish whether this is the case (see Chapter 5).  
But why was the value of choice found in Experiment 4 not found to 
replicate? The mean satisfaction levels generated in Experiment 4 and 
Experiment 6 (positive outcome conditions) were extremely similar in both the 
active choice, and default choice conditions. In fact the main difference between 
the two studies stems from the fact that in Experiment 4 satisfaction levels in the 
control condition were much lower than in the 2 choice conditions, whilst in 
Experiment 6 all 3 positive outcome conditions reported similarly high levels of 
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satisfaction. Therefore something must have been driving satisfaction down in the 
control group in Experiment 4. One potential explanation for this relates to 
methodological differences between the 2 procedures. For example, as all of the 
chocolates were labelled in Experiment 4 but not in Experiment 6, it may be the 
case that participants in Experiment 4 experienced reduced satisfaction if they 
felt that the labels did not accurately match the chocolate flavour, potentially 
leading to reduced alignment between expectations and experience. In contrast 
participants in the control group in Experiment 6 had nothing to compare their 
experience to, potentially leading to respectively increased satisfaction. However, 
if this were the explanation then one might also have predicted satisfaction in the 
two choice conditions to be lower in Experiment 4 than in Experiment 6 (as the 
chocolates were labelled in all conditions in Experiment 4), but we know this was 
not the case. Consequently a second potential explanation stems from the fact 
that in providing labels in Experiment 4, there may have been an increased 
likelihood that participants realised they didn’t like the flavour chosen for them 
prior to tasting. As neither group of control participants were given the chance to 
change the chocolate they sampled, participants in Experiment 4 may have 
already had a preconceived (negative) perception of the chocolate, and if they felt 
unable to change from something they perhaps didn’t like the sound of this may 
have led them to experience reduced satisfaction. On the other hand in 
Experiment 6, participants had no idea what the flavour of the chocolate was 
going to be. Therefore upon tasting, the positive outcome (at tasting a chocolate 
that was generally liked) may have been perceived as a pleasant surprise, 
leading to increased satisfaction ratings. Or, at least even if participants didn’t 
173 
enjoy the flavour that much there was no additional influence of perhaps 
expecting not to like the flavour, and yet having no chance to change it.  
Conversely, the results from Experiment 5 were found to replicate. 
Participants in the two choice conditions were significantly less satisfied with the 
same outcome than participants in the control group. This demonstrates that the 
‘cost of choice’ identified in Experiment 5 appears to be a fairly robust effect. 
When outcomes were negative participants were significantly more satisfied if 
they hadn’t had to make any choice for themselves, and this effect was found to 
be mediated by the counterfactual emotion of regret. When outcomes were 
negative any choice led to a significant increase in regret. By removing choice 
altogether participants’ capacity to experience regret was reduced, and their 
satisfaction levels improved.  
This finding has potentially important implications with regard to the 
structure of public policy. It appears that when outcomes are negative it may be 
better to have no choice –perhaps controversially presenting a case for a 
paternalistic approach to choice architecture (c.f. Sunstein & Thaler, 1993). This 
notion finds support from Botti and Iyengar (2004) who found that when 
outcomes were negative, no choice was preferable to any choice. Research into 
medical decision making also provides support for this claim. For example, 
Degner and Sloan (1992) asked people who had recently been diagnosed with 
cancer whether they wanted to choose their treatment for themselves, or have a 
physician decide for them. These data were compared to the forecasting 
predictions of others asked to imagine their scenario. Whilst the majority of 
forecasters predicted they would want to choose their treatment for themselves 
were they in this situation, in actual fact the authors found that the majority of 
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participants in this situation preferred a physician to choose which treatment they 
would undergo. Whichever treatment participants underwent was likely to be a 
relatively unpleasant experience for the majority, and in this instance people 
preferred not to have to make the choice for themselves. Similarly, Ende, Kazis, 
Ash & Moskowitz (1989) found a negative correlation between illnesses severity 
and participants’ desire to play an active role in decision making regarding their 
treatment.  
Results from the current experiment are consistent with this, and also 
provide evidence for the mediating role of regret in this effect. Indeed, it appears 
that if a persons’ experience of post-decisional regret is reduced by removing 
choice, then objectively negative outcomes perhaps have the potential to be 
experienced more positively. Therefore, the current experiment highlights both an 
important point of contention with economic theory, and an important point of 
consideration for policy makers, by providing evidence that a shift back towards a 
paternalistic approach to choice architecture when outcomes are likely to be less 
than positive for the chooser (for example in the field of medical decision making) 
may be most beneficial for the individual. In reality, however, removing choice 
altogether would be both ethically and practically unfeasible, as it would be seen 
as an attack on personal freedom (see Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Consequently, it 
would appear that policy makers may be wise to consider alternative means of 
reducing the counterfactual thought process during the construction of public 
policy. However, this is a point to which I will return in greater detail in the general 
discussion section of this chapter (Section 4.10), and again in Chapter 6. 
In addition it is important to note that the findings of the medical decision 
making studies discussed above may to some extent reflect a desire to rely on 
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the expertise of a physician under circumstances with such potentially important 
consequences. As such it is not possible to determine whether the results of the 
current experiments, involving chocolate choices, would accurately generalise to 
more important real-life decision scenarios such as these. More research will 
therefore be needed using real-life decision scenarios with consequential 
outcomes, in order to establish whether this is the case. 
In all 3 studies considered in this chapter it has been consistently 
demonstrated that people are equally happy if they make an active choice, or if 
they choose to stick with a default option. This contributes towards the default 
literature in terms of the influence of defaults upon postdecisional satisfaction, 
and to the ECE literature – by demonstrating that extensive choice appears to be 
of no further benefit to the consumer than opting to make no choice (and stick 
with the recommendations of the expert or experimenter). It has also been 
demonstrated in two experiments with negative outcomes (Experiments 5 and 6) 
that people were happiest with no choice whatsoever, in contrast to any 
(extensive) choice. However, the question remains as to whether peoples’ pre-
stated preferences regarding extensive choice and different choice types match 
these satisfaction judgements based upon actual experience. Experiment 7 was 
designed to investigate this issue.     
4.9                                  Experiment 7 – Forecasting Study 
4.9.1 Introduction to Experiment 7 
This experiment was designed to examine whether participants were able 
to accurately predict how different manipulations in choice type would make them 
feel. Participants were shown a series of photographs of the experimental 
conditions, and were asked to select whether they would prefer to be in the active 
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(extensive) choice condition, the default (extensive) choice condition, or the no 
choice (control) condition. By determining whether peoples’ experiences matched 
their pre-stated preferences I hoped to add to both the default and choice 
literatures, in terms of a) identifying whether participants’ were aware they would 
most likely be equally satisfied if they stuck with a default or made an active 
choice, and b) identifying whether the forecasting bias would generalise to the 
‘problem of too-much-choice’ (Fasolo et al., 2007), in terms of any recognition of 
the potentially decreased satisfaction associated with (any) extensive choice.  
Previous research has shown that people are notoriously bad at predicting 
how different experiences will make them feel. For example, Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998) found that college students who lived in the Midwest of the 
USA predicted that students who lived in California would be happier with the 
climate, and more satisfied with life on the whole, than themselves. In actual fact, 
although the Californian students did like the climate, they were not more 
satisfied on the whole. This has been referred to as an ‘affective forecasting bias’ 
(Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Schwartz, 2004).  
Similarly, in Gilbert et al.,’s (1998) experiment, young college professors 
were asked to predict how they would feel after they were either awarded or 
denied tenure, both immediately after the decision, and five and ten years later. 
These predictions were then compared with the actual experiences of professors 
who were awarded or denied tenure. Those who predicted their future feelings 
said they expected they would feel extremely happy (or extremely sad), and that 
these feelings would somewhat dissipate over time. In actual fact when 
compared with actual experience these forecasts proved to be inaccurate – with 
those who were awarded or denied tenure actually experiencing no comparative 
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differences in their well-being over time. The forecasters mispredicted how good 
a positive decision would make them feel, and how bad a negative experience 
would make them feel. In another study, Loewenstein and Frederick (1997) 
asked participants to predict how various environmental changes would affect 
their well-being over the next decade. The authors found that forecasters 
predicted each of the changes to have an exaggerated positive or negative 
impact in comparison to the actual experiences of others who were asked to 
reflect back upon the same changes over the last decade.  
Regarding the choice literature, Gilbert and Ebert (2002) asked 
participants to predict which experimental choice scenario would make them 
happiest – if they were allowed to change their minds once they had made their 
decision (reversible condition), or if this opportunity was denied (non-reversible 
condition). A large majority of participants voted that they would prefer to be in 
the reversible condition, when in actual fact those participants who were in this 
condition were found to be considerably less satisfied with their choices, in 
comparison to the non-reversible participants. In all, there is substantial evidence 
to suggest that people err systematically and substantially in making predictions 
about future events (Schwartz, 2004), and this mis-match between our 
expectations and experiences may be one reason why we come to experience 
disappointment and other negative affect with our decision outcomes (see, for 
example, Zeelenberg et al., 2000).     
4.9.2 Hypotheses 
Although previous research has shown that a) people may be happiest, or 
equally happy (Experiments 4, 5 and 6) if they choose to stick with a default 
option, than if they make an active choice for themselves, and b) that people may 
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be happiest with limited rather than extensive choice, it was nevertheless 
predicted that the majority of participants would opt to be in the active (extensive) 
choice condition, due to an affective forecasting bias (as discussed above). This 
forecasting data is then used to draw comparisons between participants’ 
predictions and expectations with the actual satisfaction data generated in 
Experiments 4 – 6.   
4.9.3              Method 
4.9.3.1 Participants  
45 participants (26 women and 19 men, mean age = 30, with a range of 18 
to 54 years), recruited via a method of convenience sampling, took part in the 
experiment in exchange for a chocolate bar. 
4.9.3.2 Materials 
Following the procedure used by Gilbert and Ebert (2002), participants 
were shown a series of three photographs of the three experimental conditions, 
based upon the choice sets and procedure used in Experiment 4 (i.e. luxury 
chocolates). These were of: 1) 24 different chocolates (active choice condition), 
2) 24 different chocolates with one labelled as a default option (default choice 
condition), and 3) just one chocolate (control condition). 
4.9.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were informed that the three photographs were of three 
different experimental conditions in a chocolate tasting experiment, and received 
the following instructions:  
“In Photo 1 (Condition 1), participants are given a choice of 24 different 
chocolates, and are asked to select which one they would like to sample. In 
Photo 2 (Condition 2), participants are given one chocolate, a default, and are 
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given the option of sampling this default, or switching to one of the other 23 
chocolates. Finally, in Photo 3 (Condition 3)participants are given one chocolate, 
but this time have no opportunity to change, and are simply asked to sample this 
chocolate”.
Participants were asked to imagine they were taking part in this experiment, and 
to select which condition they would rather be in (Appendix 4.14). 
4.9.4    Results and Discussion
 Of the 45 participants asked, the vast majority (N= 34 or 75.6%) said they 
would prefer to be in the active (extensive) choice condition. 8 people (17.8%) 
said they would opt to be in the default (extensive) choice condition, with only 3 
people (6.7%) opting to be in the control (no choice) condition. These results are 
in line with predictions that people believe they will be happiest if they can make 
their own decision via an active (extensive) choice, and subsequently this 
appears to demonstrate an affective forecasting bias. In each of Experiments 4 –
6 it was shown that participants were equally satisfied if they made an active 
choice for themselves, or if they chose to stick with a default option. Thus the 
vast majority of participants were found to overestimate how much better they 
would feel had they made the choice for themselves.  
In addition, only a very small minority opted to be in the (no choice) control 
condition. In actual fact, in both Experiments 5 and 6 it was shown that 
participants were significantly more satisfied if they were in this condition than in 
either of the two choice conditions. This demonstrates a second affective 
forecasting bias – participants mis-predicted how much better they would feel if 
given choice over no choice. Even when outcomes were positive (as in 
Experiment 6), participants were found to be equally satisfied if they were given a 
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choice, or if choice was removed altogether. This finding appears to be in line 
with research into medical decision making (e.g. Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et 
al., 1989), in which participants predicted that they would want to choose 
treatments for themselves, if presented with a hypothetical scenario. In actual fact 
when this was compared with the actual experiences of others in that situation, 
people were found to opt for no choice, preferring instead to hand over the 
responsibility for their decision to an expert. Results from the current experiment 
provide support for this, demonstrating that a) the same pattern of forecasting 
error is found within the context of the ECE (in terms of extensive choice vs. no 
choice), and b) that the push towards ever increasing choice within public policy 
may be misguided if based upon lay perceptions of what people believe will make 
them happiest. However I will return to a discussion of the applied implications of 
this forecasting experiment during the general discussion section of this chapter 
(Section 4.10). 
In all it appears that the vast majority of participants may be unaware of 
the potentially detrimental consequences of (extensive) choice to their own post-
decisional satisfaction. So why could this be the case? One explanation for this 
mis-match between predictions and experience relates to potential differences in 
the availability of counterfactual information in the two cases. This relates back to 
a possible distinction between predictors and experiencers as ‘readers’ and 
‘actors’. To illustrate, Girotto, Ferrante, Pighin and Gonzalez (2007) found that 
readers and actors engaged in different levels of counterfactual thinking, and 
attribute this to the increased availability and salience of information available to 
actors. In one experiment, participants were either asked to participate in a game 
in which they could win some chocolates (actor condition), or to read a scenario 
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describing a protagonist in the same situation (reader condition). The outcome of 
the game was pre-determined to be negative, and participants were asked to 
imagine how the outcome might have been different. The authors found that 
whilst readers were most likely to mentally undo the choice made by the 
protagonist, the greater amount of information available to actors in the same 
situation meant they were able to engage in a more detailed level of 
counterfactual thought. The actors more frequently reported aspects of the 
problem itself that might have led to a different outcome, for example, ‘if I had 
had more time to solve the task’. 
Subsequently this distinction may lend some explanation as to the mis-
match between peoples’ predictions and experiences. The predictors in the 
current experiment read about a scenario and were asked to predict which 
condition they would rather be in, meaning this condition was similar to Girotto et 
al.,’s (2007) hypothetical ‘reader’ condition. However in the current experiment, 
the predictors were not provided with negative postdecisional information about 
the outcome of their choice, something which previous research has shown to be 
important in eliciting counterfactual thought (Sanna & Turley, 1996; Connolly et 
al., 1997; Roese, 1994; 1997). As such, this lack of counterfactual information 
may have led the predictors to overestimate how satisfied they would feel 
following extensive choice. In contrast, the experiencers (akin to Girotto et al.,’s 
(2007) ‘actors’) judgements may have been influenced by more salient 
counterfactual information due to a) the availability of negative postdecisional 
information, and b) the greater amount of task information available to them as 
‘actors’. 
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This variability in the availability of counterfactual information may be one 
explanation as to why predictors frequently mispredict how they will feel in a 
variety of situations (e.g. Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Loewenstein & Frederick, 
1997; Gilbert et al., 1998). People have been shown to predict that they want 
choice in hypothetical scenarios (e.g. Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et al., 1989). 
In Gilbert and Ebert’s (2002) experiment, participants predicted they would want 
the opportunity to reverse their decisions, presumably because this would allow 
them greater opportunity for corrective action post-decision (see Roese & 
Summerville, 2005). Nevertheless when faced with these situations in reality, the 
increased opportunity stemming from both choice and reversibility leads to an 
increase in the salience of counterfactual information, and the degree to which 
this is influential in determining satisfaction judgements is something which 
readers appear to be unaware of in advance, or upon consideration of a 
hypothetical situation. 
4.10           General Discussion 
 Based upon the counterfactual action effect, the experiments detailed in 
the current chapter were designed to investigate whether presenting a default 
option might improve satisfaction with extensive choice. In each of Experiments 4 
– 6 the vast majority of participants presented with a default option opted to stick 
with that default, providing evidence for the omission bias, and the power of 
default options to influence and guide behaviour (e.g. Baron & Ritov, 1994; 
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). Whilst no direct 
evidence was found that defaults could improve satisfaction with extensive 
choice, suggestions have been made for further research which means this 
possibility should not be ruled out entirely.  
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In Experiment 4, an apparent value of choice was identified – participants 
were found to be equally satisfied with active or default choices, but when that 
choice was taken away and participants were just asked to sample one of the 
same chocolates, satisfaction decreased by a whole point. This appeared to 
provide evidence for early research into the benefits of some choice (e.g. 
Zuckerman et al., 1978). However, this effect was not found to replicate in 
Experiment 6. Following research into counterfactual theory, Experiment 5 
provided support for the notion that the high levels of satisfaction found in 
Experiment 4 (choice conditions) might have been attributable to the very low 
levels of counterfactual thoughts generated. By using negative outcomes, without 
labels, counterfactual thoughts were found to be more readily available, and in 
this instance evidence was found for a marginal action effect. This was in line 
with predictions, and supports previous research by showing not only that 
counterfactuals are cued more readily following action than inaction, but also that 
a key trigger for these counterfactual thoughts is a negative outcome, and some 
degree of violation between expectancies and experience (see also Zeelenberg 
et al., 1998; 2000; Sanna & Turley, 1996).  
Contrary to predictions, however, this increase in counterfactual thought 
was not found to correspond with a decrease in satisfaction, in comparison to the 
inactive choice (default-stick) condition. This was unexpected given the findings 
of Experiment 1, and led to the suggestion that something else other than 
counterfactual thought must have been driving down satisfaction in the default-
stick condition, lower than we might normally predict. The possibility that this 
might be attributable to feelings of betrayal following the recommendations of an 
experimenter has been discussed. As a result of this, further research will be 
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needed in order to determine the potential for default options to improve 
satisfaction with extensive choice. It is possible that in cases where the default 
option does not result in a directly negative experience for the participant, 
satisfaction might yet be improved in comparison to active (extensive) choices. 
This prediction stands on the basis that marginal evidence was found for a 
counterfactual action effect. However further research will be needed in which 
participants are asked directly about why they chose to stick with the default, and 
any potential feelings of betrayal, or being cheated or ‘let-down’ by the outcome, 
in order to determine if this is the case. On the basis of the current data I can only 
conclude that default options do not appear to improve satisfaction with extensive 
choice, but do still have the potential to do so in some situations, as they have 
been shown to reduce counterfactual thought. As a result, further research is 
needed in order to determine the potential value of default options in situations 
where the consequence of sticking with a default is a more neutral experience for 
the chooser.  
 Experiment 5 also demonstrated that contrary to the findings of 
Experiment 4, when outcomes were negative there was an apparent cost of 
choice. Participants were happiest with the same negative outcome if they hadn’t 
had to choose it for themselves. Crucially this effect was found to be mediated by 
the increased experience of regret following any (extensive) choice. However in 
order to draw any definite conclusions about the potential role of valence in 
eliciting these apparent value and cost of choice effects Experiment 6 was 
conducted as a replication of Experiments 4 and 5 but using a between subjects 
design, and an identical methodology across conditions.  
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As previously mentioned, the value of choice identified in Experiment 4 
was not found to replicate in Experiment 6. This appeared to be due to the 
reduced level of satisfaction found in the control group in Experiment 4, as similar 
levels of satisfaction were otherwise noted in the choice conditions (and 
Experiment 6 control condition) across the two experiments. This may have been 
due to methodological differences between the two experiments. Specifically, as 
previously discussed satisfaction levels may have been driven down in the 
Experiment 4 control group as the chocolates were labelled, meaning there was 
an increased chance participants could be aware they didn’t like the flavour of the 
chocolate prior to tasting, which may have been heightened by the fact that 
participants were given no opportunity to change from this flavour. On the other 
hand in Experiment 6 participants were not aware of the flavour of the chocolate 
before tasting. Therefore they may have had a pleasant surprise upon tasting a 
chocolate flavour that was generally liked. Alternatively, even if they didn’t enjoy 
the chocolate that much they were perhaps not influenced by any preconceived 
ideas about the flavour, or any potential pre-sampling resentment at trying a 
flavour they expected not to like, without being given any chance to change. 
Results from Experiment 6 subsequently contribute to the early literature into the 
provision of limited choice (e.g. Zuckerman et al., 1976). It appears that when an 
outcome is directly positive for the chooser then it doesn’t matter whether they 
play an active role in their choice, or whether choice is removed altogether. 
Following previous research (Roese 1994; 1997; Sanna & Turley, 1996), and the 
findings of Experiment 4 we can assume that this is due to the fact that 
counterfactual thoughts are not readily cued following positive outcomes. 
Following this finding it appeared that a pattern was beginning to emerge 
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regarding the role of valence as a potentially key factor contributing to the 
elicitation of the ECE. 
 On the other hand the cost of choice identified in Experiment 5 was found 
to replicate, demonstrating that this is a robust effect, which was once again 
found to be mediated by regret. By removing the capacity to experience regret, 
by offering no choice at all, satisfaction with negative outcomes was found to 
improve. Therefore these results provide tentative support for a paternalistic 
approach to choice architecture where outcomes are negative. This follows on 
from research into medical decision making which has shown that in situations 
where the outcome of choice is likely to be negative, participants often prefer to 
hand over all responsibility for active decision making regarding treatment to an 
expert, possibly in order to shield themselves from the experience of negative 
counterfactual emotion (see Tykocinski & Pittman, 1981). 
Indeed, this process is often referred to as ‘anticipated regret’ (Bell, 1981; 
McConnell, Niedermeier, Leibold, El-Alayli, Chin & Kuiper,  2000), or ‘regret 
aversion’ (Humphrey, 2004; Schwartz, 2004), whereby a substantial body of 
psychological research has shown that our desire to avoid this counterfactual 
emotion often plays an important role in guiding decision making. For example, in 
Bar-Hillel and Neter’s (1996) experiment participants were given a lottery ticket, 
and then later asked if they would like to swap it for a different ticket, which they 
were informed had objectively better odds. The authors found that the majority of 
participants were unlikely to swap because they anticipated the regret they would 
feel if their original ticket won.  
In addition, Simonson (1992) found that anticipated regret could lead 
decision makers to avoid choosing risky options, even if those options were 
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potentially better than the ‘safe’ alternative. Whilst Ritov and Baron (1990) found 
that parents who anticipated feeling regret if their child was to fall ill as a result of 
vaccination were less likely to have them vaccinated. Similarly, in Tykocinski and 
Pittman’s (1981) experiment, participants who were informed that they had 
missed out on an attractive holiday package deal at a travel agents were found to 
be significantly less likely to take up a similar but less attractive (in terms of cost) 
package deal when the opportunity arose. The authors claim this inaction inertia 
occurs as participants’ anticipate experiencing increased regret if they choose to 
act and take up an opportunity which was less attractive than the opportunity 
which was previously missed. Crucially, however, this was not found to be the 
case when participants were provided with negative feedback information 
regarding how the first holiday turned out: in these instances participants were 
found to be significantly more likely to take up the second opportunity. The 
authors claim this is because the negative feedback information “absolves one of 
anticipated regret” (pp. 615), thus removing the problematic feature that would 
otherwise have led to continued inaction.     
Research has shown that in extreme cases anticipated regret can be so 
powerful that it can lead to decision paralysis, or decision avoidance; whereby 
decision-makers are so overcome with the anticipation of regret that they simply 
opt to avoid choosing altogether (Schwartz, 2004). Indeed, the findings from 
medical decision making appear to be consistent with this, with a large proportion 
of participants opting to take no active role in their decision making, where 
predicted outcomes are likely to be perceived to be viscerally negative, e.g. 
choices between potentially painful treatment options, or those with potentially 
adverse side effects (see, for example, Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et al., 1989). 
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In these instances the likelihood of participants choosing to avoid decision 
making altogether is typically increased, and this appears to be consistent with 
counterfactual and regret literatures demonstrating a desire to shield oneself from 
the experience of potentially harmful counterfactual thought and emotion. Indeed, 
as Botti and Iyengar (2006) state, people often “prefer eschewing decisions 
{related to health care} to avoid the negative emotions associated with feeling 
responsible for their own misery” (pp. 33).
However, as discussed in Section 4.8.4 above, it is also important to note 
that these findings from medical decision making may to some extent reflect a 
desire to rely on the expertise of a physician in decision circumstances with such 
potentially important consequences. As such, it is not possible to determine 
whether the results of the current experiments, involving chocolate choices, 
would accurately generalise to more important real-life decision scenarios such 
as these. However the contrast between the predictors and experiencers in 
Degner and Sloan’s (1992) experiment would suggest that this preference for 
deferring choice to an expert may not be due to a reliance on expertise alone –
as otherwise one would expect predictors to also demonstrate a preference for 
this, when presented with a hypothetical scenario. Yet, as Degner and Sloan 
(1992) demonstrate, predictors forecasted that they would want to choose their 
treatment method themselves, were they ever in this situation. As such it would 
appear that there may be another process at work – and this could involve the 
different level of counterfactual thought that predictors and experiencers may be 
engaged in (see, Girotto et al., 2007). Specifically, Degner and Sloan’s (2007) 
forecasters’ may have demonstrated a preference for active choices due to the 
lack of salient counterfactual information available to them as ‘readers’ or 
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predictors. As such although it would appear that the same processes may be 
underpinning both the seemingly trivial choices presented in the current 
experiments, and more consequential choices in the field of medical decision 
making, more research will be needed in which the level of counterfactual thought 
participants are engaged in is compared in both situations, in order to establish 
whether this is the case. 
Notably, the finding from medical decision making that people typically 
prefer to defer to choice where outcomes are likely to be negative (alongside the 
findings of Experiments 5 and 6) is in direct contrast with the current trend for 
policy makers to push towards increased patient autonomy (see Botti & Iyengar, 
2006). It appears that in doing so, policy makers are perhaps mimicking 
participants’ beliefs that this active role in decision making will make them happy. 
However as the current research (Experiment 7) and previous research (Gilbert 
et al., 1998; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Loewenstein & Frederick, 1997) have shown, 
people are subject to affective forecasting bias – and are particularly bad at 
predicting how future events will make them feel. 
 This contrast between the forecasting data and actual experience has 
potentially important implications for policy makers. It appears that not only 
should public policy be constructed bearing the results of ECE research in mind 
(e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004; 2006; Mogilner et al., 2008; 
Shar & Wolford, 2007, Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Chernev, 2003a; 2003b; 
results detailed in Experiments 1 and 3), as this has shown that expanding choice 
does not necessarily make the chooser better off (contrary to economic theories’ 
contention), but should perhaps also not be constructed on the basis of peoples’ 
own predictions of what they want, as this has been shown to be highly 
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inaccurate. In cases where outcomes are likely to be negative it may be most 
beneficial to the individual to play no active role in their decision outcome, as this 
is likely to shield them from the experience of harmful counterfactual emotion 
(see Tykocinski & Pittman, 1981). In cases where the outcome is likely to be 
more neutral for the participant then default options still have the potential to 
improve satisfaction, as these have also been shown to reduce counterfactual 
thought.  
Realistically, however, it would be ethically unfeasible to remove choice 
altogether, as this would be seen as an attack on personal freedom (Botti & 
Iyengar, 2006). In addition, such a strategy would also be practically unfeasible, 
as in each instance the policy maker would need to ensure that the option given 
to the individual was the best available, and yet this would vary enormously 
based upon individual needs, tastes and priorities. Consequently, it would appear 
that policy makers should perhaps consider alternative means of reducing the 
counterfactual thought process during the construction of public policy. This could 
be done by a) offering limited choice, as opposed to no choice, or indeed 
extensive choice, b)potentially by offering default choice (although more research 
in this area is required), or c) by offering choice with the option of deferring 
responsibility to an expert. However more research will be needed in applied 
settings in order to determine any potential benefits of such strategies in 
improving individual well-being across a variety of real-life decision contexts.      
 In all, a striking pattern began to emerge from the results of the 
experiments discussed in the current chapter. This relates to the role of outcome 
valence in cueing counterfactual thoughts and regret (given Experiment’s 5 and
6). Where outcomes were positive, no evidence was found for any detrimental 
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effects of extensive choice upon satisfaction. Conversely when outcomes were 
negative, evidence was found that no choice was preferable to extensive choice, 
and that this was the result of the increased regret associated with active 
extensive choices. As such this raised the question of whether valence might be 
an important factor contributing to the prevalence of the ECE. Previous research 
has investigated other such factors. For example, as previously discussed, 
Scheibehenne et al., (2009) identified choice justification as a moderator of the 
effect, and in Experiment 1 I identified that load moderated the effect through its 
impact upon counterfactual generation. In their meta-analysis, Scheibehenne et 
al., (2010) found no overall evidence for the ECE, however the authors describe 
how the large degree of variance in the choice literature meant a theory of choice 
was needed which could cover these divergent findings. It may be that outcome 
valence can go some way to explaining the variance in the previous choice 
literature. Following on from the results of the current experimental chapter, it 
certainly appears that valence may play a key role in eliciting the effect, due to 
the demonstrated impact of valence upon counterfactual thought. Yet, to date, 
the role of valence within the ECE has been largely overlooked.  
The current experiments demonstrated an effect of valence when 
comparing extensive choice with no choice, and as such this may simply indicate 
that when outcomes are negative, people prefer no choice. The effect does not 
necessarily transfer to situations in which limited and extensive choice are 
compared. As such, further research is needed in which valence is directly 
manipulated, under conditions of limited versus extensive choice, in order to 
explore the potentially causal role of  valence in determining the prevalence of 
the ECE, and potentially contribute towards an understanding of the divergence 
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of findings noted in the previous choice literature. Experiment 8, described in the 
next experimental chapter, was designed for this purpose. 
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Chapter 5 – Investigating the Role of Outcome Valence in Determining the 
Prevalence of the Excess Choice Effect 
Introduction 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter I describe an experiment which was designed to examine 
the role of outcome valence and subsequent counterfactual thought processes in 
influencing the prevalence of the ECE. The rationale for this initially followed from 
the findings reviewed in Chapter 4, in which the potential for default options to 
improve satisfaction with extensive choice was investigated. In that chapter I 
found evidence that choice type only appeared to be influential in determining 
chooser satisfaction levels when decision outcomes were negative. Further, this 
effect was found to be mediated by an increase in the counterfactual emotion of 
regret following any (extensive) choice. The current experiment aims to extend 
these findings directly to the ECE, by providing an examination of the role of 
valence in situations of limited versus extensive choice. Building upon the 
counterfactual literature which has shown that counterfactual thoughts may be 
cued more readily following negative than positive outcomes (e.g. Sanna & 
Turley 1996; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Gleicher et al., 1990; although see Roese & 
Olson, 1993), it was predicted that the valence of decision outcomes may be a 
key factor contributing to the prevalence of the ECE. A more extensive rationale 
is provided in Section 5.5 below, following an introduction to the choice and 
counterfactual literatures, and existing evidence for the role of valence within both 
of these. 
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5.2 Existing Evidence for Factors Contributing to the Prevalence of the Excess 
Choice Effect
As previously reviewed, according to economic rational choice theory 
greater choice will deliver well-being by increasing the likelihood that individuals 
can satisfy personal preferences (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Consequently, 
extensive choice has become a fundamental aspect of both consumer markets 
and public policy (Schwartz, 2000; 2004; Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Choice provision 
can be direct, e.g. letting patients choose hospitals (Fasolo et al., 2010), or 
indirect by increasing income and thus access to options (Dolan & White, 2007). 
Crucially, psychological research has begun to challenge the basic assumption 
that more choice leads to greater well-being. Building on work by Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) a number of researchers have shown that while some choice is 
good, more choice can undermine satisfaction (Iyengar et al., 2004; 2006; 
Chernev 2003a; 2003b; Lee & Lee, 2004; Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009; Mogilner et al., 2008; Greifeneder et al., 2010). If widespread, this 
ECE may mean that policies aimed at increasing well-being via choice actually 
deliver the opposite of their objectives.    
 However, the universality of the ECE has been challenged. A meta-
analysis of 50 studies found no overall effect either way: more choice neither 
consistently increased nor decreased well-being (Scheibehenne et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the large degree of variance in study outcomes led the authors to 
conclude that a theoretical explanation of when and why the ECE occurred was 
needed (see also, Scheibehenne & Todd, 2009). The current chapter attempts to 
address this by drawing on theories of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 
2008; Roese & Summerville, 2005).  
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Existing research has begun to investigate potential factors which might 
influence the prevalence of the ECE. For example, in Scheibehenne et al.,’s 
(2009) experiment, five potential moderators of the effect were examined. These 
were: option variety, prior preferences, cultural differences, further increases in 
choice set size and choice justification. Of these, only choice justification was 
found to moderate the effect. In situations where participants were required to 
justify their decisions participants were found to be consistently more satisfied 
with limited than extensive choice. When these justifications were not required 
the authors found no evidence for an ECE.  
 The current experiment was designed to investigate an alternative factor 
which to date has been largely overlooked as a potential moderator of the ECE, 
and yet which may be key to determining the prevalence of the effect. That is, 
choice outcome valence. As discussed in Chapter 4, valence has been defined 
as the intrinsic degree of attractiveness vs. aversiveness of an object or situation 
(Frijda, 1986).The current experiment therefore aimed to directly manipulate the 
valence of choice outcomes in order to determine the subsequent impact upon 
the prevalence of the ECE. The rationale for this follows directly on from the 
findings detailed in Chapter 4, during which a persuasive pattern began to 
emerge relating to the potential role of valence in determining the impact of 
choice upon satisfaction. Specifically, extensive choice was only found to impact 
upon satisfaction levels when choice outcomes were negative. If found to be true, 
this might potentially also help to explain some of the inconsistencies found in the 
previous choice literature (e.g. Scheibehenne et al., 2010). However I will return 
to this point in greater detail during the discussion section of this chapter (Section 
5.9).  
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5.3 Choice and Valence 
Existing evidence regarding the role of outcome valence within the choice 
literature is relatively limited. To date, only one study (Botti & Iyengar, 2004), as 
far as I am aware, has attempted to examine the impact of varied choice levels 
where outcome valence was manipulated. In this experiment, participants were 
either given one yogurt to sample, or were asked to make a choice of which they 
would most like to try from a selection of 4 flavours. Outcome valence was 
manipulated so that participants either chose from positive outcomes (i.e. 
preferred flavours: cinnamon, mint, cocoa, and brown sugar), or negative 
outcomes (i.e. non-preferred flavours: sage, chilli powder, tarragon and celery 
seeds). The authors found that when outcomes were negative, participants 
preferred no choice. This is in line with the findings of Experiments 5 and 6 
detailed in the previous chapter. The current experiment aims to extend this 
research directly to the ECE by applying a similar manipulation of valence to 
conditions of limited versus extensive choice. In addition, following the 
procedures used by Mogilner et al., (2008) and in Experiments 3, 5 and 6, the 
current experiment aims to build upon the methodology used by Botti and Iyengar 
(2004) by using an illusory choice, in which participants are not aware whether 
the outcome of their choice will be positive or negative prior to tasting. This may 
make the current research more relevant to the field of consumer decision 
making, as in reality people may rarely have to make a forced choice between 
obviously unappealing flavours. Crucially, the current experiment also aims to 
extend this research by applying counterfactual theory as a potential explanatory 
driving force behind the effect.      
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5.4 Counterfactual Theory and Valence 
5.4.1 Evidence for the Effect of Valence in Eliciting Counterfactual Generation 
 Although existing evidence for the impact of valence upon choice 
satisfaction is relatively limited, a substantial amount of research has considered 
the role of valence within the counterfactual literature. As previously discussed, 
counterfactual thoughts represent imagined alternatives to past events and are 
mental simulations of 'what if' or 'if only' (Epstude & Roese, 2008). They are 
typically associated with negative emotions such as regret, shame and guilt 
which tend to reduce well-being (Niedenthal, et al., 1994; Roese, 1997). As the 
number of options and thus the number of alternatives foregone increases, the 
opportunity to generate specific counterfactuals also increases (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008).  
Crucially, however, in several instances evidence has been found that 
counterfactuals may be cued more readily following negative than positive 
decision outcomes (Roese, 1997; Boninger et al., 1994; Sanna & Turley, 1996; 
Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). For example, in Sanna and Turley’s (1996) experiment, 
participants were asked to read a vignette in which the protagonist, Pat (who 
either typically performed well or poorly in courses), had either passed or failed a 
recent exam. Participants were asked to retell the story into microphones, and 
the number of spontaneously generated counterfactuals was recorded (Study 1). 
The authors found that participants were significantly more likely to generate 
counterfactual thoughts where outcomes were negative, and in which prior 
expectations had been violated. This effect was replicated in a second study 
(Study 2), which examined the impact of outcome valence upon counterfactual 
generation following real-life exam performance. Specifically, as outcome valence 
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increased (i.e. outcomes became more positive), the number of spontaneously 
generated counterfactuals decreased.      
Tsiros and Mittal (2000) found similar results. This experiment involved a 
hypothetical purchasing scenario in which the protagonist, Paul, wished to 
purchase a laptop computer. Participants were provided with either positive or 
negative feedback information about the outcome of his decision (Study 4). The 
authors found that participants were significantly more likely to generate 
counterfactual thoughts when the feedback information provided to them was 
negative. Further, in line with the overarching hypothesis of the current thesis, the 
authors found evidence that it was this increased tendency to engage in a 
process of counterfactual thought which drove the experience of regret, ultimately 
undermining satisfaction.  
Other evidence for the effect of valence upon counterfactual generation is 
more indirect, stemming from the fact that a great deal of research on the relation 
between counterfactual thought and emotion has used negative outcome 
scenarios. For example, in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982a) original investment 
scenario, participants judged the actor to feel more regret than the non-actor, 
demonstrating the ability of actions to facilitate counterfactual generation, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Crucially however, in both cases the result of the action 
or inaction was an equivalent negative outcome, a loss of money. Indeed 
following this, both Gleicher et al., (1990) and Landman (1987) used Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1982a) investment scenario, and only found evidence for an 
action effect when outcomes were negative. When outcomes were positive the 
action/inaction manipulation had a reduced impact upon affective reactions, 
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suggesting that counterfactual thoughts were more readily cued, and 
subsequently more influential in judgements pertaining to negative outcomes.  
5.4.2 Evidence Against the Effect of Valence in Eliciting Counterfactual 
Generation  
Other researchers have failed to find evidence of this effect. For example, 
in Roese & Olson’s (1993) scenario based experiment, participants were asked 
to imagine that they had been asked to undertake a joint class project with 
another student, Pat (Study 1). The scenario was designed to include two salient 
actions for each actor, one positive and one negative. For example, participants 
read how Pat was unable to work on the project for the first week due to illness 
(negative action), yet had done extra work in the last week in terms of thoroughly 
checking the spelling and grammar of the project, ultimately improving its 
readability (positive action). Participants were asked to imagine that they 
personally had found a highly relevant textbook which helped to summarise the 
project (positive action), but that during the last week they had not had much time 
to work on the project due to an exam in another course (negative action). 
Outcome valence was then manipulated by informing participants that the joint 
grade received for the project was either well above average (A) or well below 
average (D). Participants were then asked to write down any ways in which the 
outcome of the project might have been different, and the number of 
counterfactual thoughts generated was recorded. The authors found no 
differences in the overall frequency of counterfactual thoughts according to 
outcome valence. This finding was replicated in a second study (Study 2) using 
an alternative scenario describing the success or failure of two tutors to teach 
mathematics to a student. Again the authors found that participants generated 
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counterfactual alternatives following positive and negative outcomes with equal 
frequency. 
One potential explanation for these conflicting findings stems from the 
different methodologies used to measure counterfactual thought. Roese and 
Olson’s (1993) study used a structured approach, in which participants were 
specifically instructed to generate counterfactual thoughts after reading the 
scenario(s). To do this, participants were asked to “list as many “what if”, or “if 
only” thoughts that could have changed the outcome of this situation” (pp. 201). 
Consequently this methodology does not necessarily provide the reader with an 
indication of the natural prevalence of such thoughts following either a positive or 
a negative outcome. Participants were consciously trying to think of 
counterfactuals, which one might perhaps reasonably presume influenced the 
amount of thoughts generated on the whole, and may even have encouraged the 
generation of such thoughts in situations where they may not naturally occur.  
On the other hand, both Sanna and Turley (1996) and Tsiros and Mittal 
(2000) used an open-ended method of measuring counterfactual thought. 
Participants in these experiments were simply asked to “write down any thoughts 
the protagonist may be having at that time” (pp. 411, Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), 
without any mention of ‘what ifs’ or ‘if onlys’ as starting points for their thoughts. 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, in this manner it has been argued that these open-
ended measures may provide a more valid means of measuring the underlying 
construct of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thoughts, in terms of 
examining differences in the likelihood of their unprompted occurrence (e.g. 
Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Crawford & McCrea, 2004). The current research 
subsequently aimed to extend this research, and examine the prevalence of 
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spontaneously occurring counterfactual thoughts according to manipulations in 
valence and choice level, using the open-ended methodology adapted from 
Crawford and McCrea (2004) and used previously in Experiments 1, 2, 4 and 5.  
5.4.3 Explanations for the Role of Valence in Eliciting Counterfactual Generation 
 There are a number of potential explanations as to why counterfactuals 
may be less readily cued following positive than negative outcomes. For 
example, negative outcomes tend to promote exploration more so than positive 
outcomes (Wong, 1979), and may be remembered better than positive outcomes 
(Gilovich, 1983). In addition, Wong and Weiner (1981) found that negative 
outcomes elicit greater attributional search than positive outcomes, which in 
contrast are typically not subject to the same degree of scrutiny. This difference 
in the depth of processing following positive and negative outcomes may result 
from the fact that people are motivated to learn how to avoid negative events in 
the future, and yet are rarely motivated to ‘un-do’ positive events (Wells, Taylor & 
Turtle, 1987). Indeed, it is widely accepted that a basic function of counterfactual 
thought may be to provide motivation and guide future behaviour (Nasco & 
Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999). Subsequently in the face 
of a negative outcome, a person is likely to naturally generate counterfactual 
thoughts with greater frequency than following a positive outcome, due to an 
underlying motivation to improve their behaviour, and avoid similar negative 
outcomes in the future.  
5.5 Predictions 
 Subsequently, following what we know about the impact of valence upon 
counterfactual generation, it was predicted that the number of options would be 
relatively unimportant for satisfaction with the chosen option if an individual 
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experienced a positive outcome since they would be less likely to generate 
counterfactuals whether presented with few or many options. By contrast, for 
choices resulting in negative outcomes the number of options will be important 
because a) people will be more inclined to consider the alternatives foregone and 
b) the more alternatives foregone the more likely it will be perceived that one of 
those would have been a better choice.  
5.6 Illusory Choice 
 Participants completed two taste tests, one involving chocolates, and the 
second involving flavoured waters. In both cases, participants were required to 
make a choice from a limited or an extensive selection of options. In actual fact, 
following the procedures used by Mogilner et al., (2008), and in Experiments 3, 5 
and 6, both choice sets were illusory as half the participants tasted exactly the 
same 'good' flavour and the other half a 'bad' flavour (determined through pre-
testing, details of which are provided in Section 5.7 below). By using illusory 
choice in this manner it was then possible to provide a thoroughly controlled 
examination of the impact of choice level manipulations upon satisfaction with the 
objectively same outcome (as per Experiments 3, 5 and 6). It was predicted that 
in the ‘negative’ outcome conditions there would be an ECE and this would be 
mediated by increased counterfactual thought. Where outcomes were ‘positive’ it 
was predicted that there would be no differences in counterfactual thought and 
subsequently no ECE. These specific predictions will be explored in follow-up 
analyses.  
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5.7            Method 
5.7.1 Pilot Tests 
5.7.1.1 Participants 
20 undergraduate Psychology students at Plymouth University (12 women 
and 8 men, mean age = 26, with a range of 22 to 51 years) each took part in 30 
minutes of pilot testing, in exchange for course credit.   
5.7.1.2 Design 
The pilot testing had a within subjects repeated measures design, with 
each participant asked to sample and rate each of 8 different drinks flavours, and 
8 different chocolate flavours. 
5.7.1.3 Materials 
Participants were presented with a selection of 8 different drinks, each in a 
clear plastic bottle, labelled Sample 1 – Sample 8, and 8 different chocolate 
types, each presented in individual paper cake cases, and labelled in the same 
manner. The piloted drinks consisted of 4 existing, popular flavoured water types: 
1) Strawberry, 2) Peach, 3) Blackcurrant, and 4) Lemon and Lime. The other 4 
waters were created by the experimenter by mixing tap water with food 
flavourings, in order to create 4 potentially ‘negative’ choice outcomes. The 
trialled ‘negative’ flavours were: 5) Rum flavouring (non-alcoholic), 6) Peppermint 
flavouring, 7) Elderflower flavouring and 8) Star Anise Flavouring. In order to 
create this last flavouring the experimenter boiled the star anise herbs for an 
hour, and then strained the water before bottling. 
 A similar selection of flavours was used in the chocolate sampling. Four 
popular flavours were trialled. These used were: 1) Lindt Milk Chocolate, 2) 
Cadburys, 3) Milka, and 4) Marks and Spencer’s Swiss. In addition, 4 chocolates 
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which were deemed likely to be relatively unappealing to the majority were also 
trialled. These were: 5) Turkish Delight, 6) Sainsbury’s own brand Dark 
Chocolate with No Sugar, 7) Lidl Dark 89% Cocoa, and 8) Lindt Dark Chilli 
Chocolate. 
5.7.1.4 Procedure 
Participants were informed that the experiment was designed to 
investigate flavour preferences, with the aim of determining the most and least 
preferred flavours of drinks and chocolates. Participants were asked to sample a 
small amount of each of Samples 1 – 8 (presented in a randomized order) for 
both the drink and chocolate trials. Before beginning both trials participants were 
instructed to pour themselves a glass of plain mineral water to sip on in between 
samples. For the drinks trials participants were instructed to “Pour a small 
amount of each sample, in turn, into one of the plastic cups provided. After trying 
each sample, please answer the respective set of questions on the questionnaire 
which relate to your enjoyment and taste perception of that sample. Please 
repeat this procedure until you have sampled and rated each of the 8 drinks 
flavours” (Appendix 5.1). For the chocolate trials participants were given the 
same instructions, but were simply asked to eat, and then rate, each of the 
displayed samples in turn (Appendix 5.2). 
 The questionnaire was designed to measure satisfaction with sample 
flavour using three questions adapted from Iyengar and Lepper (2000). These 
were: “I enjoyed the drink/chocolate I just tasted”, “The drink/chocolate was 
tasty”, and “I regret drinking/eating the drink/chocolate” (reversed). Each of these 
questions called for ratings on a 7 point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In addition to this, participants were also asked to 
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give each sample a rating out of 10 using the following item: “If I had to give the 
chocolate I just tasted a score from 1 – 10 with 1 being really unpleasant, and 10 
being totally delicious I would give it a score of....” Participants were asked to 
respond to this item using a 10 point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (really 
unpleasant) to 10 (totally delicious).  
Finally, participants were also asked about their familiarity with the 
different flavours and brands. This was an important methodological 
consideration, as I did not want to include any brands which may have been 
widely recognised in the final experiment, in order to ensure satisfaction ratings 
would be made purely following that taste experience, and would not be 
influenced by any potentially preconceived ideas about brand quality. Participants 
were asked: “To what extent were you familiar with the flavour of the 
drink/chocolate you just tasted?” again participants were asked to respond using 
a 7 point Likert-scale, this time ranging from 1 (not at all familiar) to 7 (extremely 
familiar) (see Appendix 5.3). 
5.7.1.5    Pilot Test Results 
Drinks pilot test 
Using average satisfaction ratings from the three Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000) adapted items, the most to least preferred drinks flavours were found to 
be: 1) Strawberry (M= 5.28), 2) Blackcurrant (M= 4.75), 3) Elderflower (M= 4.03), 
4) Lemon and Lime (M= 4.00), 5) Peach (M= 3.93), 6) Peppermint (M= 2.56), 7) 
Star Anise (M= 2.00), and finally 8) Rum flavouring (M= 1.75). Similar results 
were found using the scores given for each sample of out 10. The most to least 
preferred flavours were found to be: 1) Strawberry (M= 6.90), 2) Blackcurrant (M= 
6.10), 3) Lemon and Lime (M= 5.60), 4) Elderflower (M= 5.20), 5) Peach (M= 
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4.95), 6) Peppermint (M= 3.70), 7) Star Anise (M= 2.70), and 8) Rum flavouring 
(M= 2.20).  
Data from the familiarity question were then examined. Drinks flavours 
ranging from most to least recognisable were: 1) Rum flavouring (M= 4.85), 2) 
Lemon and Lime (M= 4.45), 3) Strawberry (M= 3.95), 4) Peppermint (M= 3.25), 5) 
Blackcurrant (M= 3.20), 6) Star Anise (M= 2.85), 7) Elderflower (M= 2.75), 8) 
Peach (M= 1.85). 
Consequently on the basis of this data, blackcurrant was selected as the 
preferred drinks/‘positive outcome’ flavour, as it consistently led to the second 
highest, and above average (M= 3.59), satisfaction ratings. The most popular 
option of strawberry was not selected on the basis that it may have led to such 
consistently high satisfaction ratings, that participants may subsequently have 
been less vulnerable to the experimental manipulations (as per Experiment 4). In 
addition, strawberry was more easily recognised than blackcurrant, and so 
potentially more open to any preconceived perceptions about preferred flavours. 
Regarding the least preferred drinks flavour, on the basis of the satisfaction data 
and participants’ comments post-sampling, peppermint was selected as the most 
appropriate ‘negative outcome’ flavour for use in the main experiment. This was 
selected as it was consistently disliked as a drinks flavouring, and yet was not as 
disliked as the star anise and rum flavourings. On this basis it was deemed that 
participants would still experience a negative choice outcome, and yet may still 
be open to manipulations of choice level. In addition, the rum flavouring was 
highly recognisable, whilst the peppermint was akin to the blackcurrant. As such 
it was deemed these two flavourings accurately represented the positive and 
negative ends of the preference scale, with both being approximately one point 
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above or below the average satisfaction rating, and neither being so extreme as 
to rule out potential openness to choice level manipulations.    
Chocolate Pilot Test 
 Data from the chocolate samples were then examined, firstly using 
average satisfaction ratings from the three Iyengar and Lepper (2000) adapted 
items. The top four chocolate flavours were found to induce relatively similar 
levels of satisfaction: 1) Cadburys (M= 5.50), 2) Marks and Spencer’s Swiss (M= 
5.25), 3) Milka (M= 5.10), 4) Lindt Milk Chocolate (M= 5.05). Whilst the four least 
preferred chocolates types were as follows (from most to least):  5) Lindt Dark 
Chilli Chocolate (M= 3.78), 6) Sainsbury’s own brand Dark Chocolate with No 
Sugar (M= 3.25), 7) Turkish Delight (M= 3.18), and 8) Lidl Dark 89% Cocoa (M= 
2.43). Once again this was found to be paralleled by the ratings given for each 
sample out of 10: 1) Cadburys (M= 7.40), 2) Lindt Milk Chocolate (M= 6.95), 3) 
Marks and Spencer’s Swiss (M= 6.75), 4) Milka (M= 6.70), 5) Lindt Dark Chilli 
Chocolate (M= 5.05), 6) Sainsbury’s own brand Dark Chocolate with No Sugar 
(M= 4.95), 7) Turkish Delight (M= 4.25), and 8) Lidl Dark 89% Cocoa (M= 3.05). 
 Data from the familiarity question were then examined. The most to least 
recognisable chocolate brands were found to be: 1) Cadburys (M= 5.45), 2) Lindt 
Milk Chocolate (M= 4.75), 3) Turkish Delight (M= 3.65), 4) Sainsbury’s own brand 
Dark Chocolate with No Sugar (M= 3.35), 5) Marks and Spencer’s Swiss (M= 
3.30), 6) Lindt Dark Chilli Chocolate (M= 3.20), 7) Milka (M= 3.30), 8) Lidl Dark 
89% Cocoa (M= 2.30). 
 On the basis of this pilot data, the Marks and Spencer Swiss Milk 
chocolate was selected as the preferred chocolate type/‘positive’ choice outcome. 
This was selected as it was consistently rated as being a preferred flavour, and 
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was above average (M= 4.19) in terms of satisfaction scores, and yet was not as 
recognisable as some of the other preferred chocolate types. The Sainsbury’s 
own brand dark chocolate (no sugar) was selected as the non-
preferred/‘negative’ choice outcome. This was chosen in order to make the two 
options approximately equivalent to the positive and negative drinks flavours, with 
Marks and Spencer Swiss Milk chocolate being approximately a point above the 
mean satisfaction rating, and Sainsbury’s own brand dark chocolate (no sugar) 
being approximately one point below. As such it was deemed that the options 
were liked or disliked to the same extent, and yet were not so extreme as to 
potentially become immune to the experimental manipulations.   
5.7.2 Experiment 8 
5.7.2.1 Participants 
96 participants (59 women and 37 men, mean age = 31, with a range of 19 
to 67 years) from the Plymouth public, recruited via the University’s paid 
participant pool, took place in the experiment in exchange for £4 payment. 
5.7.2.2 Design 
The experiment had a 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) X 2 (outcome 
valence: ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’) X 2 (task type: chocolate task vs. drinks task) between 
subjects design with repeated measures on the last factor. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of the four conditions. The presentation of the order of 
tasks was counterbalanced in order to reduce any potential order effects.  
5.7.2.3 Materials 
Participants were supplied with mineral water to sip on in between tasks, 
and were also provided with ‘Rich Tea’ biscuits to eat in between tasks if they 
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perceived the residual flavours of the first task to be too strong to be removed 
purely with water.  
Drinks 
As previously detailed, on the basis of pre-testing, one relatively preferred 
‘positive’ drinks flavour (blackcurrant), and a relatively non-preferred ‘negative’ 
flavour (peppermint) were selected for use in the main experiment. By then 
adding food colourants to these flavours two identically looking choice sets of 24 
different coloured drinks were created: a 'positive outcome' set which all tasted of 
blackcurrant and a 'negative outcome' set which all tasted of peppermint. Drinks 
were presented in clear plastic bottles labelled either A to F or A to X depending 
on choice condition (see Appendix 5.4). 
Chocolates 
 Also on the basis of pre-testing, one relatively preferred or ‘positive’, 
chocolate flavour (M&S Swiss), and a relatively non-preferred ‘negative’ one 
(Sainsbury’s own brand – No Sugar) were selected. In order to make the choice 
set equivalent to the drinks choice set and create an illusion of choice with 
visually different alternatives, numerous bars of each chocolate type were melted 
down by the experimenter and then re-moulded into one of 6 different shapes. 
Once cooled the chocolates were then presented to participants in individual 
paper cake cases (see Appendix 5.5). 
5.7.2.4 Procedure  
Participants were informed they were taking part in an experiment on taste 
perception (Appendix 5.6) and were simultaneously presented with a selection of 
either 6 (limited choice) or 24 (extensive choice) drinks and chocolates. These 
were presented as 2 separate tasks at opposite ends of a large table (see 
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Appendix 5.7). Participants were placed in the same condition for both tasks in 
order to ensure they didn’t reflect upon any potential costs or benefits they might 
associate with being given a different choice level for the next task.  
For the drinks task, participants were informed that the selection of drinks 
in front of them contained a variety of either 6 or 24 different flavours. In both 
cases these flavours were listed to further emphasise the different options 
potentially available within the choice set (Appendix 5.8). The listed flavours were 
as follows: orange and mango, tropical fruits, blackcurrant, cherry, banana, white 
grape and pear, aniseed, plum, apple and raspberry, orange, blueberry, 
elderflower, red grape and lime, pomegranate, lemon and lime, summer fruits, 
peach, peppermint, raspberry, apple and pear, cranberry, blackberry and apple, 
strawberry and passion fruit. The actual flavours (i.e. blackcurrant and 
peppermint) were deliberately included in this selection to reinforce belief in the 
genuineness and accuracy of the flavour list, and to hopefully cause participants 
to reflect upon their choice in the context of what else they might have chosen. 
Participants were instructed to choose the drink they “most liked the look of, and 
would subsequently most like to sample”. After making their choice participants 
were asked to pour some of their chosen drink into a plastic cup and to sample it. 
For the chocolates task, participants were informed that the chocolates 
displayed in front of them contained a selection of either 6 or 24 different brands, 
which had been melted down and re-moulded into one of six shapes using plastic 
chocolate moulds (Appendix 5.9). Participants were informed that this had been 
done so as to remove any impact of brand identity upon subsequent perception 
of taste and quality. Once again the different brands were listed to validate this 
story and further emphasise the variety of different options potentially available 
211 
within the choice set. The listed brands were as follows: Asda own brand, Lindt, 
Nestlé, Morrisons own brand, Milka, Lidl own brand, Lake Champlain Chocolates, 
Tesco Finest, Green and Black’s, Kraft, Meiji, Marks and Spencer own brand, 
Pearson’s Candy Co., Godiva, Tesco value brand, Jacob’s, Aldi own brand, 
Sainsbury’s own brand, Mauxion Schokoladefabrik, Thornton’s, Hotel Chocolate, 
IKEA own brand, Nicky Grant Cornish Patissiere, Co-op own brand. Once again 
participants were instructed to “look at the selection of chocolates in front of you 
and decide which one you most like the look of, and subsequently would most 
like to sample”. Following this participants were told to “eat that chocolate (saving 
a little in case you need to refresh your memory of the taste whilst answering the 
questionnaire)”.
 For both tasks participants completed the same questionnaire designed to 
measure satisfaction with choice (Appendix 5.10). This was done using three 
items adapted from Iyengar & Lepper (2000): “I am happy I made the right choice 
from the selection available”, “I believe my choice of drink prevented me from 
having an enjoyable taste experience” (reversed), and “I regret choosing the drink 
I selected” (reversed). Each item called for ratings on a seven point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In addition, the 
questionnaire was also designed to provide a measure of spontaneously 
occurring counterfactual thought. Following the procedures used in Experiments 
1, 2, 4 and 5, after each item participants were asked to give “at least two 
reasons why you responded in that particular way”. Internal consistency among 
the satisfaction items was high for both the drinks task (α =.90) and the 
chocolates task (α =.84) so in both cases the items were collapsed to form single 
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satisfaction measures. Finally participants were debriefed and reminded of their 
right to withdraw (Appendix 5.11). 
5.7.2.5 Measuring Counterfactual Thought 
The responses to the open ended questions were coded and used as a 
measure of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thought (e.g. White & 
Lehman, 2005). Based on the coding framework developed in Experiment 1, 
statements were coded into five categories. 'Choice counterfactuals' involved the 
explicit comparison of the chosen option with foregone alternative(s), for 
example: “One of the other drinks may have tasted better”. ‘Positive drink 
appraisals’ involved positive descriptions of the chosen drink, e.g.: “Tasty and 
refreshing”. ‘Negative drink appraisals’ involved negative descriptions of the 
chosen drink, e.g.: “Too sickly”. ‘Positive Comparisons’ involved a positive 
comparison between the chosen option and other options, e.g.: “Some of the 
other drinks look a bit weird”. Finally ‘Other Responses’ included any response 
which did not fit into any of the five main categories, e.g.: “More of a smell than a 
taste”. The first 25% of responses (134 statements) were double coded by two 
independent judges, and high levels of agreement were observed: Kappa = .88, 
p<.001. As inter-rater reliability was established, all 100% of responses as coded 
by the first judge were used for further analysis. Since I am primarily interested in 
the degree to which people considered other options, my key measure of 
counterfactual thinking was the total number of thoughts which were 'choice 
counterfactuals'. For the chocolates task this was 57 out of 534 statements, or 
10.68%, whilst for the drinks task this was 106 of 537 total statements, or 
19.74%. Following Experiments 1, 2, 4 and 5 the total number of counterfactual 
thoughts generated are reported in order to provide the reader with a clearer 
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indication of the overall prevalence of counterfactual generation (however for 
completeness, the counterfactual analysis was also run using the proportion of 
counterfactual responses generated, and details of this are provided in Appendix 
5.12). 
5.8     Results 
5.8.1 Task Effects 
The data from both tasks were analysed both combined and separately 
using a multivariate approach. This was done in order to not only get a detailed 
overview of the effects of choice level and counterfactual generation across the 
two tasks, but also to determine whether the two tasks appeared to have been 
equally successful methods of manipulating satisfaction with choice. For the first 
part of the analysis, a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited 
vs. extensive) X 2 (task type: drinks vs. chocolates) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor was carried out (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1. Mean and standard deviations of participants’ satisfaction ratings and 
counterfactuals generated across tasks, according to manipulations in valence 
and choice level. 
Positive Outcomes Negative Outcomes
Satisfaction Counterfactuals Satisfaction Counterfactuals
Task Choice Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Chocolates Limited 5.47 (1.33) .25 (.40) 5.00 (1.58) .11 (.29)
Extensive 5.41 (1.12) .23 (.30) 5.01 (1.54) .16 (.20)
Drinks Limited 5.19 (1.66) .29 (.43) 3.49 (1.77) .38 (.40)
Extensive 4.63 (1.44) .24 (.28) 2.46 (1.45) .58 (.38)
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A main effect of valence was found across tasks: F(1,92) = 32.81, p< .001, 
η²= .26. In general, participants were more satisfied with the positive than 
negative choice outcomes (Ms= 4.00 vs. 5.17), demonstrating that the valence 
manipulation appeared to be successful. A significant main effect of choice level 
was also found: F(1,92) = 3.90, p= .05, η²= .04. In general participants were 
found to be more satisfied with limited than extensive choice, replicating the ECE: 
(Ms= 4.79 vs. 4.41).  
However, a main effect of task type was also found: F(1,92) = 32.55, p 
<.001, η²= .26. Participants were found to be more satisfied overall in the 
chocolate task (M= 5.23), than in the drinks task (M= 3.97). There was no three 
way interaction between task, valence and choice level: F(1,92) = .35, p= .56, η²= 
.004. However, analysis did reveal a marginal interaction between task and 
choice level: F(1,92) = 2.96, p= .09, η²= .03, and a significant interaction between 
task and valence: F(1,92) = 11.14, p< .001, η²= .11. Follow-up analyses were 
then conducted on this interaction in order to determine if the manipulation of 
valence in either task did not appear to have worked as intended.  
T-tests revealed that the manipulation of valence was not successful for 
the chocolates task. Contrary to the results of pilot testing, participants were 
found to be equally satisfied if they tasted the 'good' or 'bad' chocolate (Ms= 5.44 
vs. 5.01, t(94) = -1.54, p= .13)(see Table 5.1). Supporting this, a 2 (valence: 
positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) ANOVA revealed no 
main effect of valence (F(1,92) = 2.31, p= .13, η²= .03), or of choice level for the 
chocolates task (F(1,92) = .006, p= .94, η²< .001). In addition, no interaction was 
found between valence and choice level: F(1,92) = .02, p= .90, η²<.001. 
Subsequently data from this task are not subject to the following main analyses 
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(however, for completeness, the analysis for the chocolate task is provided in 
Appendix 5.13). 
On the other hand, t-tests revealed that the manipulation of valence was 
successful for the drinks task. Participants were found to be significantly more 
satisfied if they tasted the 'positive’ than the 'negative' drinks flavour (Ms= 4.90 
vs. 2.99, t(94) = -5.79, p< .001) (Table 5.1). Consequently the remainder of the 
analyses focuses on data from the drinks task only, as this was the only task in 
which the manipulation of valence worked as intended. No task order effects 
were identified: F(1,92) = 2.41, p= .12, η² = .03, suggesting that the 
counterbalanced procedure was successful, thus providing further justification for 
the exclusion of the chocolate task data in subsequent analyses. 
5.8.2 Satisfaction Analysis 
 A 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of valence (F(1,92) = 35.77, p< .001, 
η²= .28), and of choice level (F(1,92) = 6.03, p= .02, η²= .06). In general 
participants were found to be more satisfied with limited than extensive choice 
(Ms= 4.34, 3.59 respectively), once again replicating the ECE (Table 5.1). 
However, no interaction was found between valence and choice level: F(1,92) = 
.49, p= .48, η²= .005. 
 A simple main effects analysis was then conducted on this non-significant 
interaction (see Winer, 1971, for the justification of this procedure). This was 
done in order to examine specific predictions that the ECE would be apparent 
following negative but not positive outcomes. For negative outcomes, an ECE 
was found: F(1,92) = 4.89, p= .03, η²= .05. Participants were found to be 
significantly more satisfied with limited than extensive choice (Ms= 3.49, 2.46 
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respectively). For positive outcomes, this effect of choice level was not 
significant: F(1,92) = 1.57, p= .21, η²= .02, with participants experiencing similar 
levels of satisfaction in the limited and extensive choice conditions (Ms= 5.19, 
4.63 respectively). These findings are consistent with predictions, and provide 
initial evidence that valence is to some extent influential in determining the 
prevalence of the ECE. 
5.8.3 Counterfactual Analysis 
 T-tests revealed that the valence manipulation was also successful in 
terms of counterfactual generation. In line with previous research, participants 
were found to generate significantly more counterfactual thoughts following 
negative than positive outcomes (Ms= .48 vs. .27, t(94) = 2.71, p= .01). 
Supporting this, a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited vs. 
extensive) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of valence on the number of 
counterfactuals generated: F(1,92) = 7.61, p= .01, η² = .08. No main effect of 
choice level was found: F(1,92) = 1.00, p= .32, η² = .01, however, a marginal 
interaction was found between valence and choice level: F(1,92) = 2.80, p= .09, 
η² = .03 (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1. Bar chart displaying the marginal interaction between choice level and 
outcome valence on the total number of counterfactuals generated. Standard 
errors are represented in the figure by the error bars attached to each column. 
A simple main effects analysis was then conducted to follow up the 
marginal interaction in order to examine specific predictions that participants 
would generate more counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice only 
where outcomes were negative. Results provided partial support for this 
prediction. Where outcomes were negative participants were found to generate 
marginally more counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice: Ms= 1.74, 
1.13; F(1,92) = 3.49, p= .07, η² = .04. Where outcomes were positive, this effect 
of choice level was not significant: F(1,92) = .23, p= .63, η² = .003, with similar 
numbers of counterfactuals being generated following extensive and limited 
choice (Ms= .72, .88 respectively). 
5.8.4 Mediation Analysis        
 Two three-step mediation analyses were then conducted in order to 
examine specific predictions that counterfactual thought would mediate any ECE 
for negative but not positive outcomes. Again following Baron and Kenny (1986) 
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Choice
(0 = Limited;
1 = Extensive)
Counterfactuals
Satisfaction (‘Bad’ Outcomes)
Counterfactuals
(-.31*) / -.18 ns
-.47***
-.07ns -.40**
.26m
Satisfaction (‘Good’ Outcomes)(-.18 ns) / -.21ns
Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model for ‘negative’ outcomes. The lower half (dashed arrows) = 
mediation model for ‘positive’ outcomes. Figures are standardised beta weights. ns = not significant, m = p = .08, *= p≤.05, 
**= p≤.01, ***= p≤.001.
each mediation analysis had three steps. Step 1 regressed choice level (limited 
vs. extensive) on satisfaction, Step 2 regressed choice level on counterfactuals, 
and in Step 3 both choice level and counterfactuals were regressed onto 
satisfaction.  
5.8.4.1 Negative Outcomes 
The results of mediation analyses using negative outcomes are 
summarised in the upper half of Figure 5.2 with the results from Step 1 shown in 
brackets and those from Step 3 in italics.  
Figure 5.2. Mediation analysis showing the role of counterfactuals in mediating 
the effect of choice set size on satisfaction for ‘negative’ but not ‘positive’ 
outcomes. 
Step 1 replicated the ECE with greater satisfaction in the limited vs. 
extensive choice condition (β = -.31, p = .04). Replicating earlier counterfactual 
analyses, Step 2 found that counterfactuals were marginally less likely to be 
generated following limited than extensive choice (β = .26, p = .08). Step 3 
suggests that the number of counterfactuals generated negatively affected 
satisfaction irrespective of condition (β = -.47, p = .001). More importantly, the 
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main effect of choice level was no longer marginally significant (β = -.18, p = .17) 
once counterfactuals were added to the model. A Sobel test confirmed that 
counterfactuals were significantly mediating the effect of choice on satisfaction (z 
= 1.60, p= .05, one tailed).  
5.8.4.2 Positive Outcomes 
The results of mediation analyses using positive outcomes are 
summarised in the lower half of Figure 5.2 with the results from Step 1 shown in 
brackets and those from Step 3 in italics. Supporting earlier analyses, there was 
no main effect of choice level on either satisfaction or counterfactual thinking and 
no evidence of mediation. Participants were just as satisfied if they had chosen a 
pleasant drink following limited vs. extensive choice (β = -.18, p= .21) and 
generated just as many counterfactuals in the limited and extensive choice 
conditions (β = -.07, p= .62). Again, demonstrating the importance of 
counterfactual thinking in general for satisfaction there was a strong negative 
relationship between them (β = -.40, p= .004) but crucially in this case they did 
not mediate the effect of choice (z = .49, p= .31, one tailed). 
5.9    Discussion 
Although an increasing amount of evidence suggests that extensive choice 
may be associated with decreased satisfaction (e.g. Iyengar et al., 2004; 2006; 
Chernev 2003a; 2003b; Lee & Lee, 2004; Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009; Mogilner et al., 2008; Greifeneder et al., 2010), the excess-
choice-effect is not always apparent. Indeed, a meta-analyses of 50 studies 
found no evidence either for or against the effect overall, leading the researchers 
to conclude that a theory of too much choice was needed which might help to 
explain the divergence of findings within the choice literature (Scheibehenne et 
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al., 2010). The current experiment aimed to address this by drawing on theories 
of counterfactual thinking. The role of outcome valence has been previously 
overlooked (Scheibehenne et al., 2009) as a potentially important factor 
contributing to the prevalence of the effect. Based upon the counterfactual 
literature, and the findings of Experiments 4, 5 and 6 it was hypothesised that the 
ECE might be more prevalent when decision outcomes were negative, due to the 
predicted impact of negative outcomes upon counterfactual thought. This was 
examined in 2 different choice tasks. 
Results from the chocolate taste test were not found to be in line with 
predictions. However, analysis revealed this was because the manipulation of 
valence was not successful for this task: participants were found to be equally 
(highly) satisfied whether they tasted the ‘good’ or the ‘bad’ chocolate. This was a 
somewhat surprising finding given the results of pre-testing, and potential 
explanations for this are considered momentarily below. However, results from 
the drinks taste test, where the manipulation of valence was successful, were 
found to be broadly in line with predictions. Specifically, the ECE was only found 
to be prevalent where decision outcomes were negative, and crucially, this effect 
was found to be mediated by counterfactual thought. Where outcomes were 
positive there were no differences in satisfaction or counterfactual thought across 
choice levels. Subsequently the results from this task provide support for a) the 
counterfactual literature suggesting that a key trigger for counterfactual thought is 
a negative outcome (Roese, 1997; Sanna & Turley, 1996; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), 
and b) the overarching hypothesis of the current thesis that counterfactual 
thought is a key driving force behind the ECE. Each of these claims is now 
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considered in turn, alongside implications for the existing choice and 
counterfactual literatures. 
Firstly, the results of the drinks task provide evidence that outcome 
valence is an important trigger for counterfactual thought. Participants were found 
to engage in a significantly increased level of counterfactual thought when 
decision outcomes were negative, providing support for previous research 
(Roese, 1997; Sanna & Turley, 1996; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). Subsequently, these 
results also hint at the possibility that previous experiments within the 
counterfactual literature which did not find any differences in counterfactual 
thinking according to manipulations in valence (e.g. Roese & Olson, 1993), may 
be attributable to certain methodological differences in procedures. Specifically, 
as previously mentioned, it may be the case that in Roese and Olson’s (1993) 
experiment, the structured method of measuring counterfactual generation may 
have meant that participants felt obliged to generate counterfactual thoughts 
even in situations where they may not normally have done so (i.e. following a 
positive task outcome). Conversely, by using an open-ended measure of 
counterfactual thought, with no specific instructions of which type of thoughts to 
generate, the current experiment provides a perhaps more accurate 
representation of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thought. In doing this, 
the determining role of valence is supported, and the greater amount of 
counterfactuals found under negative outcomes further emphasises that a  basic 
underlying function of counterfactual thought may be a source of motivation to 
guide behaviour, in an attempt to avoid similar situations in the future (see also, 
Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999).            
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 By applying this aspect of counterfactual theory to the field of choice it 
was then possible to manipulate the prevalence of the ECE, providing further 
evidence for the causal role of counterfactual thought in driving the effect. Indeed, 
the ECE was replicated only when outcomes were negative, where the effect was 
once again found to be significantly mediated by counterfactual thought. Where 
outcomes were positive and counterfactual thinking was reduced, no ECE was 
found. Subsequently the current experiment highlights outcome valence as an 
important factor contributing to the prevalence of the ECE. This not only 
contributes to the choice literature which has examined moderators of the effect 
(Scheibehenne et al., 2009), but also raises a potentially important issue with this 
previous research. Specifically, Scheibehenne et al., (2009) identified justification 
as being a key factor required in order to elicit the ECE, which the authors claim 
fits with the assumption that justification becomes more difficult when options 
become more difficult to distinguish from one another. However, it could be the 
case that the justification process impacts upon satisfaction by acting as a trigger 
for counterfactual thought. As such, when extensive choice participants are 
encouraged to fully reflect upon their choices, their decreased satisfaction levels 
may in fact mirror an increase in the availability of counterfactual thoughts about 
the attractive qualities of unchosen options. The results from the current 
experiment provide support for this account, as marginally more counterfactual 
thoughts were found to be generated under extensive than limited choice (where 
outcomes were negative). In order to resolve this issue, and determine whether 
the justification process alone is required to elicit the ECE, a replication of 
Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2009) justification experiment could be conducted, but 
with an additional measure of counterfactual thought (as per the current 
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experiment). It would then be possible to determine whether it is the justification 
process or potentially the increased level of counterfactual thought this may 
encourage, which is a necessary factor contributing to the prevalence of the ECE. 
Further support for the role of valence within the ECE would be offered if a 
review of previous studies revealed that only those which were associated with 
relatively bad outcomes led to the effect. Unfortunately this is virtually impossible 
since we cannot know a priori which outcomes were positive or negative for the 
individuals making the decisions. In some instances where the ECE was found, 
such as having to write an essay (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000, Study 2), choose jobs 
(Iyengar et al., 2006), pension schemes (Iyengar et al., 2004),or demonstrate 
creativity or artistic talent (Experiment 1)one might infer that the experience was 
a relatively negative one for many participants, but we cannot know this for sure. 
Similarly, several studies that seemed to have involved choices with a high 
chance of positive outcomes (e.g. chocolates, jelly beans, soda, restaurants and 
music; Berger et al., 2007; Kahn & Wansink, 2004; Arunachalam et al., 2009; 
Scheibehenne et al., 2009) also failed to find an ECE. Again, however, we can’t 
be sure how these outcomes compared to other choices participants could have 
made since outcome valence was not directly manipulated.   
 More challenging for this account are studies that demonstrate the ECE 
using apparently positive (e.g. jams, chocolates, Iyengar & Lepper, 2000, Studies 
1 & 3) or neutral (e.g. gift boxes or pens; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Shar & 
Wolford, 2007; Greifeneder et al., 2010) stimuli. However, just as with studies 
that seem to support my approach we simply don’t know what the initial reactions 
of people were in these studies leaving open the possibility that they were 
relatively negative or at least more negative than researchers had expected. 
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Thus I am unable to 'retro-fit' my approach to the previous literature because 
although I may have intuitive beliefs about whether a choice set is likely to 
contain options which people will find relatively positive or negative I am unable 
to effectively and objectively determine this. The chocolates task used in the 
current experiment provides evidence for the unpredictability of choice outcome 
perception. Specifically, even though pilot testing revealed the ‘negative outcome’ 
chocolates to be unappealing, they were enjoyed in the main experiment, 
potentially explaining why no subsequent impact of choice level was found here. 
A discussion of possible explanations as to why the chocolate task may not have 
worked as intended is considered momentarily below. Consequently, a test of this 
explanation of the potentially important determining role of valence within the 
ECE will therefore depend on future studies which, like the current experiment, a) 
deliberately manipulate the valence of experiences of choice, and b) provide a 
manipulation check to determine that the choice outcomes were perceived as 
intended.   
Regarding potential explanations for the chocolates taste test, analysis 
revealed that satisfaction with both the negative and positive chocolate types was 
equally high. Comparing average satisfaction ratings with those obtained during 
pilot testing it appears that the positive outcome ratings were consistent, and yet 
satisfaction in the negative outcome conditions increased by an average of 2 
whole points, essentially making them equivalent to those obtained in the positive 
conditions. There are a number of potential explanations as to why this effect 
may have occurred. For example, it may be the case that participants enjoyed the 
‘negative outcome’ chocolate more in the actual experiment than in the pilot test, 
as they may have drawn comparisons between that choice outcome and the 
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‘negative outcome’ for the drinks task. In other words, satisfaction with a horrible 
chocolate might have been improved by comparison after tasting a horrible drink. 
However, half of the participants tasted the chocolate first, so would have had no 
other negative outcome with which to compare their taste experience. In addition, 
as previously discussed no evidence was found for any task order effects. 
Therefore other factors may also have been contributing to the overall increase in 
satisfaction.  
It may be the case that the valence manipulation wasn’t as successful as 
the drinks task due to the different ways in which the tasks were described. 
Although 24 different potential outcomes were listed for both tasks, for the drinks 
task participants read a list of potential flavours, whilst in the chocolates task 
participants were given a list of brand names. As such it may be that for the 
drinks task, participants could easily determine from the outset that peppermint 
was likely to be one of the worst flavours, and may have been subsequently 
disappointed to have chosen this flavour from an extensive selection. However, 
with the chocolates task, it may have been more difficult to distinguish between 
the options according to brand name, thus meaning perception of variety within 
the assortment may have been reduced by comparison. As such satisfaction may 
have improved following a negative outcome, as information regarding the best 
and worst possible options may have been less readily available, or less easily 
brought to mind.  
This explanation is to some extent consistent with research by Gleicher et 
al., (1990) who found that the salience of counterfactual information was 
influential in determining the level of affective response following choice. As 
reviewed in Chapter 4, in this experiment Gleicher et al., (1990) used a version of 
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Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982a) original investment scenario, in which the 
valence of the protagonists’ choice outcome and the salience of counterfactual 
information were manipulated. The authors found that when outcomes were 
negative, participants consistently attributed greater affective reactions to the 
actor than the non-actor, whereas when outcomes were positive, this effect only 
occurred when counterfactual information was made highly salient. The findings 
from the current experiment appear to be consistent with this research, 
demonstrating that when counterfactual information is not made salient (i.e. when 
participants have no easily comparable information on which to base their 
satisfaction judgements) then the level of affective response is reduced.  
Indeed, the findings from the current experiment, alongside those in the 
previous chapter, extend this argument further, and show that an important factor 
in determining the perception of valence of choice outcomes may be some 
degree of comparison with other options. For instance, Gleicher et al., (1990) 
found evidence for an action effect when outcomes were negative regardless the 
degree of salient of counterfactual information. However, in their investment 
scenario participants read about a choice outcome which was undoubtedly 
negative (i.e. Mr. Paul loses money), where negative outcomes are known to cue 
for counterfactual thought (e.g. Sanna & Turley, 1996, Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). On 
the other hand, in the current experiment(s) participants may have required a 
degree of comparison with other choice outcomes in order to determine whether 
their choice outcome was relatively positive or negative. In cases where this isn’t 
perhaps as obvious as losing money, it appears that a degree of comparison may 
be influential in determining perception of valence, and when this information is 
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not readily available then participants appear to experience reduced affective 
responses to that choice outcome.       
Also consistent with this argument, it may be the case that in pilot testing, 
participants rated the ‘negative outcome’ chocolate lower than in the actual 
experiment as they may have been comparing it with the higher ranking 
chocolates. After tasting just that one chocolate in the main experiment it may 
have simply not seemed that undesirable. This also relates back to my theoretical 
account of availability of information about the best and worst possible options. 
During pilot testing, having the potential to draw direct comparisons with other 
chocolates may have driven satisfaction down, where in the actual experiment 
this information (although listed) may not have been so readily available. 
Conversely in the drinks task it may have been easier to continue to draw 
comparisons between potential options during the main experiment, and this 
degree of comparison may have allowed participants to make relative 
judgements of the valence of their outcome, leading to enhanced affective 
responses. However, at this stage this suggestion is largely speculative, and 
further research will therefore be needed in order to further examine how varying 
the salience of defining information regarding different choice alternatives may 
drive satisfaction following choice, due to the predicted impact of this upon 
counterfactual generation. Nevertheless following this, it may be that future 
experiments into the effects of valence may wish to ensure that any options listed 
are described in terms of more widely recognised characteristics, such as flavour, 
in order to ensure that participants are able to easily distinguish between options, 
thus enabling them to reflect upon the potential qualities that each may have 
whilst making satisfaction judgements.  
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 On the other hand the manipulation of valence was found to be successful 
for the drinks task, allowing me to determine that valence did impact upon the 
prevalence of the ECE, and that in line with predictions, this was partially 
attributable to the effect of valence upon counterfactual thought. However as 
these findings were only found for one task, it is important to note that these 
effects may be task specific to some extent, as per Experiment 1. As such further 
research will be needed in order to fully explore whether the findings of the drinks 
task are replicable and would generalise across domains. Nevertheless if this 
were found to be the case, then these findings would have important implications 
with regard to the construction of choice architectures within public policy (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008). Specifically, the results highlight the importance of considering 
probable outcome valence when determining the most appropriate choice level(s) 
for satisfaction. If outcomes are likely to be positive then people are less likely to 
consider options foregone and thus more choice may help them find a match for 
their preferences and enhance outcomes. However, if immediate outcomes are 
likely to be viscerally negative, more choice may undermine satisfaction. For 
instance, people tend to dislike parting with current earnings to invest in pensions 
(Iyengar et al., 2004; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) and thus presenting them with 
many options may be likely to lead to more counterfactual thinking, and less 
satisfaction with any given choice. Perhaps this is one reason why people tend to 
invest more when provided with a limited number of alternatives (Iyengar et al., 
2004), or a default pension scheme (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), as both lessen the 
need to compare many options. It is possible that a similar process occurs when 
people have to choose between a range of hospitals for an unpleasant medical 
operation (Fasolo et al., 2010), or between treatment methods following illness 
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(e.g. Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et al., 1989). In such cases it may actually be 
better to provide a more limited number of options in order to reduce 
counterfactual thinking, and thus potentially improve satisfaction with an 
objectively negative outcome. This is a point to which I will return in Chapter 6. 
To conclude, Experiment 8 demonstrated that high levels of choice were 
only ‘too much’ when the person experienced a negative outcome, and that this 
ECE was mediated by an increased tendency to consider options foregone. 
Where outcomes were positive choice level was found to have a reduced impact 
upon counterfactual thought, and no evidence for any ECE was found. Following 
this, Chapter 6 subsequently aims to: a) consider the findings of this and all 
previous experimental chapters in light of the existing choice and counterfactual 
literatures, b) determine the potential implications of each of these findings for 
consumers, retailers and for the construction of public policy, and c) identify 
additional areas of research necessary in order to continue to further our 
understanding of the role that peoples’ considerations of alternatives foregone 
plays in determining satisfaction and well-being following choice. 
230 
Chapter 6: A Review and Interpretation of the Experimental Findings and 
Recommendations for Future Research 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
The main aim of this chapter is to review and interpret the experimental 
findings reported in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, and to relate these findings both to 
the current choice literature and to the theoretical counterfactual accounts that I 
have introduced in the previous chapters. Section 6.2 provides a recap of the 
experimental findings, and an interpretation of these findings in light of the 
existing choice and counterfactual literatures, alongside a discussion of potential 
areas for future research. Section 6.3 considers the role of counterfactual thought 
as an underlying causal explanation for the ECE in light of existing theoretical 
explanations for the effect. Section 6.4 considers the wider theoretical 
implications of the experimental findings. Section 6.5 provides a discussion of the 
applied implications of the current research for the psychology of choice, with 
particular regard to retailers, consumer well-being, and the construction of public 
policy. Then Section 6.6 considers additional potential areas for future research 
to explore. Finally, Section 6.7 provides an overall reflection on the findings of the 
current research. 
6.2 Summary of Experimental Findings 
Modern society increasingly leaves people "spoilt for choice". That is, the 
presence of multiple options may be so extensive that enjoyment in the chosen 
alternative is “spoilt” in comparison to a situation with fewer options. Although the 
existence of the phrase suggests some awareness of this problem, people still 
tend to prefer more rather than less choice and the ability to undo their decisions 
once they have been made (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004; 2006; 
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Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Lee & Lee, 2004; Mogilner et 
al., 2008; Chernev 2003a; 2003b; Greifeneder et al., 2010; Gilbert & Ebert, 
2002). This awareness of the dangers of choice alongside strong preferences for 
greater choice has been referred to as the "paradox of choice" (Schwartz, 2000; 
2004). 
Building on discussions of increased regret as an account for these 
findings (Schwartz et al., 2002; Schwartz, 2004; Roese & Summerville, 2005) the 
current research aimed to directly examine the potentially causal role of 
counterfactual thought in driving the ECE. Across 7 experiments I manipulated 
various factors in an attempt to influence the availability of counterfactual 
thoughts, and thus determine any subsequent impact upon the prevalence of the 
effect, whilst another experiment (Experiment 7) aimed to determine individuals’
predicted affective responses to extensive choice. What follows now is a 
discussion and interpretation of the main findings of each experiment in turn, in 
light of the existing choice and counterfactual literatures. 
6.2.1 Experiments 1 and 2 
In Experiment 1 the number of counterfactuals generated was monitored 
under conditions of limited vs. extensive choice, in which half of the participants 
rated their satisfaction with their chosen alternatives under high cognitive load. 
The aim of this load manipulation was to undermine the systematic generation of 
counterfactuals and thus ‘undo’ the normally deleterious effects of excess choice 
on option satisfaction. Experiment 2 used the same procedure to examine the 
paradox of reversibility. The number of counterfactuals generated under 
expectations of reversible vs. non-reversible choice whilst simultaneously under 
low vs. high cognitive load was monitored.  
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In line with the overarching hypothesis of the current thesis, in Experiment 
1 the ECE was replicated under low load, and further, this effect was found to be 
mediated by counterfactual thought. The capacity to think about counterfactual 
alternatives was found to be reduced under high load, providing evidence 
consistent with research by Ward and Mann (2000;Müller et al., 2007; Beck et al., 
2009; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; although c.f. Kahneman, 1995; Goldinger et 
al., 2003), that counterfactual thinking can be an effortful process which in some 
instances may be reduced via a secondary cognitive load task. Accordingly 
following this reduction in counterfactual thought, under high load the ECE was 
found to be reversed. This latter finding appears to be in line with economic 
theory, suggesting that people may indeed be happiest with increased choice, but 
only in cases where the associated detrimental post-decisional counterfactual 
thought process is reduced.  
Results from Experiment 2 indicated that counterfactual thought also 
played an underlying role in the reversibility paradox. Specifically, under low load, 
an increased tendency to engage in a process of counterfactual thinking was 
found to partially mediate the impact of expected reversibility upon revealed 
satisfaction. Paralleling the findings of Experiment 1, under high load no 
relationship was found between reversibility and counterfactual thought. Thus, 
results from these two experiments provided initial evidence to suggest that 
counterfactual thought may play an important role in underpinning these two 
seemingly paradoxical findings within the choice literature. The findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2 are thus to some extent also consistent with the work of 
Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Bos, 
Nordgren & van Baaren, 2006), who argue that satisfaction with complex 
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decisions can be improved if decisions are made in the absence of deliberative 
attention. In this case, excess choice and reversibility can be viewed as 
contributing to a relatively complex decision process, whereby satisfaction was 
subsequently found to increase if participants’ attention was otherwise engaged 
under a high cognitive load. 
6.2.2 Experiment 3 
Following the replication of the ECE in Experiment 1, Experiment 3 was 
designed to investigate a) the long term implications of the effect, b) whether the 
effect would transfer to the novel domain of health psychology, and c) to establish 
whether the ECE could impact upon physical, as well as psychological well-
being. Participants selected a placebo treatment (a Bach’s flower essence), 
which they then used every day for a period of two weeks. This essence was 
chosen from either a very limited (2), an intermediate (12), or an extensive (38) 
number of options. Both psychological and physiological satisfaction with choice, 
and a self-reported measure of counterfactual thought were monitored at the start 
and end of the two week period.  
Results indicated that the ECE transferred to the domain of health 
psychology. In addition, consistent with previous research (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 
2007, Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009) satisfaction was found to be an inverted U-
shaped function of the number of options available at the initial time of choice. 
Specifically, participants were found to be significantly more satisfied with their 
choice of essence if this was chosen from an intermediate number of options, 
than from a very limited or an extensive choice set. At the end of the two week 
period this initial ECE was found to be reduced, and psychological satisfaction 
levels were found to be equivalent regardless of initial choice level. This 
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appeared to be consistent with counterfactual theory, paralleling the predicted 
drop in the experience of counterfactual emotion over time. However the 
counterfactual self-report data were not found to support this, with high levels of 
positive correlation found between satisfaction and counterfactual thought at both 
times of testing. This finding was particularly counter-intuitive given the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2, and suggested that the wording of the counterfactual 
question may have wrongly placed emphasis on how much participants 
considered other factual alternatives available to them at the time of choice, as 
opposed to providing a true indication of post-decisional counterfactual thought. 
As such it appears that this self-report measure may simply not have been a 
reliable method of measuring the underlying construct of counterfactual thought. 
Consequently, although the satisfaction data appear to be consistent with 
counterfactual theory, further research will be needed in order to gain empirical 
evidence for the claim that the reduced ECE exhibited over time is a direct 
consequence of an associated reduction in counterfactual thought.  
In addition, the results of Experiment 3 also help to further understanding 
of the true extent of the ‘problem’ of extensive choice (Fasolo et al., 2007), by 
demonstrating that not only does extensive choice lead to detriments in short 
term satisfaction, but can also potentially impact upon the choosers long term 
well-being. Specifically, participants were found to experience a placebo effect to 
a greater extent if they initially chose their flower essence from 12 rather than 2 
or 38 options. As such this appears to provide empirical support for Schwartz’s 
(2000; 2004) claim that choice can have a long term impact upon well-being. 
However this is a point to which I will return in greater detail in Section 6.4. 
235 
Crucially, however, this experiment was conducted within the field of 
health psychology, and involved the use of a placebo treatment. As such further 
research will be needed in order to determine whether choice continues to impact 
upon choosers’ well-being in a similar manner in both alternative, consumer-
based choice domains, and in everyday situations where the chooser might not 
necessarily continue to reflect upon the results of their decision for any 
substantial length of time. Only then can we draw any definite conclusions about 
the potential generalisability of these results to everyday decision making. This is 
an avenue for future research to explore. 
6.2.3 Experiments 4, 5 and 6 
 Experiments 4, 5 and 6 were designed to build upon a third aspect of the 
counterfactual literature: the counterfactual ‘action effect’. This refers to the 
finding that people may typically be more likely to generate counterfactual 
thoughts following acts of commission, or action, than acts of omission, or 
inaction (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). This aspect of counterfactual theory was 
then applied to the ECE on the hypothesis that presenting participants with a 
default option might then help to improve satisfaction with extensive choice, as 
choosing to stick with a default may be viewed as being akin to inaction (see 
Ritov & Baron, 1992), and thus should reduce the detrimental post-decisional 
counterfactual thought process otherwise associated with extensive choice. 
Across Experiments 4 – 6, the vast majority of participants presented with 
a default option were found to stick with that default, providing robust evidence 
for the omission bias, and for the immense power of defaults in guiding behaviour 
(Baron & Ritov, 1994; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). 
Contrary to predictions, no evidence was found that default options led to 
236 
improved satisfaction with extensive choice: participants were found to be equally 
satisfied whether they made an active choice or stuck with a default. 
Nevertheless, Experiment 5 revealed partial evidence for a counterfactual action 
effect: participants were found to generate marginally more counterfactual 
thoughts following an active choice, in comparison to those participants who 
chose to stick with the default. Subsequently, as previously discussed, this raises 
the possibility that the negative task outcome (i.e. eating an unpleasant-tasting 
chocolate) might have driven satisfaction down lower than one might normally 
predict in the default choice group, potentially through feelings of betrayal 
following the recommendations of an expert. As such, given the established link 
between counterfactual thought and the experience of negative affect (Kahneman 
& Miller, 1986; Niedenthal et al., 1994; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995), 
these results suggest that default options may still have the potential to lead to 
improved satisfaction, in cases where the default option might result in a less 
directly negative experience for the participant. However further research will be 
needed in order to investigate this possibility. 
In line with research by Sanna and Turley (1996) and Tsiros and Mittal 
(2000), Experiments 4 – 6 demonstrated that a key trigger for counterfactual 
thought is a negative task outcome and some degree of violation between 
expectation and experience (as demonstrated via the removal of chocolate 
labels). This is in line with the functional definition of counterfactuals as a source 
of motivation for guiding behaviour, with an overall emphasis upon improvement 
(see also, Markman et al., 1993; 1995; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994; 
Roese & Olson, 1995). Following this, Experiments 5 and 6 also revealed that 
when decision outcomes were negative no choice was preferable to any choice 
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(see also, Botti & Iyengar, 2004; Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et al., 1989). The 
current experiments highlighted that this effect was due to an increase in the 
experience of the counterfactual emotion of regret following any choice. When 
the capacity to experience regret was reduced by removing choice then 
satisfaction with the objectively same negative outcome was found to improve. 
Conversely, in cases where decision outcomes were more positive for the 
participant, choice type was not found to have any impact upon satisfaction.  
Once again this is seemingly contrary to economic theory, demonstrating 
that when outcomes are positive then extensive choice may be of no further 
benefit to the chooser beyond that of no choice whatsoever. Importantly, this was 
found to be due to the fact that any positive outcome was associated with a 
reduced tendency to experience the counterfactual emotion of regret. 
Consequently, the findings of Experiments 4, 5 and 6 highlighted the potentially 
important role of valence in determining the prevalence of the ECE. Active, 
extensive choices only appeared to be detrimental to satisfaction levels when the 
outcome of that choice was objectively predetermined to be negative. Experiment 
8, discussed in Section 6.2.5 below, was subsequently designed in order to 
investigate whether this same pattern of results would transfer directly to the 
ECE. 
6.2.4 Experiment 7 
Experiment 7 revealed evidence for a forecasting bias in relation to the 
‘problem’ of extensive choice (Fasolo et al., 2007). The vast majority of 
participants in this experiment were found to predict that they would rather be in 
the active, extensive choice condition than in the default or control conditions. In 
reality, not only were participants found to be equally satisfied with a default as if 
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they had chosen it for themselves, but were also either equally satisfied, or 
significantly more satisfied (Experiments 5 and 6) in the control group than in 
either of the two choice conditions. As previously discussed, results from these 
experiments appear to be in line with Girotto et al.,’s (2007) distinction between 
‘actors’ and ‘readers’, and the different levels of counterfactual thought that either 
may typically engage in. The predictors in Experiment 7 made their judgements 
based upon the consideration of a hypothetical scenario, making them essentially 
akin to ‘readers’, who according to Girotto et al., (2007), must make judgements 
in the absence of salient counterfactual information. By contrast, the experiencers 
(similar to Girotto et al.,’s, 2007, ‘actors’), would have made their judgements in 
light of an increased availability of counterfactual information based upon actual 
experience. Subsequently, this distinction appears to have led participants in 
Experiments 5 and 6 (at least where outcomes were negative) to experience 
decreased satisfaction with extensive choice, as per the ECE literature, whilst 
conversely in Experiment 7 this lack of salient counterfactual information led to an 
apparent reversal of the ECE, in terms of a preference for active, extensive 
choice.   
These findings contribute to the current choice literature by highlighting 
that a focus on the past, a reflection upon an actual experience, may be another 
potentially important factor contributing to the elicitation of the ECE. It would be 
interesting to explore whether any ECE would be found if participants were asked 
to read a hypothetical scenario detailing a choice made from either a limited or an 
extensive number of options, and measure how satisfied they believe the 
protagonist would feel following that choice. Following on from the results of the 
current experiments it would seem likely that no ECE, or perhaps even a reversal 
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of the ECE, would occur. This is because participants would be making 
judgements as readers or predictors, in the absence of readily available 
counterfactual information. Supporting this, the results from Experiment 1 
demonstrated that when the capacity to engage in counterfactual thinking was 
reduced via load, the ECE was reversed. Future research may subsequently wish 
to directly explore the prevalence of the ECE using hypothetical scenarios, and 
actual experience, in order to determine the extent to which reflection upon past 
experience is a necessary determining factor. Following this it would then also be 
interesting for future research to explore whether the ECE might then be more 
likely to occur following hypothetical scenarios if the chooser is provided with 
negative (as opposed to positive, or no) feedback information about the results of 
their hypothetical choice, due to the fact that negative outcomes may still act as a 
trigger for counterfactual thought (see for example, Sanna & Turley, 1996, Tsiros 
& Mittal, 2000; Experiment 8 below).  
6.2.5 Experiment 8 
Finally, following on from the results of Experiments 4, 5 and 6, 
Experiment 8 was designed to directly investigate the role of choice outcome 
valence in determining the prevalence of the ECE. This experiment used two 
choice tasks, a drinks taste test and a chocolates taste test, in which choice level 
and outcome valence were manipulated. For the drinks task, where the 
manipulation of valence was found to be successful, results were found to be 
largely in line with predictions. Specifically, the ECE was only found to be 
significant where outcomes were negative, and once again this effect was found 
to be mediated by counterfactual thought. Where outcomes were positive the 
influence of choice level upon counterfactual thought and satisfaction were no 
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longer significant. Subsequently these results provide further additional support 
for the overarching hypothesis that counterfactual thought is an important driving 
force behind the ECE.  
It would be interesting for future research to continue to explore the link 
between valence and the ECE, perhaps by conducting a replication of 
Experiment 8 but using at even more ‘extreme ends’ of the preference scale. This 
would be useful as the lack of an interaction term in Experiment 8 suggests that 
the ‘positive’ outcomes were still subject to the influences of choice level to some
extent. As such, although the manipulation of valence worked as intended, and 
no evidence for any ECE was found following positive outcomes, it is possible 
that by using even more extreme ‘positive’ outcome we might then find evidence 
for an interaction between outcome valence and choice level, as I would predict 
the influence of valence upon counterfactual thought to be even more 
pronounced.  
The finding that the manipulation of valence in the chocolates task did not 
work as intended also appears to be consistent with counterfactual theory, 
specifically with Gleicher et al.,’s (1990) argument that the salience of post-
decisional counterfactual information is important in determining the level of 
affective response following choice. As the chocolates were defined purely on the 
basis of brand names, this may have meant counterfactual information was less 
salient and thus less influential in subsequent satisfaction judgements, in 
comparison to the drinks taste test in which the options were defined on the 
perhaps more easily imagined characteristic of flavour. As such this lends some 
potential explanation as to why no evidence for any ECE was found for the 
chocolates task. Once again, where the capacity for engaging in a detrimental 
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process of post-decisional counterfactual thought is reduced, in this instance by 
defining options by less easily imagined characteristics, then the impact of choice 
level upon satisfaction is also found to be reduced.   
These results are also consistent with research by Hsee and Zhang (2004) 
who argue that satisfaction ratings vary depending on whether judgements are 
made in joint evaluation mode (i.e. by drawing comparisons with other options), 
or in single evaluation mode (in which no comparison can be made). For example 
in their experiment, Hsee and Zhang (2004) asked participants to predict how 
they would feel if they had written a poetry book and either a) no-one bought the 
book, b) 80 people bought the book, c) 160 people bought the book, or d) 240 
people bought the book (Study 1). Participants were either presented with all four 
possible outcomes and were asked to rate how they would feel after each 
outcome (joint evaluation condition), or were simply given one outcome, and 
were asked to rate how they would feel after experiencing that outcome (separate 
evaluation condition). The authors found that participants in the joint evaluation 
condition frequently over-predicted the difference in satisfaction they would 
experience between the latter three conditions. In actual fact, participants in the 
separate evaluation conditions reported similar levels of satisfaction regardless of 
whether 80, 160 or 240 people bought the book.  
This also relates back to the contrasting findings noted between the drinks 
and chocolates task in Experiment 8. Specifically, following the evaluability 
hypothesis proposed by Hsee (1996; 1998; 2000) and Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount 
and Bazerman (1999), it is possible that the relatively difficult-to-imagine defining 
characteristic of brand name used in the chocolates task meant decisions were 
effectively made in single evaluation mode, i.e. without comparison with other 
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options. As such this may explain why no differences in satisfaction were found 
according to choice level for this particular task. On the other hand, for the drinks 
task, the fact that the options were defined on easy-to-imagine attributes (e.g. 
colours, flavours) may have meant these decisions were akin to joint evaluation 
mode, potentially further exaggerating the differences in satisfaction according to 
choice level.  
However, it may also be argued that Hsee and Zhang’s (2004) findings 
can be explained, at least in part, by counterfactual theory, and the varying 
salience of counterfactual information following comparisons. Indeed, it is 
possible that a lack of readily available counterfactual information regarding other 
options may explain the relatively small differences found between options 
judged in single-evaluation-mode. On the other hand, the greater differences 
found between options in joint-evaluation-mode may simply reflect the greater 
amount of counterfactual information available to participants whilst making their 
satisfaction judgements. This account is consistent with the findings of 
Experiments 5 and 6 wherein satisfaction with the same negative outcome was 
found to improve if choice was removed altogether, as this reduced the 
participants’ capacity to experience the detrimental counterfactual emotion of 
regret. As such it may be the case that the single-evaluation-mode of judgement 
merely represents a means of reducing or removing the capacity for participants 
to engage in a process of post-decisional counterfactual thought.  
However at this stage this suggestion is speculative, and further research 
will be needed in order to investigate this possibility. This could be done by 
conducting a replication of Hsee and Zhang’s (2004) experiment, but with the 
addition of a measure of counterfactual thought, or perhaps more suitably, a 
243 
measure of regret, as per Experiments 4, 5 and 6 (as the removal of choice in the 
single-evaluation-mode conditions would not allow for the direct comparison of 
counterfactual thought). By then conducting a mediation analysis following the 
analytical procedure used by Baron and Kenny (1986), and in Experiments 1, 5, 6 
and 8 it would then be possible to determine whether participants judged the 
same options to be more different in the joint-evaluation-mode than in the single-
evaluation-mode due to an increased likelihood of experiencing postdecisional 
regret following comparative choice. 
Therefore to summarise so far, the experimental findings discussed in the 
current thesis provide evidence which is useful in furthering our theoretical 
understanding of the ECE. Building upon largely speculative accounts provided 
by previous researchers (see, for example, Anderson, 2003; Gingras, 2003; 
Schwartz, 2004), and upon previous research which has noted a link between 
increased choice and regret (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000;Schwartz et al., 2002; 
Roese & Summerville, 2005), the current research provides direct empirical 
evidence that counterfactual thinking plays an important role in driving the ECE. 
Indeed, across 7 experiments in a variety of domains I have found evidence that 
dissatisfaction is only experienced following extensive choice when 
counterfactual thoughts are made readily available.  
In each case where evidence was found for an ECE, the effect was found 
to be mediated, or partially mediated, by an increase in the experience of 
counterfactual thought or emotion. Further, when the capacity to think 
counterfactually was reduced, for example following the addition of a secondary 
cognitive load task, over time, or following a positive choice outcome, then 
extensive choice was no longer found to be detrimental to chooser satisfaction. 
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Finally, in another experiment (Experiment 7) the lack of counterfactual 
information available to readers considering a hypothetical choice was found to 
lead to a reversal of the ECE, in terms of a preference for active, extensive 
choice (paralleling the results of Experiment 1 under high load). Thus, in all, not 
only does this research provide substantial support for and replication of the ECE 
itself, but by linking the choice and counterfactual literatures is also the first of its 
kind to provide direct empirical evidence for an explanatory driving force behind 
the effect.  
6.3 The Link between Counterfactual Thought and Existing Theoretical 
Explanations for the Excess Choice Effect 
This section considers the link between counterfactual thought and other 
factors established within the choice literature which are also believed to 
contribute to the prevalence of the ECE. For example, Scheibehenne et al., 
(2009) suggested that a post-decisional justification process was key to eliciting 
the effect (Study 2c). In this experiment, participants were asked to read a series 
of descriptions of either a limited (5) or an extensive (30) number of different 
restaurants. Participants were then asked to select whether they wanted to 
receive money for their participation, or a voucher to dine at one of the 
restaurants. The authors only found evidence for an ECE when participants were 
asked to justify their decisions: participants were found to be more likely to opt for 
cash over a voucher when presented with extensive choice. The authors state 
this may illustrate that when more options are available they become harder to 
distinguish from one another, and thus harder to justify.  
Supporting this contention, Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) found that when 
presented with extensive choice, participants would often display a preference for 
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the simplest option available. In this experiment, participants were presented with 
a choice between either a limited or an extensive number of gambles, which 
included one all-or-nothing gamble (the simple option), with the rest being 
relatively more complex (i.e. involving winning a variable amount of money 
depending on the outcome of a throw of the dice). The authors found that when 
presented with a limited number of options, there was no difference in the 
percentage of participants opting for complex over simple gambles. However, 
when presented with an extensive number of options, participants were found to 
be significantly more likely to opt for the simple gamble. This ECE subsequently 
appears to be in line with Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2009) suggestion that extensive 
choice makes decisions harder to distinguish and justify, thus leading to a 
preference for simple choice.  
However, it may be the case that the findings of both experiments can be 
explained, at least in part, due to counterfactual theory. As previously discussed, 
it may be that the justification process identified by Scheibehenne et al., (2009) 
as being key to eliciting the ECE, acts as a trigger for counterfactual thought. 
Specifically, when extensive choice participants are encouraged to reflect back 
upon their decisions, this may lead to decreased satisfaction due to an increase 
in the number of counterfactual alternatives they have to consider. This 
explanation could be tested for by conducting a replication of Scheibehenne et 
al.,’s (2009) research but with the inclusion of a measure of counterfactual 
thought. From this it would then be possible to determine whether it was the 
justification process, or the increased level of counterfactual thought that this may 
encourage, which is key to eliciting the ECE.  
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Similarly, regarding the findings of Iyengar and Kamenica’s (2010) 
experiment, it may be the case that, rather than extensive choice decisions being 
harder to justify, participants may display a preference for simple options when 
presented with extensive choice in order to shield themselves from engaging in a 
potentially harmful post-decisional process of counterfactual thought. Specifically, 
by presenting one simple option alongside an extensive number of complex 
options, the construction of the choice itself is altered: it is no longer a choice 
between an extensive number of equivalent options, but a rather simpler decision 
– ‘Do I opt for the simple option, or invest a substantially greater amount of time 
and effort choosing between the other more complicated options?’ If participants 
opt for the simple option by default in this manner then this is likely to shield them 
from a process of counterfactual thought which may otherwise be triggered from 
the consideration of an additional extensive number of options (see, Tykocinski & 
Pittman, 1981).  
On the other hand, when presented with only a limited number of options, 
participants are likely to feel better able to fully process all of the information they 
are presented with. As such, this is likely to lead to a reduced consideration of 
unchosen options post-decision. Consequently it may be a desire to shield 
oneself from a process of counterfactual thought which leads to this apparent 
preference for simple options. This explanation could be tested for simply by 
conducting a replication of Iyengar and Kamenica’s (2010) experiment, but with 
an additional measure of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thought 
(following the procedures used in the current thesis). If the above account is 
correct, then one would expect to find an overall reduction in counterfactual 
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thought following limited choice, and following the selection of a simple option 
when presented with an extensive number of options. 
Finally, by highlighting the impact of initial choice level upon chooser 
expectations (Experiment 3) the current research also illustrates a potential 
interaction between counterfactual thinking and other existing theoretical 
explanations for the effect. For example, it appears that if expectations are 
initially lessened by extensive choice (as shown the reduced tendency to 
experience a placebo effect) then this may be the product of an interaction 
between a limited cognitive capacity (Simon, 1956; Botti & Iyengar, 2006), an 
increased sense of responsibility following extensive choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000), and the demonstrated post-decisional counterfactual thought process. The 
former two of these three factors may have led participants to feel less able and 
simultaneously more pressured to cope with the vast array of options on offer, 
potentially leading to reduced expectations about whether they were able to pick 
the outcome most suited to their needs. Thus, both of these processes may play 
an important role in triggering the increased level of counterfactual thought 
demonstrated in the current experiments. Indeed, it is possible that an all-
encompassing theory of too much choice which might help to fully explain the 
divergence of findings within the choice literature involves the interaction between 
each of these processes. Future research could investigate this possibility by 
directly asking participants (presented with limited vs. extensive choice sets) a) 
how able they felt they were to cope with, or fully process, all of the options to 
presented to them at the initial time of choice, b) how responsible they felt for 
picking an optimal outcome, c) about their expectations about the outcome of 
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their choice prior to sampling it, and d) about the level of post-decisional 
counterfactual thought participants engaged in whilst rating satisfaction. 
6.4 Wider Theoretical Implications of the Current Research 
6.4.1 Choice, Load and the Decision Making Context 
This section provides a discussion of the wider theoretical implications of 
the experimental findings of the current thesis, in light of the choice and 
counterfactual literatures, and wider related areas of current psychological 
research. Firstly, the finding in Experiment 1 that load moderates the ECE hints 
at the possibility that the ‘paradox of choice’ (Schwartz, 2000; 2004) itself may in 
part be due to the different settings in which consumers and participants in 
research tend to make decisions. Usually, participants in laboratory experiments 
make choices under relatively low load situations where they are able to 
concentrate on their choices and have mental time and space to consider the 
alternatives foregone. In many real-world contexts decision makers may be more 
likely to be under high load resulting in less consideration of alternatives and 
possibly greater satisfaction with greater choice (as per Experiment 1). The 
potential implications of this for the psychology of choice and consumer well-
being are considered in Section 6.5. However I now consider a discussion of two 
studies conducted in field settings which would appear to challenge this account.  
Firstly, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) (Study 1) examined the likelihood of 
participants choosing to purchase jams in a real world supermarket according to 
manipulations in choice level. The authors found that participants were 
significantly more likely to purchase a jam if presented with a limited vs. an 
extensive array of options. Secondly, Iyengar et al., (2006) assessed the impact 
of the number of jobs pursued upon chosen job satisfaction. Again the authors 
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found evidence for an ECE – participants who pursued fewer jobs from the outset 
experienced significantly greater satisfaction with their chosen position than 
participants who pursued a greater number of opportunities.  
In both cases, these results appear to challenge my account that low load 
settings may be necessary to elicit the ECE. However, interestingly the 
supermarket used in Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000) experiment was described as 
being ‘upscale’ (pp. 996), or upmarket. As such, this may have been a more 
relaxing, less crowded, essentially low-load setting than one might expect to find 
in a typical shopping environment. Further, the kinds of people who stopped to 
consider luxury jams (i.e. rather than making their usual purchase) may also have 
been qualitatively different from the average customer. In addition, although 
Iyengar et al.,’s (2006) job satisfaction experiment was also conducted in the 
field, the authors note that participants completed the follow-up questionnaires 
via email. As such we cannot know the extent to which participants were under 
either a high or a low load whilst rating their satisfaction. However, it perhaps 
seems reasonable to presume that participants found time when they could sit 
down and concentrate (to some extent) in order to write their replies. 
Consequently it may be the case that these participants were also in a relatively 
low load environment whilst rating their satisfaction.  
As such, it appears that it may not be simply that typically low-load 
laboratory experiments are more likely to generate an ECE, but rather that the 
ECE is context dependent, and prevalent under any low load environment. We 
might expect for example, not to find an ECE in typical everyday decision 
scenarios in which the consumer may be more likely to be under a high load – i.e. 
crowded, noisy environments in which they may be trying to focus on more than 
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one thing at a time (e.g. talking to a friend whilst choosing a sandwich for lunch). 
Future research could aim to systematically explore these possibilities both in the 
laboratory and in the field to examine the degree to which the ECE is observed 
under different choice environments. The outcomes of this research might be of 
particular interest to retailers keen to understand the optimal conditions under 
which to generate customer satisfaction (e.g. relaxing low load environments for 
shops with few options but noisier, busy environments for shops with many 
options). However this is a point to which I will return in Section 6.5. 
6.4.2 Choice and Expectations 
As previously suggested, the finding in Experiment 3 that participants were 
more likely to experience a placebo effect when initially presented with an optimal 
choice of 10 options indicates that expectations may play an important role in 
determining satisfaction levels at the initial time of choice. This is because 
research has shown that expectations are key to eliciting a placebo effect (Kirsch, 
1985; 2005; Morris, 1999). Subsequently, as participants were found to be 
significantly more likely to exhibit a placebo effect following an optimal choice 
level it appears that at the initial time of choice, presenting participants with a 
choice of 10 options may have led to optimal expectations about the potential 
results of their decisions. It appears that if participants felt able to cope with the 
number of options they were presented with, then they were better able to 
choose an option which satisfied their preferences, potentially leading to 
optimised expectations about the possible consequences of that choice. On the 
other hand, when presented with extensive choice, participants may have picked 
an option without feeling they were fully able consider all of the available 
alternatives, triggering the detrimental post-decisional counterfactual thought 
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process. In doing so, participants’ expectations about the potential benefits of 
their chosen treatment appear to have been reduced, potentially explaining why 
participants who chose from an extensive number of options did not experience a 
placebo effect following two weeks of using the treatment.  
It would be interesting for future research to explore the role of choice level 
upon initial expectations in greater detail. This could be done by conducting a 
replication of Experiment 3, and asking participants about their expectations at 
the initial time of choice, and whether they felt expectations had subsequently 
been met at the end of the two week period. Following the results of Experiment 
3 one might expect to find that an optimal choice level of 10 options leads to 
optimal expectations about the result of that choice, in comparison to those 
participants who were presented with either a very limited or an extensive 
number of options, and further, that participants who felt these expectations had 
been met at the end of the 2 week period would be most likely to experience a 
placebo effect, consistent with existing placebo research (e.g. Kirsch, 1985; 
2005; Morris, 1999). 
6.4.3 Choice and Valence 
As previously discussed, Experiment 8 found evidence that the ECE was 
most prevalent following a negative task outcome, due to the associated impact 
of negative outcomes upon counterfactual generation. More indirect evidence for 
the moderating role of valence within the ECE stems from the findings of 
Experiments 5 and 6, wherein manipulations in choice type were only found to 
impact upon chooser satisfaction where outcomes were negative. In these 
instances participants were found to prefer no choice over any (extensive) 
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choice, and crucially, this effect was found to be mediated by the increased 
experience of regret following extensive choice.  
These findings subsequently have important implications for the earlier 
experiments discussed in the current thesis, specifically with regard to the role 
that valence played within Experiments 1 and 3. In both cases evidence was 
found for an ECE, and yet neither experiment was explicitly designed in order to 
provide the chooser with a negative task outcome. So why could this be the 
case? With regard to Experiment 1 it may simply be that the creative task did 
provide the chooser with a more negative choice experience than was initially 
intended. Specifically, it may be that asking participants to undertake a creative 
drawing, or sculpting task under (time) pressure, was not a particularly pleasant 
challenge for the majority of participants, who, being psychology undergraduates 
as opposed to art students or artists, may have felt they lacked a certain degree 
of artistic flair. This could be tested for by conducting a replication of Experiment 
1, but with an additional measure of perceived task valence or enjoyment. 
Following the presence of the ECE and high levels of counterfactual thought 
found in Experiment 1 (low load condition) I would infer that the majority of 
participants viewed these creative tasks as relatively negative or un-enjoyable 
experiences on the whole. 
On the other hand, for Experiment 3 the role of valence is a little more 
unclear. The presence of the ECE at Time 1 appears to suggest that the task was 
perceived in a negative manner. However, unlike in Experiment 1 (or 
Experiments 4, 5, 6 and 8) at Time 1 participants did not sample their chosen 
outcome at the moment of choice. As such it may simply be that participants 
were less clear about the potential valence of their chosen option, meaning 
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valence may subsequently have played a less of a determining role in this 
experiment than in the other experiments. In other words, the current research 
has shown that negative task outcomes may form a key trigger for the 
counterfactual thought process, leading to an increased tendency to exhibit an 
ECE, and yet the ECE may be so pervasive that it also persists in circumstances 
where the valence of choice outcomes is less clear.  
This may be attributable to the increased likelihood of decision makers 
forming expectations where decision outcomes are less certain (see, for 
example, Zeelenberg et al., 1998; 2000). Specifically, as discussed in Section 
6.4.2 above, it may be that extensive choice participants experienced overly 
heightened expectations at the moment of choice. In turn this may have triggered 
the counterfactual thought process following extensive choice, if participants felt 
unable to verify whether their chosen option could match these high expectations. 
However, at this stage the suggestion that expectations may play more of an 
influential role in triggering the counterfactual thought process under valence-
uncertain circumstances is largely speculative, and further, although the 
satisfaction data generated in Experiment 3 are supportive of this account, the 
counterfactual data are equivocal, due to the imprecise measure of 
counterfactual thought used in this experiment.  
More research will therefore be needed in order to assess the impact of 
choice level upon expectations, counterfactual thought and subsequent 
satisfaction levels using valence-uncertain starting points. It would appear that 
the ECE will perhaps be prevalent under any circumstance except one in which 
the participant is provided with a directly positive choice outcome (following the 
findings of Experiments 4, 5, 6 and 8), due to the impact of positive outcomes 
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upon counterfactual generation. This remains an interesting avenue for future 
research to explore. The presence of this ECE following valence- uncertain, as 
well as negative choice outcomes may subsequently also help to explain some of 
the divergence noted in the previous choice literature. However this is a point to 
which I will return in Section 6.4.4 (below). 
6.4.4 Discussion of Findings in Relation to Scheibehenne et al.’s (2010) Meta-
Analyses 
The findings of the current thesis are now reviewed in the context of the 
meta-analyses conducted by Scheibehenne et al., (2010), who reviewed 50 
published and unpublished experimental studies into the ECE, in order to 
examine the prevalence of the effect across the choice literature as a whole. The 
authors found no evidence for the ECE overall, yet the large degree of variance 
in study outcomes lead the authors to conclude that a theoretical account of too-
much-choice which could help to cover these divergent findings was needed. As 
previously discussed, it may be the case that the counterfactual account 
discussed in the current research can go some way towards explaining some of 
the inconsistencies noted in Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2010) review. For example, 
as discussed in Section 6.4.3 above, Experiment 8 only found evidence for an 
ECE when participants were faced with a negative task outcome, whilst in 
Experiments 4 – 6, extensive choice was only found to be detrimental to 
satisfaction where task outcomes were negative.  
Following this, it is possible that some of the studies considered in the 
meta-analyses which did not find evidence for an ECE may have involved task 
outcomes which were directly positive for the participant, such as chocolates, jelly 
beans, soda, restaurants and music (Berger et al., 2007; Kahn & Wansink, 2004; 
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Arunachalam et al., 2009; Scheibehenne et al., 2009). Conversely, several 
studies which did find an ECE may have involved more negative or stressful 
experiences, such as writing essays, or choosing jobs or pensions schemes 
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004; Iyengar et al., 2006). In addition, 
following the results of Experiment 3, where evidence was found for an ECE in 
the absence of direct information regarding the valence of choice outcomes, it 
would appear that decisions using valence-uncertain (or at least, less directly 
positive) starting points may also elicit an ECE, in some instances. Supportive of 
this are the findings of Reutskaja and Hogarth (2009), Shar and Wolford (2007), 
and Greifeneder et al., (2010), Lee and Lee (2004) who each found evidence for 
an ECE using valence-uncertain stimuli (e.g. gift boxes, pens and CD’s), in which 
satisfaction with choice was assessed (i.e. either stated or via product demand) 
without previously having sampled, or trialled their chosen item.  
However as previously mentioned, more challenging for this account are 
studies which found an ECE using apparently positive stimuli (e.g. chocolates 
and jams; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Unfortunately it is impossible to know a priori 
the extent to which these different choice outcomes were perceived by 
participants as being positive, negative or even valence-uncertain experiences at 
the time of choice. As such, we cannot know for sure the true extent to which 
outcome valence may explain the divergence of findings in these previous 
experiments. More research will therefore be needed in which the ECE is directly 
assessed following manipulations of task outcome valence, in order to fully test 
this explanation. 
Only one study (Botti & Iyengar, 2004), as far as I am aware, has 
previously attempted to examine the impact of valence manipulations upon 
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satisfaction according to varying choice levels. This experiment is subsequently 
both relevant to the ECE and yet perhaps surprisingly not considered in 
Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2010) meta-analyses. Botti and Iyengar (2004) found that 
when decision outcomes were positive, choice was preferred to no choice, and 
yet when decision outcomes were negative, no choice was preferred to any 
choice. Subsequently this research appears to be consistent with my 
counterfactual account of the ECE, and for the impact of valence in determining 
the prevalence of the effect. When outcomes were positive, choice was not 
detrimental to satisfaction. Following the results generated in the current thesis 
(Experiments 4, 6 and 8) we can perhaps presume this may be because positive 
outcomes do not lead the chooser to engage in a process of counterfactual 
thought. On the other hand when outcomes were negative, increased choice was 
found to be detrimental to satisfaction (Experiments 6 and 8). Subsequently Botti 
and Iyengar’s (2004) research indirectly provides additional support for my 
theoretical account that valence is a key trigger for counterfactual thought, which 
in turn is key to eliciting the dissatisfaction often experienced following increased 
choice. 
Other studies which are also not included in the meta-analyses conducted 
by Scheibehenne et al., (2010), and yet which are both relevant to the ECE, and 
which appear to be consistent with my counterfactual account regarding the role 
of valence as a potential determinant of the effect, are based within the field of 
medical decision making. For example, both Degner and Sloan (1992) and Ende 
et al., (1989) found that participants were more likely to prefer no choice over any 
choice in terms of deciding their own medical treatment following serious illness. 
It is likely that the options presented to participants would have been regarded as 
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being potentially negative experiences by the majority (e.g. between potentially 
painful treatment options, or those with undesirable side-effects), and once again 
in these instances people were found to prefer no choice. These studies could 
have usefully been considered in the meta-analyses conducted by Scheibehenne 
et al., (2010), as each is relevant to the ECE, and may help to further our 
understanding of the effect across wider variety of domains.  
In addition, as previously discussed, the findings of the current research 
also identified some studies which were included in the meta-analyses as 
providing evidence against the ECE, and yet which may not necessarily reliably 
demonstrate this. For example, Kahn and Wansink’s (2004) experiment revealed 
that choice could influence consumption levels, and Scheibehenne et al., (2010) 
considered this to be evidence for a reversal of the ECE. However it may be 
unwise assume that increased consumption levels equate to increased 
satisfaction. This point was demonstrated by Reibstein et al., (1975) who 
conducted a similar experiment, and found that whilst more choice did indeed 
lead to increased consumption, crucially this did not equate to increased 
satisfaction. Consequently this raises doubt over the use of Kahn and Wansink’s 
(2004) data as evidence against the ECE.  
In addition, the meta-analyses also considers evidence from 
Scheibehenne et al.,’s (2009) charity study as evidence against the ECE. This 
experiment asked participants to choose whether to donate money to charity or 
keep it for themselves, and results revealed found no differences in likelihood of 
choosing to donate according to manipulations in choice level (Study 2a). 
However, in this experiment participants were either presented with a choice of 2 
or 30 options, and, as the results of Experiment 3 demonstrate (see also, Shar 
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&Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009), in reality both extensive and very 
limited choice may be equally detrimental to chooser satisfaction levels. As such 
it may also be unwise to use an experiment which includes only these two 
extreme ‘ends of the scale’ as evidence against the ECE.  A more intermediate 
level of choice must also be included in order to truly establish whether the ECE 
is prevalent or not.  
Finally, the meta-analyses also considers evidence from Haynes (2009), 
Kleinschmidt (2008), and Scheibehenne (2008; jam study), as either for or 
against the ECE, and yet each of these experiments involved a comparison 
between a very limited choice set (3 options in each case), with an intermediate 
level of choice (either 10 or 12 options). As Experiment 3 in the current thesis, 
and results of previous research (e.g. Shar & Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja & 
Hogarth, 2009) demonstrate, intermediate choice is not comparable to extensive 
choice, and in fact may be most likely to lead participants to experience 
increased satisfaction with decision outcome. Consequently it is not possible to 
ascertain evidence either for or against the ECE in any of the above mentioned 
experiments, as no measure of true extensive choice is used for comparison with 
the very limited and intermediate choice sets. Nevertheless, each of these is 
regarded as relevant in the meta-analyses provided by Scheibehenne et al., 
(2010). 
Therefore to summarise so far, there are numerous studies which perhaps 
could have been usefully included in the meta-analysis, and perhaps several 
others which should have been excluded as they do not necessarily relate to 
satisfaction levels according to relevant manipulations in choice. Notably some of 
these overlooked or excluded studies appear to be largely consistent with my 
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counterfactual account relating to the role of outcome valence as a potential 
determinant of the ECE. Unfortunately it is not possible to re-assess the studies 
included in the meta-analyses in terms of the valence of their task outcomes, as it 
is impossible to know for certain a priori the extent to which the different task 
outcomes were perceived as positive or negative at the time of choice. However, 
if a second meta-analysis were to be conducted, based upon replications of key 
experiments but with the inclusion of a standardised measure of task outcome 
valence, and which only included experiments which were directly relevant to 
appropriate manipulations in choice level, then it is possible that: a) we would not 
only get better understanding of the role that valence plays in determining the 
prevalence of the ECE, but b) that we might also get a clearer perspective of the 
pervasiveness of the ECE within the choice literature as a whole. Future research 
may wish to consider investigating this possibility. 
6.4.5 Choice, Counterfactual Thinking and Psychological Well-Being 
In Chapter 1 I reviewed evidence provided by the Centre for Economic 
Performance (2006) concerning the fact that life satisfaction has stayed constant 
in many western countries despite economic growth and expansions in choice. 
Further, in Chapters 1 and 3 I also reviewed the theoretical suggestions of 
Schwartz (2004) who argued that extensive choice may in fact lead to long term 
detriments to well-being, via its impact upon chooser expectations. Specifically, 
Schwartz (2004) argued that if faced with too many options one may experience 
heightened expectations about the potential results of that decision, and thus 
may be more likely to experience negative counterfactual thought and emotion 
when the results of that choice do not match up to these expectations, leading 
people to blame themselves for their perceived ‘failures’ (see Section 3.2). 
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As discussed in Section 6.4.2 above, empirical evidence provided by 
Experiment 3 appears to provide tentative support for this claim, demonstrating 
that participants were more likely to exhibit a placebo effect following 2 weeks of 
treatment, if initially presented with an optimal choice of 12 options, rather than 
an extensive choice of 38 options (or indeed, a very limited choice of 2 options). 
Given that previous research has shown that expectations are key to eliciting a 
placebo effect (see, for example, Kirsch, 1985; 2005; Morris, 1999), findings from 
the current research appear to be consistent with the suggestion that extensive 
choice may indeed impact upon long term well-being via impact upon 
expectations and the subsequent experience of counterfactual thought and 
emotion.  
Indeed, this link between counterfactual theory and physiological and 
psychological well-being has previously been recognised within clinical 
psychology, where the link between rumination and major depressive disorder is 
well established. Conway, Csank, Holm and Blake (2000) define rumination as 
“repetitive thinking concerning ones’ present distress, and the circumstances 
surrounding the sadness” (pp. 404). Further, Papageorgiou and Wells (2004) 
state that ruminative thoughts relate to undoing the antecedents or nature of the 
negative mood. According to Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky (2008; 
see also Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Alloy, 
Abramson, Hogan, Whitehouse, Rose, & Robinson, 2000), higher ruminative 
tendencies lead to reduced motivation and initiative, and increasingly severe and 
numerous bouts of depression in those susceptible to major depressive disorder. 
Indeed this link has been demonstrated in a substantial amount of psychological 
research. For example, using data from the Temple-Wisconsin Cognitive 
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Vulnerability to Depression Project, Alloy and Abramson (1999), found that the 
interaction between negative cognitive styles and ruminative thoughts predicted 
the retrospective lifetime rate of major depressive episodes in those susceptible 
to the disorder. Similarly, Robinson and Alloy (2003) found that the same 
interaction predicted the onset and duration of major depressive episodes (see 
also, Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Joormann, 2006; 2010; Spasojevic & 
Alloy, 2001). Indeed, it is widely accepted that ruminative thoughts are not only a 
symptom of depression, but are also associated with vulnerability to the onset 
and recurrence of depressive episodes and with the maintenance of negative 
affect (see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
Interestingly in this respect it might be argued that ‘rumination’ is akin to 
counterfactual thinking, and that those with depressive tendencies may in fact be 
more prone to naturally generate upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
negative life events. This potential link between rumination and counterfactual 
thought stems from the fact that both thought processes appear to share a 
number of key defining structural attributes. For example, both processes involve 
a reflection upon past experience, and focus upon ‘undoing’ the past, to a certain 
extent. Secondly, both rumination and counterfactual thinking have been shown 
to draw upon the resources of working memory. In Joormann, Levens, and 
Gotlibs’ (2011) experiment, for example, participants diagnosed with depressive 
disorder were presented with a list of either emotional or neutral words, which 
they were asked to recite in reverse order. The authors found that rumination 
predicted the length of time required to sort the words only when participants 
were presented with negative words, not positive or neutral words. The authors 
conclude that this demonstrates that rumination and depression are associated 
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with deficits in cognitive control, meaning that individuals find it particularly 
difficult to remove negative material from working memory. It is suggested that 
this cognitive inflexibility with regard to processing negative information may 
explain why individuals prone to depressive disorder will often become effectively 
‘stuck’ in a negative particular mindset (see also, Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). Similarly, there is consistent evidence that 
counterfactual thinking can be an effortful process, which also draws upon the 
resources of working memory to some extent. This link has been established in 
various aspects of developmental (Müller et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009) and 
clinical (Gomez et al., 2005; McNamara et al., 2003) research, and was 
demonstrated in the current thesis by the finding that the systematic generation of 
counterfactuals could to some extent be inhibited using a secondary cognitive 
load task (see also, Ward & Mann, 2000).  
Thirdly, rumination and counterfactual thinking are also similar in the 
respect that both processes are typically associated with the experience of 
negative affect (see for example Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Niedenthal et al., 1994; Roese, 1997; Roese & 
Olson, 1995). Indeed in some instances rumination has even been defined by an 
associated experience of negative counterfactual emotion. Tull (2009), for 
example, states that rumination is a preoccupation with thoughts about past 
occurrences which may result in feelings of anxiety, sadness, regret, shame, or 
guilt. The similarities between the two thought processes certainly appear striking 
in this respect.  
The final similarity between the two processes stems from the suggestion 
that rumination is instrumental to the attainment of higher-order goals (Martin 
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&Tesser, 1989; 1996). This is akin to the definition of counterfactual thinking as a 
source of motivation for guiding and thus improving future behaviour (see Roese 
& Olson, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999). However, Martin and Tesser (1989; 1996) 
note that rumination is not always beneficial in this respect, and does not always 
lead individuals to progress towards their desired goals, even though that may be 
its primary purpose or function. This is because, contrary to the counterfactual 
thought process, ruminative thinking is associated with the onset of a depressive 
episode, and as such once the individual becomes effectively ‘stuck’ in a typically 
negative mindset they may find it difficult to gain the motivation to act upon their 
ruminative thoughts and thus improve their behaviour. Nevertheless, it appears 
that a similar underlying process may be evoked in both instances, at least at the 
outset, even if the way in which the individual might then choose to cope with this 
information may be different.  
In all, these striking similarities between rumination and counterfactual 
thought subsequently appear to lend support to the suggestion that one factor 
behind modern depression rates may be ‘too much choice’, and the fact that this 
may lead to overly heightened expectations, and thus encourage individuals to 
ruminate upon options foregone (see also Schwartz et al., 2000; 2004). Clearly 
however, further research will be needed in order to a) determine the extent to 
which counterfactual thought really is akin to rumination, and following this (and 
the findings of Experiment 3), to b) further investigate any potential link between 
extensive choice, expectations, and counterfactual thought with long term 
chooser health and psychological well-being. This remains an interesting avenue 
to future research to explore. 
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6.5 Applied Implications of the Current Research
6.5.1 Retailers and Consumer Well-Being 
This section considers the applied implications of the findings of the 
current research, with particular regard to retailers, consumer well-being, and the 
construction of public policy. Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the finding that 
load moderates the ECE (Experiment 1) has potentially important implications 
both for retailers and general consumer well-being. For instance, shop owners 
who own upmarket, boutique-style shops are likely to be presenting their 
customers with a relatively relaxed, low-load environment. In this case they may 
be wise to restrict the variety of options on sale to a limited amount, as an 
extensive number of options is likely to induce a process of counterfactual 
thought, and lead to reduced satisfaction, and potentially unhappy customers. On 
the other hand, in busier, nosier shopping environments it would appear that 
choice level may have less of an impact upon chooser satisfaction, as the 
capacity to think about counterfactual alternatives is likely to be reduced. As such 
in these environments retailers may wish to consider presenting a wider variety of 
options, as choosers who are unable to think counterfactually may actually be 
more satisfied with increased choice (as per Experiment 1). Notably, however, in 
the current experiments participants were placed under load at the moment of 
reflection, not the moment of choice. As such it may be the case that load level at 
the moment of choice does not have the same impact as load at the moment of 
reflection. Consequently further research will be needed in which participants are 
placed under load at different stages of the decision making process in order to 
ascertain whether this is the case, and as such establish the validity of these 
potential implications for retailers. 
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In addition, we of course have to consider the fact that a large proportion 
of consumer decisions made in retail environments will involve essentially 
rehearsed choices, made between options which are already familiar to the 
consumer. Indeed, it is likely that the consumer will already have particular 
favourite brands and products, and so will simply aim to ‘gather’ these items, 
rather than making a carefully considered choice between the other available 
alternatives. For this reason, supermarkets often change the layout of their 
stores, in order to encourage consumers to look at products they may not 
otherwise consider buying (Cialdini, 2007). However, interestingly, it may be the 
case that switching the store layout is an additional means of placing the 
consumer under a form of high cognitive load. Specifically, rather than making 
simple rehearsed choices around a familiar layout, the consumer is forced to 
consider new brands and products, at the same time as recalculating the 
locations of items they originally came to purchase. As such, this form of ‘load’ 
may also help to improve satisfaction, by inhibiting the extent to which the 
customer is able to think counterfactually post-decision. This is consistent with 
the suggestion of Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; 
Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren and van Baaren, 2006), that satisfaction with 
complex decisions can be improved if decisions are made in the absence of 
deliberative attention. Once again this tactic is likely to be most beneficial in large 
stores containing extensive selections of options as this is where counterfactual 
thought levels are demonstrated to be highest, however further research will be 
needed in order to establish whether this is the case. 
Following on from this, consumers may also wish to consider the role of 
load as a potential means of ensuring their own satisfaction and well-being. For 
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example, if one is facing an important decision from an extensive selection of 
options (particularly with potentially negative consequences) then it might actually 
be beneficial to make the choice, or at least to reflect upon the choice post-
decision, under a high load in order to shield oneself from engaging in a 
detrimental process of post-decisional counterfactual thought. This potential for 
load to improve general consumer satisfaction within field settings, perhaps 
pertaining to real and consequential decisions is something future research may 
wish to explore. 
6.5.2 The Construction of Public Policy 
In addition, the finding that individuals may be happiest with no choice 
when outcomes are likely to be perceived as negative (Experiments 5 & 6) also 
has potentially important implications with regard to the construction of public 
policy. This is perhaps particularly relevant to the highly consequential fields of 
medical and financial decision making in which consumers are likely to be faced 
with relatively complex decisions between selections of options each with 
potentially viscerally negative outcomes. Indeed, it appears that the current data 
perhaps controversially present a case for a paternalistic approach to choice 
architecture in these instances (c.f. Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). This notion finds 
support from Botti and Iyengar (2004) who found that when outcomes were 
negative, no choice was preferable to any choice. Research into both medical 
(e.g. Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et al., 1989) and financial (Benartzi & Thaler, 
2002; Iyengar et al., 2004) decision making also provides support for this claim.
However, as previously discussed, according to Botti and Iyengar (2006), 
the paradigm that has dominated the focus of policy makers within modern 
societies over the last 20 years is that of increasing choice and autonomy. For 
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example, within the field of financial decision making the number of employer-
provided retirement plans in the USA has more than doubled in the last decade, 
from under 100,000 in the 1990’s, to over 400,000 by 2002 (Mottola & Utkus, 
2003). Whilst within the field of medical decision making there has been a 
dramatic shift away from the previous paternalistic approach which granted 
physicians the right to decide what was best for their patients. As Schwartz 
(2004) puts it, responsibility for medical care has “landed on the shoulders of the 
individual with a resounding thud” (pp. 30). People are now expected to play 
much more of an active role in deciding their own medical care, and while this 
may sound appealing in theory – explaining why people predicted they would 
prefer this in a hypothetical situation (Degner & Sloan, 1992; Ende et al., 1989), 
in reality people appear to be happiest with limited choice – if the responsibility 
for these decisions is handed back to an expert.  
Supporting this contention, Strull, Lo and Charles (1984) conducted a 
survey of patient and physician preferences regarding responsibility for treatment 
decisions, and found that 47% of patients preferred that the physician made their 
therapeutic decision, 19% wished they could share the decision with the doctor, 
and only 3% reported that they would prefer to make the decision for themselves. 
Whilst the physicians consistently overestimated the degree of responsibility they 
believed the patient would prefer – believing 78% would want to share the 
decision making, and that only 22% would prefer the physician to make the 
decision for them.  
Indeed, it appears by increasing choice policy makers are perhaps 
mimicking participants’ beliefs that this active role in decision making will make 
them happy. However as the current research (Experiment 7) and previous 
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studies (e.g. Gilbert et al., 1998; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Loewenstein and 
Frederick, 1997) have shown, people are subject to affective forecasting bias –
and are not especially good at predicting how future events will make them feel. 
As such it may in fact be more beneficial to the individual to consider the 
outcomes of psychological research into the effects of choice on well-being over 
personal stated preferences when considering the construction of choice 
architecture within public policy.  
Further, by demonstrating the role of thoughts about unchosen options in 
driving the dissatisfaction associated with choice, the current research appears to 
provide empirical support for Botti and Iyengar’s (2006) claim that people may 
“prefer eschewing decisions {related to health care} to avoid the negative 
emotions associated with feeling responsible for their own misery” (pp. 33) (see 
also, Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994; Botti & McGill 2006; Luce 1998). 
Supportive of this is the following testimony of Gawande (2002, pp. 221), 
reflecting upon his active role in deciding the best treatment method for his 
suffering premature daughter: “I wanted the doctors to decide—doctors I had 
never met before. The uncertainties were savage, and I could not bear the 
possibility of making the wrong call. Even if I made what I was sure was the right 
choice for her, I could not live with the guilt if something went wrong.” Similarly, 
Botti, Orfali and Iyengar (2009) found that parents who made an active decision 
to discontinue their suffering premature infants’ life support experienced a greater 
level of negative post-decisional counterfactual thought and emotion in 
comparison to parents in a similar position who had the same decision made for 
them by a physician. 
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Consistent with these accounts, in Experiments 5 and 6 it was shown that 
the same negative outcome has the potential to be experienced to some extent 
more positively if the individuals’ capacity to think counterfactually is reduced via 
the removal of choice. Although the negative choice outcomes used in 
Experiments 5 and 6 were clearly less extreme than the choice scenarios 
described by Gawande (2002) and Botti et al., (2009), in both experiments it was 
nevertheless demonstrated that an increased level of regret mediated the impact 
of choice level upon post-decisional satisfaction following a negative outcome. As 
such, this would appear to suggest that the same underlying processes may be 
evoked following negative outcomes in the laboratory as appear to have been 
both evoked and reported in the field studies discussed above. In all instances, 
when choice is removed (potentially via deferral to an expert) then individuals 
may experience a negative event less negatively, and this may be due to the fact 
individuals are to some extent shielded from engaging in a typically detrimental 
process of counterfactual thought. 
However, as previously discussed, it is also important to note that the 
findings of the current experiments, involving chocolate choices, may not 
necessarily generalise to more consequential decision scenarios, such as those 
described in the medical decision making studies above. This is because, in 
scenarios with important real-life consequences, the individual may choose to 
defer choice due to a desire to rely on the expertise of a physician. One would 
not predict this to have an effect in less consequential decision scenarios such as 
those presented in the current experiments. However the contrast between the 
predictors and experiencers in Degner and Sloan’s (1992) experiment would 
suggest that this preference for deferring choice to an expert may not be due to a 
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reliance on expertise alone – as otherwise one would expect predictors to also 
demonstrate a preference for this, when presented with a hypothetical scenario. 
Yet, as Degner and Sloan (1992) demonstrate, predictors forecasted that they 
would want to choose their treatment method themselves, were they ever in this 
situation. As such it would appear that may be another process at work in these 
important decision scenarios – and following Botti and Iyengar’s (2006) claim, 
and the findings of the current experiments using negative choice outcomes, it is 
possible that this may involve the different level of counterfactual thought that 
predictors and experiencers may be engaged in. However, at this stage it is not 
possible to determine whether or not counterfactual thought may underpin this 
preference for choice deferral in important, as well as seemingly trivial decision 
scenarios. More research will therefore be needed using real-life decision 
scenarios with consequential outcomes, in order to establish whether this is the 
case. 
If the findings of the current thesis are found to generalise to more 
important real-life decision scenarios, then this would have important implications 
with regard to the construction of public policy. Specifically, it would appear that if 
we can help to improve satisfaction by removing choice, then perhaps this may 
be a viable strategy for promoting consumer well-being? In reality however, this 
may be simply unfeasible, as removing choice altogether could be taken as an 
attack on personal freedom (Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Further, removing choice 
would mean policy makers would need to be able to ensure the chooser was 
always offered an optimal outcome, and yet this will vary greatly according to 
individual needs, tastes, and priorities. Some people would benefit from the 
removal of choice, and yet others could potentially suffer if the option wasn’t 
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suited to their needs. As such, it would appear policy makers keen to promote 
personal well-being should perhaps be encouraged to consider alternative means 
of reducing the post-decisional counterfactual thought process during the 
construction of public policy.  
As the current research shows, a limited selection of options also reduces 
the level of counterfactual thought individuals engage in, in comparison to a more 
extensive number of options. As such it would appear that if policy makers wish 
to truly promote well-being amongst consumers, then limiting choice may be the 
answer. Research from the field of financial decision making provides further 
support for this idea. For example, as reviewed in Chapter 1, in Iyengar et al.,’s 
(2004) experiment it was found that extensive choice could jeopardise an 
individuals’ long term financial health and well-being, by leading to a direct 
reduction in the likelihood that they would opt to invest in their own retirement. 
Once again this appears to reflect a tendency to want to shield oneself from 
experiencing the potentially detrimental counterfactual thought and emotion 
otherwise associated with an extensive number of options (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 
1996; Simonson, 1992; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Schwartz, 2004; Tykocinski & 
Pittman, 1981).  
Consequently, it appears that limiting choice may be the most appropriate 
and beneficial strategy for ensuring individual satisfaction and well-being. Policy 
makers may also wish to consider promoting an added option of ‘deferring 
choice’ to an authority figure, if the individual is satisfied with the limited selection 
of options available, and wishes instead to defer responsibility for that choice. 
Further, in cases where the choice outcome likely to be perceived as being 
relatively positive then it would still appear to be the case that extensive choice is 
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of no further benefit to the chooser beyond that of no choice, or a more limited 
selection of options (Experiments 6 & 8 respectively). As such, it would appear 
that the promotion of limited choice policies with the option of deferring choice 
would also be of no detriment to chooser well-being where outcomes are positive.  
To summarise so far it would therefore appear that policy makers would 
perhaps be wise to consider counterfactual theory when considering the 
construction of choice architectures, particularly within the highly consequential 
fields of medical and financial decision making, as psychological (and potentially 
physiological) well-being may be improved if choice is restricted due to the impact 
of this upon post-decisional counterfactual thought levels. However, further 
research will be needed in order to a) identify real-life decision contexts likely to 
be associated with relatively ‘negative’ experiences, b) determine whether the 
findings of the current thesis generalise to these situations, and thus any potential 
benefits to well-being of limiting choice (with the added option of deferral) in these 
instances, and c) investigate any differences between limited (i.e. 4 or 6 options) 
and more optimal (i.e. 10 or 12 options) choice sets, and thus determine the most 
‘optimal’ number of options that consumers should be presented with in order to 
maximize satisfaction across a range of different choice contexts. 
6.6 Further Directions for Future Research 
The current research highlights that counterfactual thinking appears to 
play an important role in driving the dissatisfaction often associated with 
extensive choice. Indeed, across 7 experiments I have systematically 
manipulated the prevalence of the ECE, based upon key findings within the 
counterfactual literature (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Roese & Olson, 1995; 
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Byrne, 2005). Specifically, it has been demonstrated that extensive choice is only 
detrimental when participants are able to think counterfactually post-choice, and 
when the capacity for this is reduced, either using cognitive load, over time, or 
when participants were given a positive choice outcome (such as a pleasant 
tasting chocolate or drink to sample), then there is no evidence for any 
detrimental impact of extensive choice upon chooser satisfaction levels. In 
addition, the current research has also identified additional factors which appear 
to be influential in determining the level of counterfactual thought and thus 
satisfaction following extensive choice. Specifically, in Experiment 7 participants 
were found to exhibit a preference for active, extensive choice, when presented 
with a hypothetical scenario. It has been suggested that this may be attributable 
to the lack of counterfactual information readily available to participants as 
‘readers’, leading to highly inaccurate (given the findings of Experiments 5 and 6) 
predictions of affective responses to active, extensive choice. Whilst in 
Experiment 8, no evidence for any ECE was found in a chocolate tasting task. 
One potential explanation for this stems from the type of information used to 
define the different options in this task (i.e. brand names) being less salient or 
easy to imagine than in a comparative task in which options were instead defined 
by flavour, thus leading to an overall reduction in counterfactual thought and 
subsequently reduced impact of (extensive) choice upon satisfaction. 
It would be interesting for future research to continue to explore the 
boundaries of the relationship between choice and counterfactual thought, using 
the other ‘fault lines’ of reality identified in previous counterfactual literature. For 
example, as reviewed in Chapter 1, research has shown that people may also be 
more likely to generate counterfactuals following exceptional vs. routine events 
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(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982a; Lundberg & Frost, 1992), and following controllable vs. uncontrollable 
antecedents (Girotto et al., 1991; McCloy & Byrne, 2000; Markman et al., 1995). 
It would be interesting to apply these aspects of the counterfactual literature 
directly to the ECE in order to further explore the extent to which the prevalence 
of the effect may be determined by the level of counterfactual thought participants 
are engaged in. One aspect of this might involve the examination of satisfaction 
according to manipulations in choice level following exceptional versus routine 
choices. For example, choosing a flat to live in, which might be viewed as a 
relatively uncommon, or exceptional choice, versus choosing a sweet to eat, 
which may be viewed as comparatively more common or usual. One might 
predict that the ECE would be more prevalent following the exceptional choice, 
as this may be more likely to act as a trigger for counterfactual thought. However, 
notably in this situation one must also consider the fact that most ‘exceptional’ 
decisions would be made on the basis of hypothetical scenarios, in which 
participants are presented with a choice set consisting of descriptions of different 
flat, or house options, for example. This is because it would be difficult assess the 
impact of choice level upon ‘real life’ exceptional choices such as these, as the 
choice set could not easily be standardised, and in each instance may contain 
outstandingly ‘good’ or ‘bad’ options, which may alter the choice process, and 
thus the number of options actually considered. As such it would appear that the 
best way to test for the impact of choice upon satisfaction following exceptional 
versus routine choices may be to ask both groups of participants to consider 
hypothetical choices, i.e. a hypothetical choice between flats to rent, or a 
hypothetical choice between sweets to sample. In both instances, following the 
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results of Experiment 7, and previous counterfactual research (see, for example, 
Girotto et al., 2007) one would expect an overall reduction in the level of 
counterfactual thought participants are engaged in. However, if participants in 
both instances are provided with negative feedback information regarding the 
outcome of their choices, then this may act as a trigger for counterfactual thought 
(see Section 6.2.4), allowing researchers to assess the extent to which the 
prevalence of the ECE appears to be affected by exceptional versus routine 
choices. Following on from the counterfactual literature (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Lundberg & Frost, 
1992) one might predict to find that the ECE would be most prevalent following 
exceptional versus routine choices, due to the predicted impact of exceptional 
circumstances upon counterfactual thought.   
Secondly, the finding that counterfactual thoughts may be cued more 
readily following uncontrollable versus controllable antecedents (Girotto et al., 
1991; McCloy & Byrne, 2000; Markman et al., 1995) may also be applied directly 
to the ECE. This could be done either using real experience, or using 
hypothetical scenarios. For instance, following the procedure used in Experiment 
1 of the current thesis, participants could be asked to either make a choice of 
drawing implement (controllable condition) for use in a creative task (from a 
limited versus extensive selection of implements), or could be shown the 
selection of implements, and informed that one had already been selected for 
them to use by the previous participant (uncontrollable condition). Participants 
should then complete the creative drawing task, followed by measures of 
implement satisfaction and counterfactual thinking (as per Experiment’s 1 and 2). 
One might predict that participants would be more likely to experience 
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dissatisfaction with an option selected from an extensive choice set if they chose 
the option for themselves, due to the predicted impact of controllable 
circumstances upon counterfactual generation.  
Alternatively this could also be assessed using hypothetical scenarios, in 
which participants are presented with a (limited versus extensive) number of 
options detailing possible ways to spend a free day with a friend, such as going to 
the cinema, going shopping, staying in and watching a movie. Participants should 
either be asked to choose one of these options for themselves (controllable 
condition), or be informed that their friend made the decision for them 
(uncontrollable condition), and should then be provided with feedback that the 
option they chose turned out to be extremely boring and un-enjoyable. 
Participants should then be asked to rate how happy they were with the way they 
spent their day, and to list any thoughts they may have regarding the days’ 
events, in order to generate a measure of spontaneously occurring counterfactual 
thought. As before, based upon the findings of the current thesis which has 
demonstrated the underlying casual role of counterfactual thought in driving the 
ECE, one would predict to find that the ECE may be more prevalent following 
controllable circumstances, due to the predicted impact of controllable versus 
uncontrollable antecedents upon the spontaneous generation of counterfactual 
alternatives.  
Notably the latter of these experimental designs is similar to that used by 
Sagi and Friedland (2007) with two main methodological deviations: 1) using 
extensive versus limited number of options, as opposed to 2 versus 3 options, 
and 2) the inclusion of a measure of counterfactual thought. As previously 
discussed, Sagi and Friedland (2007) claimed it was unlikely that counterfactual 
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thought played a role in the ECE, due to the fact that the presence of additional 
inferior options also led participants to experience decreased satisfaction with 
their choice outcome. The current research has provided substantial empirical 
evidence to counter this claim, demonstrating that counterfactual thinking does 
play an important role in driving the ECE, and further, when this process can be 
inhibited, then the impact of extensive choice upon decision satisfaction is also 
found to be reduced. This proposed controllable versus uncontrollable 
experiment using a similar hypothetical scenario would provide further means of 
testing Sagi and Friedlands’ (2007) claim, by providing a direct assessment of the 
role of counterfactual thought in driving the ECE within the specific choice context 
used in their original experiment, whilst simultaneously allowing us to assess the 
impact of controllable versus uncontrollable antecedents upon the prevalence of 
the effect.       
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Therefore in conclusion, the current research is the first of its kind to 
provide direct empirical evidence for an explanatory driving force behind the 
ECE. In doing so, the current research hints at the possibility that the ‘paradox of 
choice’ (Schwartz, 2000, 2004) may not actually be that paradoxical after all. It 
has been demonstrated that the prevalence of the effect can be largely 
determined by the extent to which an individual is able to engage in a process of 
post-decisional counterfactual thought. As such, when considering a hypothetical 
scenario or predicting how one will feel following choice, it has been 
demonstrated that individuals are likely to show a preference for active, extensive 
choice. Lay beliefs that increased choice equates to increased happiness 
subsequently appear to persist. Crucially, in line with counterfactual theory this 
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appears to be because predictors make their choices without the availability of 
counterfactual information about unchosen options. Thus, the application of 
counterfactual theory would appear to render an individuals’ initial attraction to 
more choice understandable, not paradoxical.  
Further, our post-decisional affective response to choice also appears to 
be a direct consequence of counterfactual thinking. Specifically, as the current 
research demonstrates, individuals only appear to experience decreased 
satisfaction following extensive choice when counterfactual thoughts are made 
readily available. When the capacity to think about counterfactual alternatives is 
reduced for example via a high cognitive load, over time, following a positive 
outcome, or when information required to draw comparisons between options is 
made difficult to imagine, then no evidence is found for any detrimental impact of 
extensive choice upon (psychological) satisfaction levels. 
Consequently, by gaining an insight into the underlying processes at work 
behind the ECE we can begin to deepen our understanding of the effect, and in 
doing so realise that our response to choice is perhaps not so paradoxical, but 
rather a rational, in the sense that the counterfactual imagination of possibilities is 
organized along the same principles as rational thought (Byrne, 2005), and in this 
respect largely predictable, response to the choice environment we are presented 
with. The implications of these findings for the psychology of choice, consumer 
well-being, retailers and for the construction of public policy have been 
discussed. Finally, areas for future research required in order to continue to 
further our theoretical understanding of a) the ECE, and b) the role that 
counterfactual thinking plays in determining individual satisfaction and well-being 
across a variety of different choice contexts have been identified. 
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Contrary to popular belief many choice options and the ability to reverse one's initial choice are sometimes
associated with decreased chooser satisfaction. Two studies investigated the role of counterfactual thinking in
explaining these paradoxes. Participants chose drawing implements from either a limited (6) or extensive
(24) choice set (Study 1), or an expected reversible/non-reversible selection (Study 2). Following a drawing
task, satisfaction with their chosen implement was rated under either high or low cognitive load to
manipulate the availability of counterfactual alternatives. In Study 1 satisfaction was higher with limited vs.
extensive choice under low load. The number of counterfactuals generated mediated this effect. Under high
load the pattern was reversed. Participants in Study 2 generated more counterfactuals when reversibility was
expected under low but not high load and this partially mediated the impact of expected reversibility on
revealed satisfaction. Implications for theoretical understanding of these paradoxes are discussed.
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Introduction
Thenotion that the provision of choice is advantageous for individuals
andsociety iswidely accepted(Schwartz, 2000, 2004).According tomany
psychologists, freedom and autonomy are essential to well-being, and
choice is critical to freedom and autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Modern
societies providehigh levels of choice across a rangeof life domainswhich
previously had limited choice including consumer goods (Schwartz,
2004), education and employment (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006),
health care (Propper, Wilson, & Burgess, 2005), pensions (Thaler &
Benartzi, 2004) and religion (Wolfe, 2001). Nevertheless, such unprec-
edented levels of choice are not necessarily associated with higher well-
being. Life satisfaction, for instance, has stayed constant inmanywestern
countries despite economic growth and expansions in choice (Layard,
2005).
Psychological research is beginning to address this apparent
paradox. One avenue involves the psychological effects of few vs.
many choice options on satisfaction with the chosen alternative
known as the ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) (Arunachalam, Henneberry,
Lusk, & Norwood, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Another involves the
‘paradox of reversibility’where although many people would like the
opportunity to undo earlier choices actually having this ability seems
to undermine satisfaction with the initial choice (Gilbert & Ebert,
2002). Existing explanations include suggestions that excess choice
may lead to an increased sense of responsibility (Iyengar & Lepper,
2000) and/or may force decision makers to make difﬁcult trade-offs
and experience increased regret (Schwartz, 2004). Meanwhile,
reversibility may inhibit the psychological processes which would
normally aid the manufacture of satisfaction (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002).
However as empirical evidence in this area is limited, the precise
nature of the processes involved remains unclear.
The present research explores the role of counterfactual thinking
as a potential explanation for the increased regret associated with
greater choice and opportunities for reversing decisions. We will
begin by discussing the excess choice and reversibility effects in detail,
beforemoving on to provide a more detailed rationale for the role that
counterfactual thinking may play in supporting these paradoxes.
The “paradox of choice”
Economic theory suggests that increasing choice should, all else
being equal, increase satisfaction with the chosen option because there
is a greater chance of satisfying individual preferences (Dolan &White,
2007). However this is bounded and there appears to be an optimal
threshold, at least for some domains, beyond which satisfaction
with chosen options decreases as the option set increases (Reutskaja
&Hogarth, 2009; Shar &Wolford, 2007). Iyengar and Lepper (2000), for
instance, found that participants were more likely to purchase gourmet
jams or chocolates or to undertake optional class essay assignments
when offered a limited (6) rather than an extensive (24) array of
options. Moreover, participants reported greater subsequent satisfac-
tion with their selections or wrote better essays when their original set
of options had been limited.
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A similar ﬁnding has been reported for more important choices.
Iyengar et al. (2006) found that the presence of more choice is
associated with lower chooser conﬁdence and greater experiences of
negative affect. Speciﬁcally, job seekers who pursued more job
opportunities were found to achieve higher starting salaries and yet
were also less satisﬁed with their accepted job offer and reported less
commitment to their position than job seekers who pursued fewer job
opportunities. This seems to indicate that even when more choices
lead to seemingly objectively better outcomes, they may be perceived
as worse subjectively.
There are several, not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations
for the ECE. From an economic perspective, as the number of options
increases the marginal value of the chosen option may decrease
because more of the rejected alternatives share positive attributes
with the chosen option or may even have positive attributes that the
chosen option lacks. That is, “opportunity costs”, i.e. the loss of
beneﬁts associated with the next best alternative foregone, tend to
increase with option size reducing the satisfaction with the actual
option chosen. However, while opportunity cost might explain a
reduction in marginal satisfaction from a larger choice set it does not
explain why people show less satisfaction in absolute terms when
faced with more options. If one is a perfectly rational decision maker
then the option chosen is still the best available and should provide
the highest level of satisfaction under the circumstances and certainly
no lower than selecting the same alternative from a smaller choice set.
Psychological research since Simon (1956) has demonstrated,
however, that people repeatedly fall short of perfectly rational decision
making due to limited cognitive capacity. Consequently, individuals
are rarely able to fully process all the possible information that they
would need to make an optimal choice (Botti & Iyengar, 2006); a
problem that growswith choice set size (Dhar, 1997; Schwartz, 2004).
Schwartz (2004) argues that this can lead to an increased likelihood of
regret, making decisions both harder to make in the ﬁrst place
(anticipated regret) and harder to enjoy (post-decisional regret).
Supporting this suggestion a number of studies have found more self-
reported regret for an option chosen from a larger option set (Iyengar
& Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso,
Lyubomirsky,White & Lehman, 2002). Indeed, Roese and Summerville
(2005) suggest that the top six biggest regrets in life involve those
areas which offer the greatest amount of choice and opportunity;
namely, education, career, romance, parenting, the self and leisure.
Choice and counterfactual thinking
But how is it that we come to experience more regret as choice
levels increase? Regret is deﬁned as a counterfactual emotion, in that
the experience of regret cannot occur without a prior counterfactual
inference (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Landman, 1993). Epstude and
Roese (2008) deﬁne counterfactuals as evaluative thoughts about
imagined alternatives to past events, typically associated with various
negative emotions (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Niedenthal,
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995).
They are epitomised by the phrase “what might have been” and may
serve the important beneﬁcial functions of behaviour and mood
regulation. As the number of available options increases the range of
alternative states of the world that did not actually occur, i.e.
counterfactuals, also increases. As such it is suggested that previous
research which has noted a link between increased choice and regret
(e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) may have picked up on one aspect of a
general increase in counterfactual thought. Supporting this conten-
tion, Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and McMullen (1993) showed
that generating counterfactuals heightened general feelings of
dissatisfaction. Consequently we suggest that it is counterfactual
thoughts concerning the realisation that better choice alternatives
may have potentially been foregone which may drive the experience
of regret and undermine satisfaction.
Previous research has linked other aspects of choice with
counterfactual thought. For instance, using a hypothetical purchasing
scenario Tsiros and Mittal (2000) found that counterfactuals were
more likely to be generated in the face of negative rather than positive
decision outcomes. In addition, Walchi and Landman (2003)
examined the link between counterfactual thought and consumer
affect and found that negative feedback led to greater levels of
counterfactual thought and, importantly, increased regret. Concerning
the ECE speciﬁcally, Anderson (2003) suggested that the mutability of
alternatives; deﬁned as the ease with which elements of reality can be
altered to create a counterfactual statement (Roese & Olson, 1995);
could directly impact upon decision-satisfaction as increased coun-
terfactual thought is associated with increased regret. Further,
Gingras (2003) found that participants were less satisﬁed with
decisions made from diverse options, as opposed to more similar
options, and attributed this difference to increased counterfactual
thought.
However, despite this body of research, and the fact that the notion
of counterfactuals appears to be at the heart of theorising about the
ECE (Schwartz et al., 2002), it is somewhat surprising that no studies,
as far as we are aware, have actually tried tomeasure their presence in
conditions of more vs. less choice. Although we know of one paper
(Sagi & Friedland, 2007) that has challenged the relationship between
counterfactuals and regret with respect to increased choice there are a
number of differences in the studies used in that research to the
standard ECE paradigm and thus we leave further consideration of
that research until the discussion section. In sum, we argue that
people may be less satisﬁed with a choice made when faced with
many options or under conditions of reversibility because a) people
may be more likely to generate counterfactuals and b) these
counterfactuals may lead to negative emotions which ultimately
undermine satisfaction with the option chosen.
Excess choice and reversibility
The present research aimed to directly explore the role of
counterfactual thinking in two seemingly disparate phenomena —
the excess choice and reversibility paradoxes. Such thoughts may play
a key role in these two paradoxes because of the same “opportunity
principle” (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Summerville, 2005). Both
situations may be perceived to provide the “opportunity” for
corrective action following a suboptimal choice (Epstude & Roese,
2008). In terms of the ECE, the more choices there are the more
opportunities are available and consequently the greater the number
of counterfactual possibilities. In terms of choice reversibility the
situation is perceived to be changeable compared to conditions where
this opportunity is not available. Consequently the counterfactual
alternative will remain salient even after an initial decision has been
made. In short, both situations are characterised by a greater number
of perceived opportunities for correct(ive) action and associated
counterfactual thoughts. If our central hypothesis is correct then a)we
should ﬁndmore counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice,
and for reversible than non-reversible decisions, leading to a decrease
in satisfaction and b) reducing the ability to systematically generate
counterfactuals should reduce the effects of excess choice and
reversibility upon post-decisional satisfaction levels.
Manipulating counterfactual thought
One possible way of undermining the systematic generation of
counterfactuals is through the introduction of a cognitive load dual-
task (Ward & Mann, 2000). Previous research (e.g. De Neys &
Schaeken, 2007) has found that activities which involve effortful
processing become harder when cognitive resources are burdened
through a cognitive load dual-task. Although counterfactuals may
vary in the degree to which their generation relies upon effortful
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processing (see for example, Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & Beike,
2003; Kahneman, 1995), a point to which we will return in the
discussion, there is consistent evidence that reasoning about
counterfactual possibilities draws upon executive processes, includ-
ing working memory. This has been shown repeatedly in develop-
mental research where the link between working memory and
counterfactual thinking is well established (see, for example, Beck,
Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009; Müller, Miller, Michalczyk, & Karapinka, 2007)
and has been shown to extend to judgements that are often
considered to be inﬂuenced by the automatic activation of counter-
factual thoughts (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008).
Thinking counterfactually depends upon considering multiple
possibilities (Byrne, 2005), the representation of which is considered
to draw upon the resources of working memory (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991). For instance, Ward and Mann (2000) found that
counterfactual thinking could be reduced under high cognitive load. In
their experiment restrained and unrestrained eaters were given the
opportunity to eat high calorie foods whilst under either a high or low
cognitive load. Normally restrained eaters were found to consume
more food when under a high cognitive load. The authors argue that
this is because the load prevented participants from engaging in
‘monitoring’ behaviour — the process by which an individual
compares their current state with the standard or ideal state (i.e.
counterfactual thinking).
Consequently it was predicted that under low load, participants
would generate more counterfactuals under extensive than limited
choice, and that this would lead ‘extensive choice’ participants to
experience decreased satisfaction with their decisions. However
under high load, where the use of counterfactual thinking will
become less systematic, the effects of extensive choice on decreasing
satisfaction should be reduced. These hypotheses were tested in Study
1. Study 2 examines whether a similar process may account for the
‘paradox of reversibility’.
In summary the present research had three speciﬁc aims. First we
aimed to examine the impact of counterfactual thinking on choice
satisfaction by manipulating the potential for counterfactual gener-
ation during choice evaluation through cognitive load. Second, by
investigating both the excess choice and reversibility paradoxes using
the same empirical approach we were able to examine whether the
same underlying process, i.e. counterfactual generation, underpins
two quite seemingly different paradoxes. Third, as detailed below, we
examined the paradoxes in a creative context whereby participants
were asked to select drawing implements to complete a creative task
(see also Chua & Iyengar, 2008). This allowed us to examine the
evidence for ECE and reversibility effects beyond the more thoroughly
researched domain of consumer choices and explore how excess
choice affects satisfaction with means (i.e. implements to complete a
task) as well as ends (i.e. consumed products).
Study 1
Study 1 examined whether counterfactual generation was greater
under limited vs. extensive choice and whether this may account for
the excess-choice-effect. Participants were given a choice of drawing
implements from an extensive/limited selection, and following
completion of a creative drawing task rated satisfaction with their
chosen implement. Participants were also asked to explain their
reasons for their satisfaction, and from this ‘thought-listing’ measure
we were able to record the number of spontaneously occurring
counterfactual thoughts. In order to further explore the role of
counterfactuals half of the participants evaluated their chosen option
under normal circumstances and half evaluated it while simulta-
neously engaged in a secondary listening task. The aim of this task was
to limit the ability of participants to systematically generate more or
less counterfactual alternatives as a function of choice condition. If
counterfactuals are important, and if the load manipulation affects
their systematic generation, then we should see the ECE under low
but not high load.
Method
Participants
One hundred undergraduate students at the University of
Plymouth took part in the experiment in exchange for course credit.
Design
The experiment had a 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive)×2
(load level: low vs. high)×2 (task: task one vs. task two) mixed
factorial design with repeated measures on the last factor. Two tasks
were used with the aim of testing whether results would generalise
across tasks.
Materials
Based on pre-testing, twenty-two different drawing implements
were used in task one. These included a mixture of paint-roller pens,
felt tip pens, twig pencils, wax crayons, and coloured chalks. No
implements which participants had strong prior preferences towards
such as biros were included. Twenty-two different sculptingmaterials
were used in task two, including amixture of coffee beans, string, mini
pom-poms, cat biscuits and split-peas. A similar amount of each
material type was placed inside a see-through plastic cup. Again no
materials which participants had strong prior preferences towards,
such as pipe cleaners were included.
Load manipulation. Participants listened to a recording of four musical
instruments playing one note every two seconds, via headphones, and
pressed a key every time a piano note was played. This task was
similar to that devised by Knowles and Condon (1999), and was
selected from three tasks used at the pre-testing stage as being the
most effective means of manipulating cognitive load.
Procedure
Participants were informed they would be taking part in an
experiment on ‘individual differences in creativity’, to avoid focusing
on the main issue of choice and randomly allocated to one of the four
conditions. Before starting the experiment participants were given a
short practice session of the cognitive load manipulation task in order
to ensure they understood the instructions. Participants were
instructed to listen to a recording of a series of musical notes, and to
either press a buzzer every time they heard a piano note played (high-
load conditions), or to simply ignore themusical distraction (low-load
conditions).
Participants then began the ﬁrst creative ‘drawing’ task. They were
presented with a limited (6) or an extensive (22) selection of drawing
implements, and were instructed to “select one implement which you
feel would best allow you to interpret a basic cartoon image according
to your own artistic preferences”. After making a choice they were
presented with the cartoon image (a sheep in a ﬁeld) and were given
1 min to study it. The image was then removed and participants were
given 5 min to complete their interpretation. Upon completion they
answered the questionnaire whilst under a high or a low cognitive
load.
Choice satisfaction was measured using three items adapted from
Iyengar and Lepper (2000) with responses ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): “I am happy that I made the right
choice from the selection of implements available”, “I feel my choice of
implement prevented me from expressing myself artistically” (re-
versed), “If I could start the experiment again I would select the same
implement”. Although the latter of these items is a prefactual
statement (which could have encouraged counterfactual thought),
analysis revealed no differences in the number of counterfactual
thoughts generated across the three items. In addition the internal
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consistency of the three items was high (α=.83). As such data from
the three items are collapsed to give a single satisfaction measure.
After each item participants were asked to give “at least two reasons
why you responded in that particular way”. These responses were
later coded and used as evidence of counterfactual thinking.
Following this, participants were given a ﬁller task to perform for
5 min, and then moved on to the second creative ‘sculpting’ task.
Participants were asked to select one material to use to create a 3D
model/interpretation of a cartoon image (a ﬁsh). Again, participants
were given 1 min to study the image and a further 5 min to interpret
it. They were then asked to complete a second questionnaire, which
was identical to the ﬁrst except that the phrase ‘drawing implement’
was replaced with the phrase ‘modelling material’. Again, internal
reliability across the three items was high (α=.89) and the questions
were answered either under low or high load. Finally, participants
were debriefed and thanked.
Coding counterfactuals
Participants' responses to the ‘thought listing’ aspect of the
questions were coded by two independent coders prior to commenc-
ing with analyses. Six categories were generated. These were; ‘Choice
Counterfactuals’, which involved the explicit comparison of the
chosen option with foregone alternative(s), for example: “Maybe
salt could be a better alternative”. ‘Problem Counterfactuals’, which
involved a counterfactual consideration of how performance could
have been improved, had an aspect of the task been different, e.g.:
“I could have been more creative if I could have used more than one
medium”. ‘Positive Implement Appraisals’, which involved positive
descriptions of the chosen implement, e.g.: “I found the pen easy to
use”. ‘Negative Implement Appraisals’, which involved negative
descriptions of the chosen implement, e.g.: “Hard to hold comfort-
ably”. ‘Positive Comparisons’, which involved drawing a comparison
between the chosen option and other options, e.g.: “easier to use than
some others”. Finally ‘Other Responses’ included any response which
did not ﬁt into any of the ﬁve main categories, e.g.: “I'm rubbish at
drawing anyway so I can't blame the implement”.
All statements were then coded by one of the original coders and a
third coder who had not been involved in developing the coding
framework. High levels of agreement were observed between the two
judges: Kappa=.83, pb .001. As inter-rater reliability was established,
the coded counterfactual responses from the ﬁrst judge were used for
further analysis. The category of response which is of particular
interest for the purposes of this study is ‘Choice Counterfactuals’.
Preliminary analysis found no substantive differences in results
whether we used the absolute number of counterfactuals a person
generated or the proportion of all statements which were counter-
factuals. The analysis below therefore used the raw number generated
to provide the reader with a clearer indication of overall counterfac-
tual prevalence. Of all statements recorded 18% were counterfactuals,
and of all counterfactuals recorded 89% were choice counterfactuals.
Results and discussion
Does load moderate the excess choice effect?
To investigate whether load moderates the effect of choice level on
choice satisfaction we conducted a 2 (choice: limited vs. extensive)×2
(load: low vs. high)×2 (task: picture vs. model) mixed factorial ANOVA
(Table 1) with repeated measures on the last factor and two planned
contrasts. These contrasts examined satisfaction between limited and
extensive choice: a) under low load to examine the replicability of past
ﬁndings and b) under high load to examine whether the choice effect
continued to be robust under high load.
There were no signiﬁcant main effects of choice level, F(1,96)=
.54, p=.47, η2=.01; load level, F(1,96)=.08, p=.78, η2b .01; or task,
F(1,96)=.60, p=.44, η2=.01. Overall, satisfaction was similar under
limited vs. extensive choice (Ms=4.60; 4.42), under low vs. high load
(Ms=4.54; 4.47) and for the drawing and modelling tasks
(Ms=4.60; 4.41). Nevertheless, a signiﬁcant interaction was found
between choice and load level: F(1,96)=12.84, p=.001, η2=.12
(Fig. 1). The planned contrasts revealed that under low load,
satisfaction was higher under limited vs. extensive choice
(Ms=5.05; 4.03), t(48)=3.41, p=.001. This ﬁnding replicates
previous research into the ECE. Under high load, however, the effect
of choice level was only marginally signiﬁcant t(48)=−1.84, p=.07.
Moreover it was in the opposite direction such that satisfaction was
higher for extensive than limited choice (Ms=4.80; 4.14). These
ﬁndings are more consistent with people's stated preferences for
more vs. less choice. The only other signiﬁcant effect was an
unpredicted interaction between task and choice: F(1,96)=5.48,
p=.02, η2=.05. This suggested that choice level was more important
for Task 1 than Task 2 but since the effect was not further moderated
by load we focus on the effect of the two tasks combined.
Is the moderating effect of load due to its effect on counterfactual
generation?
To investigate whether counterfactuals accounted for the differ-
ences between the choice effects on satisfaction under high vs. low
load we conducted two mediation analyses, one for low load and one
for high load. If our predictions are correct then choice level should
inﬂuence the generation of counterfactuals and thus mediate the
satisfaction effect only under low but not high load. Since preliminary
analysis found no important effects of task on counterfactual
generation we again collapse across task in the following analyses.
Following Baron and Kenny (1986) each analysis had three steps:
1) regressing choice level on satisfaction, 2) regressing choice level on
counterfactuals and 3) regressing both choice level and counterfac-
tuals onto satisfaction. The results of the two analyses are summarised
in Fig. 2 with the results from Step 1 shown in brackets and those from
Step 3 in italics. The paths for low load are shown in the upper half of
the ﬁgure and those for high load in the bottom half.
Table 1
Mean and standard deviations of participants' satisfaction ratings and counterfactuals generated.
Task Choice Low load High load
Counterfactuals Satisfaction Counterfactuals Satisfaction
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Study 1
Picture Limited .48 (.92) 5.36 (1.56) .64 (.86) 4.60 (1.91)
Extensive 1.20 (1.26) 3.81 (1.49) 1.04 (1.40) 4.62 (1.67)
Model Limited .84 (.80) 4.73 (1.73) 1.00 (1.29) 3.67 (1.99)
Extensive 1.28 (1.40) 4.24 (1.60) .64 (.86) 4.98 (1.76)
Study 2
Picture Non-reversible .19 (.51) 5.00 (1.53) .52 (.79) 4.64 (1.34)
Reversible 1.04 (.98) 4.46 (1.22) .75 (.90) 4.42 (1.65)
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Step 1 replicated the above analyses such that the effect of choice
on satisfaction is negative under low load (β=−.44, pb .001), i.e.
satisfaction is lower under extensive than limited choice, but positive
under high load (β=.26, p=.07), i.e. satisfaction is higher under
extensive than limited choice. As predicted, Step 2 suggests that
choice inﬂuences the number of counterfactuals generated under low
(β=.33, p=.02) but not high load (β=.01, p=.94). The positive
effect of choice under low load shows that more counterfactuals were
generated under extensive than limited choice. Step 3 suggests that
the number of counterfactuals generated negatively affected satisfac-
tion under both low (β=−.37, p=.006) and high load (β=−.50,
pb .001), but that there was only a drop in the effect of choice under
low (βs=−.44 vs. −.32) but not high load (βs=.26 vs. .26). Sobel
tests further supported the argument that counterfactuals were
mediating the effect of choice on satisfaction under low (z=1.85,
p=.032 (one tailed)) but not high load (z=.08, p=.47). Further,
Step 3 also shows that under high load, when taking counterfactual
thinking into account, choice level became a signiﬁcant predictor
of satisfaction, but in the opposite direction to that noted under low
load — speciﬁcally as choice level increased, so too did satisfaction
(β=.26, p=.034).
The experiment replicates previous research into the paradox of
choice in the novel context of creativity. Although Chua and Iyengar
(2008) demonstrated that high choice may limit creativity we believe
this is the ﬁrst study to show the excess-choice-effect for selection of
tools to perform a creative task. Perhaps more importantly, we also
demonstrated that the excess-choice-effect disappeared under high
cognitive load, thus identifying load as another important moderator
of the ECE (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2009, 2010). Given
that many real-world decisions and choices may be made under
conditions of high load (e.g. someone shopping in a noisy supermar-
ket with their children) compared to the relatively low load
conditions of an experimental lab (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) this may
help to explain inconsistencies in previous research (Scheibehenne
et al., 2009, 2010). In line with predictions there was also evidence
that the reason why satisfaction was lower under high choice and low
load was due to the number of counterfactuals generated. Irrespective
of load, more counterfactuals meant lower satisfaction (Anderson,
2003) but only under low load did the number of options to consider,
systematically alter the number of counterfactual thoughts generated.
An unexpected ﬁnding was that satisfaction with high choice was
actually higher than low choice under high load. This reversal of the ECE
is consistentwith economic theory and layperceptions thatmore choice
makes people happier. Speciﬁcally it may be that the presence of many
choice options is seen as a good thing and this perception is only
“undone” if one is able to then systematically generate counterfactuals.
Under high load systematic counterfactual generation is inhibited and
thus the initial reactions are not overturned and satisfaction with
extensive choice remains high. If true, then the ECE is not as paradoxical
after-all if lay people are commenting on their preferences for extensive
choice under normal everyday (high load) conditions whereas
psychologists have explored these issues under relatively low load
conditions with low ecological validity. Clearly more work is needed to
investigate these possibilities further.
Study 2
The paradox of reversibility
Given that the ECE was found to be mediated by an increase in
counterfactual thought in Study 1, Study 2 was designed to investigate
whether increased CFT may also explain another paradox in the choice
literature, which has been shown to have similarly detrimental effects
upon chooser satisfaction: the ‘paradox of reversibility’. According to
Schwartz (2004) having the opportunity to change your mind post-
decision is highly valued amongst decision-makers as it lessens the
burden of having to make a good decision ﬁrst time around. However,
research shows that simply having the option of changing your mind
post-decision may actually lead to greater levels of dissatisfaction with
your original choice. Gilbert and Ebert (2002) conducted a series of
experimentswhich tested the effects of reversibility upon satisfaction in
decision-making. Students in a photography course were asked to take
two personally meaningful photos, and then choose one to keep. In the
reversible choice condition participants were told that they would be
able to change their minds about their choice at a later time, and in the
non-reversible condition they were told that their decision was ﬁnal.
Results showed that whilst the vast majority of participants said they
would opt to be in the reversible condition if given a choice, those
participants who actually were in this condition were signiﬁcantly less
happy with their original choice than ‘non-reversible’ participants.
Choice
(0 = Limited;
1 = Extensive)
Counterfactuals
Satisfaction (Low load)
Counterfactuals
(-.44***) / -.32*
-.37**
.01ns -.50***
.33*
Satisfaction (High Load)(.26†) / .26*
Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model under low load. The lower half (dashed arrows) = mediation 
model under high load. Figures are standardised beta weights. Ns = not significant, †= p<.10, *= p<.05, **= p<.01, **=
p<.001.
Fig. 2.Mediation analysis showing the role of counterfactuals in mediating the effect of choice set size on stated satisfaction for participants under low but not high load in Study 1.
Fig. 1. Participants' mean stated satisfaction ratings as a function of choice set size and
load manipulation in Study 1 (both tasks collapsed).
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Why does reversibility affect satisfaction in this manner? Research
in this area is limited however Gilbert and Ebert (2002) suggest that
having the opportunity to change your mind post-decision inhibits
the psychological processes that normally aid the manufacture of
satisfaction. In other words, if a person is able to change their mind
post-decision then they will do less work psychologically to justify
their decision, in terms of reinforcing positive aspects of the chosen
alternative, and disparaging the rejected alternatives (Schwartz,
2004). Along similar lines, we suggest that reversibility may also
affect satisfaction as a direct result of increased counterfactual
thinking due to the opportunity of being able to change one's choice
(i.e. the “opportunity principle”, Epstude & Roese, 2008). Study 2 was
designed to investigate this possibility and as with Study 1, examined
satisfaction under conditions of both high and low cognitive loads.
It was predicted that when presented with a reversible choice,
participants would engage in more counterfactual thinking than if
they were told their decision was non-reversible. Further it was
predicted that this increase in counterfactual thinking would lead
‘reversible’ participants to experience decreased satisfaction with
their choice. In addition, if counterfactuals could be made less
available under reversibility, through the addition of a high cognitive
load, then this should lead to a subsequent increase in satisfaction
levels.
Method
Participants
Ninety-four undergraduate students at the University of Plymouth
completed the experiment in return for course credit.
Design
The experiment had a 2 (reversibility level: reversible vs. non-
reversible)×2 (load level: low vs. high) between subjects design.
Given the similarity in results across the two tasks in Study 1, only the
drawing task was used here.
Materials
Since the aim of this study was to investigate the role of
counterfactuals for choice reversibility rather than choice amount the
same 10 options were provided to all participants. This number of
options was selected based previous research into the optimal levels of
choice for satisfaction (Reutskaja & Hogarth, 2009; Shar & Wolford,
2007). On the basis of pre-testing tenmoderately preferred implements
were selected, including a twig pencil, an oil pastel, a gel pen, a wax
crayon, and a paint pen. The load manipulation was the same as for
Study 1.
Procedure
The basic procedure was the same as in Study 1 with the following
change. Participants were lead to believe they would have to complete
two creative ‘interpretations’ of different cartoon images, when in actual
fact they only had to complete one. This was done in order to create a
choice context inwhich amanipulation of reversibilitywouldbepossible.
Participants were presented with the selection of 10 drawing imple-
ments, and were instructed to “select one implement which you feel
would best allow you to ‘interpret’ a cartoon image, according to your
own artistic preferences”. After having made this selection participants
were instructed either that they would (reversible conditions) or would
not (non-reversible conditions) be able to exchange the implement they
had just selected later on in the experiment. Participants were
deliberately given this information relating to reversibility after having
made their choice based upon the recommendations of Gilbert and Ebert
(2002), as prior knowledge may have elicited different decision making
processes which may otherwise have impacted upon results.
After making a choice, participants completed the drawing task
as in Study 1. They were then placed under either a high or a low
cognitive load to complete the satisfaction questionnaire. This was
identical to the questionnaire used in Study 1with one addition. Based
upon previous research (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Gilbert &
Ebert, 2002) we felt it was also important to assess participants'
“revealed satisfaction” (i.e. whether or not they wanted to change
their original choice before starting the next task). With this in mind,
participants in reversible conditions were instructed: “You now have
the opportunity to change your implement choice before starting
work on your next image ‘interpretation’. Would you like to select a
different implement for use in the next part of the experiment?”
Whilst participants in the non-reversible conditions were instructed:
“At this point in the experiment some participants are given the
opportunity to change their choice of implement. Had you been
placed in this condition would you have taken up the opportunity to
select a different implement before startingwork on image two?” (see
also Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Participants were required to give a simple
Yes/No response. Participants were then told they wouldn't actually
have to do a second drawing before being fully debriefed.
Coding counterfactuals
Participants responses to the ‘thought listing’ aspect of the
questionnaire items were coded according to the same criteria
established in Study 1 with the “Choice Counterfactuals” being the
target of further analysis. Of all statements recorded 13% were
counterfactuals, and of all counterfactual responses recorded 90%
were choice counterfactuals. This pattern of response is very similar to
that found in Study 1.
Results and discussion
Does load moderate the choice reversibility effect?
As noted above, satisfaction in this studywas examined in twoways:
a) revealed satisfaction, i.e. whether the person would want to reverse
their original choice if they could; and b) stated satisfaction based on the
responses to the questions used also in Study 1. Revealed satisfaction
results were consistent with the hypothesis that reversibility would be
important under low but not high load. Under low load 87% of people
who had initially expected that they could change their implement for
the second task (reversible) opted to do so, whereas only 54% of people
who did not originally expect this possibility (non-reversible) said
they would like to change, χ2 (1)=6.04, p=.014. Under high load, the
percentages opting to change were not signiﬁcantly different, χ2 (1)=
1.08, p=.30 (reversible=75%; non-reversible=61%).
Stated satisfaction was examined using a 2 (reversibility: reversible
vs. non-reversible)×2 (load: lowvs. high) betweenparticipants ANOVA
(Table 1) with two planned contrasts. These contrasts examined
satisfaction between: a) non-reversible and reversible options under
low load to examine the replicability of past ﬁndings and b) reversible
options under lowvs. high load to examinewhether the addition of load
improved satisfaction. Contrary to predictions, therewas nomain effect
of either reversibility, F(1,90)=.92, p=.41, or load F(1,90)=.01,
p=.94 and no signiﬁcant interaction F(1,90)=.01, p=.94. Satisfaction
was very similar between reversible (M=4.44) and non-reversible
(M=4.64) conditions, and under low (M=4.55) vs. high (M=4.52)
load. Neither of the planned comparisons were signiﬁcant (tsb .51,
psN .60). In sum load moderated the choice reversibility effect only for
revealed but not stated satisfaction.
Is the moderating effect of load on revealed satisfaction due to its effect
on counterfactual generation?
To examine the load effect on revealed satisfactionwe again used a
three step mediation approach. Binary logistic regressions were used
in the steps predicting revealed satisfaction (yes= same choice; no=
change choice). The results of the two analyses are summarised in
Fig. 3 with the results from Step 1 shown in brackets and those from
Step 3 in italics. Step 1 replicated the above analyses such that the
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effect of reversibility on revealed satisfaction was only signiﬁcantly
negative under low load (B=−.87, p=.02). That is people are less
likely to stick with their original option if they were expecting to be
able to change it, but not under high load (B=−.33, p=.30). Step 2
suggests that reversibility inﬂuences the number of counterfactuals
generated more under low (β=.27, p=.06) than high load (β=.14,
p=.36). Finally Step 3 suggests that the number of counterfactuals
generated negatively affected revealed satisfaction under both low
(β=−1.33, p=.05) and high load (β=1.78, p=.02), but that there
was only a drop in the effect of reversibility under low (βs=−.87 vs.
−.64) but not high load (βs=−.33 vs.−.27). The mediation effect of
counterfactuals was, based on a Sobel test, however only marginally
signiﬁcant, z=1.38, p=.08.
This experiment provides further support for the reversibility
paradox (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Speciﬁcally, under low load partici-
pants weremore likely to stick with their initial choice for a second task
if the ability to reverse their optionwas unexpected (non-reversible) vs.
expected (reversible).This ﬁnding is not simply due to the slight
difference in instructions for the two conditions since it was not
prevalent under high load. Moreover, the fact that 54% of those in the
“non-reversible” condition said they would have liked to change if they
could supports the notion that non-reversible participants easily
understood the question. Rather, the difference seems to be at least
partly caused by the propensity to systematically generate counterfac-
tual thoughts under reversible vs. non-reversible expectations under
low but not high load. Indeed, a comparison of Figs. 2 and 3 reveals a
remarkably similar pattern of data for both high vs. low choice (Fig. 2)
and reversible vs. non-reversible options (Fig. 3). In all conditions more
counterfactuals were associated with lower satisfaction and the role of
counterfactuals appeared stronger under low than high load.
In contrast to the revealed satisfaction results, however, no
signiﬁcant effects of reversibility were found for stated satisfaction
levels. Although not initially predicted this result is nonetheless also
consistent with the counterfactual opportunity principle (Epstude &
Roese, 2008; Roese & Summerville, 2005). Speciﬁcally, when opportu-
nities exist for corrective action then behaviour regulation, rather than
affect regulation, tends to be the dominant focus of counterfactual
thought. Consequently, in a situation like the present one where
participants are expecting to be able to change their choice for a
subsequent task their counterfactual thoughts may have been more
focusedonwhat theyneeded todo in termsof future behaviour, i.e. stick
or change, than attempting to regulate any emotional outcomes.
General discussion
Modern society increasingly leaves people “spoilt for choice”. That is,
the presence of multiple optionsmay be so extensive that enjoyment in
the chosen alternative is “spoilt” compared to a situation with fewer
options. Although the existence of the phrase suggests some awareness
of this problem people still tend to prefer more rather than less choice
and the ability to undo their decisions once they have been made
(Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). This awareness of the
dangers of choice alongside strong preferences for greater choice has
been referred to as the “paradox of choice”.
Building on discussions of increased regret accounting for these
ﬁndings (Schwartz, 2004) the current research directly examined the
role of counterfactual thoughts in both the ECE and the reversibility
paradox. In addition to monitoring the number of counterfactuals
generatedunder conditions of limited vs. extensive choice (Study1) and
under expectations of reversible vs. non-reversible choice (Study 2) half
our participants rated their satisfaction with their chosen alternatives
under high cognitive load. The aim of this load manipulation was to
undermine the systematic generation of counterfactuals and thus
“undo” the normally deleterious effects of excess choice and expected
reversibility on option satisfaction.
Results from Study 1 found that under normal (low load) conditions
people were generally more satisﬁed with their chosen drawing
implement when they had selected it from only a few (6) rather than
many alternatives (22). This replicates the ECE found for jams,
chocolates and essays (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000) in the novel, more
creative, context of drawing, whilst extending this literature to include
satisfaction with means (i.e. drawing implements used to create a
picture) rather than the ﬁnal outcome of a decisions itself (e.g. taste of a
chocolate or performanceonanessay). Given thedifﬁculty in replicating
theECE elsewhere thiswas encouraging (e.g. Scheibehenne et al., 2010).
Under high load however participants were more satisﬁed with their
drawing implementwhen theyhad selected it from theextensive choice
set. Crucially for our central hypothesis the effect of choice set size on
satisfaction was mediated by the number of counterfactual alternatives
generated under low but not high load. The number of counterfactuals
generated was an important inﬂuence on satisfaction under both load
conditions but only when load was low were these counterfactuals
systematically related to choice set size.
The ﬁndings from Study 1 are to some extent consistent with the
work of Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren and van Baaren (2006) and
Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006), who argue that satisfaction with
complex decisions can be improved if decisions aremade in the absence
of deliberative attention. In this case, excess choice can be viewed as a
comparably complex decision, whereby satisfaction was found to
increase if participants' attention was otherwise engaged under a high
cognitive load. In addition, results are consistent with the work of
Scheibehenne et al. (2009) who found no evidence of the ECE, except in
their third study which asked participants to justify their decisions. In
this case an ECE effect was found — the authors note that participants
found it harder to justify their decisionswhen presentedwith increased
choice. Thismimics the current experimentwhich calls for justiﬁcations
of the reasons behind decisionmaking. Consequently, it seems the post-
decisional justiﬁcation process may be responsible for the increase in
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Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model under low load. The lower half (dashed arrows) = mediation 
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Fig. 3.Mediation analysis showing the roleof counterfactuals inmediating theeffect of reversibility of choiceon revealedsatisfaction forparticipants under lowbutnot high load inStudy2.
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counterfactual thinking which causes reduced satisfaction, and that if
this can be reduced via the addition of a high cognitive load, then
participants remain most satisﬁed with increased choice.
Results from Study 2 found that under low load people were less
likely to want to change their original choice if this possibility was
previously unexpected. According to our thinking, people in this
condition would tend to generate less counterfactuals than those who
were expecting the ability to reverse their original decision and this
should account for their lower propensity to want to reverse their
decision. Findings only partially supported this explanation, however.
First, the number of counterfactuals generated in the reversible-
expected condition under low load were only marginally more than
those generated in the reversible-unexpected condition (p=.06).
Second, although adding counterfactuals to the mediation model
reduced the direct effect of condition on satisfaction from signiﬁcance
to non-signiﬁcance the Sobel test of mediation was also only
marginally signiﬁcant (p=.08). Nevertheless, and as predicted,
there was no systematic relationship between condition and
counterfactual generation under high load. Moreover, as with Study
1 the number of counterfactuals generated under loadwas still related
to satisfaction, it was simply that the load manipulation undermined
their systematic generation as a function of whether the ability to
reverse one's options was expected or unexpected.
Our studies suggest that excess choice and choice reversibility may
both affect satisfaction via increased counterfactual thought. Whilst
the claim that counterfactual thinking underpins levels of reported
satisfaction in decision making contexts is common (see, for example,
Anderson, 2003; Gingras, 2003; Schwartz et al., 2002), the present
study provides direct evidence of a link between the number of
counterfactual alternatives generated and reported satisfaction.
However, as discussed earlier, the link between counterfactuals and
choice satisfaction is not universally accepted. Sagi and Friedland
(2007) have argued that counterfactual thinking does not contribute
to judged regret in choice tasks. They showed that regretwas related to
the number of positive attributes possessed by the full set of non-
chosen options and that this even extended to unpopular options that
would rarely be chosen. As participants would be unlikely to generate
a counterfactual for an unpopular option, they claimed that counter-
factual thinking was unlikely to contribute to judgments of regret.
There are a number of reasons why we believe these ﬁndings are not
decisive regarding the role of counterfactuals in choice satisfaction.
First, wewould argue that evidence showing that the characteristics of
non chosen options contributes to choice evaluation is in itself
consistent with the idea that participants represent the non chosen
items as counterfactual alternatives. We may often, for example,
consider alternative choices in aﬂeeting and superﬁcialmanner before
dismissing them or they may be considered in depth and ruminated
upon. In both cases, however, these considerations will contribute,
perhaps to differing extents, to our feelings regarding a decision. It is
also worth pointing out that in contrast to the experiments presented
here, Sagi and Friedland (2007) only examined decision contexts with
a maximum of 4 options, a much more limited set than in the present
studies. In addition, their study was scenario based and participants
were presented with a chosen option at the outset which they were
then asked to assign a level of regret.Whilst scenario based studies are
common in research on counterfactual thinking (see, for example,
Byrne, 2005), there is some evidence that they can be misleading
regarding the cognitive processes underlying the evaluation of ‘real’
choices (see, for example, Feeney & Handley, 2006). Finally, Sagi and
Friedland did not incorporate a direct measure of counterfactual
thinking in their study, unlike the experiments presented here, and
consequently there is no direct evidence that their participants were
not engaging in a process of counterfactual thinking. Future research
could usefully examine the role of counterfactual thinking in scenario
based studies of this kind, perhaps by employing self report measures
of the kind used in the present studies.
A key assumption underlying the approach taken in our experi-
mental work is that evaluating choice satisfaction depends upon an
effortful process of counterfactual generation and evaluation. Whilst
there is some evidence that counterfactual thinking draws upon the
resources of working memory and executive function (Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 1991; Ward & Mann, 2000) there is also evidence that
intuitive biases in judgement often arise because of automatic
activated counterfactual processes. For example, consider the case of
an employee, Paul, who leaves work at the normal time and is
involved in an accident that is demonstrably the fault of another
driver. Compare this situation to one in which Paul leaves work early
to watch a movie and the same outcome occurs. In which case would
you assign greater levels of compensation? Typically in studies of this
kind greater blame, responsibility and less compensation is assigned
in the latter case, where counterfactuals are presumably more
available because of the exceptionality of Paul's behaviour in the
second scenario (see Byrne, 2005, for a review).
Recently Goldinger et al. (2003) have shown that a secondary
load leads to an increase in the level of compensation and blame
associated with the exceptional scenario, particularly for participants
of lower working memory span. They claim that this ﬁnding shows
that counterfactuals for the exceptional scenario are generated
automatically. Those participants who have access to fewer available
resources are less able to inhibit these counterfactuals and are
consequently more affected by them. Whilst it is undeniably the case
that some counterfactuals are so salient that they come to mind very
rapidly, wewould argue that counterfactuals will vary in the degree to
which their generation depends upon controlled processing. The
comparisonof two scenarios,where one involves an exceptional event,
may well make a counterfactual readily available. However, in the
experiments presented here, we were careful to ensure that
participants were making choices between similar options, where
there was no single option with distinctively more attractive features.
Consequently we would argue that the decision is a challenging one,
where evaluating satisfaction would involve careful and considered
evaluation of the features of alternative choices. Furthermore, Gold-
inger et al. (2003) used an approach which involved the evaluation of
two different decisions scenarios, which is quite different to a task that
involves making a single decision that has meaningful consequences
for subsequent activity. It is quite possible that such scenario based
judgments encourage a comparative process whichmay play a limited
role in everyday counterfactual thinking (see, for example Feeney &
Handley, 2006).
A greater understanding of the implications for real-world decision
making will require further research. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings hint at
the possibility that the paradox of choice may in part be due to the
different settings in which consumers and participants in research tend
to make decisions. Usually, participants in experiments make choices
under relatively low load situations where they are able to concentrate
on their choices and have mental time and space to consider the
alternatives foregone. In many real-world contexts decision makers
may bemore likely to be under high load resulting in less consideration
of alternatives and possibly greater satisfaction with greater choice (as
in Study 1). Of course, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) did demonstrate the
excess choice effect in a real world supermarket but interestingly the
supermarket used was described as being upmarket (and possible a
more calm atmosphere than other shopping locations) and the kinds of
people who stopped to consider luxury jams (rather than making their
usual purchase) may also be qualitatively different from the average
customer. Future research could systematically explore these possibil-
ities both in the lab and in the ﬁeld to examine the degree to which the
ECE is observed under different choice environments. The outcomes of
this research might be of particular interest to retailers keen to
understand the optimal conditions under which to generate customer
satisfaction (e.g. relaxing low load environments for shops with few
options but noisier, busy environments for shops with many options).
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To conclude, the current research replicates Iyengar and Lepper's
(2000) work showing that more options can lead to lower satisfaction
and furthers previous research into the reversibility paradox (Gilbert
& Ebert, 2002) by demonstrating that people are less likely to stick
with their original choice if they believe they will be able to change
their mind in the future. Importantly, however, these effects were
only replicated under low load, i.e. the normal conditions in prior
research. Under high load the effects disappeared. We account for this
pattern by demonstrating that while under low load people generate
more counterfactuals for the high and reversible than low and non-
reversible conditions, consistent with the counterfactual opportunity
principle (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Summerville, 2005). By
contrast, there was no relationship between choice amount or
reversibility and counterfactual generation under high load. Although
it is too early to say exactly what implications our ﬁndings have for
applied decision making we believe they point to the need for further
research into decision making context and the role this may have on
people's considerations of alternatives foregone.
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Appendix 2.1 – Sample Mathematical Worksheet used in Pilot Testing 
1. 20 X 6 =     13.  8 X 5 = 
2. 75/15 =     14.  60/15 = 
3. 677 – 524 =     15.  9 X 7 = 
4. 96/3 =      16.  66/3 = 
5. 7 X 6 =     17.  703 – 678 =  
6. 32 X 2 =     18.  52 X 3 =  
7. 777 – 309 =     19.  8 X 8 =  
8. 88/4 =      20.  45/5 = 
9. 12 X 5 =     21.  360 – 257 = 
10. 60/12 =     22.  42/14 = 
11. 34/7 =      23.  55 X 2 = 
12.  561 – 371 =     24.  6 X 9 =
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Appendix 2.2 – ‘Open – Ended’ Pilot Questionnaire
 Please look back at your responses to the questionnaire you have just answered. 
You will now be asked to think about, and explain, your reasons for responding in 
the way that you did.  
 For each question on the questionnaire, please carefully consider the response 
that you gave (i.e. how satisfied you are with your interpretation of the image, and 
your choice of drawing implement), and then explain why you responded in that 
particular way (i.e. how you made your satisfaction judgement). 
Question 1: 
Question 2:  
Question 3:  
Question 4: 
Question 5: 
Question 6: 
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Appendix 2.3 – ‘Semi – Structured’ Pilot Questionnaire
 Please look back at your responses to the questionnaire you have just answered. 
You will now be asked to think about, and explain, your reasons for responding in 
the way that you did.  
 For each question on the questionnaire, please carefully consider the response 
that you gave (i.e. how satisfied you are with your interpretation of the image, and 
your choice of drawing implement), and then explain three reasons why you 
responded in that particular way (i.e. how you made your satisfaction judgement). 
Question 1. Reason One: 
           Reason Two: 
                     Reason Three: 
Question 2. Reason One: 
           Reason Two: 
                     Reason Three: 
Question 3. Reason One: 
           Reason Two: 
                     Reason Three: 
Question 4. Reason One: 
           Reason Two: 
                     Reason Three: 
Question 5. Reason One: 
           Reason Two: 
                     Reason Three: 
Question 6. Reason One: 
           Reason Two: 
                     Reason Three: 
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Appendix 2.4 – Pilot Satisfaction Rating Questionnaire 
On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate how much 
you agree with the following statements, by circling the corresponding number: 
1. I am happy with my interpretation of the picture.
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
2. If I could start the experiment again I would interpret the picture in a 
different style.
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
3. I am happy that I made the right choice from the selection of implements 
available. 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
4. I feel my choice of material prevented me from expressing myself 
artistically.
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
5. I am not satisfied with my drawing. 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
6. If I could start the experiment again I would select the same implement. 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
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Appendix 2.5 – Final List of All Implements used in Drawing Task Limited and 
Extensive Choice Conditions, with Pilot Test ‘Effectiveness Rankings’
Implements discarded from main experiment during Pilot Testing: 
Effectiveness
Ranking
Implement Type Average Effectiveness 
Rating 1 (most effective) –
24 (least effective)
1 Felt - Tip 2.7***
2 Pencil Crayon 2.8***
Effectiveness
Ranking
Extensive Choice 
Implements
Average Effectiveness Rating 
1 (most effective) – 24 (least 
effective)
Limited Choice 
Implements
1 Mini Felt – Tip 7.2
2 Chunky Pencil 
Crayon
9.3
3 Glitter Gel Pen 9.5
4 ‘Twist – Up’ 
Crayon
9.9
5 Twig Pencil 10.1
6 Oil Pastel 10.9
6 Rainbow Pen 10.9
8 Linea Pen Marker 11.9
9 Gel Pen 12.3
10 Wax Crayon 12.8
11 Highlighter (Thin –
Tip)
13.0
12 Chunky Wax 
Crayon
13.1
12 Paint Pen 13.1
14 Easy Painter 13.4
15 3 – D Bright Gel 14.0
16 Mini Highlighter 14.8
17 Glitter Pen 14.9
18 Liquid Chalk Pen 15.4
19 Chunky Highlighter 17.0
20 Chalk 17.9
21 Mini Pencil Crayon 18.9
22 Giant Chalk 22.7
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Appendix 2.6 – Final List of All Implements used in Sculpting Task Limited and 
Extensive Choice Conditions, with Pilot Test ‘Effectiveness Rankings’
Materials discarded from main experiment during Pilot Testing: 
Effectiveness
Ranking
Implement Type Average Effectiveness 
Rating 1 (most effective) –
24 (least effective)
1 Plasticine 6.7***
2 Pipe – Cleaners 6.9***
Effectiveness
Ranking
Extensive Choice 
Materials
Average Effectiveness 
Rating 1 (most effective) –
24 (least effective)
Limited Choice 
Materials
1 Coloured Matchsticks 7.4
2 Buttons 8.5
3 Mini Pom – Poms 8.7
4 Pasta Shells 8.9
5 Split – Peas 9.1
6 Glitter 9.6
7 Sunflower Seeds 9.9
8 Mini Star – Shapes 11.6
9 String 12.8
10 Rice 13.2
10 Wool 13.2
12 Blu – Tack 13.4
13 Ribbon 14.4
13 Coffee Beans 14.4
15 Rainbow – Pearls 14.7
16 Paper – Clips 15.0
17 Shoe Laces 15.7
18 Drawing Pins 15.8
19 Sugar 16.1
20 Cat Biscuits 16.5
21 Cotton 17.9
22 Salt 18.1
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Appendix 2.7 – Experiment 1 and 2 Final Questionnaire Design 
Participant Number: 
On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate how much 
you agree with the following statements, by circling the corresponding number.  
Please then use the spaces provided underneath to explain at least two reasons 
why you responded in that particular way – i.e. the reasons why you agreed or 
disagreed with each preceding statement. 
1. I am happy with my interpretation of the picture.
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
2. If I could start the experiment again I would interpret the picture in a 
different style.
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
3. I am happy that I made the right choice from the selection of implements 
available. 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
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Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
4. I feel my choice of implement prevented me from expressing myself 
artistically.
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
5. I am not satisfied with my drawing. 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
6. If I could start the experiment again I would select the same implement. 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
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Appendix 2.8 – Experiment 1 Brief 
 This is an experiment designed to investigate individual differences in creativity, 
with particular reference to the ways in which different people often interpret the 
same image in many different ways. 
 You will shortly be shown a basic cartoon image, which you will then be asked to 
‘interpret’ in your own style.
 You will be given a selection of drawing implements, and will be asked to choose 
the implement that you feel will allow you to best interpret the image according to 
your own artistic preferences. 
 Following this you will be asked a series of questions relating to how satisfied you 
are with your interpretation of the image. Whilst you are answering these 
questions, you will be required to listen to a musical recording/ and perform an 
associated reaction-time task (high load participants only) 
 After this, you will complete the second creative task, which will require you to 
‘rate’ a series of images in terms of how well you feel they portray feelings of 
tranquillity. 
 Next, you will complete the third and final creative task, which will require you to 
produce a 3 – D model or interpretation of a second basic cartoon image. 
 You will be given a selection of modelling materials, and will be asked to choose 
the material that you feel will allow you to best interpret the image according to 
your own artistic preferences. 
 Following this you will be asked a series of questions relating to how satisfied you 
are with your interpretation of the image. Whilst you are answering these 
questions, you will be required to listen to a second musical recording/and perform 
an associated reaction-time task (high load participants only) 
 You have the right to withdraw from the experiment now, or at any time later in the 
experiment, should you wish to do so. 
 All data given will remain anonymous and confidential at all times. 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Are you happy to continue? 
 If so please inform the experimenter. 
Thank-you and enjoy the experiment
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Appendix 2.9 – Instructions for Practice Musical Task 
Version One – Low Load Participants: 
 Later in the experiment, you will be required to listen to a musical recording 
whilst answering questions about your satisfaction with your performance at 
the creative task you will have just completed. 
 The musical recording consists of a series of notes – one played every two 
seconds, on one of four musical instruments – the piano, the cello, the steel 
drums, and the guitar. 
 You will be required to simply ignore the musical distraction whilst completing 
the questionnaires. 
 You will now be given a short practice session of this musical task, so that you 
will be prepared when to complete it when required later in the experiment. 
Version Two – High Load Participants: 
 Later in the experiment, you will be required to listen to a musical recording, 
and complete an associated reaction-time task, whilst answering questions 
about your satisfaction with your performance at the creative task you will 
have just completed. 
 The musical recording consists of a series of notes – one played every two 
seconds, on one of four musical instruments – the piano, the cello, the steel 
drums, and the guitar. 
 The reaction-time task will involve pressing the ‘space’ key on the keyboard 
every time you hear a piano note played.  
 You will be required to undertake this reaction-time task whilst completing a 
questionnaire later in the experiment. 
 You will now be given a short practice session of this musical reaction-time 
task, so that you will be prepared when to complete it when required later in 
the experiment. 
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Appendix 2.10 – Instructions for Selecting a Drawing Implement 
 You will shortly be asked to begin your first cartoon image ‘interpretation’. 
 Please select the drawing implement that you would like to use for this part of 
the experiment from the selection on the table in front of you. 
 Select the implement you feel would best allow you to interpret a cartoon 
image according to your own artistic preferences. 
 Once you have made your selection, you will be given a set of instructions to 
guide you through the task. 
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Appendix 2.11 – Cartoon ‘Sheep Field’ Image
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Appendix 2.12 – Drawing Task Instructions 
 You will shortly begin the first creative task. 
 Once you have finished reading these instructions please focus on the 
cartoon image on the piece of paper in front of you. You will be given a minute 
to study this picture, and to think about how you want to interpret it. 
 The experimenter will inform you when this minute is up, and will then 
temporarily take the image away, so please note that you will not be able to 
refer back to it during the interpretation phase of the experiment.  
 You will then be asked to begin your interpretation of the image.  
 Please feel free to interpret the image in any style you wish. Remember this is 
an experiment on individual differences in creativity, so there are no right or 
wrong answers.  
 You must interpret the image using the drawing implement you have just 
selected, and onto one of the blank pieces of paper provided.  
 You will be given five minutes to complete your interpretation of the cartoon 
image, and the experimenter will notify you when this time is up. 
 When the five minutes is up, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire 
relating to how satisfied you are with your interpretation of the image. 
 Whilst you are completing this questionnaire, you will be required to 
simultaneously undertake the musical task, as practiced earlier. 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Are you happy to continue? 
 If so, please begin the experiment.
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Appendix 2.13 – Sample ‘Interpretation’ of Cartoon Sheep Field Image
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Appendix 2.14 – Filler Task Questionnaire 
Please use the table provided below to rate each of the images in terms of how well 
you feel they portray feelings of tranquillity, using a scale of 1 (not at all tranquil) to 
7 (extremely tranquil). Please circle the appropriate ‘x’ for each image in turn.
                   Not at all tranquil               Moderately Tranquil           Extremely Tranquil 
                          1               2              3               4               5               6               7 
Image 1             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 2             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 3             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 4           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 5             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 6             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 7             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 8             x               x               x x               x               x               x
Image 9             x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 10           x               x               x               x    x               x               x
Image 11           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 12           x               x               x               x               x x               x
Image 13           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 14           x               x               x               x               x               x    x
Image 15           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 16           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 17           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 18           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 19           x      x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 20           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 21           x               x x               x               x               x               x
Image 22           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 23           x               x               x x               x               x               x
Image 24          x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 25           x               x               x               x    x               x               x
Image 26           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 27           x               x               x               x               x        x               x
Image 28           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
Image 29           x               x               x               x               x               x            x
Image 30           x               x               x               x               x               x               x
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Appendix 2.15 – Cartoon Fish Image (used in Sculpting Task) 
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Appendix 2.16 – Sample ‘Model/Interpretation’ of Cartoon Fish Image (Sculpting 
Task) 
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Appendix 2.17 – Experiment 1 Debrief 
Participant Number: 
 The experiment has now finished. Thank-you for participating. 
This study was investigating the effects of choice level on satisfaction in decision-making. Up 
to this point it has been necessary to withhold some of the information regarding the true aim of the 
experiment, so as not to bring conscious attention to the decision-making process, which could have 
otherwise affected the results. The main focus of the experiment was on your responses to the 
questionnaire, and your satisfaction with your choice of drawing implement, and modelling 
material.....not the picture you drew or the model you made. Previous research has found that people 
who are given an extensive choice are less likely to be satisfied with their choice than people who are 
given a limited choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Possible explanations for these findings include the 
fact that participants who are given an extensive choice may be more likely to feel an increased sense 
of responsibility for making a good decision, or to experience greater post-decision regret due to the 
fact that they had to turn down an increased number of alternatives (Schwartz, 2004).  
However, this experiment was also designed to investigate the possibility that the 
dissatisfaction often experienced in such choice overload situations might in fact be caused by an 
increased tendency to engage in counterfactual thinking. As such, ability to engage in counterfactual 
thinking was manipulated using the music task, which placed participants under either a high or a low 
cognitive load (depending on their experimental condition). Those participants under a ‘high load’ 
carried out a reaction-time task, which involved pressing a buzzer every time they heard a piano note 
played. In contrast, those participants in the ‘low load’ conditions were simply told to ignore the 
musical distraction. It was predicted that those participants who were under a high cognitive load 
would be less able to engage in counterfactual thinking (as indicted by the reasons given on the 
questionnaires), and as such, that these participants would experience an increase in satisfaction 
levels, in comparison to participants who were placed under a low cognitive load.  
In this study you were placed into one of four conditions. In condition one; participants were 
given a limited choice of six drawing implements/modelling materials, and were placed under a high 
cognitive load. In condition two; participants were also given a limited choice of six 
implements/materials, but were placed under a low cognitive load. In condition three participants were 
given an extensive choice of twenty-two drawing implements/modelling materials, and were placed 
under a high cognitive load, and in condition four; participants were also given an extensive choice of 
twenty-two drawing implements, and were placed under a low cognitive load.  
It was predicted that those participants in the extensive choice conditions would be less 
satisfied with their choice of drawing implement and modelling material than those participants in the 
limited choice conditions. It was also predicted that participants who were placed under a high 
cognitive load would experience an increase in satisfaction, in comparison to the low-load 
participants, due to the fact that they would be less able to engage in counterfactual thinking. 
 I would like to remind you that all data has been kept completely anonymous and confidential 
throughout the experiment, and will be referred to in any future analysis by means of your participant 
number. You maintain the right to withdraw your data at any point after this experiment. Should you 
wish to do so please email me with your participant number which is at the top of this page. 
 Thank you for taking the time to participate in my experiment. If you have any further 
questions or concerns about your participation in the study please do not hesitate to contact me or 
Mat on one of the following: 
rebecca.hafner@plymouth.ac.uk
mat.white@plymouth.ac.uk
  I would appreciate it if you would not discuss the background information relating to this study or its 
predictions with anyone, as this may affect data collection later on.  
References 
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much 
of A Good Thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(6), 995 – 1006.
Schwartz, B. (2005).The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. New York: HarperCollins  
Publishers. 
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Appendix 2.18 – Experiment 2 Brief 
 This is an experiment designed to investigate individual differences in creativity, 
with particular reference to the ways in which different people often interpret the 
same image in many different ways. 
 You will shortly be shown two basic cartoon images, which you will then be asked 
to ‘interpret’ in turn, in your own style. 
 You will be given a selection of drawing implements, and will be asked to choose 
the implement that you feel will allow you to best interpret the image according to 
your own artistic preferences. 
 Following this you will be asked a series of questions relating to how satisfied you 
are with your interpretation of the image. Whilst you are answering these 
questions, you will be required to listen to a musical recording/ and perform an 
associated reaction-time task (high load participants only) 
 After this, you will complete the second creative task, which will require you to 
‘rate’ a series of images in terms of how well you feel they portray feelings of 
tranquillity. 
 Next, you will complete the third and final creative task, which will require you to 
produce a 3 – D model or interpretation of a second basic cartoon image. 
 You will be given a selection of modelling materials, and will be asked to choose 
the material that you feel will allow you to best interpret the image according to 
your own artistic preferences. 
 Following this you will be asked a series of questions relating to how satisfied you 
are with your interpretation of the image. Whilst you are answering these 
questions, you will be required to listen to a second musical recording/ and 
perform an associated reaction-time task (high load participants only). 
 You have the right to withdraw from the experiment now, or at any time later in the 
experiment, should you wish to do so. 
 All data given will remain anonymous and confidential at all times. 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Are you happy to continue? 
 If so please inform the experimenter. 
Thank-you and enjoy the experiment
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Appendix 2.19 – Instructions for Experiment 2 Creative Task 
 You will shortly begin your first cartoon image interpretation. 
 Once you have finished reading these instructions please focus on the 
cartoon image on the A4 piece in paper in front of you. This is ‘image one’. 
You will be given a minute to study this picture, and to think about how you 
want to interpret it. 
 The experimenter will inform you when this minute is up, and will then 
temporarily take the image away, so please note that you will not be able to 
refer back to it during the interpretation phase of the experiment.  
 You will then be asked to begin your interpretation of ‘image one’. 
 Please feel free to interpret the image in any style you wish. Remember this is 
an experiment on individual differences in creativity, so there are no right or 
wrong answers.  
 You must interpret the image using the drawing implement you have just 
selected, and onto one of the blank pieces of paper provided.  
 You will be given five minutes to complete your interpretation of ‘image one’ 
and the experimenter will notify you when this time is up. 
 When the five minutes is up, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire 
relating to how satisfied you are with your interpretation of the image. 
 Whilst you are completing this questionnaire, you will be required to 
simultaneously undertake the musical task, as practiced earlier. 
 When this is completed you will be presented with the next cartoon image: 
‘image two’, and will be asked to repeat the above procedure in order to 
complete your interpretation of this image. 
‘Reversible’ participants were then instructed:
 PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE IMPLEMENT 
YOU HAVE JUST SELECTED BEFORE STARTING WORK ON ‘IMAGE 
TWO’, SHOULD YOU WISH TO DO SO. 
Whilst ‘non-reversible’ participants were instructed:
 PLEASE NOTE THAT YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO EXCHANGE THE 
IMPLEMENT YOU HAVE JUST SELECTED AT ANY TIME DURING THE 
EXPERIMENT.  
 Do you have any questions? 
 Are you happy to continue? If so, please begin the experiment. 
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Appendix 2.20 – Experiment 2 Extra Reversibility Question 
Version One – Reversible Conditions: 
 You have the opportunity to change your choice of drawing implement before 
starting work on Image Two, should you wish to do so. 
 Would you like to select a different implement for use in the next part of the 
experiment? 
 Please tick the appropriate box. 
Yes, I would like to select a different implement for the next part of the   
experiment. 
No, I would like to use the same implement for the next part of the 
experiment.  
Version Two – Non-Reversible Conditions: 
 At this point in the experiment some participants are given the opportunity to 
change their choice of drawing implement before starting work on Image Two.  
 Had you been placed in this condition would you have taken up the 
opportunity to select a different implement for use in the next part of the 
experiment? 
 Please tick the appropriate box. 
         Yes, I would have selected a different implement for the next part of the  
experiment. 
         No, I would not have selected a different implement for the next part of the  
experiment. 
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Appendix 2.21 – Experiment 2 Debrief 
Participant Number: 
 The experiment has now finished. Thank-you for participating. 
This study was investigating the effects of reversibility on satisfaction in decision-making. Up 
to this point it has been necessary to withhold some of the information regarding the true aim of the 
experiment, so as not to bring conscious attention to the decision-making process, which could have 
otherwise affected the results. The main focus of the experiment was on your responses to the 
questionnaire, and your satisfaction with your choice of drawing implement....not the picture you drew! 
Previous research has shown that people who are given a reversible decision as less likely to be 
satisfied with their choice than people who are given a non-reversible decision (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). 
It is suggested that this may be due to the fact that having the opportunity to change your mind post-
decision results in people doing less psychological work to justify the decision they’ve made, in terms 
of reinforcing the chosen alternative, and disparaging the rejected alternatives (Schwartz, 2005).  
However, this experiment was also designed to investigate the possibility that the 
dissatisfaction often experienced in reversible-decision scenarios might in fact be caused by an 
increased tendency to engage in counterfactual thinking. As such, ability to engage in counterfactual 
thinking was manipulated using the music task, which placed participants under either a high or a low 
cognitive load (depending on your experimental condition). Those participants under a ‘high load’ 
carried out a reaction-time task, which involved pressing a buzzer every time they heard a piano note 
played. In contrast, those participants in the ‘low load’ conditions were simply told to ignore the 
musical distraction. It was predicted that those participants who were under a high cognitive load 
would be less able to engage in counterfactual thinking (as indicted by the reasons given on the 
questionnaires), and as such, that these participants would experience an increase in satisfaction 
levels, in comparison to participants who were placed under a low cognitive load.  
In this study you were placed into one of four conditions. In all conditions choice level was 
held constant, and all participants were presented with a choice between 10 implement options. In 
condition one: ‘reversible/high load’, participants were given a reversible decision (i.e. were allowed to 
change their choice of implement later on in the experiment), and were placed under a high cognitive 
load. In condition two: ‘non-reversible/high load’, participants were also placed under a high cognitive 
load, but were given a non-reversible decision (i.e. were not allowed to change their minds later on in 
the experiment). In condition three: ‘reversible/low load’, participants were given a reversible decision 
and placed under a low cognitive load, and in condition four: ‘non-reversible/low load’, participants 
were given a non-reversible decision and were placed under a low cognitive load.  
It was predicted that those participants in the reversible choice conditions would be less 
satisfied with their choice of drawing implement than those participants in the non-reversible 
conditions. It was also predicted that participants who were placed under a high cognitive load would 
experience an increase in satisfaction, in comparison to the low-load participants, due to the fact that 
they would be less able to engage in counterfactual thinking. 
 I would like to remind you that all data has been kept completely anonymous and confidential 
throughout the experiment, and will be referred to in any future analysis by means of your participant 
number. You maintain the right to withdraw your data at any point after this experiment. Should you 
wish to do so please email me with your participant number which is at the top of this page. Thank 
you for taking the time to participate in my experiment. If you have any further questions or concerns 
about your participation in the study please do not hesitate to contact me or Mat on one of the 
following: 
rebecca.hafner@plymouth.ac.uk
mat.white@plymouth.ac.uk
I would appreciate it if you would not discuss the background information relating to this study or its 
predictions with anyone, as this may affect data collection later on.  
References 
Gilbert, D. T., & Ebert, J. E. (2002). Decisions and Revisions: The Effective Forecasting Of 
Changeable Outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(4), 503 – 514.
Schwartz, B. (2005). The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
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Appendix 2.22 – Experiment 1 Counterfactual Analysis using Proportions of 
Counterfactual Responses Generated 
The impact of choice level upon the proportion of counterfactual responses 
generated was examined using a 2 (choice: limited vs. extensive) X 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 
(task: picture vs. model) mixed factorial ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. 
Consistent with analysis using the total numbers of counterfactuals generated, results 
revealed no effects of choice level (F(1,96) = 1.58, p = .21, η² = .02), load (F(1,96) = .003, p 
= .96, η² < .001), or task (F(1,96) = 1.12, p = .29, η² = .01), with similar proportions of 
counterfactual responses being generated under limited vs. extensive choice (Ms= .14, .18), 
under low vs. high load (Ms = .16, .16) and for the drawing and modelling tasks (Ms= .15, 
.17).  
In addition, a marginal interaction was found between choice and load: F(1,96) = 
2.90, p = .09, η² = .03. Paralleling earlier satisfaction analyses once again there was no 
three way interaction between task, choice and load: F(1,96) = .99, p= .32, η² = .01, and no 
interaction between task and load: F(1,96) = .13, p= .72, η² = .001. However an unpredicted 
marginal interaction was found between task and choice: F(1,96) = 3.17, p =.08, η² = .03. 
Again this appeared to suggest that the impact of choice level upon the number of 
counterfactuals generated was more important for Task 1 than Task 2. Follow-up analyses 
were subsequently conducted on this marginal interaction in order to explore whether this 
was the case.  
T-tests revealed that for the drawing task the impact of choice level upon 
counterfactual generation was broadly in line with predictions. Specifically, under low load 
counterfactual generation was significantly higher under extensive than limited choice (Ms= 
.20, .09;t(48) = -2.05, p = .05), whilst under high load there was no impact of choice on 
counterfactual generation (t(48) = -1.00, p = .32), with similar proportions of counterfactual 
thoughts being generated following extensive and limited choice (Ms= .18, .12).However for 
the sculpting task, no effects of choice level were found upon counterfactual generation, with 
similar proportions of counterfactual responses being generated following extensive and 
limited choice under low (Ms = .21, .14; t(48)= -1.46, p = .15), and high load (Ms= .13, .21; 
t(48) = 1.28, p = .21). Again this appears to suggest that the impact of choice level upon 
counterfactual generation may be context dependent, to some extent. Nevertheless in order 
to get a balanced overview of the impact of choice level upon counterfactual generation 
across tasks I examine the effects collapsed across tasks during later counterfactual follow-
up analyses.  
Finally once again there was no interaction between task and load: F(1,96) = .13, p 
=.72, η² = .001, and no three way interaction between task, load and choice: F(1,96) = .99, p 
=.32, η² = .01. A simple main effects analysis was then conducted on the marginal 
interaction between choice and load in order to examine specific predictions that choice level 
would only influence the number of counterfactuals generated under low but not high load, 
collapsed across tasks. Analysis revealed that under low load the proportion of 
counterfactual responses generated was significantly higher following extensive than limited 
choice (Ms = .21, .11; F(1,96) = 4.37, p =. 04, η² = .04). Subsequently this provides support 
for predictions that under low load, more counterfactuals would be generated following 
extensive than limited choice. Under high load this effect of choice upon counterfactual 
generation was no longer significant (Ms = .15, .16; F(1,96) = .10, p =. 75, η² = .001). 
In all there were no substantive differences in analyses using either the proportion of 
counterfactuals generated, or total numbers. The total numbers are therefore included in the 
main body text in order to give the reader a clearer overview of overall counterfactual 
prevalence. 
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Appendix 2.23 – Experiment 2 Counterfactual Analysis using Proportions of 
Counterfactual Responses Generated 
The impact of reversibility upon the proportion of counterfactual responses 
generated was examined using a 2 (reversibility: reversible vs. non-reversible) X 2 
(load: low vs. high) between participants. In line with predictions, a main effect of 
reversibility was found: F(1,90) = .4.31, p= .04, η² = .05 . The proportion of 
counterfactual responses generated was found to be lower overall in the non-
reversible than reversible conditions (Ms = .10, .18 respectively). However, contrary 
to predictions there was no main effect of load, F(1,90) = .10, p=. 75, η² =.001, and 
no significant interaction, F(1,90) = .48, p=. 49, η² = .005. 
A simple main effects analysis was then carried out on the non-significant 
interaction (see Winer, 1971, for the justification of this procedure) in order to 
examine specific predictions that: a) under low load counterfactual thought would be 
greater following reversible than non-reversible choice, and b) under high load any 
impact of reversibility upon counterfactual generation would be reduced. Under low 
load the number of counterfactuals generated was found to be significantly higher 
following reversible than non-reversible choice: Ms= .20, .09; F(1,90) = 3.84, p=. 05, 
η² = .04, consistent with predictions. In addition, under high load this effect of 
reversibility upon counterfactual generation was no longer found to be significant: 
F(1,90) = .96, p=.33, η² = .01, with similar proportions of counterfactual thoughts 
generated following reversible and non-reversible choice: Ms = .16, .11 respectively. 
In all, once again there were no substantive differences in analyses using 
either the proportion or total number of counterfactual responses generated. The 
total numbers are therefore presented in the main body text following the procedure 
used in Experiment 1, and in order to give the reader a clearer overview of overall 
counterfactual prevalence. 
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Appendix 3.1 – Experiment 3 Recruitment Poster
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Appendix 3.2 – Experiment 3 – Questionnaire and Instructions for Selecting a Flower 
Essence 
1. Please describe the minor psychological or medical complaint (if any) that 
you are taking the essence for (e.g. stress, fatigue, aches and pains): (Time 1 
only) 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................... 
2. How much are your symptoms bothering you today? (Time 1, 2 and 3) 
A little                                                                                                          A great deal 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
INSTRUCTIONS: (Time 1 only) 
 Please carefully consider all of the flower essences presented to you, and 
select the option you feel is most relevant to your symptoms, and which you 
would subsequently most like to trial  
 PLEASE REMEMBER TO TELL THE EXPERIMENTER WHICH ESSENCE 
YOU HAVE CHOSEN... 
 Please take your essence 3 times per day, with additional doses as you feel 
you need them. It is vital that you take your essence three times a day 
because its effectiveness depends on having a regular dose. You may also 
take additional doses as required.  
4. How satisfied are you with the essence you have chosen? (Time 1)/ How 
satisfied are you with the essence you chose? (Time 2 and 3) 
Very dissatisfied                                                                                       Very satisfied 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
5. How much did you think about (Time 1)/ How much have you thought about
(Time 2 and Time 3) the other choices which were available to you? 
Not at all                                                                                                     A great deal 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
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Appendix 3.3 – Additional Analyses for Time 2 Data 
Preliminary analyses conducted using the 57 participants who did complete 
the Time 2 (Day 7) questionnaire revealed no evidence of an ECE: F(2,54) = .64, p = 
.53, η² = .02. Similar levels of satisfaction were found across the 2, 12 and 38 option 
conditions (Ms= 3.78, 3.40, 3.83 respectively). This provides preliminary evidence in 
line with predictions that the ECE noted at the initial time of choice does not persist 
over time, and may reduce as little as 7 days after the initial time of choice.  
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Appendix 3.4 – Additional Analyses for Time 3 Drop-Out Group 
13.3% of participants failed to complete the Time 3 (Day 14) questionnaire. As 
this was considered a fairly significant drop-out rate, additional analyses were 
conducted in order to determine whether these 11 participants differed in any way 
from the remaining participant group. A one way ANOVA revealed that the drop-out 
group were significantly less satisfied at Time 1 (Day 1) than the remaining 
participants: F(1,81) = 13.02, p = .001, η² = .14 (Ms= 3.36 vs. 4.86 respectively), 
further justifying  the exclusion of this data in the remaining analyses. 
In addition, a chi squared test was then carried out in order to determine 
whether the 11 drop-outs were more likely to have been in any particular condition. 
However, analysis revealed no such effects: ² (2, N= 83) = 3.09, p = .21. The drop 
outs were found to be equally likely to have been in the 2, 12 or 38 option conditions 
(Ns = 5; 4; 2, respectively). 
349 
Appendix 3.5 – Full Tables of Means for Chapter 3 Satisfaction (Table 1) and 
Counterfactual (Table 2) Analyses 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviations of participants’ satisfaction levels according 
to choice level. 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviations of participants’ mean reported level of 
counterfactual thought according to choice level. 
Time 1 Time 3
Choice Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
2 4.38 1.36 3.94 1.81
12 5.28 1.13 3.55 1.66
38 4.70 1.20 3.44 1.53
Time 1 Time 3
Choice Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
2 4.81 1.60 2.13 1.50
12 4.72 1.60 2.66 1.91
38 5.22 1.40 2.85 1.79
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Appendix 3.6 – Time 3 Symptom Analyses minus Covariate 
A similar pattern of results was found when the covariate was taken out of the 
Time 3 symptom analyses. A marginal main effect of choice level upon reported 
symptoms was found: F(2,69) = 3.00, p = .056, η² = .08. Participants reported 
experiencing fewer symptoms if they initially chose their essence from 12 rather than 
2 or 38 options (Ms= 2.69 vs 3.44, 3.63 respectively), and planned contrasts 
revealed this difference to be significant: F(1,69) = 5.36, p = .02, η² = .07.
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Participant Number:                    Appendix 3.7 – Experiment 3 Debrief
The experiment is now over. Thank you for participating. 
This experiment was looking to explore the long-term effects of choice level on satisfaction in 
decision making. For this experiment you chose a Bach’s Flower Essence which you were then asked 
to use every day for a period of two weeks. 
In this experiment you were placed into one of three conditions: in Condition One, participants 
were given a choice of 2 flower essences. In Condition Two, participants were given a choice of 12 
flower essences, and in Condition Three, participants were given a choice of 38 different flower 
essences. 
After making your choice of essence you were then asked to rate how happy you were with 
your decision. This satisfaction measure was then also repeated at the follow-up stages 7 and 14 
days after the initial time of choice, via email. 
Following on from the previous Excess-Choice-Effect (ECE) literature (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000; Shar& Wolford, 2007; Reutskaja& Hogarth, 2009), it was predicted that participants would be 
most satisfied with their choice if they chose from 12, rather than 2 or 28 options initially. The current 
experiment also aimed to extend this research by examining the extent to which this effect may 
attributable to an underlying process of counterfactual thought. 
Following this, it was also predicted that these differences in satisfaction according to choice 
level would reduce over time, due to the predicted reduction in counterfactual thought and emotion 
over time. This was assessed using the follow-up questionnaires on Day 7 and Day 14. 
In addition, as well as assessing the long term impact of choice on psychological well-being, 
this research was also interested in exploring whether initial choice level could have any impact upon 
physiological well-being. In this manner, the research was based in the field of health psychology, and 
involved the use of Bach’s Flower Essences. Importantly, these flower essences were selected as 
although many people believe them to be an active treatment, research has shown them to be no 
different from placebo (Armstrong & Ernst, 1999; Hyland, Geraghty, Joy & Turner, 2006; Walach, 
Rilling & Engelke, 2001). As such it was predicted that those participants who chose from 12 options 
initially may be more likely to experience a placebo effect over time, in terms of reported improvement 
in your physical symptoms over time, in comparison to those participants who chose from 2 or 38 
options. 
I would like to remind you that all data has been kept completely anonymous and confidential 
throughout the experiment, and will be referred to in any future analysis by means of your participant 
number. You maintain the right to withdraw your data at any point after this experiment. Should you 
wish to do so please email me with your participant number which is at the top of this page. Thank-
you for taking the time to participate in my experiment. If you have any further questions or concerns 
about your participation in the study please do not hesitate to contact me or Mat on one of the 
following: 
rebecca.hafner@plymouth.ac.uk
mat.white@plymouth.ac.uk
I would appreciate it if you would not discuss the background information relating to this study or its 
predictions with anyone, as this may affect data collection later on. 
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Appendix 4.1 – Experiment 4 chocolates, presented in individual paper cake cases 
353 
Appendix 4.2 – Experiment 4, 5 and 6 Brief 
 This is a market research study designed to examine people’s flavour
preferences, in order to provide feedback to a new up-and-coming chocolate 
company. 
 To begin the experiment you will take part in a chocolate taste test.  
 When you have finished reading this brief please read the instruction sheet on 
the table in front of you. This instruction sheet will guide you through the taste 
test. 
 When you have eaten the chocolate please answer the questionnaire which is 
also on the table in front of you. This will relate to your experiences during the 
taste test. 
 You have the right to withdraw from the experiment now, or at any time later 
in the experiment, should you wish to do so. 
 All data given will remain anonymous and confidential at all times. 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Are you happy to continue? 
 If so please begin by reading the instruction sheet on the table in front of you 
to start the chocolate taste test. 
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Appendix 4.3 – Experiment’s 4 and 6 ‘Active Choice’ Condition Instructions
 You will shortly be asked to sample one of the chocolates displayed on the 
table in front of you. 
 When you are ready, please pick the chocolate you most like the look of, and 
most want to sample. 
 Please now eat the chocolate you have selected. 
 Once you have eaten the chocolate please complete the questionnaire 
provided. 
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Appendix 4.4 – Experiment’s 4 and 6 ‘Default Choice’ Condition Instructions
 The chocolate on the table in front of you has been pre-selected for you to 
sample. 
 Are you happy to sample this chocolate or would you like to switch to 
another chocolate type? (Please record your answer by ticking one of 
the two boxes below): 
Yes I am happy to try the pre-selected chocolate 
No I would like to switch to another chocolate type 
 If you have chosen to try the pre-selected chocolate please now eat the 
chocolate.  
 Please then answer the questionnaire provided. 
 If you have chosen to switch to another chocolate type please turn over the 
instruction sheet marked ‘switch’ on the table in front of you. 
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Appendix 4.5 – ‘Switch’ Instructions
 If you have chosen to switch to a different chocolate type, please carefully 
consider all of the options displayed in front of you.  
 When you are ready, please pick the chocolate you most like the look of, and 
most want to sample. 
 Please now eat the chocolate you have selected. 
 Once you have eaten the chocolate please answer the questionnaire 
provided, which relates to your taste experiences. 
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Appendix 4.6 – Control Group Instructions 
 You will now be asked to begin the chocolate taste test. 
 A chocolate has been placed on the table in front of you. 
 When you have finished reading these instructions please eat the provided 
chocolate, and then answer the questionnaire provided which relates to your 
taste experiences. 
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Appendix 4.7 – Active and Default Conditions Questionnaire 
 On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate your 
responses to the following questions and statements, by circling the 
corresponding number.    
 Please then use the spaces provided underneath to explain at least two 
reasons why you responded in that particular way – i.e. the reasons why 
you agreed or disagreed with each preceding statement. 
1. The flavour of the chocolate I sampled was unusual
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
2. I enjoyed the chocolate I tasted
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree         
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
3. I was NOT satisfied with the chocolate I sampled  
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
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Any other reason: 
4. The chocolate I sampled was tasty   
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
5. I regret choosing the chocolate I selected(active choice conditions)/ I regret 
choosing to stick with/switch from (delete as appropriate) the default 
chocolate(default choice conditions) 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree         
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
6. As you know, payment for participating in the study is £3 cash. You can now 
choose between getting £3 cash, or alternatively you can have a box of six 
chocolates that is worth £3. Which one would you like for participating in the 
study? Please tick one answer: 
Cash 
Chocolates 
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Appendix 4.8 – Control Group Questionnaire 
On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate your 
responses to the following questions and statements, by circling the corresponding 
number.    
1. The flavour of the chocolate I sampled was unusual
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
2. I enjoyed the chocolate I tasted
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree         
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
3. I was not satisfied with the chocolate I sampled  
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
4. The chocolate I sampled was tasty  
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
5. Do you regret eating the chocolate you tasted? 
Not at all                                                                                                       Very much 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
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Appendix 4.9 – Experiment 4, 5 and 6 Debrief 
Participant Number: 
The experiment is now over. Thank you for participating.  
This experiment was designed to investigate the action/inaction effect within the field of decision 
making. Up to this point it has been necessary to withhold some of the information regarding the true 
aim of the experiment, so as not to bring conscious attention to the decision-making process, which 
could have otherwise affected the results. The main focus of the experiment was on your responses 
to the questionnaires, and your satisfaction with your choice of chocolate in relation to which of three 
experimental conditions you were placed in. 
 In condition one, participants were asked to make an active choice of which chocolate they 
would like to sample, from an extensive (24) set of options. In condition two, participants were given a 
default option, and were asked whether they would like to stick or switch to a different chocolate type. 
In condition three (the control group) participants were simply given one chocolate with no option to 
change. Previous research has shown that extensive choice may be associated with decreased post-
decisional satisfaction (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). The current research attempted to address this 
via the application of counterfactual theory. It has been demonstrated that counterfactual thinking may 
be cued more readily for actions rather than inactions (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a; Landman, 
1987; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). As such the current experiment was designed to see whether 
satisfaction with extensive choice might be improved via the addition of a default option, due to the 
predicted impact of this upon counterfactual thought.  
 I would like to remind you that all data has been kept completely anonymous and confidential 
throughout the experiment, and will be referred to in any future analysis by means of your participant 
number. You maintain the right to withdraw your data at any point after this experiment. Should you 
wish to do so please email me with your participant number which is at the top of this page. 
 Thank you for taking the time to participate in my experiment. If you have any further 
questions or concerns about your participation in the study please do not hesitate to contact me or 
Mat on one of the following: 
rebecca.hafner@plymouth.ac.uk
mat.white@plymouth.ac.uk
I would appreciate it if you would not discuss the background information relating to this study or its 
predictions with anyone, as this may affect data collection later on.  
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Appendix 4.10 – Behavioural Indicator of Satisfaction used in Experiment 5 
As you know, payment for participating in the study is one participation point. 
As an extra thank-you for participating you have the option of taking an extra 
one of the chocolates you selected home with you. Would you like to take one 
of the chocolates you selected home with you? Please tick one answer: 
Yes please 
No thanks 
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Appendix 4.11 – Experiment 5 ‘Active Choice’ Condition Instructions  
 Please look at the selection of chocolates displayed on the table in front of 
you.  
 This selection consists of a variety of flavours including some liqueur 
chocolates, some fruit flavoured chocolates, some truffles, some caramels, 
and other assorted flavours.   
 You will shortly be asked to sample one of these chocolates. 
 In order to select this chocolate, please look at each chocolate in turn. 
 When you are ready, please pick the chocolate you most like the look of, and 
most want to sample. 
 Please now eat the chocolate you have selected. 
 Once you have eaten the chocolate please complete the questionnaire 
provided. 
 Once you have completed ‘Questionnaire Two’ please move on to 
‘Questionnaire Three’ and ‘Questionnaire Four’ in turn.
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Appendix 4.12 – Experiment 5 ‘Default Choice’ Condition Instructions
 Please look at the selection of chocolates displayed on the table in front of 
you.  
 This selection consists of a variety of flavours including some liqueur 
chocolates, some fruit flavoured chocolates, some truffles, some caramels, 
and other assorted flavours.   
 The chocolate on the table in front of you has been pre-selected from 
this selection for you to sample. 
 Are you happy to sample this chocolate or would you like to switch to 
another chocolate type? (Please record your answer by ticking one of 
the two boxes below): 
Yes I am happy to try the pre-selected chocolate 
No I would like to switch to another chocolate type 
 If you have chosen to try the pre-selected chocolate please now eat the 
chocolate.  
 Please then answer the questionnaire provided. 
 Alternatively, if you have chosen to switch to another chocolate type 
please turn over the instruction sheet marked ‘switch’ on the table in 
front of you. 
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Appendix 4.13 – Supplementary tables for Experiment 6 
Table 1. Mean difference and standard errors of pairwise comparisons for choice 
type for Positive Outcomes – Experiment 6.  
Positive Outcomes
Satisfaction Regret
Pairwise Comparison Mean 
Difference
Sig. (SE) Mean 
Difference
Sig. (SE)
Active Default -.064 .874 .404 .464 .318 .462
Control .212 .582 .383 .119 .788 .439
Default Active .064 .874 .404 -.464 .318 .462
Control .276 .488 .397 -.345 .449 .454
Control Active -.212 .582 .383 -.119 .788 .439
Default -.276 .488 .397 .345 .449 .454
Table 2. Mean difference and standard errors of pairwise comparisons for choice 
type for Negative Outcomes – Experiment 6. 
Negative Outcomes
Satisfaction Regret
Pairwise Comparison Mean 
Difference
Sig. (SE) Mean 
Difference
Sig. (SE)
Active Default .067 .879 .437 .800 .112 .500
Control -1.167* .009 .437 2.350* .000 .500
Default Active -.067 .879 .437 -.800 .112 .500
Control -1.233* .006 .437 1.550* .002 .500
Control Active 1.167* .009 .437 -2.350* .000 .500
Default 1.233* .006 .437 -1.550* .002 .500
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Appendix 4.14 – Experiment 7 Forecasting Questionnaire 
 Please now look at Photo 1 and Photo 2 on the table in front of you. These 
photos are of different experimental conditions in a chocolate tasting experiment. 
 In Photo 1 (Condition 1), participants are given a choice of 24 different 
chocolates, and are asked to select which one they would like to sample. 
 In Photo 2 (Condition 2), participants are given one chocolate, a default, and 
are given the option of sampling this default, OR switching to one of the other 23 
chocolates 
 Finally, in Condition 3 participants are given one chocolate, but this time have no 
opportunity to change, and are simply asked to sample this chocolate. 
 Please imagine you are taking part in this experiment. Which condition 
would you rather be in? (Please tick the appropriate box) 
Photo 1/ Condition 1 (active choice from 24 options) 
Photo 2/ Condition 2 (given a default but with the opportunity to change) 
Condition 3 (given one chocolate with no chance to change) 
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Appendix 4.15 – Experiment 4 Counterfactual Analysis using Proportions of 
Counterfactual Responses Generated 
Data from the counterfactual ‘thought-listing’ aspect of the questionnaire were 
then analysed in order to examine the prediction that inactive (default) choice 
participants would generate less counterfactual thoughts than active choice 
participants. A one way ANOVA revealed no effect of choice type upon the 
proportion of counterfactual responses generated: F(1,46) = 2.62, p = .11, η² = .05. 
Counterfactual generation was found to be similar in the active choice, and default 
stick conditions (Ms = .01, .04).  
As per the results using the total number of counterfactual responses 
generated, these results appear to go against earlier predictions that participants in 
the default condition would generate fewer counterfactuals than participants who 
made an active choice. However the very low levels of counterfactuals generated 
overall (c.f. the counterfactual rates in Experiments 1 and 2 using the same method) 
parallels the earlier finding that there were no differences in satisfaction according to 
the active/default choice manipulation. 
Subsequently as no substantive differences were found whether I used the 
total number of counterfactual responses, or the proportion of counterfactual 
responses, the total number of counterfactuals is reported in the main body text in 
order to provide the reader with a clearer perspective on overall counterfactual 
generation. 
368 
Appendix 4.16 – Experiment 5 Counterfactual Analysis using Proportions of 
Counterfactual Responses Generated 
Data from the counterfactual ‘thought-listing’ aspect of the questionnaire were 
then analysed in order to examine the prediction that inactive (default) choice 
participants would generate less counterfactual thoughts than active choice 
participants. Consistent with main analyses using total numbers of counterfactuals 
generated, a one way ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of choice type upon the 
proportion of counterfactual responses generated: F(1,83) = 3.11, p = .08, η² = .04. 
Once again the number of counterfactual thoughts generated was found to be 
marginally higher in the active than in the default stick condition (Ms= .05, .02).  
Consequently as per Experiments 1, 2, and 4, once again no substantive 
differences were found whether I used the proportion or total number of 
counterfactual responses generated: in both cases evidence was found for a 
marginal counterfactual action effect. Given that, and following the procedures used 
in previous experiments, the total numbers are therefore included in the main body 
text in order to give the reader a clearer overview of overall counterfactual 
prevalence. 
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Appendix 5.1 – Drinks Pilot Test Instructions 
 For the second part of the experiment you will be asked to sample a small 
amount of 8 different types of flavoured water. 
 In between each sample you will be required to drink a small amount of 
mineral water to take away the taste of the previous sample. 
 Please ensure you have enough mineral water left in your glass for this (after 
the chocolate sampling), and pour more if necessary. 
 The drinks samples are displayed on the table in front of you (labelled 
‘SAMPLE 1 – 8’)
 When you have finished reading these instructions please begin the 
experiment by drinking ‘SAMPLE ONE’ and then answering the first set of 
questions on the questionnaire which relate to your enjoyment and taste 
perception of that sample. 
 Once you have finished this first set of questions please drink some mineral 
water to take away the taste of this sample, and then drink ‘SAMPLE TWO’, 
and answer the questions relating to this sample 
 Please continue with this procedure until you have tried all 8 samples. 
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Appendix 5.2 – Chocolate Pilot Test Instructions 
 For the first part of the experiment you will be asked to sample a small 
amount of 8 different types of chocolate. 
 In between each sample you will be required to drink a small amount of 
mineral water to take away the taste of the previous sample. 
 Please pour yourself a glass of mineral water now in preparation for this. 
 The chocolate samples are displayed on the table in front of you (labelled 
‘SAMPLE 1 – 8’)
 When you have finished reading these instructions please begin the 
experiment by eating ‘SAMPLE ONE’ and then answering the first set of 
questions on the questionnaire which relate to your enjoyment and taste 
perception of that sample. 
 Once you have finished this first set of questions please drink some mineral 
water to take away the taste of this sample, and then eat ‘SAMPLE TWO’, 
and answer the questions relating to this sample 
 Please continue with this procedure until you have eaten all 8 samples. 
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Appendix 5.3 – Drinks Pilot Test Questionnaire 
On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate your 
responses to the following questions and statements, by circling the corresponding 
number.    
SAMPLE ONE 
1. I enjoyed the drink I just sampled
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree         
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
2. If I had to give the drink I just tasted a score from 1 – 10 with 1 being really 
unpleasant, and 10 being totally delicious I would give it a score of: 
Really Unpleasant                                                                                Totally delicious          
1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8             9         10 
3. The drink I sampled was tasty   
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
4. Do you regret drinking the drink you just sampled? 
Not at all                                                                                                     Very much 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
5. To what extent were you familiar with the flavour of the drink you just 
tasted?   
Not at all familiar                                                                                        Very familiar 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
6. If you were familiar with the flavour of the drink you just tasted, which 
flavour/brand, if any, did it remind you of?(If none please put ‘none’).
“It reminded me of: __________________________________________”
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Appendix 5.4 – Experiment 8 – Selection of Drinks used in Extensive Choice 
Condition 
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Appendix 5.5 – Experiment 8 – Selection of Re-Moulded Chocolates used in 
Extensive Choice Condition 
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Appendix 5.6 – Experiment 8 Brief 
 This experiment is designed to investigate the degree to which different tastes 
and flavour preferences are influenced by individual differences, and visual 
cues.  
 You will be required to complete two taste tests, one with flavoured waters 
and one with chocolates.  
 When you have finished reading this brief, please read ‘Instruction Sheet 
One’, which will guide you through the first taste test. 
 After completing this taste test please answer ‘Questionnaire One’, which will 
relate to your taste experiences. 
___________________________________________________ 
 After this you will be required to complete the second taste test. Please refer 
to ‘Instruction Sheet Two’ for this, and then answer ‘Questionnaire Two’ when 
the taste test is complete.  
 You have the right to withdraw from the experiment now, or at any time later 
in the experiment, should you wish to do so.
 All data given will remain anonymous and confidential at all times.
 Do you have any questions?
 Are you happy to continue?
 If so please begin by reading the ‘Instruction Sheet One’ on the table in front 
of you to start the first taste test. 
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Appendix 5.7 – Experiment 8 Experimental Set-Up 
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Appendix 5.8 – Drinks Taste Test Instructions 
 This experiment is designed to investigate individual differences in taste 
perception.  
 On the table in front of you is a selection of 24(extensive choice conditions 
only) / 6(limited choice conditions only) different flavoured waters.  
 The waters displayed in front of you are 24 different flavours including: orange 
and mango, tropical fruits, blackcurrant, cherry, banana, white grape and 
pear, aniseed, plum, apple and raspberry, orange, blueberry, elderflower, red 
grape and lime, pomegranate, lemon and lime, summer fruits, peach, 
peppermint, raspberry, apple and pear, cranberry, blackberry and apple, 
strawberry and passion-fruit (extensive choice conditions only). 
 / The waters displayed in front of you are 6 different flavours including: orange 
and mango, blackcurrant, banana, lemon and lime, peppermint, and apple 
and pear (limited choice conditions only).    
 Please now look at the selection carefully, and decide which one of the waters 
you most like the look of, and subsequently would most like to sample.  
 When you have made your selection please pour a small amount of that 
sample into one of the plastic cups provided, and then drink it. 
 Please take your time to fully reflect upon your taste perceptions of the 
sample as you drink it. 
 Once you have drank the sample please then answer the questionnaire 
provided. Please answer all questions as honestly as possible, and take extra 
sips of your selected sample if needed to refresh your memory of the taste 
whilst answering the questionnaire.   
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Appendix 5.9 – Chocolate Taste Test Instructions 
 On the table in front of you is a selection of 24 (extensive choice conditions 
only) different brands of milk (positive valence condition only) / dark(negative 
valence condition only) chocolate. The brands of chocolate used in this 
selection include: Asda own brand, Lindt, Nestlé, Morrisons own brand, Milka, 
Lidl own brand, Lake Champlain Chocolates, Tesco Finest, Green and 
Black’s, Kraft, Meiji, Marks and Spencer own brand, Pearson’s Candy Co., 
Godiva, Tesco value brand, Jacob’s, Aldi own brand, Sainsbury’s own brand, 
Mauxion Schokoladefabrik, Thornton’s, Hotel Chocolate, IKEA own brand, 
Nicky Grant Cornish Patissiere, Co-op own brand. 
 On the table in front of you is a selection of 6 (limited choice conditions only)
different brands of milk (positive valence condition only) / dark (negative 
valence condition only) chocolate. The brands of chocolate used in this 
selection include: Lidl own brand, Thornton’s, Sainsbury’s own brand, Green 
and Black’s, Marks and Spencer’s own brand, and Nicky Grant Cornish 
Patissieré.     
 Research has shown that a products brand identity can have a dramatic 
impact upon subsequent perception of taste.  
 As such for this taste test all information relating to brand has been 
completely removed, and all 24 / 6 different brand types have been melted 
down and re-moulded into one of three shapes using plastic chocolate 
moulds. 
 Consequently it can be guaranteed that perception of taste is due to taste 
alone, and is not influenced by any pre-conceived ideas about brand, quality, 
product price etc. 
 Please now look at the selection of chocolates in front of you and decide 
which one of the chocolates you most like the look of, and subsequently 
would most like to sample.  
 When you have made your selection please eat that chocolate (saving a little 
in case you need to refresh your memory of the taste whilst answering the 
questionnaire). 
 Please take your time to fully reflect upon your taste perceptions of the 
sample as you eat it. 
 Once you have eaten the sample please then answer the questionnaire 
provided. Please answer all questions as honestly as possible, and take an 
extra bite of the chocolate you saved, if needed, in order to refresh your 
memory of the taste whilst answering the questionnaire.   
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Appendix 5.10 – Experiment 8 Questionnaire 
 On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) please indicate your 
responses to the following questions and statements, by circling the 
corresponding number.    
 Please then use the spaces provided underneath to explain at least two 
reasons why you responded in that particular way – i.e. the reasons why 
you agreed or disagreed with each preceding statement. 
Q1.The drink/chocolate I tasted had an unusual flavour
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree         
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
Q2. I regret choosing the drink / chocolate I selected 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
Q3. I am happy that I made the right choice from the selection available 
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
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Any other reason: 
Q4. I was NOT satisfied with the drink/chocolate I sampled  
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
Q5. The drink/chocolate I sampled was tasty   
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason: 
Q6. I believe my choice of drink / chocolate PREVENTED ME from having an 
enjoyable taste experience during the experiment  
Strongly Disagree                                                                                  Strongly Agree 
 1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
Reasons for my response:   
Reason One: 
Reason Two: 
Any other reason:
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Appendix 5.11 – Experiment 8 Debrief 
Participant Number: 
The experiment is now over, thank-you for participating. 
The experiment was investigating the excess-choice-effect (ECE), wherein conflicting evidence has 
been found for and against the notion that increased choice can lead to decreased satisfaction with 
the chosen option (e.g. Iyengar & Lepper, 2000;Shar and Wolford, 2007; Scheibehenne, 
Greifeneder& Todd, 2010).  
The current experiment was designed to further this research by testing the hypothesis that the ECE 
may be more prevalent when the outcome of that choice is a relatively bad or unpleasant one. In 
cases where the outcome is pleasant or enjoyable it is predicted that the effects of excess choice in 
causing decreased satisfaction will be reduced/ will no longer be apparent.  
For this study you took part in two taste tests, a chocolate taste test and a drinks taste test. In both 
cases you were either presented with a limited selection of 6 options, or an extensive selection of 24 
options. Further to this, all of the outcomes you were presented with were either deemed as above or 
below average enjoyment levels (determined through previous pilot testing). So it was pre-determined 
that you would either get a relatively good or a relatively bad outcome from the selection, regardless 
of your choice.  
It was predicted that those participants in the relatively bad outcome conditions would be less 
satisfied with their choices if presented with an extensive, rather than a limited, number of options, 
providing support for the ECE. Whereas for those participants in the relatively good outcome 
conditions, it was predicted that choice level would have a reduced impact upon satisfaction levels. 
I would like to remind you that all data has been kept completely anonymous and confidential 
throughout the experiment, and will be referred to in any future analysis by means of your participant 
number. You maintain the right to withdraw your data at any point after this experiment. Should you 
wish to do so please email me with your participant number which is at the top of this page. 
Thank-you for taking the time to participate in my experiment. If you have any further questions or 
concerns about your participation in the study please do not hesitate to contact me or Mat on one of 
the following: 
rebecca.hafner@plymouth.ac.uk
mat.white@plymouth.ac.uk
I would appreciate it if you would not discuss the background information relating to this study or its 
predictions with anyone, as this may affect data collection later on.  
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Appendix 5.12 – Experiment 8 Counterfactual Analysis using Proportions of 
Counterfactual Responses Generated 
The counterfactual analyses were also run using the proportion of 
counterfactual responses generated, and results were found to parallel earlier 
analysis using the total numbers counterfactuals. Specifically, t-tests revealed that 
the valence manipulation was also successful: participants were found to generate a 
greater proportion of counterfactual thoughts following negative than positive 
outcomes (Ms= .26 vs. .15, t(94) = 2.48, p =.02). Supporting this, a 2 (valence: 
positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of valence on the proportion of counterfactual responses 
generated: F(1,92) = 6.47, p =.01, η² = .07. No main effect of choice level was found: 
F(1,92) = 1.07, p =.30, η² = .01, however, a significant interaction was found between 
valence and choice level: F(1,92) = 4.04, p =.05, η² = .04. 
 A simple main effects analysis was then conducted to follow up the interaction 
in order to examine specific predictions that participants would generate more 
counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice only where outcomes were 
negative. Results were found to provide support for this prediction. Specifically, 
where outcomes were negative participants were found to generate more 
counterfactuals under extensive than limited choice: Ms = .32, .19;F(1,92) = 4.54, p = 
.04, η² = .05. Where outcomes were positive, this effect of choice level was not 
significant: F(1,92) = .49, p = .49, η² = .005, with similar proportions of counterfactual 
responses being generated following extensive and limited choice (Ms= .13, .17 
respectively). 
In all, for this experiment the results were found to be even more pronounced 
using the proportions of counterfactuals generated, as opposed to the total numbers 
of counterfactuals generated. However, the total numbers are reported in the main 
text in order to maintain consistency with the procedure used in previous chapters, 
and in order to provide the reader with a clearer indication of overall counterfactual 
prevalence.  
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Appendix 5.13 – Experiment 8 Analysis of Chocolate Task Data 
Satisfaction Analyses 
A 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) ANOVA 
revealed no main effect of valence (F(1,92) = 2.44, p =.20, η² = .03), or choice level 
(F(1,92) = .01, p =.92, η² <.001) upon satisfaction. In addition, there was no 
interaction between valence and choice level: F(1,92) = .01, p =.92, η² <.001. 
Satisfaction was found to be similar in the positive and negative (Ms= 5.44, 5.00), 
extensive and limited (Ms = 5.21, 5.24) choice conditions. 
Counterfactual Analyses 
A 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) X 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) ANOVA 
revealed no effect of valence (F(1,92) = 1.91, p =.17, η² = .02), or choice level 
(F(1,92) = .21, p =.65, η² =.002) on the total number of counterfactuals generated. In 
addition, no interaction was found between valence and choice level: F(1,92) = .38, p 
=.54, η² = .004, with similar proportions of counterfactuals generated in the positive 
and negative (Ms =.24, .14), extensive and limited (Ms = .20, .18) choice conditions, 
providing support for earlier satisfaction analyses. 
In all, as reported in the main text (Section 5.8.1) the manipulation of valence was 
not found to work for the chocolates task. Therefore, as both the ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ outcome conditions were both perceived as being relatively positive (in 
comparison to the pilot test data using the same chocolates, and in comparison to 
the drinks task ‘negative’ outcome condition), one would not necessarily expect to 
have found any further effects of choice level, as based on the findings of the 
previous chapters, we have seen that a negative task outcome may be a key factor 
contributing to the prevalence of the ECE. Consequently these results appear to be 
consistent with the finding that any outcome perceived in a positive manner may be 
less likely to lead to any experience of an ECE. However as the main aim of this task 
was to provide a contrast between a negative with a positive outcome condition in 
order to establish whether this was the case, and as the manipulation of valence was 
unsuccessful in this instance, the data from this task are subsequently excluded from 
main analyses in order to focus upon the drinks task, where the manipulation of 
valence was found to work as intended.  
